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Dr. Larry Sternstein Good Memories 
Dr. Lawrence Sternstein, 'Larry' to everybody, was of Romanian descent born 
in the United States of America. His childhood in New York made him a tough man. He 
held scholarships throughout his education career. He was interested in Thailand and his 
Ph.D. thesis in 1965 was 'Settlement in Thailand: Patterns of Development'. He wrote, 
read and spoke Thai and understood Thai culture well. That was a reason why he wrote 
many articles and books about Thailand. On completion of his doctoral studies, the 
several organisations with which he was affiliated provided him with funds to carry out 
a number of research projects. 
Dr. Lawrence Sternstein was my first supervisor. The first time I met him was in 
June 1994 when I was looking for a supervisor at the Australian National University. A 
closer relationship developed when I started the Ph.D. programme with him in April 
1995. We enjoyed talking about every problem in Thailand. He told me many amazing 
stories about his experiences in dealing with conupt people in Thailand. He taught me 
when and how to get tough and wished me to be a good planner. Unfortunately, I did 
not have the chance to learn everything from him that I could have. 
Dr. Lawrence Sternstein suffered and stayed in bed for months . He died of 
cancer at the age of 63 on 24 May 1997 at Canberra Hospital. Nobody was invited for 
the cremation ceremony according to his last wish. Despite only two years working with 
Dr. Lawrence Stemstein, it seems to me to be a very long time and I can remember 
everything about him. His name and his smiling face with an o ld pipe in his mouth will 
be in my mind fore ver. 
The last student of Stemstcin 
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Introduction 
The Cabinet's approval of the development of the Second Bangkok International Airport at 
Nong Ngu Hao on 7 May 1991 was minor news in Thailand. The 97,000 million baht 
airport project progressed so gradually, and not at all, that only some 5,000 million baht 
had been spent by early 1997. The project became big news when General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh, the Prime Minister, first raised objections to the project on 19 January 1997 
during talks with the provincial chambers of commerce from all over the country in Trang, 
a province in the south of Thailand. His statement affected the project soon after. On 1 
February 1997, the Bangkok Post, a local English newspaper, highlighted this news as a hot 
issue: 
City 's second airport destined to never get off the ground. Bangkok's 
citizenry have grown old waiting for the city's second airport at Nong Ngu 
Hao. Many of those now involved with it were likely in short pants when the 
project was first mooted. The reason General Chavalit gave for shelving 
Nong Ngu Hao was that the first phase would not be ready by 2000. 
Thailand is also burdened with a severe current account deficit [Bangkok 
Post, 1 February 1997, p8J. 
However, the reason for the Prime Minister backing way from the project seems to 
be conflicts of interest, with the allegation that the coalition government had benefited from 
the project. Meanwhile, another old development activity became less important news. On 
24 February 1997, an article on 'Planning Bangkok's. Future' was published in the Bangkok 
Post. Its highlight was 
Believe it or not, but the vast, chaotic urban metropolis that is Bangkok has 
operated under a centralised urban development plan for the past five years. 
The first attempts at urban planning in Bangkok date back to 1958, but 
authorities then rejected the idea as unworkable. Not until 1992 was a master 
plan actually implemented [Bangkok Post, 24 February 1997, p 12]. 
People had different views on the two planning projects. What people were 
interested in most was the corruption allegation over the Second Bangkok International 
Introduction 
Airport project, one of the longest planning projects in Thai history second only to the Kra 
' 
Canal project initiated in the late nineteenth century. A number of substantial articles about 
the airport project were published through the month. In contrast, the Bangkok city 
planning project did not interest the public much. Did people know that the two activities 
had a long relationship, since the 1960s? 
As a professional planner and resident of Bangkok, I have followed these projects 
for years. I noticed a number of unusual things. The government's many unclear 
explanations about development decisions seemed to indicate a dark side of the two 
projects that has never been studied seriously before. My investigation started here. I was 
curious to study what really happened to the two planning projects and what they were all 
about. 
Given my background and my current career working for the Department of Town 
and Country Planning1, this provided a very good opportunity to study the weaknesses of 
city planning in Thailand. I have a strong belief that a good city plan, made at an early 
stage, can solve urban problems. Although, a number of city plans have been made and 
enforced by law in Thailand but none of these has solved urban problems . A question is 
what is going wrong with the current application of planning practice. 
To my knowledge, no study on the problems of planning practice m Thailand, 
viewed as a whole system, has yet been conducted. Moreover, some practical problems 
between the administrative system, legal system and planning system are overlooked. There 
is occasional discussion on the failures of city planning in huge projects in the big cities 
such as Bangkok [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 117-135]. This is a reason why Bangkok, in 
association with the Second Bangkok International Airport, is a very good case for this 
thesis. 
To foster interest in the serious consequences of failures in planning practice, I have 
selected the chronic problem of flooding in and around Bangkok for particular attention. A 
comprehensive analysis of flood conditions is made to understand the changing patterns of 
flooding. Studies of flood protection date back to 1903, early times in the development of 
modem responses to flood protection needs. One of my tasks is to evaluate the likely 
1 Department of Town and Country Planning is a national department under the Ministry of Interior, and is 
responsible for city planning throughout the whole country. Its main task is to control the land use and 
development of towns and cities following the Town and Country Planning Act 1975. 
2 
Introduction 
impact of the Second Bangkok International Airport (SBIA) on flooding and present flood 
' 
protection systems. 
Where a bureaucratic system cannot solve such problems effectively, one could be 
optimistic and argue that politics is supposed to fill this gap by introducing good policies 
and providing quick solutions. Thailand is not like this2 because the politicians put 
individual interest first and public interest last. Consequently, every major project in 
Thailand is affected by narrow political influence. The strange thing is that public interest 
does not react. Moreover, the nature of Thai politics, with constant power struggles among 
a number of parties and their factions, exacerbates the problems and puts solutions out of 
reach. 
However, the implications of the politics of planning can be understood from 
theoretical perspectives. I discuss my findings in terms of theories of planning, theories of 
urban politics and the idea of environmental integrating impact assessment into the 
planning process. I expect this thesis to stimulate the authorities involved in planning and 
development to_ realise the seriousness of planning problems in Thailand. Ultimately, I hope 
for great improvement in the planning system through more effective planning practice in 
Thailand. 
Background 
During the study period, politics in Thailand changed. The nation stepped from a 
military dictatorship to democratic government. Changes happened through social 
upheaval. 
The 1960s, under the dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, was a turning 
point in Thai planning: American consultants introduced modem planning. Two planning 
projects emerged together in 1960, the first modem master plan of Bangkok and the Second 
Bangkok International Airport Project were proposed. It had been understood that the first 
master plan of Bangkok recommended the separation of civil and commercial aviation out 
of the military base at Don Muang, and the military government used this point to develop 
the new Bangkok airport proposal. 
2 Thailand 's parties are not real political parties but political cliques or political factions [Tongdhammachart, 
1982 #I 14, 39) . 
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Sarit's regime was more centralised than any other in Thai history. He demanded 
that his needs, which included the ~ew airport, be met immediately and without question. 
Site selection for the new airport was achieved simply by identifying a site named Nong 
Ngu Hao in the east of Bangkok, and the government started purchasing the land instantly. 
After his death in 1963, the master plan of Bangkok was ignored but the power elite 
strongly supported the development of the new airport. The two planning activities 
influenced many other projects through the following decades. In the 1970s and 1980s a 
number of study reports and master plans were produced to solve problems in Bangkok; 
however, none was successfully implemented. 
The two planning projects have much in common. Both started and stopped many 
times even though the benefits of airport development and the need for a Bangkok master 
plan have been on the national agenda for years. The politics of planning of the two 
projects are complex and controversial, reflecting the power struggles of Thai politics. 
Apart from describing their supposed economic benefits, governments during the 
past four decades did not tell the people much about the development of the Second 
Bangkok International Airport or the intent of the Bangkok Plan. The information in the 
report prepared by the foreign experts distributed and circulated between the government 
departments was mostly in English. It may help explain why people of Bangkok took little 
interest in the plans. The government neglects the fact that the SBIA is being built on a 
swamp blocking the natural floodways. This increases the likelihood of flooding and limits 
the effectiveness flood protection for the east of Bangkok and the city core. Despite this 
critical problem, the project continued. 
The first master plan of Bangkok enforced by law in 1992 did not influence the city 
because the implementation of the plan was weak. This is in contrast to the new airport. A 
number of infrastructure development projects have conglomerated in the east of Bangkok, 
moreover, some reports including the master plan of the Second Bangkok International 
Airport were made hurriedly to guide development in Bangkok and around the airport site. 
Environment impacts were studied superficially but many important issues were not 
included. By using these reports, some concerned authorities are putting pressure on the 
making of land use plans of Bangkok and nearby areas to allow more commercial 
developments around the new airport. This degree of interest suggests that some people 
stand to benefit a great deal from the airport going ahead. 
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Nobody can deny that Bang~ok's geography in the 1990s has changed greatly since 
1960. The city has extended in every direction, with a number of problems. The site of the 
Second Bangkok International Airport has become a part of Bangkok surrounded by 
houses, schools, universities and factories; however, the government has not considered 
these changes. 
Moreover, two existing large airbases developed by the Americans during the 
Vietnam War, Kampaengsan in Nakhon Pathom and U-Tapao in Rayong have been studied 
and proposed for expansion as the new Bangkok airport. Both airbases were alternatives for 
the governments of the 1970s and 1980s when the decision on the Nong Ngu Hao site 
became uncertain. Facilities were provided at U-Tapao airport, which has become an 
international airport since 1990. However, U-Tapao airport currently serves less than 10 per 
cent of its capacity and its potential of being the second Bangkok international airport is 
ignored. 
It is a fact that the upgrade of an existing airport is more economical than building a 
new one. Furthermore it is particularly costly to develop a new airport on swamp. Despite 
all the shortcomings, the authorities concerned appear convinced that it is necessary to 
develop a Second Bangkok International Airport and insist that Nong Ngu Hao is the most 
suitable site. There must be some important reasons why the governments in the 1990s 
retain this policy of spending 120 billion baht or 3 billion US$ to develop the new Bangkok 
airport on swamp. 
Aim of this Thesis 
In the 1960s it was not possible to study the two planning projects because debate 
and discussion about the military government's projects was not allowed. Politics in 
Thailand have changed. The 1990s is a decade of more accountability and transparency, 
with more democracy. The public can follow the government's work more closely. The 
Second Bangkok International Airport is now one of many projects attracting public 
discussion about corruption and other shortcomings; however, little serious study has been 
attempted on the development of the Second Bangkok International Airport under current 
conditions. 
s 
Introduction 
Almost four decades of delaying the two projects suggests that there have always 
' 
been political concerns, indicating a comprehensive study should be undertaken. It is quite 
evident that the making of the Bangkok plan and the development of the Second Bangkok 
International Airport are related, and that political interests form part of this relationship. 
My study of the two projects is intended to demonstrate hidden dimensions of the politics 
of planning in Thailand. Hence, the purpose of my thesis is to find out the truth about what 
really happened to the two projects during the past four decades, how they react and what 
are their implications for planning practice in Thailand. 
Subsidiary research questions are: 
• Has the existing Bangkok International Airport at Don Muang really reached its 
ultimate capacity so that it can no longer be expanded? If it has, what are the 
constraints for expansion? 
• Since Bangkok in the 1990s has six times the population it had in the 1960s, is 
the site at Nong Ngu Hao still the most suitable for the Second Bangkok 
International Airport? 
To reflect on: 
• How do Thai politics relate to the conduct of planning: using Bangkok and the 
new airport as case study? 
• How does the nature of the administrative and legal systems contribute to the 
interface between politics and planning? 
• How effective can planning be in such a dynamic political context? 
Methodology 
My methodology used a combination of documents and fieldwork, with focus on 
critical analysis of historical and contemporary papers, reports, maps and press coverage. 
The process started with fieldwork in Bangkok for six months from March to 
September 1996. That included personal interviews with 18 people who were involved with 
the two projects: politicians, military officers, senior bureaucrats, developers, policy 
makers, landlords and scholars. The most revealing informant was a contractor who lost the 
bidding for an airport contract. 
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Unfortunately, I did not have the chance to discuss the projects with some of key 
' 
actors involved, due to this being the election campaign period for the new BMA Governor 
in June 1996. Some bureaucrats explained that they were not willing to give me 
information at that time. Despite the fact that a senior bureaucrat of the BMA, and a senior 
colleague at the DTCP had collected a great deal of useful information in their computers, I 
was allowed only to have a glance on their computer screens. Moreover, some informants 
avoided answering my questions and tried to mislead the objectives of my study. 
I was helped in these interviews by my wide range of personal and professional 
contacts. Knowing the political sensitivities of my subject matter, I have made a close 
critical analysis of the interview records, comparing them with one another and 
documentary sources, and looking for what was omitted as well as what was said. 
Some research materials used in this thesis are from Dr. Larry Stemstein's 
collection in Canberra. After his death in May 1997, I was able to study a number of rare 
materials, some of which I had been unable to find in Thailand. That includes the original 
reports of Bangkok city planning and the new airport project prepared in the 1950s through 
the 1970s. I found that some reports are different from the versions in Thailand. For 
instance, the Litchfield Plan from Sternstein's collection is a series of monographs but a 
single bound version is in Thailand. It is not clear how many versions of this plan were 
made in 1959 and 1960. Some parts of the two planning projects remain a mystery. 
I also had personal access to some confidential information, including some primary 
data that was somewhat different to that shown in the government's reports. This supports 
my argument that some authorities concerned have tried to cover up facts and suppress data 
about the airport project. Compared with other materials gathered from Thailand, some 
materials from Stemstein's collection made more sense. However, the comprehensive 
analysis in this thesis is made carefully, based on the best available materials in each 
country. 
Ultimately, my methodology requires integrative analysis drawing on both human 
and biophysical aspects of geography, planning and environmental assessment. While the 
focus is on politics, the administrative system is examined as a compounding feature. 
Theoretical analysis is important for this thesis. Planning theory, urban politics theory and 
the concept of integrating impact assessment into the planning process are discussed 
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towards the end of this thesis, in order to explain the interactions between urban and airport 
' 
planning described in the preceding chapters. 
Sequence of the Thesis 
My study is a narrative tracing Bangkok's development from the relocation of the 
capital in the eighteenth century through to the origins and development of planning for 
Bangkok and the SBIA. 
The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) deals with the planning and administration of 
Bangkok from the reign of King Taksin, late in the eighteenth century, to the first stages of 
development of aviation early in the twentieth century. In this the planning and politics of 
King Rama I (1782-1806) are studied, focusing on his reasons for relocating the capital 
city. The environment of Bangkok in the late eighteenth century is discussed to give a 
picture of old Bangkok. Changes in the urban geography of Bangkok in the reign of King 
Chulalongkom (Rama V, 1868-1910) are studied showing the influences of modem 
civilisation. The development of aviation explains how Don Muang became Bangkok's 
airport. 
The second part (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) studies the problems of the political, legal, 
administrative and planning systems in the context of the development of Bangkok and the 
SBIA. Politics in Thailand after the revolution in 1932 are discussed to show how the 
military government influenced the urban structure of Bangkok. The dictatorship regime 
and regional conflict in the 1950s are studied to show how the development of the transport 
system in Thailand was important during the Vietnam War and how these political events 
influenced airport development in the 1960s. I analyse why the dictator, Sarit, wanted the 
new airport. 
I proceed to a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the first modern 
master plan of Bangkok and the new Bangkok airport in 1960. Development of the two 
projects in the 1970s and 1980s is studied, emphasising how and why the SB IA project 
survived without actually being constructed for decades. 
Re vi val of the two projects in the 1990s is discussed in the context of the different 
atti tudes of government in 1991. 
8 
Introduction 
A policy analysis of Bangk~k metropolitan region and air transport development is 
made, highlighting the government's policies and their consequences. Meanwhile, an 
overview of the current situation is given to reconsider the issue of putting the new airport 
on a swamp at Nong Ngu Hao. Most importantly, the existing Bangkok International 
Airport at Don Muang is studied to investigate whether it has already reached its ultimate 
capacity and what are the actual constraints on expansion. Moreover, U-Tapao International 
Airport in Rayong and other airbases around Bangkok are discussed in terms of their 
feasibility for the development of a new Bangkok airport. This evaluates whether the SBIA 
at Nong Ngu Hao is really necessary. 
I analyse the interactions between the making of the Bangkok plan and the new 
airport plan. The politics of making the Bangkok master plan in 1998 are discussed, using 
The Bangkok Plan submitted by the planning team of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) in October l 995 as a detailed case study. I emphasise planning concepts 
and the development recommendations associated with the new Bangkok airport 
development. The master plan of the SBIA (August 1994) and other related studies are 
reviewed in detail. 
The third and last part (Chapters 7 and 8) evaluates the consequences and impacts of 
the decisions made about the development of the two projects within the political, legal, 
administrative and planning systems. The study of flood protection shows how much 
politics influences the development of the SBIA and Bangkok city planning. Chapter 8 
discusses , within the theoretical frameworks of politics, planning and environmental 
concerns, the outcomes of planning and development, taking into account the political , 
legal and administrative systems. A brief and concise conclusion integrates the key findings 
to present an understanding of the present situation. 
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Part I Planning History; Bangkok and Its Airport 
Bangkok is a primate city, probably the most primate city in the world. The population of 
Bangkok is currently thirty-fold more than the second most populous city of Thailand, as a 
consequence of being the centre of administration, transportation, trade, finance, education 
and services for decades, causing a number of problems. Many attempts have been made 
and a lot of money has been spent but most Thai governments have failed to resolve the 
collective problems of Bangkok due to their complexity and a lack of understanding. One 
way to understand the complex problems of Bangkok is to learn its history. The 
development of Bangkok through the past centuries has been concerned with changes in the 
balance of political power. New urban elements such as the airport and city plan did not 
serve their function in meeting the needs of the city but they did serve the needs and 
aspirations of the power elite1. 
For centuries, city development and planning in the Thai kingdom has been 
military-oriented rather than trade and commercially-oriented. From the period of absolute 
monarchy to the military dictatorship regime and the struggle for democracy in the 1990s, 
the power elite was concerned with the development of Bangkok, the centre of power. 
Despite radical changes in Thai politics, this priority has not changed much in the view of 
the ruling class. This is one of many reasons why the urban primacy of Bangkok remains 
unsolved. An analysis of planning history in this part will present my argument. 
Part I briefly discusses the historical background of Bangkok and Bangkok's 
airports in a planning context. However, it has been argued among scholars for years that 
the power elite has written Thai history and therefore some facts are biased and cannot be 
used for analysis. This argument is reasonable in my view and is recognised in this thesis. 
Despite this, it is possible to study Bangkok by making an historical analysis of city 
planning and development. Settlement patterns and the development of urban form and 
structure through time can be explained in terms of planning which has been influenced 
heavily by politics in association with social, economic and technological changes. 
1 The Thai power elite is an intermarried set of people with hereditary status, political, fi nancial and 
bureaucratic power. 
Part I provides a basic unde~standing of how Bangkok became the capital city and a 
comprehensive analysis of how the planning of Bangkok and Bangkok's airports became 
political concerns. In this part we can distinguish two general periods in the history of 
Bangkok, before and after the turning point of Thai planning and the birth of the Second 
Bangkok International Airport (SBIA) in 1960. Chapter 1 presents a development overview 
of Bangkok, Thai aviation development and planning from the early period of settlement in 
1563 to 1960. Chapter 2 discusses how the SBIA project and the making of the Bangkok 
plan were introduced and why the two projects made no real progress for three decades 
from 1961 to 1991. 
In my view, Bangkok and its complex urban problems can be understood in terms 
of political interaction between three systems, the administrative system, the legal system 
and the planning system. As a core of this thesis, the analysis concentrates on these three 
systems which the power elite has used to control the development of Bangkok. The same 
approach of historical analysis will be applied in Part II as well. 
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Chapter 1: The Development of Bangkok, Its Airport and 
Planning 
Bangkok celebrated the Bicentennial Anniversary of its foundation in April 1982. In the 
view of urban historians, Bangkok is quite a new city compared with other ancient 
towns in the world, many of which are more than than 2,000 years old. However most 
Thai people view Bangkok as an old city because they compare the age of everything 
with their own life spans. In fact, in studying the age of a town, one should not compare 
the age of town with human life but with other older towns. 
Despite their different geography and different chronicles, the urban history of 
Bangkok and other older towns have something in common. The ancient planning of 
these towns followed a similar pattern of imposing human order on the natural 
environment to achieve both social and political purposes [Stout, 1996 #82, 333] , as did 
Bangkok. This crucial fact is overlooked in Thai society. People understand history only 
from what they learned in class and what is written in Thai history. An historical review 
is not their concern and is far from their interest. This may explain why people have a 
general knowledge about Bangkok but know very little, probably nothing, about its 
planning history. 
A number of problems in Bangkok are the consequences of the lack of planning. 
This short statement is usually mentioned when the authorities involved have 
run out of ideas to solve the problems of Bangkok'. People seem to understand that 
Bangkok has never been planned. So, it is expected that planning can solve or make the 
problems less critical. In fact, plans have been made since Bangkok was a small fortress 
in the 17th century. Even with a perfect plan, however, one would have to admit that the 
context of planning by itself cannot solve every problem. In fact, success depends on 
the ability to use the plan as well. 
In this chapter, therefore, it is interesting to study Bangkok city planning and the 
development of Bangkok based on the interaction of three systems: the administrative 
system, the legal system and the planning system. This chapter briefly describes the 
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early periods of Bangkok to give a better understanding of how the city was developed. 
The discussion focuses on some political events affecting the planning context. The 
emphasis is on the turning point d~ring the period that changed Bangkok from the 'City 
of Angels' to the 'Bedeviled City'2. 
From the early period of Bangkok as a citadel to the glorious period as the 'City 
of Angels', the administrative, legal and planning systems were integrated and applied 
by the king who had absolute power. Consequently, planning processes and decision-
making by the king were by means of 'just in time' solutions. Despite great changes in 
governance during the reign of King Rama V ( 1868-1910), the integration of the three 
systems remained practicable under the new administrative structure and the new legal 
system. King Rama V recruited his sons as the heads of the new administration. The 
relationship between father and sons may be the main reason why the new systems 
worked. The political reform3 in 1932, on the contrary, separated the integrated systems 
into a number of component parts that were controlled separately by different factions 
in the government. This caused confusion and numerous problems in Bangkok. 
However, the three systems became integrated again under dictatorship from 1959 to 
1963. The consequences of the fragmentation of the three systems are discussed in the 
following sections based on historical analysis. 
The main argument in this chapter is that absolute power, in the terms of 
'command and control', was crucial to the ruler as a key factor in planning and 
developing the city. Hence, the problems of Bangkok city planning can be understood in 
terms of the use of power over the administrative, legal and planning systems. Despite 
the different models of governance, in my view, politics in Thailand cannot and will not 
allow a reasonable balance of power to plan Bangkok as an expression of the public 
interest. As a result of the slow process of democratic development, politics in Thailand 
became pluralist with a number of factions, resulting in shortcomings in managing 
changes to the built environment of Bangkok. The struggle for power among factions 
has influenced Bangkok city planning. Even though there have been some 
developments in Thai politics as a result of the new constitution of 1997, the political 
struggles remain and continue under the new form of governance. 
1 This statement was recently repeated by Kamroplak Surasawadi, Director-General of the Office of the 
Commission for the Management of Road Traffic in the Bangkok Post, the local newspaper on 15 March 
1997 that ' a lack of town planning causes traffic problems'. 
2 Sternstein expressed this view of Bangkok in his article Exorcising the Bedeviled City of Angels ' in 
'Porcrait of Bangkok in 1982. However, arguments on the English meaning of Bangkok are extensive due 
to its long official name. 
3 The absolute monarchy ended on 24 June 1932 starting the era of democracy in Thailand. 
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1.1 The Planning of Bangkok 
The main theme in this section is the rationale behind planning in Bangkok, 
focusing on three periods of development: the early settlements from 1563 to 1782; the 
new capital of Siam from 1782 to 1932; and the period of violent political struggle from 
1932 to 1960. 
These three periods can be distinguished in terms of the administration, the legal 
control and the planning strategy that influenced the development of planning in 
Bangkok. In the first period prior to becoming the national capital, Bangkok was one of 
the most important citadels planned and controlled by the French. During the second 
period, from the reign of King Rama I (1782-1809) to the reign of King Rama VII 
(1925-1934 ), it became a stronghold, totally created and developed by the kings. The 
third period started from the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932 until 1960 when the 
development of Bangkok became a political concern of the military government. 
The principal concern in this section is to reconsider the planning effort initiated 
by the rulers under different circumstances and under different forms of governance. 
More importantly, my attempt is to study how the planning process worked in each 
period and what actually turned Bangkok from the 'City of Angels' into the 'Bedeviled 
City'. 
1.1.1 A Citadel, 1563 to 1782 
Bangkok was one of several small fortress-towns established during the reign of 
King Prajai (1534-1546) along the river to guard the waterways leading from the Chao 
Phraya across the delta south of Ayutthaya, the main Thai centre in those days. During 
the reign of King Chakkapat (1549-1565), a town named Muang Thon Buri Si Maha 
Samut was founded on the west bank of the Chao Phraya in 1563 to defend against 
invaders. Bangkok town appeared on the west bank of the Chao Phraya as 'Banckock' 
on a chart of the Chao Phraya river drawn by Joost Schouten, manager of the Dutch 
factory at Ayutthaya in the 1630s. 'Banckock ' was described as the head of the province 
and the most important place down-river from Ayutthaya. 
A fort on the east bank was built first in the 1660s to the design and under the 
supervision of Father Thomas, an Italian member of a French Jesuit missionary group 
which came to Ayutthaya in 1664. Both forts, Thon Buri on the west and Bangkok on 
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the east, were reconstructed by a French engineer in 1675. Steel chains were tensioned 
between the two forts to control access to the river [Sidhithankij, 1995 #49,47]. 
In 1686, a distinguished French naval officer, the Chevalier de Forbin, 
modernised the fortifications at Thon Buri and Bangkok. The two forts appeared in a 
portrait evoking the Battle of Bangkok between the Thai army and the French guards in 
1688 that showed that the east fort at Bangkok was bigger than the west fort. The fort at 
Bangkok was demolished after the battle in that year. About 30 years later, Captain 
Alexander Hamilton described the fort at Bangkok as a regular tetragon. The fortress at 
Thon Buri retained strategic pre-eminence in the area and became the new capital of the 
kingdom during the reign of King Taksin (1767-1782) [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 6-8]. 
It is worth noting that Bangkok has been an important checkpoint for tax 
collection since it was a small fortress town [Sidhithankij, 1995 #49,17]. Every vessel 
had to stop here before sailing upstream to the capital, Ayutthaya. Joost Schouten stated 
in the 1630s that the trade was very good, as reflected by the number of European and 
Asian trading houses in Ayutthaya. The water became shallow a little way above 
Bangkok and big ships were sometimes forced to stay until the annual high tides in 
September, October and November. Only smaller vessels could reach Ayutthaya. 
Besides its military function, Bangkok also became a meeting point for a number of 
vessels and played an important role as a port. 
Apparently both Bangkok and Thon Buri were originally designed and planned 
on the basis of military needs. The strategic significance of the stronghold at Bangkok 
was clearly shown in maps and charts drawn by the Europeans in the late 17th century4 
(see Figure 1.1). However, the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese in 1767 
changed the fate of the kingdom. The compact citadel5 at Thon Buri on the east bank 
was the most strategic position available for Ki~g Taksin who was crowned on 28 
December 1768, and it became the capital of the kingdom for a short time from 1770 to 
1782. 
~ ( 1) Vo lent des Verquains, J. , Historie de la Revolution de Siam Arrivee en l 'Annee J 688 Lille, Glasgow, 
1727. 
5 Nowadays the citadel has become a historical monument known as 'Vichai Prasidh ' of Old Thon Buri 
Palace where the headquarters of the Royal Thai Navy are located. 
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Source: Lo Santo Presente Di Tutti I Paesi E Popoli Del Mondo, Venice, 1738, Vol III 
Figure 1.1 Indo-China by Isac Tirion 
During the reign of King Taksin, there was little development in Thon Buri 
because of many full-scale invasions by the Burmese and the restoration of the 
territorial limits of the kingdom6 . In fact, King Taksin was more interested in offence 
than in defence and spent most of his time in the battlefields. The palace at the citadel of 
Thon Buri seemed to be a temporary residence [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 8]. His small 
6 There were I 0 battles between the Thai and the Burmese from l 767 to 1782. 
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bedroom and few simple belongings preserved at the old palace seem to reflect a 
personality that was content with very little. 
In short, development in this period was concentrated within the citadel and the 
growth of Thon Buri City occurred naturally along the river and the waterways. The 
most interesting issue for discussion is preparations for relocating the capital from Thon 
Buri to Bangkok. According to historical records, it is not clear who actually proposed 
this idea and why the capital was not relocated during this period. The most 
controversial issue among historians is the politics between King Taksin and his ablest 
general, Chao Phya Chakri. 
A close relationship between King Taksin and Chao Phya Chakri had developed 
since the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. However there is no conclusive evidence of how the 
relationship changed afterwards. A coup attempt and a riot occurred in Thon Buri in 
1781 while Chao Phya Chakri was in Cambodia. This was a turning point, after which 
King Taksin became incapable of governing. Chao Phya Chakri returned to Bangkok 
and took power. As a result the dynasty of King Taksin suddenly ended. On 6 April 
1782, Chao Phya Chakri was crowned King Rama Thibodi (he was known as King 
Rama I) and established the new dynasty of Chakri. Thai history does not use the term 
'coup' for this political event. 
On 8 April 1782, King Rama I gave an order to two officers; Phya 
Thanmathikorn and Phya Wichitnavee, to survey and prepare a site on the east bank for 
the new palace [Sidhithankij , 1995 #49, 85). He moved the citadel from the west bank 
to the east bank and founded the new capital of the kingdom on 21 April 1782. The 
need for additional security from the Burmese was viewed as the primary reason for 
relocating the capital. It is interesting to reflect on why King Rama I seems to have 
decided to relocate the capital so soon, only two days after being crowned. As we shall 
see the story is more complicated. 
In Stemstein's view, King Taksin had planned to establish a new citadel on the 
east bank of the Chao Phraya River. The construction, or at least planning for building, 
had been under way for some time before the move by King Rama I [Stemstein, 1982 
#3, 8). In contrast, historian Prince Darnrong Rachanuphap (1862-1943) thought that 
King Rama I, not King Taksin, had proposed the initiative as a general in 1775. 
However, King Taksin did not agree with this idea [Rachanuphap, 1971 #47, 588-589]7. 
7 Prince Damrong Rachanuphap [ l 862-1943] wrote a book Thai Rap Phama which was republished in 
1971. 
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These different views should be considered carefully in the context of political events 
during the reign of King Taksin. 
King Tak.sin was a great warrior who had a magnificent military strategy and so 
was Chao Phya Chakri. His home base was some distance from Ayutthaya along the 
east coast of the Gulf of Thailand, now the provinces of Chon Buri, Rayong and 
Chanthaburi [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 5]. It was understood that King Taksin might abandon 
Thon Buri and move back to his home base if necessary. This argument gives a 
reasonable explanation of the situation during his early period of uncertainty. However, 
his military strategy and policy changed after he gained control of the whole kingdom 
some years later. The home base along the coast seemed to be less important and was 
replaced by other fortress towns in the west and the south of the kingdom. On the one 
hand, Thon Buri and Bangkok had become the commercial centre of the kingdom and 
any plans to relocate the capital had to be considered carefully. Besides military security 
reasons, economic and political affairs seemed to be other crucial factors which 
influenced his decision. 
In terms of political geography, there were several possible reasons for King 
Taksin wanting to relocate his palace and citadels. Firstly, King Tak.sin's army had 
increased from less than 1,000 soldiers in 1767 to more than 30,000 soldiers in 1780 so 
the old citadel was too small for his larger army. Secondly, the growing numbers of 
Chinese, Mons and Laotians who migrated to live in and around Thon Buri required 
more land. Thirdly, the fortifications at Thon Buri were surrounded by numerous 
temples and villages that limited urban expansion. Under these circumstances, the 
rationale for relocating the citadel during the reign of King Taksin seemed reasonable. 
It is interesting to study the way the site was selected in the preparation for 
relocating. Given the political situation at the time·, my argument is that a civil war and 
violent riots in Thon Buri did not allow King Rama I to think about relocating the 
capital. In fact, the possibility of relocating the capital may have occurred some years 
previously. 
The next question was where to move the capital. It has been explained 
repeatedly in Thai history that a site on the west bank of the river was chosen for the 
new palace and citadel [Rachanuphap, 1971 #47, 587-588], but it was already occupied 
by a rich Chinese merchant and a considerable community of Chinese. The Chinese 
were invited to move to an uninhabited area immediately beyond the walls of the new 
citadel [Stemstein, l 982 #3, 8]. My question is why the Chinese had to move 
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immediately. Besides a number of military and geographical reasons8, there have been 
no other explanations for selecting the site. Given the political fragmentation at the 
time, there may have been anbther critical reason for choosing the site. More 
importantly, it is also doubtful who actually asked the Chinese to move out, King 
Taksin or King Rama I. 
Given the pattern of Chinese settlements, the removal of the large community 
would have been hard work in those days, particularly moving to a new bushland site. It 
is worth noting that Chinese in the Thai kingdom were powerful in terms of financial 
and military supporters and had a very good relationship with King Taksin9• On the one 
hand, a vast swamp known as the Sea of Mud stretched to the east of the river and had 
to be drained before construction could begin [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 8]. In addition there 
was pressure from a Burmese invasion which was being planned after news about the 
riot in Thon Buri. Certainly it was a good opportunity for the Burmese to attack the Thai 
kingdom. Given these circumstances, the new capital could not have been completed 
within three years without proper preparations. 
In terms of relocating the Chinese community, m my view there are two 
possibilities that suggest that preparations might have been underway already. Firstly, 
King Taksin may have been negotiating with the Chinese before King Rama I moved 
the capital in 1782. This would mean that King Taksin had his own plan to develop a 
new citadel but not build the new capital because of his personality. Secondly, King 
Rama I may have had a plan to rearrange his political bases after terminating the 
dynasty of King Taksin. In other words, political stability and security for the new 
dynasty may have been, and in fact, probably was the most important factor for King 
Rama I. 
It is quite clear that both King Taksin and King Rarpa I had planned to develop 
the west bank of the river for some time earlier but with different motivations. 
However, further discussion on this issue requires more conclusive historical evidence 
and a more comprehensive analysis than is possible here. 
Obviously, in terms of relocating the capital, Bangkok city planning during this 
period was a political concern with command and control reflecting the hegemony of 
the current king. In fact, many capitals in the region such as Burma, Laos, Cambodia 
8 Thai history explains that by moving the citadel from the west to the east bank. the river became in 
effect, a ready-made moat, a quarter of a kilometre wide and nine fathoms deep; and the bow was easily 
'strung' by a canal fSternstein, 1982 #3, 8]. 
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and Vietnam were relocated during the same period in accordance with struggles for 
power. Political pressure and military confrontations were the primary reasons for 
relocating the capitals. The case of the Thai kingdom was no different. If political 
conflict had not been so critical, Bangkok might not have been chosen for the new 
capital. 
1.1.2 The 'City of Angels 'J 1782 to 1932 
At 6.55am on 21 April 1782, after being crowned for two weeks, King Rama I 
formally founded and named the new capital: Krung Thep Pra-Maha-Nakorn, Boworn-
Thawarawadi-Sri-Yudhya, Maha-Dilokpop, Noparatana-Radhani, Burirom, Udom-Pra-
Rajnivet-Mahasatan. Four years later, the capital was renamed: Krung Thep Pra-Maha-
Nakorn, Boworn-Ratanakosindra, Mahindra-Yudhya, Maha-Dilokpop, Noparatana-
Radhani, Burirom, Udom-Rajnivet-Mahasatan, Amorn-Pimarn-A vatarn-Satit, 
Sakkatuttiya-Vishnukarm-Prasit. 
Later King Rama IV (1851-1868) altered Boworn-Ratanakosindra to Amorn-
Ratanakosindra. Translated, the formal name of Bangkok reads: The City of Gods, The 
Great City, The Residence of The E merald Buddha, The Impregnable City (of 
Ayutthaya) of God Indr, The Grand Capital of The World Endowed With Nine Precious 
Gems, The Happy City Abounding Enormous Royal Palaces Which Resemble The 
Heavenly Abode Wherein Dwell The Reincarnated Gods, A City Given by Indr and 
Built by Vishnukarm (Stemstein, 1982 #3, 11]. This name is highly meaningful. In 
beautiful poetry, the formal name of Bangkok, therefore, gave the hope, the promise and 
the confidence of prosperous living in the new capital of the whole kingdom. 
In fact, Bangkok was born during the most troubled time for Thai warnors 
fighting against the Burmese invasion'0 from the west and the Vietnamese from the east. 
9 King Taksin's father was Chinese. As a consequence. he got a great deal of support from t11e rich 
Cltinese \\ho were majority along the east coast. location of his early home base. 
''' There \\ere -+-+ battles between the Thai and the Burmese from l5J 8 to 1885. in 103 years of fighting . 
There \\UC 2-+ battles in the Ayutthaya period ( 1538-1767). in comparison. there were l 0 battles during 
the fifteen years of King Taksin ·s re ign and 7 battles during the re ign of King Rama I ( 1782-1809). The 
largest Bunnese invasion with l .+.i.ooo soldiers. compared "itl1 70.000 Thai soldiers. was in 1785 a few 
montJ1s after the new capital of Bangkok \Yas completed. 
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Bangkok was planned meticulously in the image of Ayutthaya (see Figure 1.2). 
The layout of the city and the form of the principal structures were intended to 
correspond as closely as possible 'to Ayutthayan prototypes. King Rama I did not wish 
to create a completely new city but to recreate Ayutthaya and reproduce the form of the 
old capital as an essential part of his wish to restore the whole of the Ayutthayan way of 
life [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 11]. The old names of places in Ayutthaya and all traditional 
ceremonies were brought to Bangkok. This explains why Bangkok has become the 
ritual centre following the experience of Ayutthaya. 
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Source: John Crawfurd' s Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, 
Oxford University Press, 1967. 
Figure 1.2 Sketch of the town of Bangkok, 1825 by a native 
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The kings of the Chakri Dynasty in this period developed Bangkok enormously 
after Burma became a British colony in 1852, which allowed the kingdom to be 
peaceful for decades. A number' of canals were constructed in Bangkok for public 
transportation and irrigation. Not surprisingly, Bangkok was known by European 
envoys and tradesmen as the Venice of the East11 or the floating city. The beauty, 
splendour and the glories of Bangkok in this period were gracefully described and 
expressed in numerous maps, drawings, photographs and written documents. The first 
road named Charoen Krung or New Road, was built in the reign of King Monkut (Rama 
IV, 1851-1868) for Europeans as recreation space for riding in carriages. Many public 
works and several modem roads were completed at the end of his reign (see Figure 1.3). 
The kingdom changed considerably in the reign of King Chulalongkom (Rama 
V, 1868-1910)12• King Rama V truly brought the kingdom into the modem world and 
the signs of modernization were nowhere more obvious than in the capital (Sternstein, 
1982 #3, 20-21). Besides a number of modem physical features, King Rama V worked 
hard on arranging the administration as well as on legal reform, as both were necessary 
for effective management. 
Legal reform began in 1891 when the Ministry of Justice was established. The 
courts were rearranged under the new administration and numerous old laws and legal 
procedures were greatly improved and many new laws were issued. The ministerial 
system for the central administration was first introduced in 1892. A number of 
responsibilities and authorities were rearranged under a new administration of twelve 
new ministries. In 1894 the local administration was divided under the administration of 
the Ministry of Interior (Mol). It should be noted that the administrative system and the 
legal system were rearranged and expected to balance the use of power among the 
different authorities by laws. 
Thailand had never been colonised and in the 19th century the Thai kingdom 
succeeded in the slow process of bureaucratic reform and modernization. In terms of 
administrative restructuring, King Rama V aimed at centralising power in the 
government because he demanded an effective tool for control over the kingdom after 
losing territory to the British and the French 13• It is unfortunate that the King's strategy 
on decentralisation was less important. After the revolution in 1932, however, his 
11 Fernao Mendez Pinto was the first to use the epithet 'Venice of the East' when referring to Ayutthaya 
in a letter to the Society of Jesus in Lisbon dated 1554 [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 13). The prototype of 
Bangkok was compared with Ayutthaya. 
12 Sternstein called the enormous development in this period 'an awful momentum ' . 
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attitude towards centralising the local administration and power was of benefit to the 
military government. 
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Source: Collection of Larry Stemstein; reproduced in Portrait of Bangkok, Sternstein, 1982. 
Figure 1.3 Plan of Bangkok 1904 (drawn by J Antonio, dated by Sternstein) 
13 From 1786 to 1909, Thailand lost territory 8 times to the British and the French. 
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King Rama V recruited his princes and members of the Royal Family as the 
heads of the new administration and also initiated most of the development projects. 
' However during his reign the process of Bangkok city planning was fast because the 
king made all the decisions. As a result only 15 canals and 110 roads were developed in 
Bangkok from 1868-1910 [Kabilkam, 1995 #50, 68-70]. In Stemstein's view, Bangkok 
during this period was well laid-out and park-like, intersected with a network of broad 
shady roads running in all directions [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 87]. However, the new 
administrative and legal systems were in the early stage of development and needed 
more time for improvement. Unfortunately, this great period for Bangkok lasted for 
only 150 years from the reign of King Rama I to the reign of King Rama VII (1782-
1932). 
This elegant and glorious period of development which Stemstein called the 
'City of Angels', ended after the revolution on 24 June 1932 which terminated the era 
of absolute monarchy in the Siamese kingdom. Bangkok was well planned during this 
period because the king had used his absolute power to proceed with Bangkok city 
planning by command and control. Bypassing the administrative and legal systems, his 
command was effective in development management and implementation. 
1.1.3 Instability and Transition, 1932 to 1960 
An increasing number of urban elements and factors greatly influenced Bangkok 
urban planning during this period (see Figure 1.4), and the situation became more 
complex. Following the main theme of this chapter, the emphasis in this section is on 
the use of power wielded by those who controlled Bangkok city planning in different 
circumstances. 
For 27 years from 1932 to 1960, Thailand experienced 13 coups and seven 
constitutions under the administrations of 29 governments. As a result, urban problems 
in Bangkok increased under the administration of 'come and go' governments which 
had no interest in Bangkok city planning. 
It is apparent that the lack of political stability and unity in this period was a 
major cause of Bangkok's problems. Some arguments focus on the poor performance of 
the Thai bureaucratic system, with greed and corruption causing more critical problems 
[Komonlachet, 1972 #124 , 97-111]. However, it is necessary for the discussion to move 
beyond these arguments. 
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Source: Department of Survey, Ministry of Defence 
Figure 1.4 Plan of Bangkok, 1936. 
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Since the political changes in 1932, the democratic movement did not progress 
as military governments controlled the country for decades. People did not understand 
what democracy was about ano the military governments concentrated on the struggle 
for power. Consequently, Bangkok city planning was dominated by the military. For 
instance, the road network was developed in association with military purposes. Most 
problems in Bangkok during this period were caused by natural disasters, such as the 
great flood in 1942. 
The resignation of King Rama VII on 2 March 1934 as a result of strong 
political conflict was a turning point for the Royal Family and Thai politics. Prince 
Anan became King Rama VIII when he was only l 0 years old. However, King Rama 
VIII was assassinated on 9 June 1946 and his younger brother, Prince Bhumipo l became 
King Rama IX. The Royal Family did not get involved in po litics in this period and 
Bangkok became a ground for power struggles among factions in the military and in the 
parliament. 
The key person who influenced the development of Bangkok during this period 
was Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram. Phibun had played a very important role in the 
first coup from 11-25 October 1933 as a young Major standing at the frontier. He was in 
command at Bang Sue, a railroad junction north of Bangkok whi le rebels 14 took over 
Bangkok airport at Don Muang, some kilometres away. Bangkok in the 1930s was still 
compact and there were few roads in the city. Most people travelled by boat as a local 
means of transportation although railroad was the best means of transportation. 
The seasonal flood in October became a huge problem for the army because 
Phibun could not move his tanks and failed in his plan to attack the rebels by putting his 
tanks on carriages in front of a locomotive. After that Phi bun understood how important 
the road network was. This may explain why Phibun developed many new roads after 
he became Prime Minister in December 1938, starting the first military dictatorship 
regime in Thai history. Phibun introduced many new things. He renamed the country 
and Siam became Thailand on 28 August 1939. The traditional New Year was also 
changed from 1 April to 1 January on 29 August 1940. 
Phibun was also the first person 'vvho tried to relocate the capital during the 
Second World War to Phetchbun, about 400 kilometres north of Bangkok. He believed 
that the location of Phetchbun, far away from the sea and surrounded by high mountains 
would be safe from military attack, but his project was cancelled by the end of the war. 
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Phibun developed new roads to connect the military camps in and around Bangkok. In 
other words, road developments in this period reflected military functions rather than 
economic functions, as we shall see later. Despite three assassination attempts and many 
' 
bloody coups, Phibun survived and served as Prime Minister for many years, becoming 
one of the most dominant actors in Thai politics in the 1940s through to the 1950s. 
In Sternstein's view, the worst aspect of Bangkok's drive to modernise started at 
the end of the Second World War with the destruction of the urban waterways system. 
Roads intersected many canals and many waterways were buried beneath avenues. 
Many streets were widened by uprooting bordering shade trees. In short, the network of 
waterways was dismembered. Its function as a transportation system has never been 
reconstituted by roadways. More importantly, its function as a drainage system has 11ot 
been replaced although a grandiose, costly sewerage, drainage and flood protection 
scheme was drawn up. The beauty of the waterways has been lost, while Bangkok has 
become as mean as any modern city anywhere, a 'city of great distance' since the 1960s 
[Sternstein, 1982 #3, 87]. These words express the current image of Bangkok well 
because it takes so much time to go anywhere because of traffic congestion. 
Regional conflict in the 1950s became a new factor which influenced Thai 
politics. In response to the Thai policy against communism, the United States of 
America aimed to exploit the political geography of Thailand as a military base for 
covert operations in Laos and Vietnam. American roles and political intervention in 
Thailand were open. Phibun and some military generals became political actors v 1ho 
obtained weapons and financial support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
However Phibun failed to balance military power between his two close colleagues, 
General Pao and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Sarit staged a coup on 16 September 
1957. Phibun and Pao were forced into exile. The political struggle in Thailand ended 
for a while (1958-1973) under the new dictatorial regime of Sarit then Thanem 
Kittikachorn, Sarit's colleague. However, American technical and financial aid to 
Thailand continued and substantially influenced the development through the next three 
decades, which will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 2. 
1.2 Thai Aviation and Bangkok Airport, 1910 to 1960 
As discussed, the traditional Thai way of life changed rapidly during the reign of 
King Chulalo ngkorn (Rama Y, 1868-1910). The Great King and his progressive 
1
•
1 Prince Bor.-orndcj ''as the leader of the rebels. He controlled military forces in the northeast. 
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policies, described as one of the most advanced sovereigns of Eastern Asia, brought the 
kingdom into the modern world. The Royal Family introduced a number of modern 
elements over a half century including the telephone in 1881, the railway in 1893, the 
electric tram in 1894 and the motor car in 1909. This included the development of 
aviation in the early 20th century. 
This section gives an overview of developments in Thai aviation. The emphasis 
is on how Don Muang became Bangkok's airport and how important it has been. The 
discussion also focuses on political events relating to Bangkok airport to explain how it 
became a political concern during the early cold war period. 
1.2.1 Early Development 
In January 1911, van den Bern, a Belgian representative of a French aircraft 
company, asked permission to demonstrate its flying machine in Bangkok. After 
receiving official approval from the King, the field of Sra Prathum (see race course in 
Figure 1.3) was prepared, which is now the Royal Bangkok Sports Club at Prathumwan. 
A temporary runway was built while the exciting news was announced and a flying 
schedule was published in both Thai and English newspapers. The airshows were 
scheduled for 31 January, 1 and 6 February 1911 , thus starting Thai aviation history 15 . 
Tickets outside the field along Sra Prathum Road, Sanammar Road and 
Rachadamri Road cost 25 satang16 each. Tickets inside close to the show with seating 
cost 2 and 5 baht each. This historical event took place in Bangkok only seven years 
after the Wright Brothers took the first plane into the sky on 17 December 1903. The 
Belgians and the French did not expect much profit from ticket sales as their concern 
was with the Royal Family who were very interested in the new machine as a sign of 
modernisation. On 31 January 1911, Prince Kampaeng Peth Akara Yodin was the first 
Siamese passenger to board a plane flying over Bangkok. 
Later, Prince Nakhonchaisri Suradej visited Europe and studied the successful 
development of aviation in France. After returning to Bangkok, he reported to Prince 
Pithsanuloke Prachanard, Minister of Defence and stressed the importance of planes for 
15 An article in a local magazine. Transport, volume 12 in July 1990, states that the first plane was landed 
in January 1910 by the French. But a book; JOO Historical Events 1983, with information gathered from 
Department of Art, Pakgard Palace and Siam Society claims that the firs t plane was landed in January 
1911 by the Belgians. The Pictorial History of the Thais; collection from the Royal Family. shows a 
photograph of Prince Kampaeng Peth Akara Yodin and van den Bern on the plane taken on 31 January 
19 l l. 
16 Thai currency unit; one baht equals 100 satang. 
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national defence. The Royal Thai Army also realised this and decided to establish an 
aviation unit in the army. On 28 February 1911, three army officers departed from 
' Bangkok and arrived in Paris on 21 March 1911. While they were being trained to fly 
different planes, the Ministry of Defence bought seven planes and one more was 
donated by Chaopraya Apaibej, a general. Thai aviators tested and flew the new French 
planes before they were transported back to Thailand. After finishing the training 
course, the new aviators arrived at Bangkok on 2 November 1913. 
Obviously the planes were firstly considered as a sign of modernisation from the 
military point of view. Thai society was not very impressed with the French at the time 
due to territorial losses to the French some years previously. The first planes were 
therefore bought from France due to their advanced technology. In fact, the recognition 
of modem technology had existed for years in Thailand. Politically, King Rama IV and 
King Rama V understood the importance of the development of transportation. The 
territorial losses of nearly half the kingdom from 1786-1909 were a painful experience 
which reminded them that many things needed to be done to protect the nation and 
maintain independence. This situation forced them to develop telegraph, road and 
railway systems towards the frontiers of the western colonies. 
The field of Sraprathum with its former runway became a base for the first 
squadron. Hangars were built on the north of airfield, now the Headquarters of the 
Police Department. However, after being used for only three years, the airfield could not 
be expanded to accommodate larger aircraft. Squadron Leader Luang Saksulyavud, one 
of the three aviators trained in France, then conducted an aerial survey over and around 
Bangkok for a new airport site. He found an area named Don Muang in Bangkaen 
district (see Figure 1.5) which would not be flooded and which was not too far from 
Bangkok. His report proposed the Don Muang site; 29 kilofr!etres from the Royal Palace 
and was approved by Ministry of Defence. A relocation plan was undertaken 
immediately. The criteria for site selection were simple and reasonable. Its geographical 
location with a large area of high land was not attractive to farmers in those days who 
relied more on flood plains, leaving the high land empty. It was also close to the 
railway, which had been developed in March 1896, providing good access to Bangkok. 
It is worth noting that the government allowed people to own land and a certificate of 
land ownership had been issued in 1901 . However, the king still owned almost all the 
land of the kingdom therefore there was no problem with land acquisition for the new 
airport. 
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Figure 1.5 Don Muang Airport and the development of Bangkok, 1900 to 1968 
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The relocation from Sra Prathum to Don Muang was completed on 17 March 
1914. The Ministry of Defence officially established the first air defence division on 27 
March 1914 and this became a part of the foundation of the Royal Thai Air Force later. 
However, it remained a small unit under the direct command of the Royal Thai Army. 
On 22 January 1914, the Ministry of Defence started an aviation training 
programme which produced another two new aviators seven months later. The 
development of Thai aviation continued rapidly. Many more airfields were gradually 
built throughout the country: Prachuapkirikan in April 1914, Chantaburi in June 1919, 
Nakhon Ratchasima in February 1925 an<l Lopburi in September 1925. These airfields 
became primary and secondary strategic airbases and military camps. 
After the First World War, veterans gained much more experience in Europe and 
their mechanical knowledge greatly contributed to the development of Thai aviation 
later. A one-day round trip from Bangkok to Chantaburi on 17 June 1919 carried mail 
and earned 9,250.72 baht. Many air shows were held in other provinces in order to 
gather money to buy more planes. 
Thai .aviation was now m progress. Thailand signed an agreement on 
International Air Conventions in Paris on 14 October 1919 which paved the way for 
international air transportation. However, Thai civil aviation actually started on 23 June 
1920 when a flight between Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima took only one hour, 25 
minutes. Three planes extended the service to faraway provinces and served wider areas 
particularly during times of epidemics and natural disasters. In June 1921 , for instance, 
the planes took doctors and medical supplies to Ubon Ratchatani where cholera was 
spreading. 
In 1928, the Dutch Airline became the . first international earner to begin 
overseas aviation to Southeast Asia with flights from Amsterdam to Battavia, its 
colonial town in Java. A large aircraft with three engines landed at Don Muang airport 
at 5.00pm on 8 November 1928 and a new era of modern transportation had begun. 
Since then a number of international carriers from Europe to Bangkok have brought 
great changes to the country. 
Meanwhile the small air defence unit at Don Muang was gradually upgraded in 
association with an increase in aviation personnel. This included the Department of 
Army Aviation on 1 December 192 1, the Department of Air Force on 12 April 1935 and 
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eventually the Royal Thai Airforce on 9 April 1937. Hence, there is a sense of 
belonging with the Don Muang district. 
' 
The landscape of Don Muang in the 1930s can be described as a military town 
surrounded by paddy fields. Most headquarters and offices were on the west of the 
runway close to the railway. A new road; Prachathipat Road (later renamed 
Phaholyothin Road17) was built two kilometres from and parallel with the railway on the 
east connecting Bangkok and the northern suburbs and a military hospital. More 
residences were built along both sides of the new road which became another Air Force 
compound. An area south along the road next to the military residences was developed 
and became a fresh food market. More road networks and the adoption of the 
Automobile Registration Act in 1909 provided much more convenient transportation. 
From a political point of view, the changing pattern of transportation had a 
strong impact on the strategic location of Don Muang airbase, which could control both 
primary accesses to Bangkok by railway and roads from the north and northeast. 
After the revolution in 1932, there was serious fragmentation in the Thai 
military amongst the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and even the Police which led to a 
number of political incidents in the capital city. The coup from 11-25 October 1933 was 
the first time Don Muang was involved in a political conflict when troops from Nakhon 
Ratchasima took over the airport and threatened the government in Bangkok. 
After the coup in 1933, the Army established more military camps in Bangkaen 
to achieve a balance of power, only some kilometres south of Don Muang. The most 
powerful camp was the Eleventh Regiment (see Figure 1.5), covering an area almost as 
large as Don Muang airbase. Since this force was involved in every political conflict 
and Bangkok was a ground for power plays, its g~ography and development had been 
watched by the military government for decades. In December 1943 for instance, two 
new roads, Laksi-Pakkred (later renamed Chaengwattana Road) and Laksi-Minburi 
(now Ram Indra Road), were built during the regime of Phibun so that the Eleventh 
Regiment and other military camps on the two roads could control access routes better 
than from Don Muang camp. The army was concerned about air travel and therefore the 
airport has been a military concern since the 1930s. 
17 Prachathipat Road was relatively under-deve loped until it was redeveloped in December 1943 as a 
strategic road to Chiangrai under the administration of Marshal Phibun Songkhram. It was known as 
Highway no. 5 before being renamed Phaholyothin Road. Its official name now is Highway No. I . 
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There have been many attempts by civilian governments to move the military 
camps out of Bangkok but these have been unsuccessful due to military threats and 
coups. In contrast, military governments have expanded their territory and increased 
their role on the grounds of national security. 
Between 1948 and 1952 Don Muang airport was improved by the Air Force in 
order to enhance the capacity, efficiency and safety of aviation. Don Muang airport was 
ready to welcome the jet era. However the management and operation of both 
commercial and military aircraft movements were totally the responsibility of the Air 
Force. 
In 1953 the city of Bangkok covered an area of only 67 square kilometres. Don 
Muang airport was still remote and surrounded by rice fields . Most vehicles in the 
country belonged to the military. Railway was the most convenient form of transport 
between Bangkok and Don Muang while the waterways were still popular with local 
people. However, the geographical importance of Don Muang was changing along with 
current regional politics and Thailand's involvement in the cold war. 
1.2.2 The American Role 
There was no development m Thai aviation through World War II between 
1937-1945. The economic bases of Thailand were heavily damaged, as with other 
countries. It was the United States which played a unique and constructive role in the 
development of Thailand during the post war period. This section discusses aviation 
development in Thailand in the 1940s and 1950s under the supervision and assistance of 
the United States government. 
The great Indochinese peninsula attracted little American interest and attention 
until the closing months of the Second World War. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 's 
anticolonial sentiments expected Indochina to be free from France. During the war, in 
fact, the American role in the region was limited by British pressure that it only support 
the Free Siamese Movement, Ho Chi Minh ' s force and other political groups against the 
Japanese. Due to the British willingness to revive France as a European power to help 
balance the growing strength of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, the United States 
was drawn into this region starting a new era of cold war [Furtrell, 1981 #27, 3-5] . 
In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the political situation in Southeast Asia 
changed dramatically in association with greater intervention by the American 
government. In the view of Thai society, the U.S. was more friendl y than its allies 
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Britain and France, which took away a half of Thai territory during the colonial period. 
Not surprisingly, a great friendship developed with the Thai government following 
' American policies on anti-communism. Regional conflicts became direct Thai concerns 
which led to the deployment of American forces in Thailand between 1961-1975. 
However, this friendship became controversial as the American prosecution of the 
Indochina war came to an end and corruption was exposed. 
As part of the close friendship and mutual interest, U.S. official economic and 
military assistance started in 1946 and ended in 1988, amounting to roughly US$ 3.3 
billion. However U.S. investment in infrastructure in Thailand was mostly for military 
purposes. It is very important to note that Thailand was heavily dependent on foreign 
expertise in the 1950s and in the 1960s. A number of development programmes 
involving American professionals and institutions as providers, strongly influenced the 
Thai knowledge base and later development policies [Muscat, 1990 #25, 39,265]. 
In terms of air transport, a small civil aviation project began in 1951, 
implemented by the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Bangkok. This was at 
the same time that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was working closely 
with USOM, started one of the biggest operations named Project Paper on 7 February 
1951. Civil Air Transport, a CIA facility, later became Air America in 1959 and in 
association with Sea Supply18 another CIA facility, set up a station in Bangkok. Its 
planes used Don Muang airport as a base to supply arms and ammunition to Chiang 
Kai-shek's army in northern Burma. Such a large operation would have been impossible 
without support from Thailand. Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram had approved and 
supported the American operations based on the same anti-Communist rationale [Leary, 
1984 #24, 127-132, 208]. 
In late December 1951, an open controversy erupted when the Chinese 
communists publicly charged that the American government was ferrying nationalist 
soldiers from Taiwan to Thailand and Burma through Don Muang airport [Prados, 1986 
#17, 73-75]. This episode involved Don Muang airport in the American secret war. 
The first phase of a 10-year programme in aviation development was actually 
begun by USOM in 1955. It included the financing and installation of navigational aids 
at Don Muang and 13 other civil airports. Various communication systems, airport 
improvements including control towers , runways, an instrument landing system, aprons 
18 Sea Supply was staffed by professional paramilitary personnel, many of them former The Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) agents in Thailand [Randolph. 1986 #16, 25). 
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and a power plant were developed at Don Muang. The U.S. aviation authorities also 
considered that Bangkok's geographical position was certain to make it a major traffic 
' 
hub. Hence, it is interesting to study why the U.S. spent a lot of money developing the 
transportation system in Thailand. 
In October 1954, an article in Foreign Affairs, 'Spotlight on Thailand' by Edwin 
F. Stanton; the resident U.S. ambassador who served from 1946 to 1953, stated that: 
Because of her geographical and strategical location, Thailand or Land of the Free, is 
the heart and citadel of the region ... Thailand's assent to that is, of course, absolutely 
essential; and it is equally necessary for the United States and the members of any 
Southeast Asian alliance ... Such a defensive system for Southeast Asia can best function 
if it is based on Thailand [Randolph, 1986 # 16, 26]. 
Obviously the geography of Thailand was viewed mainly in terms of political 
security. Certainly, any reason could be raised and quoted depending on the motive of 
the observer. Meanwhile, many secret operations in Laos had been underway and the 
CIA's first flight was a supply lift to a camp in Laos on 6 May 1953 [Prados, 1986 #17, 
115]. 
The large investment in airport development during this phase resulted in the 
greatest reform to Thai aviation. By February 1960, construction had been completed at 
Takhli, Udom, Ubon, Nak.hon Ratchasima (Korat) and Chiangmai airports. In April 
1961, a new control tower was completed at Don Muang airport. The largest scale 
construction was the development of three new airbases: U-Tapao in Rayong, Nam 
Phong in Khonkaen and Kamphaeng Saen in Nakhon Fathom built from 1963 to 1968. 
Seven airports became primary strategic bases for U.S. Air Force operations 
during the Vietnam War. Meanwhile Don Muang became the centre of American 
facilities and the base of fighter interceptor squadrons where U.S. Air Force personnel 
had begun their operations in April 1961 [Furtrell,' 1981 #27, 279-280; Randolph, 1986 
#16, 52]. After other airbases were better developed, Don Muang was used mainly as a 
passenger and cargo transfer point. 
A decision on the second phase of Don Muang was made in early 1965 as a 
result of the growth of the Vietnam confli ct. The prime reason for the second phase was 
a realisation that the build-up in military air traffic was going to place increased 
demands on Thailand's civi l aviation structure for handling military traffic and mixing 
it safely with the expanding civi l traffic. When the second and last phase was finally 
completed in 1974, Bangkok had become one of the major hubs of the world as 
expected [Muscat, 1990 #25, 104-105]. However, the American policy on Bangkok 
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airport development changed in the 1970s. A comprehensive analysis of this will be 
made in Chapter 2. 
It should be noted that Air America closed its bases in June 1974, the last year of 
the final phase of the 10-year programme in aviation development. Its facilities at the 
airports were taken over by the Thai Airways Aircraft Maintenance Company, while its 
personnel in Bangkok opened new companies with new addresses which continued 
other secret missions as usual. Since 1974 American aid has not played a significant 
role in Thailand. Many American projects were revised and redeveloped by Japan 
through the next decades. 
Besides the construction programme, assistance from the U.S. also covered 
several areas of research work; one of which was a report submitted to the Ministry of 
Communication in June 1959, A Comprehensive Evaluation of Thailand's 
Transportation System Requirements. This report has become important evidence 
against the development of the SBIA. A comprehensive analysis of this will be 
presented in Chapter 5. 
This report gave most attention to a national system and network of 
transportation development in which selected alternatives were rationalized given the 
current situation. In accordance with other projects being undertaken by USOM, large 
transport investments were a first priority in order to accommodate the growth of the 
Thai economy and the military capability. 
In terms of air transport, the report stressed two prime considerations: (1) the 
relation of global air travel to Thailand's economy; and (2) the need for an integrated 
military and civilian air transportation system for Thailand. 
The report also pointed out the tourist potential for !hailand and the favourable 
location of Bangkok with its excellent international airport on global jet routes which 
would enable the Thai economy to benefit quickly from the influx of visitors. A 
recommendation of high and continuing budgetary priority strongly emphasized that 
Don Muang airport must be improved and maintained to jet age standards set out by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [Consultants, 1959 #15, 97). 
It is worth noting that this report was written in association with the USOM-
programmed project to reconstruct the Bangkok-Don Muang road section to a four-lane 
highway which would safely carry the increased airport traffic together with a growing 
load of suburban and inter-urban traffic. This new highway was finished in 1962 and 
36 
Chapter 1 Development and Planning 
later named Vibhavadi Rangsit Highway. It greatly influenced the land use pattern of 
Don Muang airport in the 1970s. 
Similar recommendations were given with respect to other provincial airfields. 
In the case of new airport developments, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) group of 
USOM was qualified to give valuable assistance with equipment and construction 
standards and the final selection of sites. Unfortunately, this goodwill was completely 
forgotten when the site selection for the second international airport in Bangkok was 
undertaken three years later. 
In 1960, another study by the FAA, Air System Requirement Plan and Survey for 
the Kingdom of Thailand, pointed out that there should be a second international airport 
in Bangkok to accommodate larger civil aircraft. No one knows how and why this 
contradictory recommendation was made to the Thai government only one year later. 
While the FAA study was referred to from time to time through the next three decades, 
in contrast, the former study has never been mentioned. 
The method of the FAA study is questionable. The report, A Comprehensive 
Evaluation of Thailand's Transportation system Requirements, had just been completed. 
Why did the FAA undertake a new study? In fact, it was another American team 
working on Bangkok city planning who originally gave the same recommendation. 
More details on this are discussed in the next section. It is quite clear that the FAA's 
study was concerned with politics therefore its recommendations supported the new 
Bangkok airport project. 
1.2.3 The Second Bangkok International Airport 
In 1959, the U.S. Agency for Internatio~al Development (USAID) started a 
Public Administration Project on Bangkok city planning with a contribution of US$ 1.4 
million. Litchfield, Whiting & Bowne, a U.S. private contractor for USAID, was 
working on The Greater Bangkok Plan 2533 (AD.1990), the first modem plan for the 
country. In 1960, the consultants recommended the separation of civil and commercial 
aviation at the military airbase at Don Muang. A site 17 kilometres east of Bangkok was 
originally suggested for the new international airport. This recommendation was 
associated with the proposed direction of industrial development along the seaboard of 
the Gulf of Thailand. It was expected that the new airport would facilitate both Bangkok 
and the new industrial area. 
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The rationale for the need for a second international airport seemed to have been 
based on urban and regional development. No matter what the fundamental reasons 
were, this initiative was welcome. 
Thai society learnt the exact meaning of dictatorship after the second coup 19 of 
Army Field Marshal Sarit Thannarat in October 1958. His regime was more highly 
centralised than any other in Thai history. He was Prime Minister, Supreme 
Commander, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Acting Director of the Police 
Department among a host of other top positions in State Enterprises. He demanded that 
his needs be met immediately and without question. A decision on the route of a new 
road was easily implemented by calling in the landowners and paying them off after a 
short talk; the new airport project therefore started immediately. Construction of the 
new airport, however, was different from other projects. In short, Sarit himself wanted 
the new airport. 
On the one hand, the political situation in the region during the post-war period 
provided a reason for this reaction. Direct U.S. military involvement in Laos during 
1960-1962 and the deployment of U.S. troops in Thailand was a major concern for the 
Thai government which was staunchly anti-communist. It was simply understood in the 
early 1960s, that the Don Muang airbase would be mainly military and that the unstable 
political situation in Southeast Asia dictated that national security was the primary 
concern. The new Bangkok airport was seen as a necessity. 
The introduction of the new airport was a political concern and its actual 
rationale was kept quiet through the period of dictatorship. Any criticism of politics in 
Thailand was unusual in the 1960s. The permanent secretary of Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication, Mr. Kan Nakamdee, who was dismissed in 1977, 
had argued in 1978 that some high-ranking officers in the military government were 
involved in Nong Ngu Hao land acquisition. He also argued that only a few people who 
had a close relationship with the committee took part in purchasing such a large plot of 
land20. In the view of landlords living near Nong Ngu Hao, land prices were 
unreasonable as cheaper land with better access and greater potential was available21 . 
A turning point occurred when Sarit died of cirrhosis of the liver on 6 December 
1963. Since then the Nong Ngu Hao project became of less importance and no progress 
19 The first coup of Sarit that forced Phibun and Pao to exile was on 16 August 1957. 
20 Mr. Kan Nakamdee expressed his concern on Siamrath Weekly on 11 December 1983 p.18-23. 
21 A landlord who has lived near Nong Ngu Hoa for three decades expressed this viewpoint in a fieldwork 
interview in l 996. 
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was made on it for three decades until 1991. What happened to the new Bangkok airport 
project during these three decades will be discussed in Chapter 2. However, land 
' 
acquisition continued until 1968 with a total budget of 129 million baht for an area of 
19,241 rai22 (30.78 square kilometres). 
If Sarit had lived for a couple of years longer, the Nong Ngu Hao project might 
have been completely finished which would have greatly changed the future of 
Bangkok. He was the only person who could proclaim the name of the Second Bangkok 
International Airport in any purposeful way. Similar statements are made when other 
people talk about this project, but some important questions are forgotten. Did Sarit 
know that the new airport would be built on a swamp? If he did, why he decide to build 
it there? And what did he really expect from the project? 
Both the positive and negative consequences of Sarit's absolute power 
throughout his regime have been discussed for years. Whether his decision on the 
second international airport was right or wrong, he started the agenda for the longest 
development programme with the most controversy in Thai history, the legendary 
Nong Ngu Hao project. 
It is also interesting to study the contradictory recommendations contained in the 
FAA study in 1960 and the previous report of A Comprehensive Evaluation of 
Thailand 's Transportation System Requirements in 1959. Recognising that Sarit was 
one of the most corrupt dictators in Thai history, my concern is to search for a clear 
understanding of what the new Bangkok airport project is all about. 
1.3 Origins of the Second Bangkok International Airport 
Thai governments for decades have argued .that the first Bangkok city plan made 
by Litchfield, Whiting & Bowne and the FAA study in 1960 both recommended the 
separation of civil and commercial aviation from the military base at Don Muang. 
Governments have used this point to continue with the Second Bangkok International 
Airport project at Nong Ngu Hao. This recommendation has been repeated again and 
again in local newspapers throughout the past few decades . However, no one has ever 
studied the details of this recommendation23 . My investigation starts here by finding out 
22 Land Measurement in Thailand; one square kilometre equals 625 rai. 
23 Future of Nang Ngu Hao and Thailand, a recent book published in December 1998, does not study any 
detail of recommendation of the Second Bangkok Internatio nal Airport Project [Chanachai, 1998 #85, 1-
118] . 
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the truth about the Second Bangkok International Airport project. A serious question is 
what really happened in 1960. 
Unfortunately, the FAA document is not available for this thesis. However, I 
have the catalogue which represents the complete holdings of the Documents Section, 
USOM Technical Library publications on Public Administration, dated October 1972, 
and the original copies of the first master plan of Bangkok and some letters that 
Litchfield, Whiting & Bowne wrote to the government in 1959 and 1960. These 
materials are enough to reveal the truth about the origins of the new airport project. 
From December 1957 to August 1960, the Litchfield consortium submitted 15 
reports to MoI. All were published, however, none were related to the airport project 
[(USOM), 1972 #125, 16-25]. 
After carefully checking every single page of the main report of the first master 
plan of Bangkok, I have found nothing relating to the new airport project. Despite the 
most important section which recommended the development of a new seaport on the 
eastern seaboard, which has become Lam Chabang deep seaport in Chonburi, there is 
nothing about the airport development. However, this recommendation may have been 
written elsewhere in a letter or may have been discussed amongst the people involved. 
If it was, then the recommendation could not have been properly proposed. 
My argument is that the Litchfield consortium did not have time to seriously 
study the new airport idea (see Appendix 1). Moreover, the consortium specialised in 
city planning but not in air transport planning. The idea to move things out of Bangkok 
was probably due to tension between the military and planners. However, what really 
happened in 1960 was concerned with politics under the dictatorial regime of Sarit. 
In 1963, Cyrus R. Nims, the USOM city planning advisor to the government of 
Thailand from August 1961 to November 1963, submitted a report City Planning in 
Thailand to the City Planning Office, Minitry of Interior. Nims discussed the Litchfield 
Plan and stated that at least 75 per cent of the basic policy recommendations of the 
Litchfield Plan had not been adopted or even seriously considered [Nims, 1963 #122, 
105-106). Nims mentioned very briefly that the new airport site selected was near the 
recommended site [Nims, 1963 #122, 5] , however, no details were given about the new 
airport project. 
It should be noted that Nims became the USOM city planning advisor one year 
after the Litchfield consortium had left Bangkok. He was responsible for recommending 
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that further action be taken to more effectively establish city planning as a permanent 
function of the Thai government [Nims, 1963 # 122, introduction). In the repo11 Nims 
concentrated on the technical and administrative basis of city planning. The new airport 
' 
was not his concern. 
It is clear in the planning document that there is no evidence about the 
separation of civil and commercial aviation at Don Muang airport and the need for a 
new Bangkok airport. The task of this thesis is to understand what happened with the 
SBIA project. 
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There were many political changes in Thailand from 1961 to 1991 starting with Sarit's 
death in 1963, the collapse of military dictatorship in 1973, the violent struggles for 
democracy in 1973, 1976 and 1991 and the replacement of the power elite in the 
political theatre in the 1980s. From October 1958 to February 1991, Thailand 
experienced eight coups and eight constitutions under the administration of 21 
governments. These political changes and the consequent instability influenced the fate 
of almost every development project in this period. 
Neither the plan for Bangkok nor the plan for the SBIA progressed from 1961 to 
1991. The Litchfield Plan was ignored. Land was purchased for the new airport 
throughout the 1960s, but there was no construction. Despite many attempts to 
implement the two projects, nothing happened for three decades. Meanwhile as a 
consequence of the lack of development control for these decades, Bangkok has become 
the city of magnificent distances1 with a growing number of urban problems. 
After 1960 the two projects had parallel developments under different 
authorities. The two projects became active again in the early 1990s after the SBIA was 
approved in May 1991 and the first legal city plan of Bangkok, the Bangkok General 
Plan 1992 was approved in July 1992. 
This chapter discusses important developments in Bangkok city planning and 
the SBIA from 1961 to 1991. The first section discusses what happened after the first 
master plan of Bangkok was submitted to the Thai government in 1960. The emphasis is 
on a review of the first master plan of Bangkok and attempts to revise the Bangkok plan 
in the 1970s. A shift to development planning· for Bangkok will be discussed in 
accordance with the new form of Bangkok local administration. 
The second section discusses attempts under different political conditions to 
continue the SBIA Project in this period. The third section discusses the shortcomings 
of planning due to a lack of development control for decades in the face of the urban 
primacy of Bangkok. Changes in Bangkok's built environment between 1960 and 1990 
will be discussed to reconsider how reasonable it would be to develop the new Bangkok 
airport on the site chosen three decades ago. 
1 The term City of Magnificent Distances or City of Crear Distances is given by Larry Sternstein 
[Sternstein, 1982 #3, 65-106]. Sternstein explained that Bangkok is 'city of great distances' because to go 
any distance takes a great deal of time. 
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2.1 Planning Bangkok, 1961 to 1991 
In hindsight a plan for th~ development of Bangkok was crucial for few could 
have foreseen the growth which took place over three decades. An effective, or even 
partly effective plan, could have facilitated the planning of infrastructure. It might also 
have influenced the planning and development of a second airport for Bangkok. But 
here the influence of a plan for Bangkok would necessarily have been limited for the 
area under the jurisdiction of a city plan did not extend to the proposed site of the 
airport. 
Litchfield Whiting Bowne & Associates completed the master plan of Bangkok 
in April 1960 and ended its three-year contract with the Bangkok-Thon Buri City 
Planning Project in August 1960. The American government's aid to Thailand on city 
planning continued until 1966 under USAID Public Administration Projects with a total 
contribution of US$ 1.4 million [Muscat, 1990 #25, 310]. The Thai government in the 
1960s did not place any importance on the first master plan of Bangkok. City planning 
skills and techniques introduced by the American consultants in the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, influenced the development of many Thai government departments. This 
included introducing the use of a five-year plan prepared by the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB) in 1963 and the creation of the Department of 
Town and Country Planning (DTCP) in 1961 . 
It is worth noting that the most serious problems of Bangkok were clearly 
apparent by the late 1960s. However, the problems were concentrated within the inner 
area of the old city such as traffic congestion at the Memorial Bridge linking Thon Buri 
and Bangkok and the problem of seasonal flooding in Thon Buri. The problems of this 
period were studied and it was recognised that something should be done about the 
Bangkok city planning. 
My argument is that the government could have controlled and resolved the 
problems in this period if the Litchfield Plan had been implemented. Despite the power 
struggles among the political factions, there were many times that the rulers, sometimes 
as dictators with extreme power, could do something about 'planning' to solve the 
problems effectively but instead they did nothing. This chapter discusses how the rulers 
were concerned with dealing with the problems of Bangkok after the plans had been 
made. 
The first master plan for Bangkok in 1960 and the re-plans in 1969 and 1971 are 
good examples. In Sternstein's view, these plans never received the legal and financial 
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support necessary for their implementation. The master plan for Bangkok, therefore, 
never had a chance to realise its potential [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 117]. 
' Bangkok city planning did not move forward from 1961 to 1991. Even though 
from 1961 to 1991 the Town and Country Planning Act provided legal power in 1975 
and the administrative system of Bangkok had been reformed giving it more authority, 
the authorities concerned failed to implement the master plan of Bangkok in 1976. What 
went wrong with Bangkok city planning? 
2.1.l Failures of Bangkok City Planning 
The purpose of this section is to identify the failures of Bangkok city planning in 
this period. It will also examine the 'transition period' when planning could have 
achieved something before Bangkok's problems became too complex and critical for 
any resolution. 
There are many reasons why the DTCP and the Bangkok Municipality, which 
became the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) in 1975, failed to implement 
the master plan for Bangkok from 1961 to 1991. In my view, the failure was due to 
political interference and the separation of three systems, the administrative, legal and 
planning systems. This section concentrates on political interference. The failures 
caused by the three systems will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Numerous experts had already prepared many reports and master plans2 in this 
period to solve Bangkok's problems but none were implemented. Consequently, the 
problems have increased rapidly since the 1970s, from the core of the city in every 
direction where new roads have been developed. An interesting question is why these 
plans were ignored. It cannot be denied that two military dictators, Field Marshal Sarit 
and Field Marshal Thanom3, both with strong power in this period, ignored city 
planning for Bangkok. The consequences of this will be discussed in the last section of 
this chapter, focusing on urban primacy and changes in Bangkok's built environment 
which have influenced Bangkok city planning. 
Thanom was not as authoritarian as Sarit. In February 1969 there was an 
election and a commitment to issue a new constitution soon. According to the report on 
the first revision of the Bangkok Plan prepared by the DTCP in February 1971, the 
biggest constraint was likely to be a legal concern because the government was waiting 
for the new planning law and expecting the use of more powerful legal measures. The 
2 See Appendix 2.1 
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current planning law, the Town and Country Planning Act 1952, was not practicable and 
a proposal to revise it had been made as early as 1959. The first draft of the new 
planning law was completed in f965 but the House of Representatives rejected it in 
1966. Some Members of the Parliament argued that the new planning law should be 
issued in association with the new constitution which was being drafted. Cabinet 
received the amended draft in November 1970 and was preparing to send it to the House 
of Representatives [(DTCP), 1971 #51, 2]. Unfortunately, the coup on 17 November 
1971 prolonged the procedure of issuing the new law until 1975. 
In 1976, the DTCP attempted to proceed with city planning for Bangkok. 
However it could not continue after receiving thousands of complaints in 1977 and 
1978. As a result, the process was suspended indefinitely. The failure of planning in this 
period was controversial. Some projects were developed soon after the city planning 
was suspended. This included the most scandalous case in which a large commercial 
complex was developed on State Railway of Thailand (SRT) land at the intersection of 
Vibhavadi Rangsit Highway and Phaholyothin Road. This area had been proposed as a 
public park and for recreation development in the 1976 master plan. 
It is clear that the failures in this period were due to political interference. 
Nuanpen Sawasdimongkol, who worked for the DTCP in this period, stated that 
discussions on the master plan for Bangkok were held at General Kriengsak 
Chomanan4 's residence. It also cannot be denied that the suspension of Bangkok city 
planning in this period greatly benefitted the landed elite. 
Without controls on urban development for many decades, the delay in 
legislation strengthening planning caused a number of serious problems for Bangkok 
such as urban sprawl and the poor provision of infrastructure. It took 16 years, from 
1959 to 1975, to re-issue the Town and Country Planning Act. However, it took another 
17 years to implement the first legal plan for Bangkok in 1992. In my view, these delays 
were a result of manipulation by the power elite. More arguments on this are included in 
Chapter 3. 
Moreover, the issue of political interference includes the fragmentation between 
the authorities involved, which is a basic problem with the administrative system in 
Thailand. It is generally understood that city planning is a concern of local government. 
However, this view was controversial in Thailand in the 1960s through to the 1980s. 
Responsibility and authority for making the Bangkok plan involved a serious conflict 
3 Army Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat controlled the country from 1958 to 1965 and Field Marshal 
Thanom Kittikachorn took the power and became Prime Minister from 1965 to 1973. 
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between the national government DTCP and the Bangkok Municipality according to the 
flexibility of planning law. Both claimed responsibility for making the Bangkok plan. 
The DTCP argued that the Bangkok Municipality was not ready to make the Bangkok 
, 
plan. My question is whether in fact local government could make the plan. 
The Bangkok Municipality was enthusiastic and had its own planning office 
from 1956 with sufficient manpower, recognized as the largest local planning authority 
in Thailand. In other words, everything had been ready for years to make the plan 1Jut 
this potential was overlooked. 
Besides the new planning law issued in 1975, there was also a need in the 
government's view for a better form of local administration to deal with the numerous 
problems of Bangkok and another new Act was issued in the same year. Consequently, 
the Bangkok Municipality and the Thon Buri Municipality were merged and became the 
BMA. The BMA Act gave considerable authority to the governor of Bangkok. 
Although the capacity to solve Bangkok's problems using planning measures 
had existed since 1975, there was no attempt to proceed with Bangkok city planning in 
the 1980s. The failure of Bangkok city planning in the 1980s therefore was not involved 
with the administrative, legal and planning systems but due to the 'politics' of the use of 
power. Why did the governors in the late 1970s and 1980s hesitate to proceed wit!1 
Bangkok city planning that might have impacts on the landed elite? 
In comparison, the Bangkok General Plan 1992 was completed under the 
administration of Cham long Srimuang who was the Governor of the BMA from 1988 to 
1994 He was viewed as a religious man whose politics were impressive and energetic. 
Chamlong challenged the power of the central government during his six-year 
administration, compared with previous governors who always thought about their 
political interests and popularity. 
A similar problem of planning occurs in almost every city in Thai land where it 
is compulsory to have a city plan that is controlled by law. It is believed by local people 
that the local authority, particularly a municipality, is unable to prepare its own plan. 
This is not the case. In fact, in many cases the mayor is unwilling to deal with planning 
procedures because he does not want to be involved in any conflict with the local people 
in case this influences his popularity during the next election. As a result, municipalities 
let the DTCP prepare any plans and prefer to play the role of an observer. 
Chamlong was not reluctant to proceed with Bangkok city planning and to use 
every available tool to develop Bangkok. Unfortunately, the old concepts of city 
1 Kriengsak mis Prime l¥1inister from 12 November 1977 to 29 February l 980. 
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planning in Thailand had strong influence on the Thai planners. The first legal plan for 
Bangkok showed only a colourful land use map and a road network plan. Emphasis was 
on zoning and enforcement was not strict. The road network plan became useless. As a 
result it was not possible to solve Bangkok's problems with the Bangkok Plan 1992. 
The Plan could, however, slow down development in some areas, at least for a while. 
In the case of a big city with rapid growth such as Bangkok, it was the view of 
professional planners that the sooner the plan was implemented, the more effective it 
would be. In other words, Bangkok might not have faced such critical problems if tte 
first plan had been implemented in 1960. Despite its implementation by law in 1992, 
however, the eventual first plan had very little influence on the development cf 
Bangkok because the BMA could not provide a budget to implement any of the 
development projects included in the plan. Hence, Bangkok city planning seems to be 
an unfinished affair and the planning system seems to be discredited accordingly. 
2.1.2 The Greater Bangkok Plan 2533 [A.D.1990] 
The most classic case of Bangkok city planning is the first master plan for 
Bangkok, The Great Bangkok Plan 2533 [A.D.1990} widely known as the Litchfield 
Plan [Litchfield, Whiting, Bowne and Associates, 1960). It is interesting to study the 
Litchfield Plan because it has been referred to in numerous studies and has guided the 
preparations of many infrastructure development plans. In this section, the basic 
approach is to consider this plan from a different angle to other scholars. The discussion 
in this section also reflects the politics of planning in the 1960s. The consequences of 
this plan in the context of changing Bangkok will be discussed in the section on the 
First Revision of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area in 197 1. 
In 1955, the Bangkok Municipality under the mayorship of General Mangkorn 
Promyodhi, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Interior as~ing USOM to send technical 
experts to help with city planning. An agreement was reached between USOM and the 
Thai government in June 1957. A contract was signed between Litchfield Whiting 
Panero5 Associates and the Thai Ambassador to the US on 16 December 1957. The 
town-planning experts of the Litchfield consortium arrived in Bangkok in March in 
1958 and started work at once [Pore, 1959 #83, 1-3]. The land use of Bangkok in 1958 
was surveyed as shown in Figure 2 1. 
' The letter dated 28 October 1959 from the US Embassy in Bcu1gkok to Washington mentioned this name 
according to the contract on I G December 1957. Litchfield Whiting Panero became Litchfield Whiting 
Bowne & Associates\\ hen the consortium was in Bangkok. 
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The American consultants spent less than three years on their study. The Plan 
shown in Figure 2 .2 was essentially a land use plan: blocks of different uses separated 
by access ways and coloured to produce a pleasant mosaic-like structure able to 
comfortably accommodate four and a half million people, attendant facilities and 
anticipated industrial growth in 1990 [Sternstein, 1971 # 18, 1]. The basic problems with 
making the Litchfield Plan, which influenced the quality of the plan, were apparently 
time management concerns. The American consultants spent too much time gathering 
data and focusing on too many details in unnecessary areas such as the distribution of 
education services in all the districts of Bangkok. However, the emphasis in this section 
is on the planning problems, a better understanding of which can explain what went 
wrong and why the plan was not practicable . 
Besides the report on the First Revision of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area in 
1971, the problems of the Litchfield Plan have been pointed out repeatedly by Larry 
Sternstein6 [Sternstein, 1971 # 18; Sternstein, 1976 # 19; Sternstein, 1982 #3]. Sternstein 
strongly argued in his article Bangkok 2001 : A Space Odyssey that ... 
On arrival, the American consultants found no adequate map of the city A base 
map of the area was then produced from aerial photos .... A considerable time 
was devoted to providing the bare necessities of planning .. .. It appears that a 
considerably greater period of time ought to have been devoted to the 
compilation and analysis of basic data, for the result is neither complete nor 
critical. In particular, it seems strange that the available population data were 
not ;;arefully assessed .. .. None of the data elicited were used in preparing 'The 
Greater Bangkok Plan 2533·. Apparently, advance returns for the Metropolitan 
Area were not requested or could not be supplied before the contract between 
the Thai Government and its consultants terminated in August 1960 .. . . 
[Sternstein, 1982 #3, l 09J 
6 Stcmstcin mainl>· expressed l1is view on the problems in his two books: ( l ) Portrait of Bangkok in the 
article of Bangkok :!001 . . ·l Space Oc(vssey ·published in 1982 and (2) Planning the Developing Primate 
Ci rv Bangkok :!000 pub I ished in 197 l. 
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Bangkok Land Use 1958 
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Inadequate information was likely to be the first problem for the Litchfield Plan. 
Without a reliable survey system, little data collected by different authorities could be 
used for analysis and this problem remains today. The second problem was a poor 
management of limited time, which the American consultants could have used to 
prepare a better plan. However, these were general problems which have been discussed 
in many other documents [(DTCP), 1971#51,5]. 
Stemstein briefly stated that the American consultants were 'to develop general, 
practical plans, including programmes for their implementation' for a number of 
facilities and 'to institutionalise planning a continuing ... process in the Metropolitan 
Area'. The Plan included a budget document which indicated the costs involved in 
providing the necessary facilities, translated the land-use plan into a series of projects to 
be strategically phased in over time and discussed the need for fiscal, legal and 
administrative changes to enable implementation of the Plan [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 109]. 
In other words, the expectation was to apply western management techniques to 
Bangkok city planning. However, making the Bangkok Plan in 1960 was not to be 
smooth. 
The most critical problem, in my view, was that the American consultants did 
not understand systems in Thailand. Without previously studying the administrative, 
legal and planning systems, the Litchfield Plan introduced the so-called new planning 
philosophy which insisted on strategic measures and the provision of the necessary 
fiscal, legal and administrative infrastructure. This caused confusion [Sternstein, 1982 
#3, 109]. Perhaps this planning philosophy was little understood by the Thai authorities. 
Consequently the series of projects in the Plan became a series of conflicts among Thai 
authorities7• 
In Stemstein's view: Thai authorities referred to The Greater Bangkok Plan 
2533 in bolstering arguments for specific devet'opments included in it when these 
cropped up in the traditional project-by-project approach and ignored it when the project 
was not included in the Plan [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 109]. This statement implies that the 
planning philosophy in the Litchfield Plan was ignored and misused. 
In accordance with the Litchfield Plan, the government concentrated on efforts 
to restructure and rearrange the existing systems. In the administrative system, the 
municipalities of Bangkok and Thon Buri were merged in 1971 and became a special 
form of local administration named the BMA in 1975. What the Litchfield Plan required 
most was the new Town and Country Planning Act, the legal authority for a more 
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effective planning system [DTCP, 1971 #51, 1-2] which was issued in 1975. Obviously, 
a considerable time was wasted by taking 15 years to restructure the administrative and 
' legal systems. Consequently, the series of projects proposed were ignored and there was 
little concentration on advancing Bangkok city planning. 
It is not clear whether the American consultants expected these consequences 
with their approach. My argument is that it is not reasonable to make a plan on the basis 
of entirely changing the existing systems. 
The Litchfield Plan may not have been a perfect plan but it could have achieved 
something if it had been implemented. It recommended that controlling the urban 
population could solve the problem of the urban primacy of Bangkok, and that the 
regional cities should be developed in accordance with a programme of decentralisation. 
A transportation network was proposed, giving importance to a mass transit system. All 
of these recomendations were based on development policies which required only ' good 
will' from the government. If any of these recommendations had been implemented, 
Bangkok might have been more properly developed. 
While there were opportunities to reconside r the Litchfield Plan in 1969, 1970 
and 1971 , nothing happened. The failure of planning for Bangkok in this period was 
expressed precisely by Sternstein in his article 'Exorcising the Bedeviled City of 
Angels' [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 117]. Bangkok became a big city with a number of 
problems. In the view of some Thai people, it seems to be the fate of Bangkok that evil 
spirits have settled down in the capital permanently and enjoyed extending their 
territory to the nearby provinces through this period. 
2.1.3 The First Revision of the Plan, 1971 
Very little in the Litchfield Plan was implemented during the 10 years after its 
completion. Meanwhile Bangkok had changed so rapidly that it became necessary to do 
something with the plan. Figure 2.3 shows land use in Bangkok in 1968. An effort to 
refashion it was made unofficially in 1969, transformed unofficially in 1970 and 
officially revised in 1971 . These three efforts reflected something about the planning of 
Bangkok in this period. The emphasis in this section is to study planning philosophy 
according to the different views of Thai planners. Moreover, it will also give another 
interesting aspect of what went wrong with the planning of Bangkok. 
7 See Appendix 2 .2 
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Figure 2.3 Land Use of Bangkok, 1968 
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In October 1969 Arpom Chancharoensook, an architect with the City Planning 
Division, Office of the City Clerk~ Municipality of Bangkok, completed a Memorandum 
Describing Activities under the Responsibility for Planning and Proffering Advice 
Concerning the Future of Bangkok. A large amount of data was presented. The 
problems of Bangkok were discussed briefly. The proposal that the population of the 
Greater Bangkok Area in 2000 be limited to 6,500,000 and the area fixed at 975 square 
kilometres covering four municipalities would require a new metropolitan planning 
authority. Eventually a land use plan in association with a road plan, a facility plan and 
other development programmes were presented [Stemstein, 1971 #18, 93-168]. 
In April 1970, Professor An Nimmanhamindr, an architect, planner and lecturer 
in the Faculty of Architecture, Chulalongkom University, presented a Solution to the 
Traffic Problem in Bangkok-Thon Buri and Establishment of a New National 
Administrative Centre. The problems of Bangkok city planning were discussed briefly. 
He stated that authorities could not solve the problems because of the lack of finance, 
manpower and authority. In his view, the population of Bangkok should be limited to 
3.5 million. Besides a solution to traffic congestion, Professor An proposed that the 
government should consider moving the capital to a new site and relocating the deep sea 
port and certain types of factories [Stemstein, 1971#18,183-213). 
In February 1971, the DTCP, Ministry of Interior completed a Report on the 
First Revision of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area. DTCP briefly reviewed the 
Litchfield Plan which was considered as a policy guideline but was no longer the master 
plan. The greatest problem for the DTCP was the lack of data on industry and 
commerce in Bangkok and Thon Buri. After studying a wide range of urban and 
regional data, it concluded that the metropolitan area should be delimited so as to 
include areas under the direct economic influence ?f Bangkok. It also proposed that the 
1990 population should be limited to 6.5 million living w.ithin an area of 732 square 
kilometres. The emphasis was on land use and communication planning and different 
zones were presented [Stemstein, 1971 #18, 17-91). Figure 2.4 shows the First Revision 
of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area in 1971. 
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Figure 2.4 The first revision of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area, 1971 
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In 1971 , these three papers were republished in S ternstein' s P tanning the 
Developing Primate City,' Bangkok 20008. In Sternstein' s view, the papers showed 
' 
authoritative Thai thinking on city planning in this period. Besides presenting strong 
criticisms and arguments about differences between the three papers, Sternstein 
concluded that ' to grasp the opportunity for planning, Bangkok needs people in 
authority who are aware of what is going on in the many and varied fields pertinent to 
urban development and who know Bangkok.' [Stemstein, 1982 #3, 115]. During the past 
decades however, the people Stemstein mentioned could not be found and the old 
problems of Bangkok city planning remain. 
The papers also highlighted another aspect of the planning problem. The authors 
were the representatives of three primary actors who were involved in Bangkok city 
planning. First, the Municipality of Bangkok was viewed as the local government 
agency which has to act as the manager in the development of Bangkok. Second, 
Chulalongkorn University was viewed as the primary planning school which supplied 
personnel to the planning authorities. Last, the DTCP was viewed as a representative of 
the central government responsible for city and community planning. In principle, all of 
them were closely involved with Bangkok city planning and cooperation was therefore 
crucial. The fragmentation in planning philosophy was another serious problem for 
Bangkok city planning in this period. A consequence of this problem was evident when 
the fragmentation became worse and the effort of proceeding with the Bangkok Plan in 
1976 failed despite the new planning law being issued in 1975. 
2.1.4 Development Planning 
After 1976, Bangkok city planning was m limbo, while the problems of 
Bangkok became worse every day. Traffic congestion, floods, slums and pollution 
extended in every direction of road development. The city demanded any practical and 
urgent solution that could be implemented immediately. As a result, many multi-million 
baht projects were rapidly approved to solve Bangkok's problems, such as the first stage 
of the expressway project9 started in the late 1970s. However, these solutions were 
undertaken separately by different public authorities and without any coordination. As a 
result, infrastructure development projects in this period extended the built environment 
8 The highlights of these three papers with the same context was republished on the new title Bangkok 
2001: A Space Odyssey, in Portrait of Bangkok in I 982 [Sternscein, I 982 #3, 109-105]. 
9 The first expressway system, comprising three sections, namely Din Dang-Port. Bang Na-Port and Dao 
Khanong-Port, of respective lengths of8.9, 7.9 and 10.3 kilometres was completed in 1987. 
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of Bangkok in a disorderly fashion. Without development controls, the city was 
growing rapidly in every direction while the new infrastructure was being developed. 
Under the new form of local government with a larger administrative structure 
and more financial support, the BMA became more autonomous in development 
management and could implement its own large projects. As a result of this new 
arrangement, the BMA and other authorities were mutually responsible for the chaotic 
development of Bangkok in this period. 
A fundamental shift of planning strategy was evident when the BMA started the 
first five-year development plan (2520-2524 B.E. or 1976-1981). It was supposed to be 
implemented in 1976 but was not completed until October 1977. Its goal was to provide 
clear development guidelines and policies in accordance with the five-year national 
development plan prepared by the NESDB [BMA, 1977 #52, 1-9]. The five-year 
development plan is divided into five smaller plans including (1) the land use and 
infrastructure development plan; (2) the environmental development plan; (3) the social 
and economic development plan; (4) the BMA revenue development plan; and (5) the 
BMA administration development plan. The process of making the plan suggests that 
the BMA could not manage and integrate the five-year plan with its urban planning for 
Bangkok and other projects. 
The five-year plan then became an agenda that allowed development projects to 
proceed in an orderly manner. Besides the five-year plan, however, there are also plans 
and master plans which the BMA produces under the responsibility and supervision of 
its different departments. Some projects are implemented in accordance with new 
regulations issued by the BMA itself. As a result, the BMA is able to develop its own 
multi-million baht projects in Bangkok. 
The most controversial project is the mass transit system initiated and developed 
by the BMA, known as the Sky Train Project. Authority for· this project is written in the 
EMA Act of 1975. In 1990 and 1991 , the SRT proposed its mass transit system 
separately. Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority (MRT A), a new state 
enterprise established in August 1992, is also developing an underground mass transit 
system. Cabinet approved the first stage of the MRT A project on 17 May 1994. 
The BMA is a special form of local government. The MRTA is a new state 
enterprise under the Office of the Prime Minister and the SRT is another state enterprise 
under the Ministry of Transportation. Factions in the coalition government have made 
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decisions on these authorities. Consequently, the mass transit systems 10 are completely 
different in terms of technology, planning philosophy, operation and development 
' 
management. In 1997 and 1998 construction problems at many road intersections 
became evident. 
According to the coalition government, compromise was the best way to satisfy 
the different political factions which had interests in these mega-projects. It was 
understood by the government that the result of this lack of coordination would be 
costly. However, any intervention by the government was to compromise and let the 
projects continue. The government obviously ignored the issue of 'public interest'. Why 
did the government not have a clear policy on these projects? Political interest seemed 
to be more important than public interest. The problem of the chaotic development of 
Bangkok therefore remains unsolved. 
Besides implementing the local five-year plan, the Department of City Planning 
of the BMA also provides numerous plans for districts in Bangkok focusing on city and 
community planning. Private consultants and academic institutions are hired separately 
to make an 'urban development plan' for each district. A great number of urban facts 
are presented and the problems are discussed. Existing land uses are analysed briefly 
and assumptions are made in order to make projections of population growth and 
infrastructure requirements. A brief conclusion is made and some recommendations in 
terms of project planning are proposed for urban development. However, the 
consequences of this method of planning are another story. 'Development planning' 
becomes a political concern of the district council when it is dealing with budget 
allocations. Not surprisingly, urban problems at the district level are included in the plan 
to increase the budget. In reality, the budget seems to be spent to increase political 
popularity, not to solve problems. 
It can be a considerable waste of time to make this sort of plan because they are 
never actually implemented. Also, the proposed project for the district is seldom 
functional particularly when it has to be connected with the systems of Bangkok. This 
sort of plan seems to satisfy some members of the District Council who used it as a 
political tool for election campaigns. 
Moreover, other infrastructure development programmes and projects with 
bigger budget allocations have already been considered and planned as systems by 
many other departments of the BMA. A good example is the BMA flood protection 
project which is integrated with the traffic congestion resolution programme. At least 
10 See Appendix 2.3 
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five departmental bodies within the BMA's administration have responsibilities for this: 
the Department of Public Works, the Department of Traffic and Transportation, the 
Department of Drainage and Sewerage, the Department of Policy and Planning and the 
Department of Public Cleansing. 
Therefore, in my view, it is not necessary to make urban development plans for 
districts in Bangkok. Evidence supporting this argument is the idea to cut the budgets 
for all district councils in Bangkok in which candidates campaigned during the local 
election for district council members in April 1998. 
Besides this sort of plan, the development planning of Bangkok has been studied 
extensively on a regional scale with reports and regional plans being submitted to the 
government since the 1980s. The planning doctrine has changed and a larger scale of 
planning with different viewpoints has influenced the old tradition of Bangkok city 
planning due to the fact that Bangkok has become a part of the global city system. 
Consequently, the context of planning has moved beyond the old planning philosophy 
focusing on a simply land use planning towards the networks of international trade, 
information and transportation which will be discussed later in terms of Bangkok as the 
aviation hub . . 
The rapid growth of Bangkok with the boom in the Thai economy in the late 
1980s influenced the government's policy on Bangkok and airport development in the 
early 1990s. A number of chronic problems in Bangkok, which were consequences of 
uncontrolled development during the past three decades, became a serious constraint 
because the site at Nong Ngu Hao was now surrounded by a number of houses, 
factories, schools and universities. However, the government continued its new policy 
on metropolitan regional development, making Bangkok much bigger. 
2.2 The Second Bangkok International Airport, 1961-1991 
As discussed, Bangkok city planning and the SBIA Project had parallel 
development agendas from 1961 to 1991. It is evident that the power elite in this period 
required a high degree of command and control to develop a project as big as the SBIA. 
This section discusses what happened to the airport development in this period and why 
it did not progress for three decades. An analysis of the airport development in this 
period shows that the new Bangkok airport project was a political concern to make 
money. The emphasis in this section is on the site selection and the Prime Minister' s 
interest. The discussion covers the chaotic period of airport development in the 1980s. 
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2.2.1 Site Selection and the Prime Minister's Interest 
The matter of site selection is usually a controversial process and no site passes 
acceptance on all important factors such as air space, meteorological considerations, 
' 
topographical conditions, environmental concerns, capital and operating costs and 
surface transportation capacity. This process normally takes much time, usually years, 
however such troublesome activities were bypassed in the case of the new Bangkok 
airport. 
However, the official reports available do not. mention much about proceeding 
with the new airport in 1961 and 1962 despite the latest reports in the 1990s. 
In 1961 11 (probably early 1962), Army Field Marshal Sarit Thannarat, a 
particularly authoritarian person in Thai history, quickly set up a committee to progress 
the development of the new airport. After the committee was set up, its first task was to 
select a suitable site. The site selection methodology was to point to locations around 
Bangkok. Figure 2. 5 shows seven sites which were proposed and evaluated briefly: ( l) 
Lad Lumkeao and (2) Lad Bualuang in Prathumtani province; (3) Sai Noi in Nontaburi 
province; (4) Nong Ngu Hao and (5) Bang Bo in Samut Prakarn province; (6) Nong 
Chok; and (7) Don Muang in Bangkok. None of the sites were studied in detail and the 
committee expressed a clear preference for developing the site east of Bangkok at Nong 
Ngu Hao. 
It might have been good timing that the US Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), meanwhile, submitted an aerodrome study and proposed that a site be found 
approximately 25 kilometres east of Bangkok. This would offer enough separation 
between Don Muang and the new airport for aviation operations. This is the location of 
Nong Ngu Hao The FAA study proposal showed an interlocked decision implying that 
the government had expressed an interest early to choose Nong Ngu Hao for the new 
airport. The mi litary government immediately. proclaimed its intention to purchase 
19,000 rai (30.4 square kilometres) at the Nong Ngu Ha·o site. In September 1962, the 
Land Acquisition Act for Nong Ngu Hao was approved as a legal measure to enable 
early development . 
11 Sia111ra1h Weekly Magazine on l l December l 983 briefly mentioned that Sarit started the site selection 
in l 96 l. 
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Source: Thongchai Roachanakanan, 1999. 
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Figure 2.5 Site selection for the Second Bangkok International Airport in 1962 
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Since 1961, official documents and reports from the authorities concerned have 
elaborated a number of positive characteristics about the Nong Ngu Hao site. But the 
' facts cannot be denied. Nong Ngu Hao is a flood plain comprising nearly a thousand 
large and small ponds located between the Chao Praya and Bang Pakong rivers; a 
natural floodway to the sea. The name itself means 'the great swamp of cobras'. The 
terrain is flat, close to the sea and only 0.50-0.80 metres above mean sea level. There is 
a great risk of flooding from both stormwater and high tides. Unconsolidated sediments 
cover nearly the whole of the site and the topsoil consists of soft clay and mud to a 
depth of 10-20 metres. In short, construction in this area is costly. Despite these critical 
and well-known constraints, the project got underway. 
Utis Kaothien12, Director of the Urban Development Coordination Division in 
the NESDB, argues that all these constraints could be solved by the application of 
modem technology. He also argues that the cost of advanced technology is becoming 
cheaper compared with rising land prices. In the view of a policy maker at the national 
level, land price is more important, probably the most important factor in deciding on 
the development of the SBIA. In my view, politics in the 1960s may tell a different 
story. 
As discussed, American experts played vital roles in Thai aviation development 
in this period. Three new airbases13; U-Tapao in Rayong, 175 kilometres southeast of 
Bangkok, Nam Phong in Khonkaen and Kamphaeng Saen in Nakhonpathom 50 
kilometres northwest of Bangkok, were being developed by USOM. Apparently, these 
sites were much more carefully studied and better prepared compared with the new 
Bangkok airport project. In fact, USOM did not play any role in site selection for the 
new Bangkok airport. Its role and policy on the new Bangkok airport became clear after 
Sarit died. 
Over the past decades, the subjective matter of site· selection in 1962 has been 
discussed little, even today. Many attempts were made to propose new sites for the 
SBIA in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the ability to carry out a survey for another 
new site and land acquisition has become more difficult and also a political concern 
because it may affect the local people. Certainly, no government wants to commit itself 
openly to dealing with this troublesome problem. A recent example is the failure of an 
attempt made in 1997 to propose a new site some kilometres south of Nong Ngu Hao. 
12 Utis gave this interview and expressed his concerns at his office in Bangkok on 25 April 1996. 
13 Currently, Kamphaeng Saen is only a training school for the Royal Thai Air Force while Nam Phong. 
which was also designed for the B-52, has never been used since the end of Vietnam War. U-Tapao, with 
the largest runway in Southeast Asia, has never reached 15 per c:ent of its capac ity. 
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Ultimately, the government has been forced to continue the SBIA at the site 
selected in 1962 and let the authorities involved repeatedly cover up information and the 
shortcomings of Nong Ngu Hao. 
2.2.2 Chaotic Period of Airport Development 
After Sarit's death, Field Marshal Thanom took power and maintained the 
military dictatorship. Meanwhile, the Nong N gu Hao project was continuing. In 1964, 
the FAA was asked to restudy the six former sites for the new airport. A year later, it 
reconfirmed that Nong Ngu Hao was the most suitable site for new airport development. 
Why did its selection have to be confirmed? 
In January 1966, Cabinet approved a policy to maintain Bangkok as the regional 
aviation hub. It then asked its old friend, USOM, to survey and design a new airport at 
Nong Ngu Hao site, but its request was officially denied in 1968. It is interesting to 
study what USOM was doing at that time. 
USOM started the construction of U-Tapao airbase in October 1965 at a cost of 
US$105.9 million and completed it early in 1967 while Nam Phong was being 
developed. In fact, the second phase of a 10-year programme ( 1965-197 4) had just 
started and the relationship between the Thai and American governments became much 
closer when the Thai government officially approved the deployment of US forces in 
February 1964. Why did USOM not want to play a role in the SBIA Project? Was this 
project not in its interest? It is possible that USOM knew well that it was costly to 
develop the new airport on a swamp. Only the American documents would allow an 
answer to these questions. 
The Thai government then looked for assistance from other countries. In January 
1969, the governments of France, Japan, Canada, Italy and Israel submitted proposals to 
design and develop the second Bangkok airport. Cabinet approved the Canadian 
proposal and provided a budget to move the SBIA Project forward. 
As a consequence of the rapid growth of international aviation in the 1960s, the 
second stage of the development and extension of Don Muang airport was undertaken 
during 1970-1973. In this period, civil aviation and associated commercial activities 
were separated from the military. New international and domestic terminals replaced the 
old administrative offices of the Air Force on the west of the runways. The east of the 
runways became the military sector and the west of the runways became the civil 
aviation sector with its own access from the new highway of Vibhavadi Rangsit. A 
number of modem facilities were provided to facilitate the first generation of wide-body 
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aircraft. Pressure for this came from the Air Force due to its intervention in the national 
airline. 
The Northrop Airport Development Corporation (NADC) first proposed 
developing the SBIA in June 1971 but the Committee of Thai Aviation objected to it. 
The budget for the Canadian proposal was cut in September 1971 with no explanation 
from Cabinet. The NADC proposed the construction and operation at the new airport 
again on 11 October 1971 but it was strongly opposed by the public. It was not the right 
time to propose any projects because the public movement against the dictatorship had 
started asking for democracy. 
On 17 November 1971, a coup by Marshal Thanom was made early in the 
morning and on the same day the military government set up a committee to consider 
the NADC proposal. Although this committee had refused the proposal in March 1972 
because of insufficient return to the government and serious doubts that the NADC 
could develop the airport within the timeframe, the military government itself approved 
the proposal on 10 May 1972. Without any bidding, Air Marshal Dawee Chulyasapa, 
Minister of Transportation, signed a contract with the NADC on 1 February 1973. This 
contact became a major scandal after the collapse of the military regime in October 
1973 when Kurk-rit Pramoj14 identified that a reason for the coup in 1971 seemed to be 
to pave the way for Nong Ngu Hao development [Wonghanchao, 1974 #33, 15; 
Chanapai, 1998 #85,18]. 
After Thanem went into exile in Singapore following the overthrow of the 
dictatorship in October 1973, Dawee tried hard to validate the contract. However, the 
NADC was not able to finance the proje~t by the dateline of 31 December 1973. The 
political movement for democracy, meanwhile, became stronger with demonstrations by 
students and the labour unions taking place every day and everywhere. The SBIA 
development was viewed as military exploitation. Criticisms focused on corruption 
rather than on the poor location of the airport. After heavy pressure from the public, the 
NADC officially informed the civilian government that it could not continue the project 
and wanted to cancel the contract without any request for compensation on 1 S January 
1974. 
Obviously these political concerns had a direct impact on the dismissal of the 
development of the new airport. The NADC concentrated only on proposed revenue and 
its monopoly rights over international aviation for 20 years, but it did not actually 
14 Kurk-rit Pramoj , a leading Thai journalist, identified this reason in his artide published in Siam Rath, a 
local newspaper, on 28 September 1972. 
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prepare a feasibility study. As a matter of fact, the arguments from the public were not 
so critical in terms of technical references because of the Jack of data and information. 
However, the environmental imp~ct of the new airport was mentioned for the first time 
and this issue was taken into consideration later. 
Democracy movements in Thailand collapsed in October 1976 when the military 
dictatorship returned. Riots in Bangkok in 1976 became the turning point of Thai 
politics. A number of activists were brutally killed and some were put in prison. Some 
students joined the Communist Party and the country was controlled under martial Jaw 
for one year. 
Another attempt to revive the development of the SBIA occurred in late 1976 
after the collapse of the democracy movement. However there was no public reaction 
because of the repressive Thanin Graiwichien government recruited by the military. 
Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS), funded by the Ministry of Transportation, 
studied the ultimate development capacity for Don Muang airport in comparison with 
the investment in the new airport development at Nong Ngu Hao. It submitted a Site 
Investigation and Master Plan to the government on 20 February 1978. This study 
adopted a general technical approach, without sufficient evaluation of environmental 
impacts. Surprisingly, however the impact of flood protection on Bangkok was not 
included. 
On 2 May 1978, Cabinet approved the expansion of the Don Muang airport for 
another 10 years within a budget of 4,000 million baht, including a new runway. 
Meanwhile, it provided other funds to continue further study on the Nong Ngu Hao 
project. 
On 20 September 1979 Cabinet, under the administration of Kriengsak 
Chomanan, the newly elected Prime Minister, gave approval for the Ministry of 
Transportation to urgently develop U-Tapao in Rayong province as a commercial 
airport. The approval cancelled the previous order dated 2 May 1978 on the feasibility 
study for the SBIA. However this decision to dismiss the Nong Ngu Hao project 
became illegal in tenns of compulsory procedures under the Land Acquisition Act of 
1962, an act created for the sole purpose of airport development. Hence, it is quite clear 
why the SBIA Project could not be cancelled legally. On 21 December 1979, Cabinec 
revised its decision and let the Department of Civil Aviation continue the study. 
In 1980, the third stage of the development of Don Muang airport started under 
the responsibility of the Airport Authority of Thailand (AA T), a new state enterprise 
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established in July 1979. The capacity of Don Muang airport during 1980-1989 was 
increased to 16 million passengers per annum. 
' The political situation in this period was critical due to changes in military 
power and in the coalition government. After the general election in March 1980, the 
new cabinet under Prem15 Tinnasulanon's administration approved the proposal for the 
Ministry of Transportation to develop Nong Ngu Hao with a budget of 21,300 million 
baht on 21 September 1980. The main reason was that Don Mung airport could 
facilitate only 35 aircraft movements per hour and it would reach its ultimate capacity 
by 1992. 
More surprisingly, on 3 February 1981 the same Cabinet approved another 
proposal for the Ministry of Transportation to purchase more land of 51 rai (8. 1 ha) at 
Nong Ngu Hao with a budget of 50 million baht16. Another budget of 60 million baht 
for master planning was approved on 19 May 1981. The Nong Ngu Hao project was 
again becoming of greater interest. In September 1982, a Thai-Belgian consortium 
proposed a loan of 46,000 million baht without interest for 19 years for the construction 
of new airport but this was not considered. 
Following procedures undertaken by the Ministry of Transportation, the 
Netherland Airport Consultants (NACO) won the bidding for master planning in 
October 1982. After reaching agreement on more detailed designs and services, the 
Acting Cabinet approved a contract worth 136 million baht with NACO on 12 April 
1983. The doubling of this budget later caused political conflict. 
The results of the general election on 18 April 1983 totally changed the fate of 
the new airport. The new Minister of Transportation, Samuk Sundaravej, formally 
announced that policies on the new airport project must be revised. He argued that the 
Nong Ngu Hao site was unsuitable for airport development and proposed a new site in 
Nonthaburi province. On 22 November 1983 he submitted a proposal to restudy the 
development alternative between Don Muang airport and Nong Ngu Hao. 
In 1984, meanwhile, the NACO completed a master plan for the Nong Ngu Hao 
site. It submitted a report; The SB/A Master Plan, Study, Design and Construction 
Phasing. This was based on extensive data gathering and has often been referred to in 
subsequent studies. However it was not the right time for Nong Ngu Hao as Don Muang 
airport was being tripled in area. In the view of the decision-makers , there was no need 
15 The political situation in 1980 was complex. The elected representatives avoided a confrontation with 
the army as they required political stability. Consequently the factions in the parliament reached an 
agreement to support General Prem Tinnasulanon form the government. 
16 Siam Rath Weekly, 11December 1983, pl8-23. 
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to spend a large amount of money on a similar project at the same time. Also the great 
flood in 1983 had completely submerged Nong Ngu Hao for three months. Under these 
circumstances, the government ~eturned Nong Ngu Hao to the shelf, leaving the 
purchased land idle again. 
In 1985, TAMS shifted its task to Don Muang and submitted a report; The 
Expansion Feasibility Study for the Bangkok International Airport, to government. On 
27 August 1985, Cabinet approved the development of a commercial airport at U-Tapao 
airbase as a supplementary airport under the responsibility of the Royal Thai Navy. 
Phojana Simasathien 17, Deputy Project Director; Second Bangkok Airport, has stated 
that the mid 1980s was a period of chaos for airport development because of changing 
governments. Political lobbying, which was common for every multi-million baht 
project, made the airport development confused. 
The development of Don Muang airport, completed in l 989, still could not meet 
the increased rate of air traffic as the average growth of passengers was at 15 per cent 
per annum, which was much more than estimated. A budget of 165 million baht was 
then provided for the improvement of U-Tapao airport in April 1990 and its name was 
changed to 'Rayong U-Tapao International Airport'. This solution was stressed again 
when the NESDB submitted a report, Feasibility Study and Master Plan for Rayong U-
Tapao International Airport, by Louis Berger International Inc. to the government in 
March 1991. Under the national policy, the emphasis was not only on commercial 
development but also on aircraft maintenance and cargo handling. However, the new 
project, Global Transpark, did not attract the air transport industry. In 1995, Rayong U-
Tapao International Airport served only 2, 186 commercial aircraft movements 
compared with a capacity of 150,000 annual movements [Thannews, 1996 #84, 12]. 
Early in 1991, Louis Berger International Inc and its partners sponsored by the 
AAT, submitted an Airport System Master Plan Study which projected air traffic growth 
of 58 million passengers by 2010. The Don Muang airport's ultimate capacity was to be 
reached by the year 2000. 
On 23 April 1991, Cabinet approved the fourth development stage of the Don 
Muang airport. As a result, a second passenger terminal was completed in 1995 
increasing the capacity of Don Muang airport to 25 million passengers per annum. 
The Thai economy was booming in the late 1980s and the early 1990s and the 
right time had come. Cabinet approved the development of the SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao 
17 He gave an interview and expressed this point at his office in Bangkok on 30 April 1996. 
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on 7 May 1991 thereby initiating the most expensive infrastructure investment ever in 
Thailand. 
2.3 Urban Primacy 
A 'Primate City' may be defined as the existence of one overridingly large city 
which dominates the nation functionally as well as in terms of size [London. 1980 
#1, l]. 
This section discusses the most significant shortcoming of development without 
planning and control. The urban primacy of Bangkok, in my view, is the primary 
problem that has caused a number of chronic problems in Bangkok. Despite a policy on 
development decentralisation·, most governments have failed to retard the growth of 
Bangkok and the urban primacy problem has been ignored. 
Time Period Multiplier** Remarks 
1780-1900 10 Data are limited and of uncertain accuracy, but Chiang Mai 
appears to have been the second most populous centre during 
the period 1780-1900. 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
23 
25 
33 
51 
Chiang Mai was the second most populous centre during the 
period 1900-1950. 
1990* ** 28 
Hat Yai-Songkhla was the second most populous centre 
during the period 1960-1 980. Hat Yai and Songkhla are 
separate municipalities but there is reason to regard the two 
as comprising a twin-city. Taking Chiang Mai to be the 
second most populous centre would increase the multipliers 
for 1970 and 1980 to approximately 35 and 55, respectively. 
Nakhon Ratchasima was the second most populous centre in 
this period. 
Table 2. 1 Development of Bangkok Urban Primacy* from 1780 to1990 
* 'Primacy' means the disparity between the population of built-up Bangkok and the 
** 
*** 
second most populous centre in Thailand. 
The 'multiplier' is the number by which the multiplicand (the population of the second 
most populous centre in Thailand) is multiplied to reproduce the population of 
Bangkok; it is expressed as a whole number to suggest only general accuracy. For the 
1780- 1900 period the multiplier is not more than a reasonable supposition. 
Recalculated by Thongchai Roachanakanan in 1999. 
Source; [Sternstcin, 1982 #3, I 07], 
Bangkok has been a primate c ity for decades as shown in Table 2. 1. It is a 
primate ci ty by any definition [London, I 980 #1, 28] both in terms of size and funct ion. 
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Chris Dixon [ 1999) states that Nakhon Ratchasima was the second most populous 
centre with a multiplier of 30 in 1993 [Dixon, 1999 #115, 194]. 
' 
As a result of a national policy which has been biased and neglected balanced 
development for decades, Bangkok has become the primate metropolis and has 
extended its boundary to cover all nearby provinces. It is undisputed that the urban 
primacy of Bangkok is a serious concern causing a number of chronic problems. In this 
section the historical development of urban primacy will be discussed briefly and the 
analysis will answer the question of why the problem of urban primacy cannot be 
solved. 
In the view of Bruce London, the primate city has historically been parasitic in 
Thailand and the nature of the primate city-hinterland relationship has changed over 
time with evolving national and international situations [London, 1980 #1, 67, 121). His 
study is based on modern Thai history18 regarding the political primate city and the 
distribution of power in Thai society from 1850 to 1973. He argues that primate city 
parasitism is much more likely to exist in a situation in which an elite monopolises 
power and dominates decision-making and policy implementation than in a case in 
which power is decentralised [London, 1980 #1, 42]. The power elite, which played a 
role in exploitative and neglectful policy-making during different periods, is discussed 
by London to explain the development of the primate city. 
His analysis and arguments on the comparative use of power and the continued 
ruling class through different periods of modem Thai history which influenced the 
existence of urban primacy, are reasonable. Even though he did not focus on legal and 
planning contexts, his emphasis on elite motives as key distinguishing criteria among 
types of parasitism supports my arguments in the next chapters which focus on how the 
power elite transformed the urban structure of Bangkok. 
However, his hypothesis should be revised to explain the changing phenomenon 
of urban primacy in the 1980s and 1990s. In my view, primate city parasitism exists in 
every situation. After the collapse of military dictatorship in October 1973, the new 
power elite groups ignored all the facts about urban primacy. These new power elite 
groups included a number of factions in the political theatre. Consequently more 
resources were distributed to the hinterland but Bangkok remained the primate 
metropolis. In my view, urban primacy has become a complex problem that cannot be 
solved quickly . 
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The best available materials show that the urban primacy of Bangkok has been 
studied and solutions have been proposed since 1959. It is interesting to investigate 
what happened and why the problem of urban primacy has been ignored by successive 
governments for decades. 
In the Bangkok-Thonburi City Planning Project, Litchfield Whiting Bowne & 
Associates studied the urban primacy of Bangkok and pointed out the shortcomings in a 
technical monograph submitted to the Ministry of Interior in November 1959. 
Importantly, one of their many recommendations was to build up the economic hec.lth 
of other cities, which in turn would attract and support additional population. The 
decentralisation of government to the greatest extent possible was discussed and some 
regional cities such as Chiangmai, Korat (Nakhon Ratchasima) and Petchaburi were 
recommended for decentralisation [Litchfield, 1959 #81 , 43]. 
Cyrus R. Nims19 [1963] submitted a report City Planning in Thailand m 
November I 963 and stressed the importance of controlling population growth m 
Bangkok . He recommended that the government should stimulate urban growth in other 
parts of the kingdom so that the migration of people to Bangkok could slowed down. 
Importantly, he noted that a population of 6 to 9 million in 30 years would have serious 
consequences for the standard of living in Bangkok and for the economy generally 
[Nims, 1963 #122, I 08]. 
Despite the first warning about the senous problem of urban pnmacy, the 
NESDB, which is responsible for planning at a national level, did not include these 
crucial recommendations in its first national plan in 1961 . On the contrary, the NESDB 
concentrated on the development of the capital city and its concise reason was economic 
efficiency. In fact, the national agenda on decentralisation development policy on 
selected regional cities was written in the fifth national plan in 1982, some 20 years 
later. Why did the NESDB ignore the problem of urban primacy? Is the 1'i'ESDB 
responsible for the continued urban primacy of Bangkok?_ 
Despite the shortcomings and many arguments through the past decades, the 
NESDB is continuing its staunch policy on urban and regional development by aiming 
at a targeted population of 32 million living in the radius of 200 kilometres around 
Bangkok in 20l0. Is it a reasonable policy to agglomerate nearly half of the national 
population in an area less than 15 per cent of Thailand? 
1 
K Modem Thai history may be diYided into three periods (I ) the period of absolute monarchy from 1850 
to 1892. (2) the period of bureaucratic reform from 1892 to 1932 ;md (J) t11e ascendancy of the military-
ci\'ili<m bureaucrac:-: O\'er t11e monarchy from 1932 to 1971 [London, 1980 #I. ~91 . 
19 Cyrns R. Nims ''as a USOM city pl;urning ad,·isor to the government of T hai land from 1961to1963. 
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In Bruce London's study on the primate city and the distribution of political 
power in Thai society, two key words are mentioned to explain the use of power. They 
are the Phuyai (big people) with power and the PhunoP0 (little people) without power in 
' 
the Thai society. Hence, the coexistence of these two groups should be reconsidered. 
What is the distinction between the two groups? Why doesn't Cabinet give orders to the 
NESDB to revise its policy on urban primacy? Cabinet and the NESDB may have the 
same motive for maintaining urban primacy 
In reality, the Phuyai cannot give orders to the Phunoi . The use of power is only 
effective within the same faction. Factions, in my view, are probably the most important 
factor that influences the use of power. 
2.4 Changes in the Built Environment of Bangkok 
Bangkok in 1990 is completely different from Bangkok in 1960. This is evident 
in material produced by the DTCP, Ministry of Interior in the Report on the First 
Revision of the Plan for the Metropolitan Area Bangkok in 1971. 
Figure 2.6 shows changes in the built-up area of Bangkok which has gradually 
increased from 13 square kilometres in 1900 to 43 square kilometres in 1936 and to 67 
square kilometres in 1953. The built-up area of Bangkok has changed rapidly from 96 
square kilometres in 1958 to 141.5 square kilometres in 1968 and to 330 square 
kilometres in 1981 . The bui lt-up area of Bangkok in the early 1990s covered parts of all 
the nearby provinces of Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, Pathum Thani, Nakhon Pathorr , 
Samut Sakhon and Chachoengsao. It is believed that the built-up area of Bangkok 
metropolitan region has covered more than 2,000 square kilometres with a population of 
more than I 0 million [Roachanakanan, 1997 #55, 67]. An examination of the built-up 
area of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) has not been undertaken in detail in 
this study. However, the study has consider.ed the BMR population growth and 
structural change. These aspects are discussed in this section. 
:•· Dclint1ions of the '''o words ;1rc gi\·en by B London lLondon. 1980 #l. 53! . 
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Source: DTCP, 1971. 
Figure 2.6 Urbanised Areas of Bangkok-Thonburi, 1900, 1936, 1958 and 1968 
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There were 1,474,455 people living in the Municipality of Bangkok and 302,732 
people living in Thon Buri Municjpality in 1956 compared with 10,127 people living in 
east Bangkok, that is Bang Kapi and Lat Krabang, at that time [Litchfield, 1959 #81, 
14). The built environment of Bangkok in the 1960s is viewed as a compact city with a 
very high density of 65 ,300-84,000 persons per square kilometre living in the core of 
Bangkok or China Town. In the same period east Bangkok was remote rural with a very 
low density of 160-240 persons per square kilometre compared with 15-145 persons per 
square kilometre around Nong Ngu Hao [Sternstein, 1995 #41, 23]. 
A significant urban change in Bangkok during 1960-1990 was the decline of the 
inner city and the urban sprawl with a high rate of growth at the periphery. In 1990 the 
population of the city core including China Town, decreased from 65,300-84,000 
persons in 1960 to 39,800-41,200 persons per square kilometre in 1990. Development 
directions along the north and east corridors of Bangkok were evident as a consequence 
of industrial and housing developments on cheaper land on the outskirts of Bangkok. 
Six provinces around Bangkok, Samut Prakan, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, 
Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon and Chachoengsao, substantially absorbed young 
labour migrating from the countryside. A growing number of factories, industrial estates 
and housing projects became typical development phenomena in these provinces from 
1960 to 1990. Population distribution and change over this period are described in the 
following tables . 
From Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, one may conclude that Bangkok and its nearby 
provinces (see Figure 2.7) have grown very fast in terms of population during the period 
1960 to 1990. Samut Prakan, where the SBIA is located, shows the highest rate of 
growth through the three decades. Table 2.4 shows more details of great changes in 
population by districts (see Figure 2.8) around No~g Ngu Hao in the same period. 
The SBIA Project will have an impact on five districts in Bangkok and one 
district in Samut Prakan. They are Bang Kapi, Pra Kanong, Lat Krabang, Min Buri and 
Nong Chok in Bangkok and Bang Phli in Samut Prakan. From Table 2.3 it can be seen 
that the population in the six districts increased sharply from 370,500 people in 1960 to 
1,670,800 people in 1990. 
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1960 1970 1980 1990 
BMR (total) 3,616.0 4,883.9 7,089.8 9,142.0 
Bangkok 2,136.4 3,077.3 4,697. l 5,882.4 
Samut Prakan 234.7 329.4 484.8 769.8 
Nonthaburi 196.2 269.1 369.8 574.8 
Pathum Thani 189.8 233.9 319.7 412.4 
Nakhon Pathom 370.5 419.3 525.9 629.6 
Samut Sak.hon 165.7 200.5 247.2 321.0 
Chachoengsao 322.7 354.5 445.4 552.2 
Source: [Sternstein, 1995 #41, 10] 
Table 2. 2 Bangkok Metropolitan Region: population by standard constituent 
provinces 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 (Population in thousands) 
1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 
('000) % ('000) % ('000) % 
BMR 1,267.9 35.1 2,205.9 45.2 2,052.2 28.9 
Bangkok 940.9 44.0 1,619.8 52.6 I, 185.3 25.2 
Samut Prakan 94.7 40.4 155.4 47.2 285.0 58.8 
Nonthaburi 72.9 37.1 100.7 37.4 204.9 55.4 
Pathum Thani 44.1 23.2 85.8 36.7 92.7 29.9 
Nakhon Pathom 48.8 13.2 106.6 25.4 103.7 19.7 
Samut Sak.hon 34.8 21.0 46.7 23.3 73.8 29.8 
Chachoengsao 31.8 9.8 90.9 25.6 106.8 24.0 
Source: [Sternstein, 1995 #41, 11] 
Table 2.3 Bangkok Metropolitan Region: population growth by standard 
constituent provinces 1960-1970, 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 (Population increase in 
thousands) 
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District 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Bang Kapi 6 1.2 87.9 236. 1 599.3 
Pra Kanong 170.8 382.5 482.3 70 1.9 
Lat Krabang 23 .6 29.4 39.5 77 .4 
Min Buri 29.5 36.7 51.4 103.4 
Nong Chok 32.4 40 .4 46.6 56 .5 
Bang Phli 53 .0 57. l 69.3 132.3 
T otal 370.5 634 .0 925 .2 1,670.8 
Part A: Population in thousands 
District 1960-1 970 1970- 1980 1980-1 990 
Bang Kapi 43.6 168.6 153. 8 
Pra Kanong 123.9 26. 1 45 .5 
Lat Krabang 24 .6 34.4 95 .9 
Min Buri 24.4 40 .0 I 0 1.2 
Nong Chok 24 7 15.3 21.2 
Bang Phli 7 .7 2 1.3 90.9 
Part B: Population gro\vth over decade 
Source: [Stemstein, 1995 #41. 25 , 27] 
Table 2.4 Population numbers by standard constituent districts around the SBIA 
1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980 and 1980 to 1990. 
However, the government in the 1990s did not consider these facts and approved 
the new airport project very quickly. The flight path of the SBIA over Lat Krabang an:i 
Bang Phli wi ll have the strongest impact in terms of noise pollution. Bang Kapi, Pra 
Kanong, Min Buri and Nong Chok will receive the direct impact of floods because these 
areas are on the flood prone area where the new 'airport wi ll block the natural floodway. 
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Gulf of Thailand 
l. Bangkok 
2. Samut Prakan 
3. Nonthaburi 
4. Pathum Thani 
5. Nakhon Pathom 
6. Samut Sakhon 
7. Chachoengsao 
Source: Sternstein, 1995, #41, 7. Reproduced by Thongchai Roachanakanan 1999 
Figure 2.7 Bangkok Metropolitan Region: Standard constituent provinces 1960-
1990 
I. Bang Kapi 
2. Pra Kanong 
3. Lat Krabang 
4. Min Buri 
5. Nong Chok 
6. Bang Phli Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
SBIA Second Bangkok International Airport 
Gulf of Thailand 
I ··- ----- - - - -
Source: Sternstein, 1995, #41 . Reproduced by Thongchai Roachanakanan 1999 
Figure 2.8 Bangkok Metropolitan Region: Area of Impact from the SBIA 1999 
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The historical analysis in Part I presented an overview of how the planning processes for 
Bangkok and the SBIA became political concerns in the 1960s. The fact that neither project 
progressed for three decades is a reflection of the political culture and traditions of 
Thailand. This part continues to discuss the politics of the two projects with a more 
comprehensive analysis. 
Part II is regarded as the core of this thesis. Attempts are made to view the failures 
and problems of the two projects systematically. A task of this part is to understand how the 
authorities and actors involved influenced the progress of the two projects. Political 
changes from 1961 to 1998 are discussed in association with an analysis of the political 
influences over Bangkok city planning and the development of the SBIA. Discussion 
focuses on the consequences of political interference in planning. 
The analysis in this part relies on a review of many studies and master plans. It is 
worth noting that Bangkok's problems have been studied extensively and discussed in 
numerous articles, papers and research works in the past three decades. Most studies have 
concentrated on empirical problems such as traffic congestion, environmental problems and 
floods, however, there has been little attempt to actually consider and study the problems in 
Bangkok as a system [Ross, 1997 # 106, 1-8]. 
In my view, it is a waste of time and money to produce reports and plans which 
cannot be implemented because of political interference. A number of planning studies for 
Bangkok and the SBIA discussed in this part are examples of this. 
The main task in this part is to prove my hypothesis that political factions which 
aimed to serve their individual interests, used weak points in the administrative, legal and 
planning systems to manipulate multi-million baht1 projects. This includes the process of 
project planning. 
Chapter 3 discusses Bangkok and the problems of planning practice by focusing on 
the weakness of the three systems (the administrative, legal and planning systems) which 
has left them open to exploitation. As the centre of power, Bangkok has been the centre of 
1 Based on the currency exchange rate in May 1999, one US dollar equals 37 baht and one AUS dollar equals 
24 baht. 
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considerable interest and as a result, the three systems are deeply involved in both local and 
national politics. The discussion focuses on the historical development of these three 
systems to show how political factions have been able to manipulate the systems. The 
emphasis is on the abstract element of boundary which is regarded as problematic in the 
interaction between the three systems. 
Chapter 4 discusses the politics of Bangkok city planning under different 
administrations in the 1990s. An analysis is made to rationalise the development concept 
and planning procedures. The focus is on a review of three city plans made for Bangkok in 
1992, 1995 and 1999 and the relationship between Bangkok and the new airport. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with a policy analysis of the development planning 
strategies for the Bangkok metropolitan region and the SBIA. Reports and studies on these 
two projects are reviewed. Discussions focus on why Bangkok airport development policies 
were frequently changed during the past three decades and whether recent policies on 
Bangkok metropolitan region development and the new Bangkok airport development are 
reasonable. An attempts is made to argue whether the SBIA is necessary. 
Chapter 6 discusses the rationality of master planning for the SBIA. The main 
recommendations in the master plan are discussed to explain what the master plan is all 
about and how it has influenced the preparation of plans for Bangkok and the nearby 
provinces. 
The discussions in Part II reflect the political drama of the power struggle in 
Thailand from the 1960s to 1990s. Delays to these two activities over three decades may 
imply that the achievement of development in Thailand requires a continuity in the use of 
power. Political stability is a crucial for every government, however, this stability relies 
heavily on the leadership and resources2 of key people, which will be discussed in Part III. 
2 Hence money. personnel, materials and social power are viewed as resources. 
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The application of a good city plan is supposed to solve the problems of a city effectively. 
Many city plans have been made in Thailand but none have been able to solve the problems 
of traffic congestion, flooding and pollution in the city. Some problems have become more 
complex. What went wrong with city planning and what are the problems with planning 
practice in Thailand? 
Terdkiat Sakkumduang [ 1997], President of the Thai City Planners Association 
states that 
It is easy to set up a master plan before the city is built. But if [development is] 
already in place, it is difficult for 'any plan' to really control land use and 
activities.' 1 
In Terdkiat's view, urban plans focus on the negatives in which what cannot be 
done in any given area is regulated rather than regulating what is allowed to be done. A 
good plan shouid instead give incentives for investors and developers as encouragement to 
follow planning objectives [Bangkok Post, 24 February 1997, p24]. The term 'good plan' 
has been discussed among Thai planners but its definition remains unclear. 
Planning is an abstract word in Thailand. Only a small number of people know the 
definition and the theoretical meaning of the word planning, particularly legal 
interpretations and concerns [Wongsawasdikul, 1996 #46, I]. Most of these people are 
urban planners who have general knowledge and practical skills in terms of land use 
planning. Discussions on theories are sometimes viewed as nonsense by Thai planners2 . 
Consequently, the semantics of planning within a more complicated context such as the 
term of 'urbanism' are rarely discussed among Thai planners. 
People seem to recognise that there is a crucial need for a city plan. However, the 
basic understanding of city planning which is occasionally expressed in the local media 
reflects the fact that people know very little about city planning. Few people participate in 
city planning even though public participation has been written into planning law as a 
1 Bangkok Post, 24 February 1997, p 12 
2 For example, Director General of DTCP, Charoen Thamrongkiat ( 1981-1987) and Chaiwat Arunothai wiwal 
( 1996-1997) 
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compulsory procedure. Hence, it is interesting to study what has happened to city planning 
' 
in Thailand. 
Opportunities and constraints for the planning of a city are created within a 
particular national framework. Planning gains its power through its embodiment in 
the legislation and regulations, which form part of the legal apparatus of a particular 
country. The implementation of planning occurs through the administrative system, 
which again varies considerably across the region [Thornley, 1996 #77, 27] 
Patsy Healey and R.H. William [Healey, 1993 #105, 701) state that planning 
systems can be differentiated by 'variations in national legal and constitutional structures 
and administrative and professional cultures' [Thornley, 1996 #77, 27]. 
Based on my experience as architect and planner working for DTCP from 1982 to 
1995, many problems with planning practice concern the legal and administrative systems. 
This is the main reason why Peter Newman and Andy Thornley's approach [Thomley, 
1996 #77, 27) is applied in this thesis. Discussions in this chapter give an overview of why 
the current style of planning practice in Thailand does not work. 
The study of Bangkok city planning in this chapter is based on the analysis of three 
systems: the administrative, legal and planning systems, which have been partly discussed 
in previous chapters. Discussion focuses on the abstract issue of boundary which is 
regarded as the problematic interaction of the three systems. Politics of boundary will 
reflect the complexity of problems of planning practice in Thailand. 
It is undisputed that politics can influence administration, legislation and planning. 
A task in this chapter is to study how distinct groups of people with political links have 
manipulated these three interactive systems and how political influences have caused the 
coextensive problems of planning and development in the case of Bangkok and the SBIA. 
3.1 The Administrative System 
For political reasons, the administrative system has been the root of numerous 
problems which date back to the early period of the Siamese Kingdom since it became an 
independent state in 1247. Changes in the administrative system are a common 
phenomenon in Thai bureaucracy as a consequence of power struggles. In this section, 
therefore, a historical analysis will be made to give a better understanding of the 
development of the administrative system starting from the reign of King Chulalongkorn 
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when the sanitary district3, a form .of local administration with some autonomy, was first 
introduced. Some changes in administration4 are discussed to explain how they have 
influenced Bangkok's problems. 
The BMA, which is currently the only specialised model of local administration 
(see section 3.1.2), is described by focusing on its practices for dealing with urban 
problems. Administrative problems will also be analysed. At the same time, the national 
policy on local autonomy will be reviewed by focusing on the need for the balance of 
power. 
3.1.1 Historical Analysis of the Administrative System 
Political struggles in the Kingdom of Siam have existed for centuries and power 
arrangements have influenced the administrative system strongly. The king was concerned 
with the distribution of power which reflected the development of the urban system and 
settlement patterns based on military strategy since the 13th century5. During the Ayutthaya 
period (1350-1767), it was the tradition that the king appointed his eldest son to be the next 
king to rule Phitsanulok, a fortress city in the north. However this tradition was ignored 
when Thon Buri became the capital of the kingdom in 1767. 
After King Rama I (1782-1809) founded Bangkok as the new capital in 1782, there 
was little change in the administrative structure. Major changes started in the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1968-1910) as a consequence of a power struggle in the Royal 
Family6. The conflict in the Royal Family ended in 1885. King Chulalongkorn then had 
absolute power over the whole kingdom [Kabilkarn, 1995 #50, 21]. He significantly 
restructured and modernised the administration. A ministerial system was first introduced 
3 Sanitary District was a form of local administration for small towns with population of more than l ,500 
Ii ving in an area o f less than 13 square kilometres. If the town became bigger, it could be upgraded to a 
municipality. As a consequence of the implementation of the new constitution in 1997, all 981 sanitary 
districts throughout the country have become municipalities since 25 May 1999. 
~ Using administrative data and statistics as the formal authoritative reference, the Department of Local 
Administration, Mo! has issued a collection of administrative data from all over the Thai Kingdom. as of 
December 1997. There are 75 provinces, 794 districts, 7 ,255 sub-districts and 67,884 villages under the 
Provincial Administration. There are nine city municipalities, 89 town municipalities, 51 tambol 
municipalities and 98 l sanitary districts under the Local Administration. The census of 1998 is 6l.466, 178 
with 30,591,602 male population and 30,874,576 fe male population. The Bangkok census of 1998 is 
5,647,799 with 2,762,252 male population and 2,885,547 female populatio n. 
5 Distances between the strategic forts were two days travelling by horse. Warriors. weapons and supplies 
gathered from satellite towns and villages of the s trategic fort had to be ready within 15 days after getting an 
order from the capital [Chayabutr, 1996 #75 , 44]. 
6 It is known as Wang Na Crisis or Front Palace Crisis. The conflict in the Royal Family ended after the Front 
Palace Prince died in l 885. 
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on 1 April 1891 and the MoI became responsible for administrative arrangements. There 
' 
were a number of reasons why he had to restructure the administration. 
The French and British threat during the colonial period in the late 19th century 
resulted in the new administrative system becoming highly centralised and the Kingdom of 
Siam becoming a unitary state [Chayabutr, 1996 #75, 11]. Since then a number of 
responsibilities and a great deal of legal power have been agglomerated and given to the 
Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the Mol. King Chulalongkorn used the 
centralised administration to command and control everything, under his most trusted 
brother, Prince Damrong, the first Minister of Interior. This explains why the Minister of 
Interior has been very important and second only to the Prime Minister throughout the past 
century. 
Among many remarkable reforms, King Chulalongkom was quite concerned with 
local administration and gave importance to participation by local people. Then, Bangkok 
became the first sanitary district in 1897, which was an early model of local administration. 
At the same time the Local Administration Act was first issued in 1898 and was revised in 
1914 (B.E. 2457)7. As an experimental case, the sanitary district of Bangkok was initially 
managed by appointed bureaucrats concentrating on sanitation and the provision of some 
public services within a limited boundary of urban area8. 
As a result of coup attempts from 1925 to 1935 which were influenced by French 
educated revolutionaries, King Prachathipok (Rama VII, 1925-1935) recognised the 
strength of the political movement for democracy in the kingdom. In his view, however, it 
was too soon to have complete democracy in Thailand. He believed that local 
administration, in the form of municipalities, would be a starting point for Thai people to 
learn gradually about democracy9. Unfortunately, the municipality concept was too 
complicated for his cabinet and other people when the King proposed this idea in 1930. The 
Municipality Act had been drafted but it was suspended after the revolution on 24 June 
1932 which ended the absolute monarchy system. 
7 The Local Administration Act B .E. 2458 was used until 1998. According to the decentralisation policy 
written in Constitution 1997, all sanitary districts will become municipalities. 
8 In fact, the first sanitary district managed by the local people was established in Tha Chalom. a community 
in Samul Sakhon some kilometres west of Bane:kok on 18 March 1905. Tha Chatom was chosen because 
King Chulalongkorn mentioned its hygiene probl~ms in his cabinet meeting [Chayabutr, 1996 #7 5. 164-165]. 
9 King Prachath ipok expressed his concern about the initiative of municipality in The New York Times on 28 
April 1932. He believed that the people would understand democracy by learning how to manage their 
community [Chayabutr. 1996 #75, 122-123]. 
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Despite a number of arguments in favour of the development of democracy, King 
Prachathipok's idea was ignored for 68 years. After the 16th Constitution was approved in 
September 1997, the Mo I submitted a draft bill in September 1998 to upgrade all sanitary 
districts in Thailand to municipalities. The Mo! believed that local administration, in the 
form of the municipality, could promote democracy to the Thai people. A serious question 
is why governments during the past 68 years ignored the municipality. Besides causing an 
outrageous delay in the development of Thai democracy, it also reflects a poor commitment 
to the development of local administration in Thailand. 
The government issued the Administration Reform Act in 1933 which divided the 
administration system into three categories with different responsibilities: central 
administration, provincial administration and local administration. The division into three 
categories has become the primary structure of administration in Thailand 10. The 
Municipality Act was also issued in 1933 (B.E. 2476). As a result, Bangkok, Thon Buri and 
all provincial capital cities have become municipalities with a mayor reporting to a 
provincial governor. 
The Municipality Act has been revised and amended 11 many times. Most 
amendments were made to rearrange the hierarchy of administration 12 so that the 
municipality could play a greater role in local development. However, more serious 
concerns such as financial problems, local autonomy and management structure have been 
ignored while at the same time, administrative boundaries have become a key element for 
quickly resolving conflicts among authorities, for example tax collection and budget 
allocation. 
In spite of many legislative amendments, administrative duplication has become a 
problem in and around Bangkok as a result of the changing urban systems of Bangkok and 
Thon Buri, which are dominated by two metropolitan municipalities and many sanitary 
districts. The duplication problem has been exacerbated by the continuing rapid growth of 
Bangkok. The municipal area of Bangkok, focused on the city core, extended from 43 .1 S 
square kilometres in 1936 to 66.78 square kilometres in 1953, and 96.37 square kilometres 
1° Central Administration consists of ministries and departments, all of which are located in Bangkok. 
Provincial Administration consists of provinces, districts and villages. Local Administration is in the forms of 
municipality and sanitary dis trict. Currently, there are 125 departments in 15 ministries. 
11 It was revised in 1938, 1943 and 1953 and amended in 1955, 1956, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1974, 1976 and 1980. 
12 According to the Municipality Act, there are three categories of municipality; Tambon (community) 
Municipal ity, Muang (town) Municipality and Metropolitan Municipality based on number of population. 
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m 1958. By 1965 the area of the Bangkok Metropolitan Municipality was 238.57 square 
kilometres or 21.7 per cent of Bangkok province; meanwhile in 1966 the area of Thon Buri 
Metropolitan Municipality was 52.0 square kilometres or 11.5 per cent of Thon Buri 
province. The administration of the metropolitan municipality and the province therefore 
overlapped in terms of development management. 
As a consequence of more and more urban problems, an attempt was made in 1965 
to combine the Bangkok Metropolitan Municipality and the Thon Buri Metropolitan 
Municipality in an administrative arrangement for the metropolitan region. The Director of 
the Department of Local Administration, Chamnan Yuwaboon, wrote a confidential letter 
to the Minister of Interior on 21 April 1965 and pointed out the problem of duplication 
between the provincial administration and the municipal administration because of the 
geography of the twin cities of Bangkok and Thon Buri. He proposed rearranging the 
administration of the capital city and nearby towns, and submitted a draft of the 
Metropolitan Municipality Act which included merging the Bangkok Municipality and 
Thon Buri Municipality. 
In 1971 the military government merged the two provinces of Bangkok and Thon 
Buri and renamed them the Metropolitan Bangkok-Thon Buri province. The two 
metropolitan municipalities were merged in a simi lar fashion on 13 December 1972. 
However, the new arrangement caused confusion for administration and 
management because the two different administrative structures could not be integrated. As 
a result, the new administration was rearranged by the military government. 
In fact, the use of power to overcome conflicts was a serious concern for the 
authorities involved. Administrative chaos continued after the collapse of the military 
dictatorship and the rise of the democracy movement in October 1973. However the 
democracy movement influenced great changes in Thailand. Many essential laws 13 such as 
the TCPA and the Promotion and Conservation of the Environment Act were issued in 1975 
including the BMA Act. In other words, it took 10 years to apply a new model of 
administration enforced by law even though urban problems had been recognised for years. 
This is another reflection of the poor development of local administration in Thailand. 
Besides the roles and responsib ilities imposed in the Municipality Act, the municipality is responsible for 
twenty Acts and many o ther regulations [Chayabutr, 1996 #75,143- 146] 
13 It is worth noting that these Acts had something in common. All had been under long processes of legal 
consideration and were issued in the same year. 
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Since then Bangkok has become a special model of local administration with the 
highest degree of autonomy covering the whole area of the old province with a total area of 
1,568.737 square kilometres. The BMA Act was amended in 1985 giving more authority 
and more legal power to the governor. However, the problems of Bangkok remain unsolved 
and have become so complex that no single solution can be applied. Why is the new 
administration unable to solve the problems of Bangkok? 
In spite of significant changes since 1975, the administrative duplication still exists 
and has become a serious political concern. During the past three decades, more and more 
independent agencies in the form of state enterprises have been set up to deal with 
infrastructure development in Bangkok. They operate under the administration of different 
national departments and ministries, duplicating similar agencies already established under 
the BMA. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a good example of adrnjnistrative duplication is the 
development of the mass transportation in Bangkok in the early 1990s. Three authorities 
have been involved in developing similar projects in the same city: (1) the Hopewell project 
developed by the SRT, a state enterprise of the Ministry of Transportation, (2) the 
Thanayong project developed by the BMA, and (3) the underground subway developed by 
the MRTA, a new state enterprise under the Office of Prime Minister. All three have 
different development philosophies and apply different technology. 
Many problems in Bangkok have become chronic, such as traffic congestion, 
pollution and flooding. Consequently, the solutions to Bangkok's problems are complex 
and none have been successful because the metropolitan area is not under a single 
coordinating body [Sternstein, 1971 #18, 2-3; Ross, 1997 #106]. 
Obviously, the failure to find solutions to Bangkok's problems over the past three 
decades is a consequence of administrative fragmentation in which every agency is 
manipulated by numerous factions. The most critical problems in Bangkok reflect lack of 
an ongoing strategic policy and a lack of coordination by the authorities involved in terms 
of policy design and deci sion making. Despite all these shortcomings, successive 
governments have been unable to eliminate the problem of duplication by rearranging the 
administrative system. 
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3.1.2 The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
This section concentrates on the administrative problems of the BMA which plays a 
major management role in dealing with almost every issue concerning Bangkok. However, 
there are some areas of Bangkok's problems that the BMA cannot solve by its own means. 
Traffic congestion and flood protection are obvious examples. Although the metropolitan 
administration model used in Bangkok is expected to be functional and to assist in dealing 
with the city's numerous problems, the metro model for Bangkok is also controversial. 
It is worth noting that the BMA is not a province but a political ministry according 
to a new law. Elections are held at the city level and district level every four years . The 
Governor of the BMA is directly elected as the head of an administration which works with 
the elected members of the City Council of the BMA. Based on the parliamentary system, 
decisions are made at both the City and District Councils depending on the issue and the 
budget scale. It is a unique model of local administration specifically designed for Bangkok 
only. 
In 1978 a similar form of administration was applied to Pattaya, a tourist town on 
the east coast, in the form of a City Manager. However because of openly political 
intervention by the local Mafia, this form of local administration failed, ending with strong 
violence. Consequently, Cabinet approved the Mol' s proposal to turn Pattaya back into a 
municipality in February 1997. 
Compared with other models of local administration in Thailand, the BMA has 
better established personnel, facilities and financial .support. Some facilities have been 
established since it was a metropolitan municipality14. Notwithstanding its strengths in 
these areas, the BMA has some human resource weaknesses. For instance, the development 
of a mass transit system requires more knowledgeable and experienced experts. In practice, 
a simple solution is usually tried by giving exclusive rights to manage a project on a fixed 
period contract. A fundamental problem for the BMA seems to be its approach to human 
resources and financial management. Hence, it is interesting to study how the BMA 
understands the problems of administration and how the BMA solves urban problems in 
Bangkok in terms of administrative management. 
1 ~ For instance, Bangkok and Thon Buri municipalities have established City Planning Sections since l956 
compared with the re -establ ishment of DTCP in 1953. In 1995, moreover, there were 31,285 people working 
for the BMA compared with a total of 26,0 12 people working for the o ther 144 municipalities in Thailand. In 
the fiscal year 1996, the BMA had a total budget of 20.400 million baht, much more than some government 
ministries. 
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The approach to administr,ative management taken by the BMA assumed that 
administrative efficiency and public service could be improved by rearranging district 
boundaries. Consequently, the number of districts in Bangkok has increased from 24 
districts in 1975 to 36 districts in 1990 and 38 districts in 1993. In June 1997, moreover, the 
BMA submitted a proposal to the MoI to increase this to 49 districts. Some simple criteria 
were made to limit population to 130,000 for the inner districts and 100,000 for the outer 
districts 15• However, the problems of Bangkok remain critical and unsolved. 
My argument is that the tactic of district redivision is fruitless. Too many districts 
have been created in Bangkok causing fragmentation in solving urgent problems. A good 
example is flood protection which requires quick decisions and solutions within short 
administrative timeframes to deal with chronically affected large areas 16• The increasing 
number of districts has only increased the size of the BMA bureaucracy. It is also costly to 
have district offices and district councils which are very close to each other. For example, 
the Bang Kaen district office is only two kilometres from the Don Muang district office. 
Nobody knows how many districts there will be eventually. In my view, the BMA should 
have fewer districts which would make for more efficient management of resources. 
Moreover, administrative efficiency and public service could be greatly improved 
by extending the BMA boundaries to cover built-up areas in nearby provinces that have 
become physically part of Bangkok. By merging the districts of Samut Prakan, Nonthaburi 
and Pathum Thani, the administrative areas of duplication could be reduced. However, the 
DOLA and the governors of these provinces would strongly resist this reform because they 
do not want to lose control over their interests in these territories. Another crucial factor is 
that these areas have political implications in terms of local revenue 17 and tax collection. 
The problems of duplication are multiplied by overlapping responsibilities with the national 
government, especially the MoI. 
More importantly, administrative arrangements to combine these areas will affect 
the political bases of two powerful families 18 in Path um Thani and in Samut Prakan. They 
would lose control if the heads of villages and districts came under the administration of the 
15 Bangkok Post, 4 June 1997. 
16 A discussion on flood protection with a comprehensive analysis will continue in Chapter 7. 
17 See Appendix 3.1 
13 The two families have been Members of Parliament for decades in the provinces and have held ministries 
many times. 
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BMA. Under these circumstances, therefore, any attempt to rearrange the administration by 
extending the boundaries of Bangkok would be strongly opposed by these factions. 
A serious shortcoming in the BMA's administrative arrangements will be discussed 
in Chapter 7 in reference to cases where the BMA must deal with critical problems outside 
its administrative boundaries. The study will examine the impact of the SBIA, located in 
Bang Pli district of Samut Prakan on Bangkok flood protection to the east of the city. 
Admittedly, the BMA has many more serious administrative and management 
problems. Besides the problems of duplication and administrative arrangements discussed 
previously, in my view the most serious problem concerns the abuse of power. Despite a 
high level of autonomy, it is controversial as to whether the BMA understands how to use 
its power and how to play the role of executive manager. The problems of Bangkok may be 
complex, but the BMA could selectively use legal tools to prevent some problems before 
they arise. A good case is development control through of building permission and 
Bangkok city planning. A comprehensive analysis of this case is included in Chapter 4. 
Despite extensive arguments presenting different points of view on the 
administrative problems of the BMA, the public interest seems to concentrate on the roles 
of the BMA Governor rather than on the metropolitan organisation. That may be a result of 
the many controversial projects initiated by the Governor and also the high personal profile 
of each governor as this is an elected position. There has been little discussion on the 
external impact and the role of the more powerful authority which influences the on the 
metropolitan organisation of the BMA. Hence, it is interesting to examine the local 
autonomy of the BMA. Does a balance of power exist within the administrative system? 
What is the real problem for the BMA administration? 
3.1.3 Balance of Power? 
It is generally understood among the authorities involved that the political status of 
the BMA is second only to the Minister of Interior. In fact, this balance of power is 
underpinned by law. According to the BMA Act, in the case of a failure in administration, 
the Minister of Interior has the authority to carry out an investigation of the Governor of the 
BMA19. However, impeaching the Governor requires Cabinet approvaf0 . As mentioned, 
local and national politics cannot be isolated from the BMA and Cabinet well recognises 
19 Article 123 of the BMA Act. 
20 Article 52 of the BMA Act. 
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this sensitive matter. Despite some yolitical tensions between the BMA Governor and the 
Minister of Interior, compromise solutions are usually found to end any conflict quickly. 
However, some ongoing conflicts involving political interest and money-making by key 
actors in the city of Bangkok remain. This section examines the more powerful actors who 
control the BMA and how they influence the BMA in terms of development management. 
The parliamentary system determines the administrative structure and system of the 
BMA. Decisions are made by the city council and the district council. This system is 
viewed as providing an internal balance of power for the local council in matters of local 
politics. However, the real problems for the BMA administration come from the NESDB, a 
small yet powerful national planning organisation with strong political linkages to the 
Office of Prime Minister. Hence, the balance of power is disturbed by the NESDB as a 
third party influencing the development mechanisms for the country. 
The BMA has to submit every public project which involves high investment to the 
NESDB. The NESDB has responsibility for screening projects before passing them to 
Cabinet for final approval. This includes numerous infrastructure development projects 
such as water, power and telephone projects provided by other independent agencies in the 
form of state enterprises. In this way, the NESDB has the power to indirectly control and 
define the fate of Bangkok. A good example is the BMA Tram Project along the canals in 
August 1998, which was not approved by NESDB due to the poor feasibility study. 
Over the past four decades, the NESDB21 has become a political instrument used 
selectively by the Prime Minister to control the major interests of the coalition 
govemment22. The Prime Minister can make himself appear to stay above the conflict of 
local and national politics by using the NESDB as a third party. By delaying a project 
proposal, the NESDB can postpone a mega-project until the next government is formed. 
The NESDB also seems to have a closer political linkage with the Democrat Party because 
some of its members used to work with the NESDB and this connection remains close. This 
explains why other political parties are not keen on the NESDB and they ignore the role of 
NESDB when they become the government. 
Despite these political concerns, there is the possibility that the BMA can maintain a 
balance of power and its autonomy. Under the governorship of Chamlong Srimuang (1985-
21 The National Economic Council was established on 15 February 1950 and became the Office of the 
NESDB in July 1959. 
22 There was conclusive evidence for this argument during the administrations o f Prem ( 1980-1988) and 
Chuan Leekpai ( 1992-1995). The NESDB played a great role in screening all multi-million baht projects. 
89 
Chapter 3 Politics of Planning and Development 
1991), the BMA challenged and overcame the NESDB by starting the development of a 
mass transit project in Bangkok, which is expected to be completed in December 1999. 
Besides many crucial projects, Chamlong also put some political pressure on the 
implementation of the first legal Bangkok Plan23 in 1992. A question is how Chamlong 
succeeded in achieving a balance of power while other BMA Governors have not been able 
to. 
In my view, the coexistence of a balance of power and local autonomy depends on 
two key factors: strong leadership and a continuity of administration. Chamlong was BMA 
Governor for six years and his politics were impressive in terms of leadership and his 
popular support. Chamlong retired from his political career after losing the leadership in 
1996. 
Careful political observation reveals that these two factors are rarely present in 
Thailand. When present, it appears that the balance of power and the local autonomy of the 
BMA does not depend on the administrative system but on the quality of leadership of one 
person. However, lasting solutions to chronic problems in Bangkok cannot rely on waiting 
for such leadership. The public must tolerate each leader elected and allow them time to 
solve at least some problems. Therefore, what is needed is a radical change in the 
administrative system so that the BMA can truly play the role of executive manager. 
However, there should be further study on how to improve the administrative 
system so it will not leave an opening for powerful people to exploit. The focus should be 
on the patronage system between the two groups, the elected politicians who have the 
power to approve the project, and the bureaucrats who understand the system and the 
loopholes. Exploitation can only happen when the two groups have mutual interests. This is 
the reason why many cases of corruption cannot be exposed and why investigations of key 
actors cannot be finalised. In my view, a worst scenario is the continuity of administration 
with two corrupt groups without an effective monitoring system. 
The continuity of administration related to the problems of the legal system and the 
planning system will be discussed in the following sections. 
23 Discussion is in Chapter 4. 
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3.2 The Legal System 
Law is created and has become a legitimate instrument the government can use to 
control society by referring to the need to keep discipline and order. However, the way 
legal power is used depends on the motive of the user rather than on what is written in the 
law. The development of the Thai legal system is a good example. 
King Chulalongkorn started legal reform in 1891 and administrative reform in 1892. 
Hence, one may argue that King Chulalongkorn attempted to control the use of power by 
law, with the optimistic assumption that this might bring good governance to Thai society. 
In my view, there should be a balance of power between the administrative system and the 
legal system. The struggle for power and many political changes over the past century have 
overlooked this basic principle and problematic systems were ignored. 
In this section, it should be noted that the legal context is not a primary concern of 
this thesis but is viewed as a part of the urban development problem. The emphasis in this 
section is to briefly study shortcomings in the legal system that influence the administrative 
system and the planning system. Some weak points in the legal system will be explored 
through an empirical study which explains the coexistence of numerous problems in 
Bangkok. 
3.2.1 Review of the Legal System 
Each government department can create laws and regulations in accordance with its 
particular concerns. Consequently, a number of independent laws have been issued 
separately and implemented in accordance with the different responsibilities of 15 
ministries and 125 departments. These laws represent the distribution of responsibilities 
and powers which influence subsequent budget allocation. 
Thanin Kraivixien explains that a Bill may be introduced by the government or by a 
private member of the Assembly. Bills brought forward by the government are a result 
either of policy decisions made in Cabinet or of the recommendations of various 
government departments. They are drafted by the legal staff of the department concerned 
and are generally reviewed by the Juridical Council. Expert advice is obtained from time to 
time from professional men in their specialised fie lds depending on the nature of the law 
under consideration. When the Bill has passed through all its complicated stages in the 
Assembly, it is presented to the King for Royal Assent [Kraivixien, 1967 #78, 8]. 
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It is worth noting that most laws in Thailand have a similar legislative approach but 
were created within a framework of different timing and on the basis of different ideologies 
and purposes. Despite the fact that some old laws, with their complicated terminology, 
cannot be applied in the current situation which has changed radically, these old laws are 
still important because they give considerable power to certain authorities. Additionally, 
authorities are competing to gain more legal power than other authorities. However, the 
controversy seems to be over the use of legal power rather than outdated laws. 
These independent and conflicting laws reflect the struggle for power among 
different administrations because no department wants to lose its legal power. None of the 
departments can therefore be integrated. Chaos results when different public agencies use 
their different legal powers to solve Bangkok's problems. For instance, 17 authorities from 
three ministries have responsibility for solving Bangkok's traffic congestion problems. 
The weakest point of the Thai legal system is that every legal activity takes a long 
time to complete because of the complicated processes involved. This is a major problem 
for professional planners because time is regarded as the key element which can influence 
all aspects of the planning process. 
One may argue that the long legal process is a common constraint which should be 
expected. In my view, however, time consuming legal processes have several impacts on 
administration and planning. A BMA Governor may not succeed in achieving anything if it 
involves too much legal activity during a four-year term of administration. This supports 
the argument of the importance of the continuity of an administration. Moreover, time 
consuming legal processes may also badly affect the implementation of a development plan 
and the schedule provided in the financial plan. 
My argument is that the legal system m Thailand discourages effective 
administration and planning because every activity in the legal process takes too much 
time. The Legislation for a new form of Bangkok administration is a good example. The 
Director General of Local Administration Department, Chamnan Yuwaboon, submitted a 
draft of a Local Administration Act for Bangkok with 87 Articles to the Mo! on 21 April 
1965. It took 10 years before it became the BMA Act in 1975. 
Consequently, it is impossible to solve urgent problems that require new legal 
powers. Moreover, political factions understand the legal system and sometimes use its 
weaknesses by prolonging decisions which require legal power. The shortcomings of the 
legal system will be discussed in the next section regarding the case of planning law. 
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3.2.2 Town and Country Planning Act 1975 
There are very few studies on planning law in Thailand. The best available study on 
city planning law is the Introduction to City Planning Law in Thailand by Akboon 
Wongsawasdikul24 [Wongsawasdikul, 1996 #46]. However, his arguments are based on 
legal interpretation and there is little discussion on planning philosophy. 
The Town and Rural Planning Act (TCPA) issued in 1952 was Thailand's first 
planning law. There were only 29 articles however these could not be applied effectively. 
[Wongsawasdikul, 1996 #46, 1, 73-84]. Additionally, its focus was on building codes rather 
than on the context of planning. In 1959, the MoI considered a revision of planning law and 
many committees were set up to study and draft a new law. 
In my view, the American consultants who were working on Bangkok city planning 
from 1958 to 1960 tried to initiate planning law revision. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
American consultants expected to have legal powers to implement their plan. However, the 
American consultants did not have time to work on this initiative because their contract ran 
out in August 1960. The revision of planning law continued. It is not clear why Thai 
planners followed and adopted the British experience in town planning in the 1960s, which 
became the backbone of Thai planning law through the next three decades. 
The first draft, based on the British town planning system, was completed in 1965. 
The Juridical Council reviewed it in 1966. Subsequently, the government submitted it to the 
House of Representatives but it was returned for amending. In August 1969, Cabinet 
approved the second draft and submitted it to the House of Representatives in November 
1970. The draft was suspended because of the coup on 17 November 1970. Ultimately, the 
TCPA was declared on 5 February 1975 after a long legislative process of 16 years during 
which Bangkok's problems had become critical for 10 years. 
It is worth noting that the British town planning system in the 1950s and 1960s, 
with many centrally controlled planning instruments, was strongly influenced by the social 
sciences in the 1970s. The British Town and Country Planning Act 1959 was amended in 
1968 and later consolidated into the 1971 Act [Cherry, 1996 #104, 136-147]. British 
planners had previously viewed cities as physical entities with physical problems. Cities 
were viewed as social entities, the product of a particular society at a particular time 
[Cherry, 1996 #104, 181]. Unfortunately, this great change in British planning system did 
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not influence Thai planners in the 1970s. The British experience in the 1960s has remained 
the guide for drafting new Thai P.lanning law and has become the primary basis of plar:ning 
law since 1975. This reflects another poor development of city planning in Thailand. 
An analysis of the TCPA will be made briefly to provide a better understanding. 
Two legal planning procedures are the primary concern of the TPCA: (1) Comprehensive 
Planning and (2) Project Planning which can generate other related laws and regulations25 
depending on sequence of use. The Comprehensive Planning physical planning procedure 
aims at producing land use plans with two main purposes. First, it is designed to control the 
detailed use of land which includes determining the distribution of land for different 
functions. Second, it is intended to prepare and provide basic infrastructure for the physical 
expansion of the city, mainly in the form of road structure. It is believed that the road 
system shou~d be associated with the land use plan for the good future development of the 
city [Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 77-78]. 
The other type of planning which comes under the TPCA is Project Planning. This 
may be considered as the most crucial legal procedure for city planning in Thai land. Within 
the legal framework of comprehensive planning, the project plan is created in order to 
develop andior improve a specific area for a particular purpose. The scope of Project 
Planning can cover various scales and functions of a physical development. According to 
Article 28 of the TCPA, it allows or does not allow a number, scale and type of building 
permission and gives power to planners to restore, demolish or remove any building o r 
object in the planning area. According to Article 47 of the TCPA, a surrounding area one 
kilometre fro_m the planning boundary is forced to follow the B11ild;ng Control Act which is 
a related regulation [Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 78). That means Project Planning is the 
most powerful legal approach that the DTCP and local governments including the BMA 
can apply to control the development and growth of the city However, written power alone 
is not enough to solve urban problems. There is a crucial need for stronger controls in the 
form of P roject Planning. However, the legal approach of Project Planning was not applied 
for Bangkok from t 992 to 1999. The Project planning has never been used to date are a 
political concern because the implementation will affect the politicians who are landed 
elite. 
~, Akboon Wongs<masdikul is a lecturer at Faculty of Law. Th:unmasart University in Bangkok. His study is 
based on his e.,periencc working for DTCP. 
:s The most ii;1port;mt related l<m is the Propertv . lcquisition .kt. The others are applied in the form of 
Ministerial Regulations. 
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The TCPA is viewed as the most flexible and democratic law in Thailand. It allows 
local authorities to produce their. own development plans, both in terms of comprehensive 
plans and project plans (Article 29). People can participate in the planning process and 
determine the direction of development in their communities (Articles 33, 34 and 35). 
However, a major weakness in the planning process occurs when a compromise cannot be 
reached between different points of view. One example was the failure of the first proposed 
master plan for Bangkok in 1977 when it was drastically rejected by the public 
[Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 79-80]. 
The second major weakness is the lack of financial support. The TCPA does not 
mention anything about the provision of funds which are necessary for implementing the 
master plan. As a result, most infrastructure development projects in the master plan have 
not been implemented. This weakness has just been recognised officially however only a 
limited budget has been made available. 
The third major weakness concerns timing. According to Article 26, both a 
comprehensive plan and a project plan are legally only valid for five years and must be 
revised or corrected to cope with changes in the local economy, society and urbanisation. 
Time has become the key element which can influence the interaction of administration, 
planning and legislation. If a plan is valid during the last year of a BMA Governor's 
administr:ation, this will be a political dilemma for interaction between the administration, 
planning and legislation26. 
In cases where there have been more plans and more forms of administration 
involved in an area with different validity of legal control, the dilemma wi ll be very critical. 
Hence, the highlight of this thesis is to study the case of the SBIA and planning for 
Bangkok and its nearby towns 
As discussed, delays in the introduction of the TC'PA reflect the weakness o~ the 
Thai planning system. However, there is another reason why Bangkok had no legal city 
plan until July 1992 or 17 years after the TCPA had been introduced . The consequences of 
Bangkok having no development control for decades are quite serious. making many of 
Bangkok's problems more critical and unable to be permanently solved. What went wrong 
seems to be a result of the administrative system rather than the legal system. In my view, it 
is due to loopholes in the legislation which will be discussed in the following section. 
:r. To pro,·idc <lll C:'\amplc of this. Krisda An.mYongse na Ayullay«l. BMA Go,·crnor from 1992 to 1996. and 
his making of the Bangkok Plan is discussed in Chapter.+. 
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The Town and CountJy Planning Act 1975 was amended in 1982 and 1992. 
However, this has had little inflv.ence on the current style of city planning, and problems 
with planning practice in Thailand remain. 
3. 2. 3 Loopholes in the Law 
Loorholes are an unresolved problem. Both greedy entrepreneurs who want the 
greatest possible benefit and corrupt bureaucrats who understand and use the law, introdl..!ce 
loopholes if mutual interests can be met. The emphasis in this section is on the loopholes of 
planning law and the resulting shortcomings. 
Loopholes have become big business which involved corrupt people at every level, 
including the political factions in the coalition government. Loopholes in association with 
property development seem to be the most evident. 
Based on my experience, many loopholes in Thailand are consequences of the poor 
monitoring system The authorities involved argue that they cannot inspect every building 
in the city for financial reasons. Planning law and Building Codes and Controls are good 
examples. Regarding the procedure of building permission, an inspector visits the 
construction site only once or twice and there is no monitoring whether the land and 
building will be used as written in the building permit. In most cases, briber/7 is popular, 
and can end any troublesome process quickly 
In terms of land use control, Article 26 of the TCPA has a crucial influence on land 
speculation and land development in urban areas in the form of construction permission 
[Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 77]. This Article provides that developments in some areas 
may be frozen for five years. Use of loopholes occurs everywhere beginning with the early 
planning process, legal interpretation, through to the selective use of the planning law 
Political pressures on planners, frequent lobbying of the legislature and bribery are usually 
applied However, the simplest way that the actors involved can avoid legal problems is to 
delay the implementation of a plan. The 17 years of delaying the Bangkok Plan is evidence 
of this tactic. 
Jurgen Ruland argues that the frequently delayed master plan for Bangkok was a 
reflection of the land elites' interest in preserving the utmost flexibility for their real estate 
:· ln February and March t 995. f designed l\\·o small office buildings in Bang Ka pi district in Bangkok. 
Despite the fact that Ill\" designs followed all regulations completely. my clients had to pay 100.000 and 
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ventures [Ruland, l 996 #79, 38]. Two interesting questions are: who are the land elites and 
how do they influence planning? Should politicians who own many large plots of land 
throughout the country be regarded as part of the land elite? 
In my view, the most serious loopholes occur in delays m the Project Planning 
process. It is worth noting that Bangkok city planning in 1992 was only one early stage in 
the Comprehensive Planning procedure. This generally controls land use in Bangkok and 
primarily impacts on land prices. 
Delay has become another key word in this thesis, in studying the more complex 
interaction of the three systems using the case of the 17 year delay to the Bangkok Plar: and 
nearly four decades of delaying the SBIA. 
In my view the legal terminology of 'time' should be revised in the Thai legal 
system with a clear definition in terms of commitment and responsibility . Meanwhile, the 
concept of time in TCPA should be revised in association with revision of the planning 
system. More discussion on these points is included in the following section. 
3 .3 The Planning System 
The planning system in Thailand can be divided into three levels: national, regional 
and local. At the national level there are five-year plans, the first of which started in 1961 . 
Regional plans are prepared by government departments and are likely to provide general 
policies and development guidelines for large areas. It is only at the local level that plans 
are truly enforced and implemented by law. Local plans are made for towns and cities in 
the form of comprehensive plans according to T'CPA legal procedure. My argument is that 
the Thai planning system is not integrated and the current style of city planning fails to 
solve the problems in Bangkok because the emphasis is only on land use planning. 
The discussion of the administrative system and the legal system in the previous 
sections is integrated with arguments on the planning system in this section. The focus is on 
the weak points of the Thai planning system to explain the failure to solve urban problems 
by planning measures. 
120.000 bahl to the Di\'ision of Public Works of Bang Kapi district. A corrupt bureaucrat stilted that the 
bribes must be distributed to e\·ery person in the office My clients got buildmg pennits shortly thereafter. 
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3.3. I Development of the Planning System 
The planning system in T hailand was developed comparatively more recently than 
either the administrative system or the legal system. That is why the planning system 
appears to be different from the other two systems. Secondly, the planning system is more 
concerned with long term policy and decision-making as a part of development strategy. 
After many attempts under the American economic aid programme to Thailand 
which began in 1950s, the USOM along with the World Bank, supported the establishment 
of development planning as a new concept and process for the systematic ordering of public 
sector investment and operations. The NESDB was set up to carry out these functions under 
the administration of the Office of Prime Minister. The NESDB has responsibility for 
drafting the five-year national plan and participating in government policy review and 
decision-making processes [Muscat, 1990 #25, 267-268]. As a result, the NESDB has 
become a very powerful agency with a dominant role in every multi-million baht project 
including the SBIA. The NESDB is thus a model of highly centralised administration. 
However, the role of NESDB is not impressive in the view of some scholars. Dr. 
Weng Tochirakan~8 believes that the 'NESDB has inheried the dictatorship of the 1950s and 
that its role and authority should be reformed. In Nithi Eiew-sriwong's view~9, the NESDB 
has failed to guide the development direction of Thailand and the government should close 
down the organisation. 
During the past four decades with eight national plans, the NESDB has never 
changed its working philosophy which caused a number of chronic problems in its 
development. The urban primacy of Bangkok discussed in Chapter 2, the permanent crisis 
of both the urban and rural poor through to the deterioration of national resources and 
environs in Thailand, are all consequences of the NESDB 's staunch policies on economic 
development and an ignorance of more balanced development The most controversial issue 
is the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of per capita provincial income 
distribution, \vhich has increased from 12 fold in 1988 to 16 fold in 1996"0 
The NESDB also plays a role in making regional plans; however, these plans 
represent a narrow view and display poor theoretical understanding. Regional plans for 
:~ Dr Weng Tochirakan is the chainnan of Ille Democracy Federntion. He expressed his concern and gan: this 
statement dunng the se111in<1r on the 25'h year anni\'ersa.ry of democracy mo\'cment on l~ October 1998 at 
Ro~·a l Hotel in Bangkok. 
:
9 Nithi EiC\\ -sri,,ong gme this st:itement ill Mahidol Uni,·crsity in Bangkok and his ,·ie\\' ''as publisted in 
local IlC\\Sp;1pcr on 6 April 1999. 
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growth centres, which the NESDB developed using Growth Pole The0ty31 and put in the 
fifth national plan (1982-1986), is an obvious failure in the decentralisation of development 
[Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 15-39]. This point was emphasised in a report on Metropolitan 
Regional Structure Study submitted to the NESDB in 1995 [Leman, 1995 #10, 67]. 
However, the NcSDB seems unconcerned with arguments about its poor policy on regional 
development planning. More discussion on the controversial role of the NESDB is included 
in Chapter 5 on the issue of policy analysis. 
Despite having numerous roles and a broader authority at the national level, the 
NESDB has no legal power to control planning at the local level. Instead the NESDB puts 
political pressure on the relevant authority, such as DTCP, which has the legal power to 
fulfil its requirements. The case of the SBIA is a case in point which will be 
comprehensively analysed in Chapter 6. 
In fact, the Thai planning system itself is not complex but the planning activities 
are. Probably frustrated by the administrative system, government departments32 have made 
a number of regional and local plans based on different interests. These plans, which are 
not enforced by TCPA, are concerned with politics and the budget allocations of 
independent agencies. Each authority makes and implements its own plans without 
reference to any coordinating body. Consequently, none of the plans can be integrated and 
some even become contradictory. The environmental improvement plan and the slum 
upgrading plan for some areas in Bangkok are good examples. Any overview of these 
planning activities is chaotic and costly for the government departments and the BMA 
itself 
Independent departments do however have a nominal level of cooperation m 
planning. Most of them have a single representative sitting on the planning boards of other 
departments. However in reality, each representative plays the role of an observer rather 
than an active commentator because the Director General of each department eventually 
makes the critical decisions throug h to the final approval. This explains why the planning 
boards in each department are disfunctional. 
in See Appendix 3.2 
11 Francois Perrou.\ introduced the term · gro\\th pole· into econom.ic literal ure in 19~9. The tenn became 
· gro,nh centre· in geograph:-. By deYeloping a selected city as a growth centre. it is expected to play a role as 
a regional core to promote decentralisation of the population <rnd industrial actiYities providing the driving 
force in regional de\·clopment [Fu-Chen. 1978 # l 191 . 
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Planning theories have not been truly applied and the focus is still on singular land use 
planning in the form of the comP\ehensive plan. 
In practice, the traditional procedure of survey-analysis-plan is widely used in the 
state planning apparatus of Thailand. Even though the data and information required are 
provided well in the city plan and project plan preparation, planners still face several 
problems such as the limitation of time and poor organisational structure. Moreover, Thai 
planners are not able to produce plans that are acceptable to both the politicians who will 
endorse and support them and to the administrators who will have to implement them 
[Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 83]. Hence, it is interesting to evaluate the current style of city 
planning. What are the problems and how reasonable are the plans which are produced? 
Besides the very basic problem of data collection and analysis that has been 
mentioned in the Litchfield Plan, the first modern plan for Bangkok in 1958 and the 
Bangkok Plans of 1992 and 1999 indicate that there are many more serious problems in city 
planning. This section discusses the working style of Thai planners and their settled mode 
of thinking which has resulted in a critical failure in solving the urban problems 
During the early years of the TCPA, plans were made to get rid of narrow streets 
because it was thought, incorrectly, that the traffic congestion problem in the city could be 
solved simply. Consequently, it was proposed to make roads and streets much wider in 
association with the land use plan. This was based on the western experience of modern 
planning in the late 19th century [Turner, l 996 #80, 5) which Thai planners have followed 
for decades without making any further developments. However, this has become an 
obvious failure because the existing narrow streets, which are full of old buildings and 
densely packed houses, cannot be extended. Eventually, the idea of road planning was 
revised and the widen ing of the existing roads and streets was no longer considered in the 
plan. 
This is just one of many fundamental problems. For a long time Thai planners have 
also overlooked and ignored other modes of urban transport such as the need for an 
effective mass transit system. In fact, they need a better understanding about urban 
transport planning and more knowledge about urbanism. Additionally, they should pay 
attention to the more rational appl ication of planning theories and concepts. 
The second problem, which is even more serious, is concerned with dimensions in 
planning. Most planning activities concentrate on land use plans, in which blocks of 
different land uses are separated by access ways. Only two-dimensional drawings are used 
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to define the future of the city. The third dimension of height is discussed only in the 
procedure of project planning all.d the fourth dimension of 'time' is descriptive and only 
mentioned briefly. Social dimensions and economic dimensions, moreover, are not 
included and the interrelation of these dimensions is not considered. Consequently, the 
traditional plan with only two documents, the land use map and the road map, cannot 
control and guide the growth of the city in terms of urban form and urban density and 
cannot solve the city's problems. 
Time is a key element which can influence every aspect of planning. Besides the 
five-year validity of each plan, nothing more is done with the time factor. Rapid changes in 
the economy and society are not treated as planning concerns. A new plan is simply made 
by looking back at what happened over the past five years and rearranging land use blocks. 
Apparently, it is largely based on the existing land use. Plural land use zoning with 
different functions in the same block is not applied, despite this being the reality in much of 
Bangkok, where commerce and industry are found throughout many residential areas. This 
approach makes city planning in Thailand static. Consequently, the plan cannot define the 
development direction of the city by guiding how many houses and how much space there 
should be for new office buildings in each block over a certain period of time. In my view, 
if it could, the collapse of the property market in and around Bangkok in 1997 might have 
not happened and the Thai economy would have not been in such a critical state today. 
On the other hand, the reliance on modern technology indicates a poor 
understanding by planning authorities in Thai land. A large sum of money has been spent on 
upgrading computer systems and buying more new high-tech instruments. Despite the w;de 
application of Geographic Information Systems, Thai planners have not changed their 
planning style and continue to produce two-dimensional drawings which have become the 
sole style of planning. Every plan shows a commercial zone in the middle as the core of the 
city, surrounded by residential zones and green areas outside regardless of the reality of 
plural uses. There is no attempt to adapt plans to environmental conditions such as flood 
plains or to the economic and social processes of change. 
The effectiveness of a plan is proven over time. Through the past two decades, it 
has been proven that the current style of city planning in Thailand does not work and 
cannot solve the problems of town and city. The discussion in this section will support this 
argument. 
!02 
Chapter 3 Politics of Planning and Development 
John Friedmann34 may be the first scholar who argued that the TCPA 1975 was 
unsuitable for Thai conditions and therefore was not likely to improve the planning of cities 
in the future . His argument was given on 21 March 1975, 44 days after the Jaw had '.Jeen 
issued. In Friedmann's view, the master plans made by the DTCP were extremely 
simplistic in concept and execution and out-of-date according to rapid changes in 
Thailand's cities. 
He recommended the preparation of urban pre-investment studies for selected cities 
based on an in-depth social, economic, physical and environmental analysis. Within a given 
time period, urban development may be viewed as resulting from specific public and 
private investment projects that are properly articulated in both space and time. [Friedmann, 
1975 #39, Memorandum # 3]. However, his critical argument was ignored and his 
recommendations were not considered. 
Hence, the two key elements of space and time have been recognised since 1975 by 
Friedmann. It seems that Thai planners do not understand the philosophy of planning. 
Although these two elements have been taught as fundamental subjects in every planning 
school since the modernism movement in the early 20th century, abstract concepts seem to 
be difficult for Thai planners to grasp. 
After the first comprehensive plan for Rayong, an industrial town on the east coast, 
was issued on 29 December 1983 and had been legally implemented for some years, the 
DTCP, under the administration of Charoen Thamrongkiat, evaluated the plan and found 
that it was unsuccessful. As a result, new roads and other development projects proposed in 
the plan were not implemented Despite all these shortcomings, however, DTCP continued 
with its old style of planning and by 1997 had produced 276 comprehensive plans, however 
none of them applied the second step of project planning. Obviously, the DTCP has known 
for years that its planning style does not work. What has gone wrong? Was it a failure of 
the planning system or planning law or planning style? 
This may be the reason why the DTCP is shifting its interest to other planning 
approaches such as Land Readjustment, which was introduced through technical and 
financial support by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (HCA) in 1990. With the 
agreement of a majority of landowners, parcels of land which have no road access will be 
;
4 USOM nominated Dr John Friedmarrn to assist l'-rESDB in pl<uming rural-urban de\ elopment strategies and 
to select possible long-1cnn ad\ isors to the NESDB on regional planning in the rnraJ-urban context. Dr 
Friedmann ,·isitcd the Department ofTom1 and Countr.· Planrnng on 21 March 197 5. after the most imponant 
planning la\\ in Thailand ''as declared on 5 February 1975. 
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pooled to develop projects on the basis of sharing benefits evenly. New roads and 
infrastructure will be developed, on the land. Ironically, the Land Readjustment Act has 
been drafted by the DTCP and is expected to solve urban problems in some areas. In 
principle, land readjustment could overcome the existing poor organisation of land parcels 
and services caused by the failure to plan ahead for new urban construction. 
I argue, however, that the land readjustment concept is unsuitable for Thai 
conditions. It cannot solve urban problems in the big city because every single step in the 
legal procedure of land readjustment takes time and cannot keep up with rapid changes in 
the economy and built environment. It may be possible to implement in newer areas or in 
areas clearly due for urban renewal, but reorganising land parcels is clearly difficult in the 
older built-up parts of the city. Most importantly, it cannot be applied to any area where the 
landed elite is powerful. In my view the DTCP is following the earlier experience of taking 
16 years to issue the TCPA in the 1960s. As a consequence of the weak points in the Thai 
legal system described in the previous section, the DTCP is starting from zero to have a 
new planning law and nobody knows when the Land Readjustment Act will be approved. 
In terms of the interaction between the three systems under the circumstances 
discussed, any attempt to solve Bangkok's problems seems to be a job of the utmost 
difficulty. The next section discusses the problematic issue of planning in terms of the 
complicated interaction of the administrative system, the legal system and the planning 
system. 
3 .4 Boundaries: Interaction of the Three Systems 
The concept of boundary is the concern of all three systems. Geographical 
boundary, which is understood by all the agencies involved, has been referred historically 
to mean the territory of administration and the limitation of use of legal power. It can 
rapidly end disputes between and among government departments. However, a se-ious 
conflict may occur if the administrative, legal and planning boundaries are not clear or 
overlap. Some experts overlook the importance of the boundary, consequently, they do not 
succeed in their work. The making of the first modern plan of Bangkok in 1960 and the 
master plan of the SBIA, which have overlapping boundaries35, are good examples. 
'' Discussion on this is in Chapter 6. 
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Conflicts over Bangkok city planning, the mass transit projects developed by three 
different authorities, flood protection plans, solid waste disposal projects and many other 
infrastructure development programmes in Bangkok illustrate the shortcomings of 
overlapping boundaries. The focus of this section, therefore, is on the controversial 
boundaries which are reflected in the chaotic development of Bangkok. 
In Thongchai Winichakul 's view, the overlapping realms of the supreme overlords 
became the root of troubles when the notion of a modern boundary with absolute and 
exclusive territorial sovereignty was applied in the late 19th century [Winichakul, 1994 
#60, 96-97]. This implies that the perception of boundaries has been very important and 
meaningful in Thai society. The boundary can represent and express sovereignty, autonomy 
and the identity of a person and institution, however, these abstract concerns reqwre a 
tangible and clear means for classifying and identifying the different hierarchy. 
This may explain why the distribution of power is based on the physical boundary. 
A good example is the military areas, which are not included in DTCP plans36 However, 
much less attention has been paid to studying whether this privilege is illegal and against 
the new constitution of 1997. 
In fact, overlapping boundaries between the three systems have existed throughout 
the country. It has become a problem when mutual interests between and among p·)wer 
groups cannot be met . As mentioned, Bangkok is the hub of considerable interest where a 
number of factions compete in making money In this situat ion, the problem of overlapping 
boundaries in Bangkok is more critical. 
It may not be productive to overlay all the legal and administrative boundaries of 
125 government departments on the same map of Bangkok Neve11heless, the complexity of 
boundaries has understandable impact. Although everyone seems to recognise these facts, 
the government does nothing about the boundary problem. 
The only person in Thailand who has no problem with administrative, legal and 
planning boundaries is King Bhumipol. All the agencies concerned respond to his 
initiatives promptly with very good cooperation His solutions to the problems in Bangkok 
are remarkable. In one of many good examples, King Bhum ipol proposed the tempor.:ry 
storage of floodwaters projecr17 as a solution to the flood problem in Bangkok and some 
.ir. An agreement was made in 1985 between the Ministry of Defence and the Mo! that master plans under the 
TCP.J would not include an;; military areas because of security reasons [Roachanakanan. l 990 #20. 8.+] . 
r It is kno\\'n as Monkey Cheek project. 
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swamps in military camps were developed immediately. I have not attempted further study 
of this sensitive issue. 
This extraordinary approach is interesting and may be regarded as the most effective 
solution to the complex problems of Thailand. However, it may also reflect the fact that the 
three systems in Thailand are too complicated and too flexible so that none are effective for 
dealing with the problems of Bangkok. It is quite clear that the government cannot create a 
more disciplined administration under these circumstances. In my view, there is the need 
for a more rigid system in terms of command and control, which will be an issue for 
discussion in Chapter 8. A discussion of political influences on these three systems 
continues in the next chapter using the case of city planning for Bangkok in the 1990s. 
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Bangkok city planning in the 1990s is regarded as the beginning of land use control 
under legal processes. The Bangkok General Plan 1992 was Bangkok's first legal city 
plan and was implemented in July 1992. This started a legal commitment to Bangkok 
city planning which must continue under the TCPA 1975. However, most of Bangkok's 
problems remained unsolved. The problems are extensive because of local and national 
politics. 
For decades Bangkok has been Thailand [London, 1980 #1, 113]. Many 
scholars 1 mention this statement to describe the urban primacy of Bangkok. This image 
of Bangkok has never changed and Bangkok remains the national centre2 of 
administration, economy, finance, education, transportation and information. Bangkok 
also plays a greater role at the regional level, for instance as the aviation hub and the 
automobile production base for Southeast Asia. Because of the importance of Bangkok, 
any impact on Bangkok has an influence on Thailand and the region. The economic 
crisis which erupted in Bangkok in 1997 provides a clear example3 of this. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Comprehensive Plans and Project Plans are only 
legally valid for five years and must be revised or corrected in order to cope with urban 
changes4 . This also applies to Bangkok where a new revised plan was supposed to be 
implemented in July 1997. Although the BMA is responsible for preparation of the new 
plan, nothing happened with the plan between 1997 and 1998. The BMA expected the 
new Bangkok city plan to be implemented by July 1999. What went wrong and what 
caused the delay in the planning process? 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show land use in Bangkok in 1972 and 1986 and show how 
Bangkok has expanded to cover all nearby provinces. Bangkok in the 1990s is different 
from what it was between 1960 and 1971 in terms of physical structure and political 
1L. W . Huff [1967], B . London [1980) and many Thai scholars have repeated this point through the past 
decades. 
2 Bangkok is the ritual centre of Thailand and this has created cohesion in Thai society as the primate city. 
This argument may help explain events in Bangkok before the t t)60s when ceremonies such as the Royal 
Ploughing Ceremony were revived on 5 May. In my view, thcs~· activities are much less important than 
Bangkok's economic functions. In fact, the revival of old trad ititins and ceremonies has become a part of 
tourist promotions and there is very little relationship between I he traditional rituals and ceremonies and 
the younger generation of people living in Bangkok today. 
3 Many articles published in local newspapers and magazines in l lll)~ and 1999 support this argument. 
•
1 Article 26 o f TCPA 1975 
environment. This explains why Bangkok city planning in the 1990s is mo re difficult and 
more complicated than when the Litchfield Plan was made in 1960 and the first revision 
of the Plan for the metropolitan area was made in 1971. Despite more local autonomy, 
' 
the BMA is unable to apply planning measures to cope with the complex urban problems 
because Bangkok has become a metropolitan region5 extending far beyond the BMA's 
jurisdiction. This is the reason why a single city plan of Bangkok, using the current style 
of planning, is not effective in solving problems at the regional level. Hence, Bangkok's 
planning has become a national problem and the government needs to revise its political 
orientations on extended metropolis development. 
In my view, there is a crucial need for a revised approach to planning in Thailand 
in which political influence on decision is also regarded as a planning concern. In other 
words, to understand the planning process is to understand the political situation. 
This chapter discusses planning for Bangkok in the 1990s. A task in this chapter 
1s to understand how the politics and changing administration influenced Bangkok 
planning in the 1990s. It concentrates on a review of three plans and one study: ( 1) the 
first legal city plan for Bangkok prepared by the DTCP in 1992; (2) the city plan6 
prepared by the team from the MIT; (3) the city plan prepared by the BMA in 1999; and 
( 4) the Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study. The planning concepts of these 
plans are discussed. 
4.1 Politics of Bangkok City Planning in the 1990s 
Soon after the first city plan for Bangkok, the Bangkok General Plan 1992, was 
enforced by law on 6 July 1992, the DTCP played a lesser role in Bangkok city planning 
and the BMA began preparing another city plan for Bangkok fo r the next five years 
Krisda Arungwcnse na Ayutthaya replaced Chamlong as Governor of the BMA in 1994 
and preparation of the next city plan became his political commitment. Despite a lack of 
cooperation and political support from the BMA Council, Krisda used all available 
5 See Appendi.\ .+. I The registered population used in the urban study is based on officially a\ ailable 
data that does not include the unrecorded population \\"hich liYes illegally in the city. That includes the 
Thais from the countryside and the illegal migrants from Burma. Laos. Cambodia. the former USSR and 
China. Most of them work in the i11formal sector. Some liYe in good apartments and \\ Ork in the red 
light areas. It is belicYed thac the illegal population tn Bangkok may be more than JO per cent or the 
total population. 
6 The ·B<1ngkok Pl;111 · is a cotlaborati,·e planning project of the Department of Planning (BMA). the 
MIT Consultant Te;1111 and the EC/BMA Project Team completed in 199.5. 
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Bangkok Existing Land Use 1972 
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Figure 4.1 Land use in Bangkok, 1972 
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power to complete the new city plan. An American team from the MIT was invited to 
prepare a master plan. In October 1995, the MIT team submitted A Vision for Bangkok: 
The Bangkok Plan to the BMA. which was expected to be implemented legally in 1997. 
Political change in the following year had strong impact on this plan as we shall see. 
During the election campaign for the BMA Governorship in June 1996, Arkorn 
Huntakun, an independent candidate, highlighted the key to all Bangkok's problems. 
'Make Bangkok smaller and make Thailand bigger' was his campaign slogan. In the 
election, A.rkorn got only 20, 985 votes compared with Bhichit Rattakul who won with 
768, 994 votes. [BMA, 1996 #44, 168]. However, Arkorn's idea was interesting. 
Under the planning law, the expiry date for the first Bangkok Plan was 5 July 
1997. The MIT Bangkok Plan was also supposed to have been substantially implemented 
by then. A turning point occurred when Krisda lost the election in June 1996. The new 
Governor, Bhichit Rattakul, opposed the ivfIT plan for Bangkok and his new team 
prepared another plan. There was no official explanation. However, it was understood 
that Bhichit did not want to loose his face because the making of Bangkok Plan had been 
Krisda's primary campaign. Consequently, the Bangkok Plan prepared by the MIT team 
was completely ignored and became a waste of time and money. The shelving of the plan 
is an example of political influence on Bangkok city planning. 
This became a problem because Bhichit mainly concentrated on environmental 
issues but knew nothing about city planning. Air pollution in Bangkok was his concern 
and a tot of money was spent to grovv new· trees around the city He did not understand 
that a citv plan could be used for solving the environmental and other problems in 
Bangkok. 
City planning is still required by law to be implemented to control the 
development of Bangkok. Bhichit' s simple solution was to prolong the old plan for 
another two years During these two years, however, Bhichit's planning team did not 
succeed in making a good city plan despite the fact that his Deputy Governor, Dr 
Bannasopit Makewichai, was a professional planner who had worked with the DTCP for 
many years. Bhichit ' s planning team also included Associated Professor Manop 
Pongsathat from the Urban and Regional Planning Division at Chulalongkorn University 
\Vho has now become Chair of the Consulting Committee to the Governor of the B:\IA 
and is responsible for city planning. 
In January 1999, Manop Pongsathat confirmed that the Bangkok General Plan 
/99<) '' ouid be implemented in June 1999 after being postponed since 1998. HovVe\·er, 
Chapter 4 Planning Bangkok in the 1990s 
the draft of the new city plan presented to the public was disappointing to many Thai 
planners because it seemed that both professional planners did nothing about planning. 
It is controversial about .what planning was conducted from July 1996 to 1999. 
The Bangkok General Plan 1992 shown in Figure 4 .3 is little different to the Bangkok 
General Plan 1999 shown in Figure 4.4. Both have 14 land use categories. The overview 
of land use zoning in the two plans is the same. Land use for Bangkok from 1999 to 
2004 is divided into 509 blocks with the descriptive controls using the same patterns 
which have been applied to other towns and cities in Thailand. Furthermore, it is believed 
that Bannasopit and Manop were playing the role of politicians rather than professic,;1al 
planners in making the new plan for Bangkok. 
This short history of political change and its effect on BMA planning activities 
:llu5trates the futi lity of a purely 'rational' planning approach in Bangkok (se\! Chapter 
8). The fol~owing section reviews city plans made in the 1990s 
4.2 The Bangkok General Plan J 992 
This section reviews the first legal plan o f Bangkok which was implemented in 
1992. The discussion focuses on pbnning concepts and problems. ft focuses on how the 
boundary conflict di5cussed in Chapter 3 has become a problem for city planning and 
how this plan influenced Bangkok city planni!1g in the mid 1990s. 
4.2.1 Revie1v of the Bangkok General Plan 1992 
As discussed, the legal application of city planning is crncially needed to control 
rhe growth and development of Bangkok. After waiting for decades, the Bangkok 
General Plan 1992, prepared by the DTCP, was first legally enforced on 6 July 1992. 
A'.::cording to Article 4 of the TCPA 1975, the DTCP or the local authorit/ has authority 
to prepare city plan. While the DTCP has played a major role in preparing the Bangkok 
General Plan 1992 implementation of the Plan was the responsibility of the BMA . 
The Bant-;kok General Plan 1992 was based on land use maps surveyed in 1986, 
shown in Figure 4.2 . This means that the planning process took more than six y1..1rs 
before completiM in 1992. The Hm1gkok CJenera! ?Ian 19Y2 CO'iered 1,568 7 square 
Article ~ ddincs the BivlA Go,~rnor. 1i.t111ic1pal11~ . pro,·inci;il go,crnor a1<d p~o, inc1al cou11cil as 'the 
local authorities · 
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kilometres which included the total area of the BMA. The registered population8 of 
Bangkok in 1992 was 5,562,141·persons living in 1,383,267 houses with an average 
density of 3,546 persons per square kilometre. In this plan, land use control was a 
primary concern and Bangkok was divided into 14 zones. A list of activities for each 
zone briefly explained what could and could not be done. A road network development 
plan was presented to assist with land development. 
Apparently the planning area was simply defined and based on the 
administrative boundaries of the BMA, although the built environment of the city 
extends far beyond those boundaries. This means that the authority to control land use in 
Bangkok was entirely in the hands of the BMA, although only at the level of planning 
Jaw. In reality, as discussed in Chapter 3, a number of authorities could intervene in 
planning areas9 using their own laws and political powers. In other words, the land use 
controls were not completely effective and authorities continued to ignore the Bangkok 
General Plan 1992. 
Figure 4.3 shows that the pattern of land use control in the Bangkok General 
Plan 1992 is very similar to plans made by the DTCP for other towns and cities in 
Thailand. The commercial areas are mainly located in the city core in which most urban 
activities are highly concentrated. The residential areas are located around the city core 
and the green areas or agricultural areas are located outside performing as greenbelt 
areas to limit the growth of Bangkok. However the 276 plans made by the DTCP across 
Thailand from 1983 to 1997 provide evidence that the greenbelt approach cannot control 
and direct the growth of towns and cities in Thailand. Even so, the same greenbelt 
concept is applied to Bangkok, the metropolis with the highest rate of urban growth in 
the country. 
It is worth noting that very few industrial development areas were included in 
the Bangkok General Plan 1992. It was stated as a public policy that because of 
environmental problems, no more industry and factories will be allowed in Bangkok. 
The same policy applies to Samut Prakan, south of Bangkok however it does not include 
other urban fringes in Pathum Thani, Samuf Songkharm and Chachoengsao where 
numerous factories are located within kilometres of the BMA boundaries. 
8 The registered population used in the urban study is based on offic ially available data that does not 
include the unrecorded population which lives illegally in the city. It is believed that the illegal population 
in Bangkok may be more than 30 per cent of the total populatio n. 
9 The most powerful authority in Thailand is the military. The Bangkok General Plan 1992 does not cover 
military areas because of an agreement between the Ministry of Defence and the Mo!. Other powerful 
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The most significant contribution of the Bangkok General Plan 1992 was to 
define and preserve areas for floodways and temporary storage for floodwaters as a 
flood protection measure for Bangkok. However, a number of loopholes occurred which 
were not covered by planning laws, for example single houses were allowed to be built 
in floodway areas. Developers were able to modify their drawings to apply for building 
permission. As a result, a number of new houses have been developed in these areas. 
The landscape along some roads in floodway areas such as Pracha Ruamchai, Ratsadorn 
Uthis and Mitr Mitree in Nong Chok district east of Bangkok has become full of ugly 
housing developments. 
My argument is that the method of land use control in the Bangkok General Plan 
1992 and its extension to the present day cannot alone direct the development of the 
city. The land use plan for Bangkok was made without a comprehensive analysis and the 
descriptions of the land use permit in particular areas focus on what cannot be done. 
Despite the legal adoption of the plan, very little of the Bangkok General Plan 1992 has 
been implemented and it has become descriptive rather than effective. In this respect, 
the plan is no different from the 1960 Litchfield Plan and other plans which have had no 
influence on Bangkok. However, what the Bangkok General Plan 1992 has been able to 
do most effectively is to stop large developments in some areas of Bangkok for the time 
being. 
It is also the view of the DTCP, as national planning authority, that the Bangkok 
General Plan 1992 is not practical nor is it the best plan. However, the DTCP argues 
that it is better than having no plan 10. The question is what went wrong with Bangkok 
city planning during this period. 
Many factors have caused the failure of the Bangkok General Plan 1992. The 
first problem concerns the preparation for planning. This took more than six years 11 
after the land use map of Bangkok was completed in 1986. As an unavoidable 
consequence of rapid economic growth, Bangkok was moving into a peak period of 
property speculation from 1986 to 1992 and consequently the land use survey database 
created in 1986 was out-of-date and not very useful for planning. 
The built-up area of the city also continued to expand rapidly to cover all nearby 
provinces from where millions of people commute to work in Bangkok every day. These 
authorities arc the State Railway of Thailand and the Bureau of Crown Property which own many large 
plots of land in Bangkok. 
1° Chalerm Kaewkangwal, Direc tor General of the DTCP ( 1990-1992), gave this statement in an interview 
in a local newspaper on 14 December 1993. 
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empirical facts were mentioned but were not considered or included in the plan which 
effectively planned for a static city. 
The second problem concerns the poor performance of the DTCP, which was 
unable to develop its planning style or advance its planning philosophy to deal with the 
Thai conditions of urban change. It seems that the DTCP knew only one style: land use 
control, and only one transportation mode: road networks. These approaches are 
outdated and not practicable for a city of six million. 
The third problem was a Jack of enthusiasm to complete the planning task. After 
the completion of the Bangkok General Plan in 1992, the DTCP was reluctant to 
continue with the next legal procedure, project planning. This had the potential to 
provide a stronger planning measure in the form of density control. Some scholars 
believe that density control enforced by project planning, is the most effective approach 
to direct the growth of Bangkok and handle the problems of Bangkok effectively. 
The fourth problem was that the BMA did not provide a sufficient budget to 
implement development projects set out in the Bangkok General Plan 1992. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this problem occurs in every city which has applied planning 
laws and it seems that the DTCP also ran out of ideas to solve the problem. 
Further discussion on the Bangkok General Plan 1992 will focus on the complex 
situation when the planning process was under the greatest pressures. In my view, this 
was a big constraint on the planning process and the authoriries overlooked this 
problem. The term 'planning under siege' explains the problem of city planning during 
this period. 
4.2.2 Planning under Siege 
The 17-year delay between the TCPA 1975 and the first legal city plan for 
Bangkok was serious because Bangkok and nearby cities and towns grew without 
control. Today, urban sprawl can be seen everywhere around Bangkok. In terms of the 
physical environment, Bangkok has become a metropolitan region comprising a number 
of settlements linked along road corridors under different forms of local administration. 
This phenomenon is a major problem for planning practice. This section discusses the 
consequences for city planning policy during the past three decades, which influenced 
the making of the Bangkok General Plan 1992. 
11 The DTCP has commissioned studies o f transportatio n for the Bangkok ci ty planning since 1984. 
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The term 'planning under siege' is used to explain a critical situation in which 
planners are working under pressure in the face of a number of chronic problems. The 
siege can be understood in terms of tangible and abstract elements. The term refers to 
the situation in which a big city such as Bangkok is surrounded by dozens of 
municipalities each with local autonomy. These municipalities have implemented their 
own city plans. This has caused a fragmentation of responsibility in land use control. It 
is interesting to study how this phenomenon has occurred. 
After an attempt by enthusiasts to issue a city plan for Bangkok failed in 1976, 
the DTCP changed its strategy by shifting the use of the new planning law from big 
cities such as Bangkok to smaller towns. The DTCP targeted Rayong, an industrial town 
on the eastern seaboard and proclaimed a victory when the first city plan enforced by 
law was issued on 29 December 1983. Since then , a number of plans have been issued 
using legislation to control the land use of most towns and cities in Thailand. 
The DTCP continues the task of producing this sort of plan. Plan after plan, 
town after town and city after city - every plan has the same layout showing a similar 
pattern of land use planning. This includes plans for all urban centres12 within a radius 
of 100 kilometres around Bangkok. And yet ultimately, Bangkok city planning is 
blockaded by these plans as if it is under a siege created by the DTCP itself. 
These plans are produced separately by different planning teams based on 
provincial administrative boundaries. They are then implemented by a number of 
independent public authorities. It is important to note that this planning approach is 
different from the approach in the Litchfield Plan in 1960 and the First Revision of the 
Plan for the Metropolitan Area in 1971 which covered the inner urban areas of Bangkok 
and considered the physical built environment as their primary concern. 
In terms of Bangkok as a region, the separate plans are ineffective in terms of 
development management. They also reflect the different approaches taken by DTCP 
and the BMA to making plans. These different approaches can be understood in terms of 
national politics and local politics. While their focus is apparently on planning 
boundaries, the context of the metropolitan region is not actually recognised by them. 
The need for the metropolitan regional plan, implemented and enforced by law, is 
ignored. 
i: These urban centres are Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani. Samul Prakarn, Samut Songkharm, Samut Sakhon, 
Nakhon Pathom. Nakhon Nayok and Chachoengsao. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, it is very difficult to change this approach to planning 
because the administrative boundaries represent the limitation and degree of the use of 
power according to Thai law. This is very important in the view of the Ministry of 
Interior as the DOLA, which is the most powerful department in the ministry, handles 
most laws and uses the boundaries to solve conflicts between the different authorities. 
Besides being under siege by the abstract nature of many DTCP plans, the 
planning process in Bangkok is blocked by the many built forms and new settlements 
which have developed without control for many decades. Industrial estates and housing 
projects have been developed by both the public and private sectors and are dispersed 
across the seven constituent provinces - Samut Prakan, Nonthaburi , Pathum Thani, 
Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon and Chachoengsao - which comprise the BMR13. 
According to the 1990 census, the population of the BMR is about 9.283 million living 
in 51 districts of the seven constituent provinces [Stemstein, 1995 #41, 1-25] . 
In 1995, Stemstein presented a report on population changes in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region. It gave conclusive evidence that the rate of population growth in 
the inner core of Bangkok14 had dropped sharply and continuously. For example, Porn 
Prab Sattru Phai district lost 63.2 per cent of its population from 1970 to 1980. 
Meanwhile, the censuses showed a much higher percentage of population growth in the 
periphery in the same period. Bang Kapi, Min Buri, Nong Kham and Bang Phli were 
among the districts with high rates of growth over l 00 per cent. Bang Kapi district 
showed the highest percentage of growth of 168.6 from 1970 to 1980 [Stemstein, 1995 
#41, 27) 15• However, the Bangkok General Plan 1992 did not take into account this 
pattern of population change. 
Besides these elements, the implementation of the Bangkok General Plan 1992 
was blocked by a number of other laws and regulations 16 many of which had been issued 
previously. Some were rewritten later such as the Building Codes and Controls for 
Bangkok and Ministerial Regulation No. 33, 1991. For the effective implementation of 
the plan these laws have become problematic. Most important was the overlap among 
the laws and the consequent confusion and potential for loopholes in the whole set of 
planning law. 
\J See Appendix 4.2. 
IJ These districts are Phra Nakhon. Porn Prab Sattru Phai. Samphanthawong, Bang Rak and Prathum Wan. 
15 See Appendix 4.5 
16 Besides the TCPA 1975. there arc seven Acts and 14 Regulations which apply to Bangkok [Boonchuan, 
1997 #54. 124- 126] . 
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While the case of Bangkok may be not clear because very little of the plan has 
been implemented, a serious conflict over laws occurred in 1997 in Phitsanulok, a town 
some hundreds of kilometres riorth of Bangkok. In the city plan, the DTCP proposed 
building a new bridge across the river. However, the Department of Public Works, which 
was given a budget to build the bridge, opposed the site for the new bridge. Eventually, 
the DTCP lost the case and the bridge was built at a new site chosen by the Department 
of Public Works. 
The case of Phitsanulok indicates how current planning law is not effective and 
highlights another weakness in city planning in Thailand. Similar conflicts can occur 
anywhere, anytime if competing interests are not settled. This is a serious problem for 
Bangkok as it is the centre of significant competing interests which are influenced by 
many political factions. Boundary conflicts over the administrative, legal and planning 
systems in Bangkok are more complicated than elsewhere. However, many conflicts are 
ended quickly after a compromise is reached between factions on the basis of their 
mutual interest. 
The idea of legislation being able to establish and give effect to the interests of 
the wider community, in the presence of strong vested interests, is unlikely in the 
planning context in Bangkok. 
4. 2. 3 Reflections on the Bangkok General Plan 1992 
Even though the Bangkok General Plan 1992 has not solved Bangkok's 
problems and is viewed as 'a paper tiger' because so little of the plan has been 
implemented, it has had some influence on later changes in Bangkok city planning. 
Firstly, the plan has started an agenda for city planning under legislation and has 
highlighted the continuing need for planning legitimacy. Secondly, it has started a 
political commitment to city planning so that the Governor of the BMA is required to 
prepare a new plan every five years Thirdly, city planning in Bangkok has truly become 
local practice and the DTCP now plays a minor role by providing only framing 
recommendations. This suggests that city planning has now become more a matter for 
local politics 
The plan's greatest influence has been in providing enthusiasm for the next 
Governor of the B'v1A, Kri sda Arungwonse na Ayutthaya ( 1994-1 996), who has worked 
hard to introduce a new planning style The land use of Bangkok was surveyed in t 993 
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to facilitate this energetic movement (see Figure 4 .5). The Governor completed his task 
through the Bangkok Plan 1995. . 
4.3 Review of the Bangkok Plan 1995 
As discussed, the Bangkok General Plan 1992 was completed during a period of 
political polarisation under the BMA Governor, Chamlong Srirnuang. Chamlong had 
considerable support from his active Deputy Governor, Krisda Arungwongse Na 
Ayutthaya after the election in 1992. Krisda was the former Dean of the Faculty of 
Architecture at Chulalongkorn University and took responsibility for city planning 
because of his professional background in architectural design and project planning. 
The first Bangkok city plan became a political obligation which needed to be 
completed quickly. Because of time limitations, density control was not considered or 
included in the Bangkok General Plan 1992. However, Krisda continued with this 
attempt when he became the Governor of the BMA in 1994. Density control measures 
were recommended in the Bangkok Plan 1995. 
Instead of giving the task to local planning staff at the BMA, he gave it to a 
planning team from the MIT. There is however an explanation of why Thai planners did 
not play a leading role in making the new plan. The main reason why the planning team 
from the MIT was chosen was that Krisda had graduated from and had personal 
connections with this Institute. Hence, the arrival of the MIT planning team was 
understandable. Knowing the worldwide reputation of MIT would bring him political 
credibility, Krisda used the Bangkok Plan 1995 for his campaign during the election in 
1996. Another candidate, Bhichit Rattakul aimed his campaign at environmental 
problems in Bangkok. Chamlong, whose political relationship with Krisda had broken 
down, sold the idea of Bangkok 2000 as the city of the future. This shows the 
importance of the planning process as an electoral issue. However, the result of the 
election on 2 June 1996 did not reflect these campaigns as the voters considered the 
personality and leadership of candidates rather than their policies. 
Despite the fact that people in Bangkok did not care about the MIT plan and the 
plan was not implemented, it is interesting to study how the MIT planning team 
prepared the plan. The focus in the next section is on development planning and the 
methods that the MIT team expected to succeed in improving Bangkok. The discussion 
is on three key issues: (I) land use planning; (2) the maximum allowable floor area 
ratio; and (3) the urban development plan. 
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4.3.l Land Use Planning in the Bangkok Plan 1995 
The property booms in association with the high rate of economic growth in the 
1980s had an influence on the MIT planning team. By the early 1990s, Bangkok was a 
city where competition for land and property was intense and property values were high. 
These facts were discussed and included in the main report . 
The MIT study concentrationed on the role of Bangkok in the metropolitan 
region The Bangkok Metropolitan Area population in mid-1 995 was estimated at 8 
million with an annual growth rate of 3 per cent. This estimation was higher than the 
census shown in the BMA annual report of 1996 which gave a figure of 5,570, 743 
people who lived in Bangkok in 1995 [BMA, 1996 #44, 6]. The BMR population wa3 
approximately 11 million. It was expected that the population of the BMA would be 
about 11 million in 2005 [(MIT), 1995 #13, section 4, 3-4]. 
The MIT planning team seemed to work on the daytime population rather than 
on the registered population17, an assumption which was not considered seriously in the 
previous planning process. Hence, a constraint for the MIT planning team was the lack 
of more accurate data and information for planning. In fact, this has been a very basic 
problem since the first modern city plan was made in 1959 and 1960. The authorities 
involved did not explain why this problem remained unsolved in the 1990s. This reflects 
another problem with city planning in Thailand. 
Bangkok's chronic traffic and environment problems were discussed briefly in th~ 
MIT report. Development control in association with a development guidance system 
was proposed on the basis of a package concept This included a small number of use 
zones, maximum density of development, special areas with overriding contextual 
regulations, a density bonus system to reward developments that serve public purposes 
and a special permit system for large developments [(MIT), 1995 # 13, section 4, 11]. 
The planning concepts and policies are represented in the land use plan. Six use 
categories were proposed as shown in Figure 4 6, compared with 14 employed in the 
Bangkok General Plan 1992. The three current resident development categories (low, 
medium and high-density housing) were combined into a single residential category The 
same principle was applied to combine other categories into a single category The si~ 
categories are ( 1) mixed-use; (2) commercial use: (3) residential use; ( 4) public parks and 
1
- The registered population is the to1:1I number of people \\·ho have a permanent address in Bangkok 
and who arc registered \1·i th the local authority in Bangkok The daytime population means the number 
of people \\ho l i \·e outside but work in Bangkok Thais includes unregistered illegal migrations from 
rum! areas. 
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six categories are (1) mixed-use; (2) commercial use; (3) residential use; (4) public 
parks and open spaces; (5) industrial and warehouse use; and (6) agricultural use. The 
most significant difference between the current and proposed regulations was the 
introduction of a mixed-use zone. Most small scale residential, commercial and light 
industrial uses are permitted in the mixed-use zone [(MIT), 1995 #13, section 4, 13-19]. 
Source: MIT. 
Figure 4.6 The Bangkok Plan 1995 (land use) 
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There has been little impact on Bangkok city planning in changing the zones 
from 14 to six categories. In reality, land uses in Bangkok have always been mixed so it 
is difficult to differentiate which urban blocks are actually residential or commercial. 
One example is a commercial complex where apartments, offices, shops and a theme 
park have been integrated in the same building. Another example is the old parts of 
town which have grown informally. Here small service businesses such as mechanical 
workshops are scattered among houses. The interpretation of land use and building use 
is controversial in cases where contradictory functions are merged in a single building. 
However, this may be not a problem because some of these projects have been 
approved. The most interesting case is the multi-million investment Industrial 
Condominium project developed by the Bangkok Land Group in a suburb north of 
Bangkok in which an office, factory and warehouse have been put in the same tower 
compound. Are these reasonable and effective concepts for solving Bangkok's 
problems? 
My first argument is that the MIT planning team did not consider the urban 
primacy of Bangkok as a primary problem. Why was this serious problem overlooked? 
The main report of the Bangkok Plan 1995 discussed and expressed a positive 
view of the Metropolitan Regional Structure Plan18, prepared by the NESDB, which 
supported many development projects in and around the Bangkok metropolitan region 
[(MIT), 1995 #13, 30]. This reflected the influence of the NESDB on the planning team. 
For the same reason, other development guidelines in the Bangkok Plan 1995 supported 
policies proposed by the NESDB in its former studies, such as the master plan of the 
SBIA which was submitted in August 1994. The NESDB, for example, wanted to 
develop Lat Krabang as a suburban centre which would serve the new Bangkok airport. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the NESDB has maintained its staunch policy on the 
further development of the primate city. It has now become clear why urban primacy 
was not regarded as a problem in the Bangkok Plan 1995. The MIT planning concept 
was in fact likely to increase the role of Bangkok as the central 'knowledge economy' of 
Southeast Asia by developing a sophisticated infrastructure and providing a higher 
quality of urban life. 
I support the policy on Bangkok development as the economic development 
centre and aviation hub of Southeast Asia. However, the Thai government should study 
how smaller cities such as Singapore with less population, can play a role as the centre 
18 Discussion on this study is in section 4.4 
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of finance and transportation in the region. In my view, Bangkok is not competitive 
because of the number of chronic problems and the lack of city planning. As Jong as the 
urban primacy of Bangkok remains, it will be extremely difficult to make a good plan 
for a city which continues to grow rapidly without limitation. 
My second argument focuses on the concept of mixed-use development. Figure 
4.6 shows a large area of commercial land use forming the core of Bangkok, surrounded 
by mixed-use. One of the main purposes of encouraging mixed-use development was to 
reduce the need for travel, as multiple purposes can be served by one trip and people can 
live near the workplace. Commuting distances are minimized when offices, shops and 
housing are located in close proximity and the problem of traffic congestion could be 
reduced [(MIT), 1995 #13, 49]. In my view, this concept reflects a poor understanding 
of the development pattern of an urban economy and the social behaviour of commuters 
in Bangkok [Punpuing, 1996 #107, 132-168]. My argument is that the concept of 
mixed-use development cannot solve traffic problems in Bangkok. People who live 
outside Bangkok and work in the city core cannot afford expensive accommodation in 
the mixed-use areas. 
Coupled with the land use plan, the concept of density development was 
introduced as the most powerful way of carrying out the intentions of the new 
development plan. The concept was simple. The land use plan shown in Figure 4.6 was 
interpreted in the density control plan shown in Figure 4.7. A discussion on the 
implications of this is included in the next section. 
4.3.2 Maximum Allowable Floor Area Ratio 
A highlight of the Bangkok Plan 1995 was the control of maximum allowable 
floor area ratio. Two key terms of 'Floor Area Ratio' 19 or F.A.R. and 'Building Covered 
Ratio' 20 or B.C.R. were discussed and FAR was included in the plan. The concept was 
an attempt to broaden the view of city planning into three dimensions. However, the 
density control approach requires a large amount of information and a complicated study 
process which cannot be completed quickly. 
19 Floor Area Ratio is a ratio between the total floor area of building and the land area covered by that 
building. It is applied for controlling the density in urban areas. 
"
0 Building Cover Ratio is a ratio between the total ground floor area of a building and the land area in 
which that building is located. It is applied for controlling open space in the city. 
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It was believed that controls over the density of development were potentially 
the most powerful way of carrying out the intention of the new development. The 
density plan was proposed on the basis of four notions: 
(I ) to create a high density city core; 
(2) to concentrate further development along the routes of the mass transit 
system; 
(3) to encourage infill development within the Outer Bangkok Ring Road, except 
in areas designated for new metropolitan subcentres21 ; and 
(4) to restrict the intrusion of development into agricultural lands beyond the 
Outer Bangkok Ring Road on the west side of the city and beyond the 
King's Dyke, east of the city 
Figure 4.7 shows the FARs assigned to various areas range from an FAR of 10: 1_ 
(1,000%) in the central core of the city to an FAR of much less than 1: 1 in agricultural 
areas on the fringe of Bangkok. Hence, it is interesting to study the FAR concept 
proposed in the Bangkok Plan 1995. 
The application of FARs was superficial in the Bangkok Plan. An analysis was 
made of intensities in Asian cities and North American cities, showing a variety of 
maximum FARs from 1:1 (100%) up to 14:1 (1,400%). Ultimately, six basic FAR zones 
were designated with generally declining FARs with distance from the core: 10: 1 for the 
city core, 6: 1 and 4: 1 for inner areas, 2: 1 and 1: 1 for outer areas and a FAR for rural 
areas where not more than one dwelling associated with agricultural activities [(MIT), 
1995 #13, 22-23]. 
It was acknowledged that a great constraint on the application of FARs was the 
traffic capacity of arterial roads in Bangkok, which are extremely overloaded. The 
development of mass transit systems would allow intensities to increase ; even to rise 
above 10: I (1,000%) in areas well served by mass transit [(MIT), 1995 #13, 22]. 
I agree with the idea that there is a crucial need for density control in Bangkok. 
F ARs are an alternative approach which have been adopted in many countries. 
However, the case of Bangkok is completely different from other cities in Japan and 
North America. In my view, the application of FARs in Bangkok is more complicated 
than has been shown in the Bangkok Plan 1995 as it requires a large amount of data and 
information. Importantly, it also requires a comprehensive analysis of urban structure 
21 Hence 'ribbon development', the growth of the city along major roads, is regarded as a problem because 
the infrastructure provision is not effective. The areas parallel with the main road cannot be developed 
properly. 
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and mobility status of people and firms in the metropolitan region. Given this 
information there is a stronger· basis for identifying and classifying the different 
categories of density control. Besides the transportation issue, the criteria should include 
other infrastructure and public services such as water supply, sewage and the flood 
protection systems. 
In recognition of the fact that Bangkok is critically short of open space, the 
Bangkok Plan 1995 proposed an open space incentive programme which would serve as 
an incentive for private developers to dedicate and open up portions of their land for 
recreational purposes [(MIT), 1995 #13, 25]. Developers do not regard this incentive as 
a primary concern. In fact, a decision on property development in the city core is based 
on a cost-benefit analysis in which many factors must be considered carefully. 
It is worth noting that land parcels are a major constraint on property 
development in Bangkok. There are very few large plots of land in the city core. Despite 
the proposed high F ARs of I 0: 1, this incentive may not attract developers if a greater 
profit can be made from cheaper land outside the city core. The boom in property 
development, with many tower blocks on Rama III and Bang Na-Trad Highway, is an 
example. 
However, density control is becoming a new area of conflict in terms of the 
overlapping use of legal power. The Department of Public Works claims responsibility 
for issuing FAR regulations based on its legislation, through Building Codes and 
Controls. In fact, as density control is concerned with city planning, the regulation of 
FARs should be carried out in association with land use control for the whole city. A 
new power struggle is emerging between DTCP and Department of Public Works . The 
issue of density control and the fragmentation of responsibility between the two 
departments cannot be easily resolved. This conflict reflects another shortcoming with 
the administrative, legal and planning systems in the Thai bureaucracy. 
4.3.3 Urban Development Plan 
Besides the land use plan and density control, another significant issue proposed 
m the Bangkok Plan 1995 was the urban development plan which focused on the 
development of the peripheral areas of Bangkok. The urban development plan in Figure 
4.8 shows a development overview of Bangkok in terms of development corridors along 
the mass transit system in association with the proposed five metropolitan subcentres 
[(MIT), ! 995 # 13 , 56-59]. The development of these centres (Lat Krabang, Min Buri. 
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Lam Lukla, Taling Chan and Bang Khun Thian) was proposed in order to balance jobs 
and housing in suburban areas [(MIT), 1995 #13, section 4, 34]. This section discusses 
the rationality of the urban development plan. 
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Figure 4.8 The Bangkok Plan 1995 (urban development plan) 
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The main focus was on Lat Krabang which was the most promising location for 
developing an initial metropolitan subcentre. The layout plans covered 1,335 hectares 
and sketches showed a large development complex. However only a basic financial 
study was presented. 
The most important reason for choosing Lat Krabang was its location close to 
the SBIA, which :vould be a new economic magnet for this area. A study of the Bangkok 
Plan 1995 stated that new airports throughout the world have provided the stimulus for 
a host of related developments such as high technology research and manufacturing 
parks, airport-related industries, convention and exposition facilities and offices for 
international companies which rely heavily on air-travel [(MIT), 1995 #13, discussion 
section, 132]. 
In fact, the same concept was proposed in the Master Plan and Feasibility 
Studies for Area around Second Bangkok International Airport 1994. Areas of 2, 168.3 
hectares on the east and 2,384.5 hectares on the west of the runways were planned for a 
large commercial development which would serve and facilitate the aviation industry 
and business [Norconsult, 1994 #38, part A, main report, 8-10, 8- 14]. A discussion with 
comprehensive analysis of the airport master plan is included in Chapter 6. 
It seems that all nearby areas around the SBIA were seen as feasible for every 
sort of airport-related investment. The total area of 5,887 hectares in Lat Krabang in the 
Bangkok Plan 1995 and the east and west of the SBIA proposed in the Norconsult study 
are much bigger than the city core of Bangkok22. The question is why these two studies 
proposed such a huge area around the new airport. Are these areas really attractive and 
feasible for investment? The air freight business is a good case to consider. 
In reality, more than half of the air freight business is located in the city core for 
two reasons. Firstly, these companies have to deal with clients whose head offices are 
located in the city core. Secondly, the primary business of these companies is organising 
a forwarding service in which most goods and products are transported through the 
inland Bangkok Port at Klong Toei, some kilometres southeast of the city core. A 
manager of an airfreight company stated that his business only wanted two things: a big 
warehouse located anywhere between the client's office and the airport and a small 
22 The c ity core of Bangkok in terms o f Central Business District (CBD) covers the areas of three inner 
districts ; 553 ha of Bang Rak, 141 ha of Samphanthawong and 836 ha of Pathum W an. 
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office with two clerks at the airport23• It is not clear whether the two studies considered 
these factors as part of their concern for rational planning. 
Furthermore, the studies did not include an analysis of geographical factors and 
did not consider legal concerns. In fact, the proposed area in Lat Krabang is regarded as 
a residential area for low density development. The areas around the SBIA are on 
floodways which were to be preserved for rural and agricultural uses in the Bangkok 
General Plan 1992, as shown in Figure 4.3 and in the master plan of Samut Prakarn 
shown in Figure 6.4. This means that any large development project is forbidden in 
these areas. The question is why the two studies proposed the idea of developing Lat 
Krabang, given the development controls enforced under the law of Bangkok General 
Plan 1992. 
On the issue of flood protection proposed in the urban development plan of the 
Bangkok Plan 1995, flooding was viewed as a serious problem for both the east and 
west of the city. However, the project proposed in the Bangkok Plan 1995 reflected a 
different story. 
It stated that the development of the SBIA would have an impact on flooding in 
the east of Bangkok but it did not identify the kind of impact and how critical this would 
be. No study was made of flood geomorphology. Development controls for the 
agricultural fringe and flood protection were proposed to limit development in this area 
[(MIT). 1995 #13, discussion section. 98-99]. However, the development controls did 
not include the Lat Krabang subcentre of 1,335 hectares, previously discussed. In my 
view, the urban development plan of the Bangkok Plan 1995 gave insufficient attention 
on flood protection. In fact, its primary concern was the property development of five 
proposed subcentres around Bangkok, illustrated with a number of architectural 
sketches. 
It is not clear whether the MIT planning team clearly understood the problems of 
Bangkok and how the plan they were making would function in Bangkok. The pattern of 
the physical development of Bangkok was discussed as an introduction, with a 
recognition of the extended metropolis which has covered all nearby provinces. 
However, the land use plan of the Bangkok Plan 1995 shown in Figure 4.6, seems to 
encourage ribbon development which is not integrated with the concept of metropolitan 
centres in the urban development plan shown in Figure 4.8. 
23 The informant is the manager of Airfre ight Company who has 1 1 year-experience in this business. He 
gave the interview in May 1996 at his office o n Changwattana Road in Bangkok. 
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mechanism is behind many of the development failures in Thailand. If the government 
gives orders to the NESDB to review a project, it is well known that the project will be 
suspended at least until the last day of that government's administration. A report 
recently submitted to the NESDB has been selected in order to illustrate regional 
development policy and concepts. 
In November 1992, the Canadian International Development Agency provided 
consulting services to the NESDB for a regional study. As a result, Leman Group and its 
consortium submitted a report, the Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study, to 
the NESDB in February 1995. The main task of the study was to identify a regional and 
urban structural development framework for the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Region. 
The area identified was the great lower Chao Phraya River Basin, covering the areas of 
BMR, the Eastern Seaboard and the Upper Central Region. This represents an area 
covering 18 provinces, and an area exceeding I 00,000 square kilometres. 
The NESDB provided data and information to the consortium. On the basis of a 
holistic, transdisciplinary and integrative study, the methodology was to review previous 
related studies and reports. A full-day workshop was held on 27 October 1993 with 
some 160 participants from related agencies and the consortium presented and discussed 
the interim report. Eight sectoral studies were subsequently prepared on the key issues 
of (1) urbanisation and human settlements, (2) population growth, (3) industrial 
development, (4) land use planning, (5) water supply and sewage, (6) drainage and flood 
protection, (7) environment, and (8) organisation and management. 
The term 'Chao Phraya Multipolis' was introduced and defined as 'a distinct, 
large-scale urban system within the inter-urban transactional dynamics of high-order and 
rapidly growing intensity'. In other words, a large area within a radius of 200 kilometres 
of Bangkok has become a system of economic, environmental, social, tourism, industrial 
and commuting transactions. In addition, it was strongly recommended that all future 
studies of the Chao Phraya Multipolis should include the entire Central Region of 
Thailand. In other words, it would cover about 103, 900 square kilometres, including 
more than 250 urban districts in 27 provinces. 
The existing pattern of settlements in the study area was analysed, taking 
account of a number of old problems. It was found that urban sprawl was evident 
everywhere around Bangkok but that there was li ttle or no evidence of transactional 
linkages between the cities and towns. The context of analysis focused on the emerging 
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role of the Chao Phraya Multipolis in the future as a centre for Indochina for 
international trade and development. 
The study claimed a Multipolis, a multi-nodal system of human settlement, 
could provide more and better opportunities than a primate city. This development 
model of a vast and complex metropolitan urban system, was expected to minimize the 
functioning cost of an major urban area in terms of time, energy and money. 
The study concluded that the Multipolis, as an open-ended, dynamic, diverse 
system of settlement, would offer a whole new range of solutions to the problems 
created by the centripetal, concentric forces which have been at work in Bangkok and 
the region for the past century. Consequently, a number of strategies and phasing 
priorities were recommended for its implementation. However the regional policies and 
strategies are controversial. How reasonable are they? Why was a Multipolis 
recommended and will its implementation be successful? Some of these questions can 
be answered by examining details of the study. 
After examining the patterns of urban problems in Bangkok and highlighting the 
importance of deconcentration strategies, four options were evaluated in the study: ( l ) to 
let present trends continue; (2) to continue concentration with improved urban 
management; (3) a growth pole strategy; and (4) a Multipolis. The first three options 
were found to be unsuitable. The study emphased the last option and outlined how the 
diversity of cities in the Multipolis: a port city, an industrial city, a university city, a 
government administration city, a tourist city, etc., could enhance the diversity of 
opportunities for people who lived within its boundaries. It highlighted the freedom to 
move in the Multipolis with a minimization of time, energy and money. This wonderful 
development model seems to be propaganda only. How could millions of people living 
in an area of over a 100,000 square kilometres do this? 
My argument is that the study did not point to past government policies with 
their strong bias towards Bangkok which have accelerated its growth as a primate city 
for decades. The causes of the failure of the l\i'ESDB decentralisation strategy and rural 
developmenc policy were not identified in the study, even though it was clear that from 
the 1970s through to the 1990s, these policies were accompanied by increased levels of 
regional inequality. Many important factors relating to the emerging Bangkok mega-
urban region were not adequately studied; furthermore, it simply analysed urban systems 
without enough logical explanation which took account of present reality. 
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Figure 4.9 Chao Phraya Multipolis Land Use Plan 
In fact, the existing settlement systems in the Chao Phraya River Basin are much 
more complicated than the consortium indicated. Even though some agricultural 
conununities around Bangkok have changed as a result of the economic boom that 
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existed before 1997, the significance of the physical and hierarchical structure of 
waterbound settlements with soci.al coherence at the local level was overlooked. From 
an empirical observation, a number of new industrial areas with modem factories 
dominate everything along the highways to Ayutthaya, Samut Sak.hon and 
Chachoengsao. The reality is that a lot of small settlements and traditional clusters 
remain hidden quietly behind these huge factories but the contrasting landscape cannot 
be seen from the highway. 
The problems of the primate city were reviewed briefly. The study concluded 
that Bangkok was no longer receptive to further expansion, despite the economic 
benefits. An overview of land use was discussed. The study found that suburban areas in 
a ring between 20-40 kilometres from the centre of Bangkok include a mixture of land 
uses. Its rough measures showed that out of a total of 1,000 square kilometres; 212 
square kilometres were residential. 85 square kilometres were occupied by commerce, 
manufacturing and government offices and the rest was agricultural and open land. 
Some potential constraint factors were investigated and a land use plan was proposed as 
shown in Figure 4.9. 
The development policy of the seventh national plan ( 1993-1997) proposed the 
integration of the Bangkok Metropolis with the Eastern Seaboard. It also suggested that 
the same planning pattern used at city and regional levels be extended to cover the upper 
central region. Recognising its geographical potential, a policy on industrial 
development was proposed for Sara Buri , a city 100 kilometres north of Bangkok. Alex 
Leman recommended that Sara Buri be developed as a new Metropolis at the crossroads 
of Indochina. He also proposed the intersection of the Controlled Access Inter-Urban 
Motorway linking the NorthEastem Seaboard and Northeast-Western Region be located 
at Sara Buri [Leman, 1995 #I 0, final report, sectoral study 4, 4-1 O]. 
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Figure 4.10 Chao Phraya Multipolis Population growth in 2010 and 2015 
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But Sara Buri, with an urban population of 53,000 in 1995, is not a metropolis. 
The Comprehensive Plan for Sara Buri issued by the DTCP on 9 October 1996, 
projected that the population in the area of 51 square kilometres will be 110,410 in 2011 
with an annual growth rate of 2.24 per cent [DTCP, 1997 #37, 16-17]. The term 
Metropolis is used to describe a large city with a major centre of urban activities, a 
gathering place of people, processes and ideas and a centre of political influence for 
surrounding areas [Robinson, 1995 #6, 81-82]. In fact, Sara Buri is only a secondary 
city. Certainly, it is a long way from reaching its population target of being a metropolis. 
On the one hand, its local economic base relies on the construction material industry and 
it has a number of pollution problems that are constraining other developments. More 
importantly, Sara Buri requires a great deal of investment to provide an adequate 
infrastructure system. 
On the proposed land use plan shown in Figure 4.9, the Future Development 
Reserve Area (FDRA) was especially introduced. It suggested that land contiguous to 
existing human settlements be preserved in order to accommodate large scale, carefully 
planned and properly approved future urban uses of various kinds. Eventually, some 12 
FDRAs were selected and recommended in order to fulfill the multipolitan system 
concept. An urban compact concept was recommended for planning the FDRA. 
The issue of industry growth was discussed and studied. The study argued that 
Thailand has never had a long-term plan for industrial development. Without detailed 
studies, it could not present a clear picture of industrial development toward the year 
2010. Recent developments were taken into consideration such as technological 
changes, the loss of the cheap labour advantage, the increasing competitiveness in the 
global market and the more liberal monetary system. After taking a wide perspective 
and identifying a number of constraints for industrial development, some basic 
recommendations were made such as infrastructure improvement. Other key factors 
which have had strong impacts on patterns of industrial development were overlooked. 
In fact, the Promotion Acts of J 960, 1972 and 1977 implemented by the Board of 
Investment (Bol) and the rearrangement of zoning in accordance with the government 
policy of dispersing industrial investments to regions outside Bangkok, should have 
been reviewed comprehensively, particularly their consequences. 
On 28 January 1993 , the Bo I approved some further measures to encourage 
regional investment and decentralisation of industry. Three zones were set up in 
Thailand which provide tax benefits for the establishment and operation of new factories 
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[(Bol), 1996 #118, 1]. The zones have different incentives and this has created a new 
problem of uneven developmeqt. As the zones are based on the administrative 
boundaries of 75 provinces, only a few urban centres can gain the benefits of the zone 
system. Consequently, foreign investment with an export orientation has expanded 
greatly in some areas of zone 2 close to Bangkok. A number of new factories are also 
now located in this area of high agricultural value, which has good fertile soil and 
irrigation, only 100-120 kilometres from the centre of Bangkok. 
The role of the Bol and its promotion of the zone system has been a 
controversial issue for years. A number of industrial estates are agglomerated in Zone 2 
where transportation networks, basic infrastructure and water resources are well 
developed. As a result, the disparities among provinces in the zone are becoming wider, 
particularly in terms of income distribution and spatial settlements. The basic argument 
is that the zoning arrangement should be carefully considered on the basis of 
geographical economy rather than the boundaries of local administration. 
It is a great disappointment that the consortium did not clarify a direction for 
policy for the industrial development of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region . Moreover, it 
stated that: 
The Central Region has high agricultural potential because of good 
fertile soil and a complete irrigation system. It is also near Bangkok markets 
and it has infrastructure to service the market as well as to receive the required 
technical, financial, transportation and agricultural research support from them. 
However, the manufacturing industry has the same potential and therefore 
demands the use of land [Leman, 1995 #10, final report, sectoral study 3, 3-14]. 
Tables with old statistics were presented in the study. Eventually, the most 
impressive statement was that 'Government policy on this conflicting issue should be 
clarified'. Why did not the consortium itself suggest clarification? 
Conflicts between agricultural and industrial developments on the Chao Phrya 
River Basin have existed since the 1970s. The first environmental disaster affecting the 
fresh water ecosystem on Mae Klong during 1970-1973 is a good example. Following 
the NESDB 's national policy promoting sugar cane production to match favourable 
world market prices, a number of sugar cane factories were rapidly built along both 
banks of the Mae Klong River. The polluted water flowed directly into the river without 
any protection measures. This resulted in the complete extinction of many fresh water 
fish and habitats and a painful experience for the local people. An environmental policy 
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was presented for the first time in the third national plan ( 1972-1976) drawn up by 
NESDB. 
However, the failure of the industrial policy in the 1970s and repeated 
environmental problems were not addressed in the NESDB 's planning. Since then, these 
problems had become more complex and have remained unsolved. In the 1990s many 
similar cases have occurred in Lamphun, the Upper Ping River in the North and in Khon 
Kaen, and upstream of the Nampong River in the Northeast. Obviously the NESDB 
needs to understand the importance of watershed management and the different 
geographical domains of the Chao Phraya River Basin. The term 'sustainable 
development strategy' written in the national policy will remain rhetoric unless 
environmental factors are considered. The high rate of economic growth being achieved 
and statistics of increasing number of new factories are impressive indicators of 
development for the NESDB. 
The Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study presented the projected 
population of each of the 18 provinces for the years 1990 to 2010 by urban and rural 
residences, for the purpose of spatial planning and infrastructure development. This was 
based on the 1990 Census Report and a survey of population change in 1991. After 
considering all basic assumptions, the study projected that the population would 
increase from 15 million in 1990 to 21 million in 2010 with the urban portion of the 
population to be over 70 per cent. Figure 4. 10 shows the population growth in 2010 and 
2015. The study concluded that the population density in urban areas would increase 
sharply, particularly in the vicinity of Bangkok and in the Eastern Region, in parallel 
with the expected rapid economic development. 
At a conference in Melbourne in November 1995, Utis Kaotien from the 
NESDB reported that the projected population living within the radius of 200 kilometres 
of Bangkok would be 32 million in 2010 compared to 72 million for the whole country 
[Kaothien, 1994 #30]. Why would nearly half the nation 's population live within an area 
that is only one-fifth of Thailand? Hence, the fundamental principle in decentralization 
written in the national plan is questionable. 
The proposed strategy of changing a sprawling metropolis to a multipolitan system in 
the Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study is unclear and descriptive. An 
implementation guideline was also not included with the proposal. However, Wilbur 
Smith Associates, a well-known consulting firm in transportation, did not play a vital 
role in the most critical and important issue of transport development policy. The 
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access motorway, the SBIA, the high-speed train and other development projects were 
expected to provide a regional network. One serious concern is that the integration of 
the transport system, the most' important element for regional development, was not 
studied. More seriously, urban systems planned for the year 2010 are located in areas 
around Bangkok which were proposed in the Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning 
Study for the network of corridor development close to existing urban areas. My 
argument is that this will increase the high degree of ribbon development in every 
direction along the highways out of Bangkok. 
Compared with other reports submitted to the government, the study on the 
Bangkok metropolitan region seemed to be less important to it. The study may have been 
so complicated that Cabinet had no idea of how to deal with the complexity of the 
Bangkok Mega-Urban Region In fact, a number of committees were set up, mostly 
chaired by Cabinet members and representatives from the 1'.TESDB acting as committee 
secretaries, to consider projects in and around Bangkok. However none of the 
committees are integrated and have no executive role. 
The study reflected the NESDB' s policy on development concentration in and 
around Bangkok making the metropolis much bigger. While this development policy and 
concept remains, it is extremely difficult to do away with a number of chronic problems 
in Bangkok. 
4.5 Bangkok City Planning and the SBIA 
This section discusses the interaction and relationship between Bangkok city 
planning and the SBIA. It is interesting to study how big development projects such as 
the SBlA have influenced planning in the 1990s. 
A basic fact for discussion in this section is that the SBIA is located in Samut 
Prakarn province. It is some hundreds of metres south of Lat Krabang which is also 
outside the administrative boundaries of the BMA. The consequences of this 
geographical fact are extensive. As discussed in Chapter 3, the physical boundary 
represents the limitations of decision making, the use of legal power, budget cont. ol, 
responsibility and planning concerns. 
Cabinet approved the development of the SBJA on 7 May 1991 . Implementation 
of the Rangkok General Plan 1992 started on 6 July 1992. That means the DTCP knew 
one year earlier that the new airport would be developed at Nong Ngu Hao. However, 
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the impact of the SBIA was not included in the Bangkok General Plan 1992 as a 
planning concern. 
In August 1994, the Ma-ster Plan and Feasibility Study for the Area around SBIA 
was completed and submitted to the Office of the NESDB. The study concluded that the 
new airport would serve an ultimate capacity of 100 million passengers per year. 
However, the figure of 3 0 million passengers in 2006 was not considered in the Bangkok 
Plan 1995 prepared by the MIT planning team which concentrated only on the potential 
of the areas around the new airport . This fact which would affect infrastructure planning 
was also not included in the Bangkok General Plan 1999. 
It is obvious that millions of passengers will have to use the facilities and services 
of Bangkok. This fact should be regarded as an influential factor which will affect the 
provision of infrastrncture such as transportation between the city and the new airport. 
There should be an explanation of why the SB IA was not included in the 
Bangkok General Plan 1992, the Bangkok Plan 1995 and the Bangkok General Plan 
1999. It may however be the same reason why the Bangkok city plan was not included in 
the Master Plan and Feasibility Studies for Area around SBIA. The BMA Governor has 
nothing to do with the new airport and the authorities involved in airport development 
have nothing to do with the problems of Bangkok. Hence, the two planning domains, 
city planning and airport planning, are separated in terms of the administrative, legal and 
planning systems. The reason for not integrating the two planning domains seems to be a 
matter of arrangement of powers between the local and national government. 
Consequently, the impact of the SBIA on Bangkok such as aircraft noise ~nd 
flood protection was not considered in the three plans. Meanwhile, the impact of 100 
million passengers per year on Bangkok' s water supply demand and solid waste disposal, 
which are critical problems in the east of Bangkok, were not considered as problems in 
the master plan of the SBIA. This reflects a fragmentation of responsibility in solving 
problems by planning measures. 
The new airport is one of many urban elements which planners should consider in 
association with o ther urban facts. In my view, the making of a new city plan for 
Bangkok will be more difficult due to the complexity of the problems as well as the 
notorious environmental problems of Bangkok [Ross, 1992 #127]. T his includes new 
factors such as the impact of a large number of unoccupied houses24 and the over-supply 
~~ In September l 997. it " ·as calculated that there were 2 91.196 unoccupied houses in Bangkok. 
Nonthaburi nnd Samul Prakan. The calculation '' as made by counting the number of electricity meters 
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of office space in Bangkok resulting from the economic collapse in 1997. Hence, no 
matter how critical the situation is, Bangkok needs a good plan that works. 
As discussed, Bangkok -is a serious problem for the country and any attempt to 
make improve Bangkok planning requires a comprehensive understanding of the 
complex situation. The study will now move away from planning problems to policy 
problems. A further task of this thesis is to understand how the government' s policy on 
the Bangkok airport development has affected the formal process of city planning and 
airport planning. A policy analysis in the next chapter will explain how political factions 
have influenced rational planning since the 1960s. 
111 houses in these areas that had not used the electricity longer than three months. Source. the .\Jarichon 
ff'eekl1·.\fl!ga;:111e. 12 September 1997. \ Ol.886. p~2 
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Development 
Corruption has become a part of Thai politics. Throughout the past four decades, ~very 
large project in Thailand has suffered from scandal because of corrupt bureaucrats and 
politicians who have viewed a project as a source of quick money making. This includes 
the SBIA and a number of arguments and allegations about corruption since it began in 
1962. However, no one has ever been charged. 
The historical analysis in Chapter 2 provided a basic understanding of how the 
development of the airport became a serious concern in Thai politics. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive discussion of issues behind the government's decision on the 
development of the SBIA and the driving forces behind the project. 
My investigation dates back to the dictator period of the 1960s to explain why 
Field Marshal Sarit wanted the new airport. I discuss how the regional conflict over the 
Vietnam War influenced the development of transportation in Thailand. One task is to 
understand how the military government exploited the project. The focus is on a review 
of reports and studies prepared in the early 1990s. I discuss why the government 
approved the development of the SBIA and who was behind Cabinet's decision on the 
SBIA in May 1991. 
Lastly, this chapter studies whether the SBIA is necessary. The current use of 
Don Muang airport is analysed in terms of aircraft movement and the efficiency of land 
and building uses based on the best available materials. 
5 .1 Policy Analysis and Political Influence 
This section discusses the pol itical influences on development of the SBIA. It 
focuses on the close interrelationship among three key elements: time, actors and tools. 
Under different circumstances, actors selectively used tools to fulfil their own interest 
and express their political will in the form of policy. It is interesting to study how these 
actors have used different tools under changing circumstances to progress the project . 
'Policy is made in a framework of political constraints and opportunities.' 
The above statement gives an overview of how politics have influenced policy 
on the SBIA during the past three decades. The dictators, governments , politicians. 
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consultants and the financial institutions are regarded as actors. These actors have used 
every available tool, including reports, research papers, money and legislation to 
politically influence and control the project. 
5.1.1 The Dictatorship, 1957 to 1973 
To understand how the U.S. Government became involved in airport 
development in Thailand, we have to tum the clock back to the early period of the cold 
war and understand the political situation at the time. 
The triumph of the Chinese communists in October 1949 and the arrival of 
Chinese troops at the northern frontier of Vietnam in 1950 realised America' s worst 
fears about the Domino Theory. In February 1950, France requested American 
economic and military assistance with the war in Indochina. The U.S. Government 
decided to provide US$ 164 million in military aid to France for use in Indochina during 
the fiscal year 195 I. American fears worsened when the Viet Minh gained victory at 
Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. The Geneva Agreement in July 1954 and the 
introduction of the Manila Pact in September 1954 did not however end these fears ; but 
rather totally changed the American role in Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam was separated at the 1 ?'h parallel and foreign troops were deployed 
although arms and munitions were prohibited as a consequence of the Geneva 
Agreements. The communist victory worried the White House in Washington D.C. A 
conference on U.S. command problems in the Pacific was held in February 1955, 
focusing on Southeast Asia, and it was decided to build air facilities in the region 
[Furtrell, 198 I #27, 29-48]. The U.S. military decided that Thailand was the most 
suitable location to embark on their attempt to defeat the communist threat in Southeast 
Asia. 
During the 1950s, the US was careful in its dealings with political conflicts in 
Thailand, particularly with the three generals: Phibun, Phao and Sarit. All three received 
American assistance under different projects. Internal military conflicts in Thailand 
ended after Sarit staged a coup in September 1957 and forced the others into exile. He 
had absolute power over the country after staging his second coup in October 1958. To 
maintain successful control, Sarit had to pay a lot of money to military colleagues to 
maintain his absolute dictatorship. The US understood his politics well. My question is 
where th; money came from? 
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It was openly known that both Phao and Sarit made a fortune from the opium 
trade in the early 1950s [Fineman, 1997 #26, 31-146]. This easy way of making money 
could not be maintained after the international community put strong political pressure 
on Thailand to ban narcotics. Consequently, opium became illegal in Thailand under a 
new law promulgated by Sarit in December 1958. However the opium trade and 
narcotics production networks were never destroyed and after Sarit's death they quickly 
grew again. The drug trade became bigger and political conflicts over the region known 
as the Golden Triangle, became more complex. 
Politics in Thailand through the dictatorship period were very controversial, 
particularly the special relationship between the United States and a corrupt, 
undemocratic and often brutal Thai military. On the basis of an U.S. Military Aid 
Agreement with Thailand on 17 October 1951, the U.S. provided arms, money and 
political support to military regimes in Thailand during 25 years of regional conflict 
from 1951 to 1975. The U.S. supported different factions in the Thai military to ensure 
overall compliance with U.S . military ambitions in the region, including the 
development of airports in Thailand. A question is how the new Bangkok airport 
became involved with this. This section concentrates on the period of dictatorship in the 
1950s. 
In the 1950s, the transportation system in Thailand was fragmented and the US 1 
viewed this as the most critical constraint on economic development. From 1957 to 
1961 , USA.ID funded a company to evaluate the country's transportation system. 
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Thailand 's Transportation System Requirements 
[Transportation Consultants Inc., 1959], was made two years before the new Bangkok 
airport was addressed in the national agenda. As far as I can establish, this is the earliest 
research work in Thailand which took a wide view of national transportation covering 
roads, rails , waterways and air transport systems. It is important to review this report 
because it explained the current situation. The role of air transportation in development 
was also studied. Moreover, it gave many reasonable recommendations. which were 
completely different from those in other studies. 
The importance of air transport was focused on m association with tourism 
development as a basic element for stimulating the Thai economy. Consequently, the 
report strongly recommended that Don Muang airport be improved and maintained to 
1 See Appendix 5. l 
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meet modern standards. In the 1950s, there were only three paved-runway airports in 
Thailand: Don Muang, Chiangmai and Songkla. In other words, the nearest airport to 
Don Muang equipped to receive jet aircraft was several hundred kilometres away. 
Nakhon Ratchasima, often known as Korat, was then selected as an alternate 
international airport although investment was necessary to bring it up to International 
Civil Aviation Organization requirements [Consultants, 1959 # 15, 98-99]. 
The most significant item in this report regarding air transport development was 
a recommendation for an integrated military and civil transport system. It also urged 
USOM to provide a maintenance and repair base at Don Muang. It also stated that 
Thailand was not ready to engage on its own in the very costly, highly competitive field 
of international air transport [Consultants, 1959 #15, 97-112]. 
However, the government pointed out that Litchfield Whiting Bowne 
Associates, another American consultant group also funded by USAID and working on 
the Bangkok City Planning Project from 1959 to 1966, recommended the separation of 
civil and commercial aviation from the military airbase at Don Muang in 1960. A site 
east of Bangkok was selected for a new airport. What were the real reasons behind this 
contradiction of whether to establish a new airport? 
The second Bangkok airport proposal emerged during a difficult time in Thai 
politics. People lived in fear and knew very little about politics. What they knew best 
was the name of the great dictator who could stop anything in seconds. 
By using brutal political methods, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat gained a 
reputation as the strongest dictator in Thai history after his second coup in October 
1958. In the view of some scholars, however, the political situation during his military 
administration from 1958 to 1963 was probably the most stable period in recent history. 
He decided unilaterally to start the new airport project at Nong Ngu Hao. The tool he 
used was the Land Acquisition Act in 1962 which was issued under martial law and 
enabled him to compulsorily acquire the land. Why did Sarit want the new Bangkok 
airport? What were the politics of the new airport all about? 
Between 1955 and 1960, USOM and USAID were directly invol ved in every 
major highway project in Thailand. Some years later, this highway network provided a 
strategic access corridor to American airbases in the region , close to the Indochina 
frontier [Randolph, 1986 #16, 22-24]. 
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Figure 5.1 shows public works projects developed by USOM in 1962. 
Obviously, everything was well planned and prepared for US military deployments. If 
Thailand was so important to US Air Force operations, how could the separation of civil 
and commercial aviation from military airbases benefit American interests? The 
rationale behind the USOM programme for airport development in the 1960s should be 
analysed. 
In April 1961, a new control tower was completed at Don Muang airport 
providing the most modern air traffic control facility in Southeast Asia. In the same 
month, the U.S. detachment of the first fighter interceptor squadron moved to Don 
Muang for an indefinite duration. Additionally, the construction and installation of air 
facilities at Korat, Takhli, Udorn, Ubon and Chiangmai airports were completed by 
February 1960. US strategic air forces were deployed at Takhli in May 1962, Korat in 
July 1963 and Udorn in April 1964. Airfield construction and improvement continued 
through 1971 in accordance with the increasing number of American personnel and 
aircraft. 
It is worth noting that all these airports, except for Takhli where its geography 
did not permit commercial activities, followed recommendations made in 1959 by the 
Transportation Consultants Inc. to integrate military and civil transport systems. 
My first argument here is that this integration provided greater benefits to 
American interests because more military supplies could be transported by commercial 
airlines. This was particularly true for CIA covert missions using the names of Air 
America and other private companies. Secondly, personnel from the RTAF were 
involved in the American secret war, mainly as mercenaries in Laos, so it was much 
easier for them to travel freely as ordinary passengers without being noticed. Moreover, 
the RT AF was too small in those days to use these air facilities, so USOM had no 
reason to develop a new commercial airport. The separation of military and commercial 
activities would seem only to benefit the Thai side. However, politics between the Thai 
and American governments were complex so there needs to more explanation of what 
this was all about. 
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Figure 5.1 Public works projects being developed by USOM, 1962. 
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During this period, USOM played a lasting role in public administration. A 
number of political and administrative figures were notorious for intervening in the 
process of granting contracts for large public sector construction projects in order to 
extract bribes and rents through various devices. The best way for technocrats to 
insulate a project from these corrupt practices was to engage USOM and other 
international donors in every step of the process, from feasibility studies to the finished 
product [Muscat, 1990 #25, 144]. Within this context, Sarit was learning the politics of 
aid and developing applications for his particular interests. 
As a result, several large-scale projects such as the deep seaport on the eastern 
seaboard2 were initiated by Sarit ' s government. His government undertook land 
acquisition procedures for these projects including the new Bangkok airport project. 
The UN Special Fund, however, did not approve the proposal for a deep seaport in 1962 
and USOM officially refused playing a role in the development of the new Bangkok 
airport in 1968. 
A logical explanation for rejecting projects was to point out that the projects 
were costly. However, later the U.S. provided another budget for improvements to the 
Don Muang airport and Bangkok's river port at Klong Toei. The politics of aid to 
Thailand continued as long as mutual interest was still the major concern for the two 
countries and their individual benefit was not adversely affected. 
Sarit is the most interesting actor in this thesis. His politics were remarkable. In 
Thak Chaloemtiarama's view, on the practical side, Sarit was a born problem-solver. 
His instinctive ideas were always tempered by a concern to solve problems 'Yvith skill 
and dispatch [Chaloemtiarana, 1979 # l 08, 169). The I.and Acquisition Act, introduced 
for the new airport under the martial law in September 1962, became a concrete 
foundation for the project. The Act is one of Thailand's strongest legal forms, second to 
the Constitution and can be amended only by the majority of the National Assembl y not 
by Cabinet Hence, Sarit was responsible for the legacy of the SBlA project. 
Sarit 's biography, published at the time of his cremation on 17 March I 964, did 
not mention anything about the SBIA project. Other persons involved in the SBIA have 
so far not been willing to give more information. The legend of the Nong Ngu Hao 
project remains a mystery. However, my investigation could be continued further based 
on more information which might be avai \able in the archives in Washington DC. 
: II became Laem Chabang Po11 Project. the largest infrastnicture built 111 the 1980s. as a part of lhc 
Eastern Seaboard Dc,·cloplllent ProgranHnc funded b~ Japan. 
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After Sarit 's death in December 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn 
continued the dictatorship but with less control. During the Thanom administration, 
several new actors, referred to as 'consultants', influenced policy through proposals 
which offered to provide benefits to the government. Tools used by the actors included 
technical studies and reports. The biggest groups of actors were the people who called 
for democracy. Their tool was a massive demonstration against the new airport project. 
Even though the old tradition of military hierarchy was followed, the political 
situation was not stable. Due to a lack of strong leadership, Thanom was not as 
successful as Sarit. Moreover, the army was fragmented while the political movement 
for democracy was gradually developing. 
The airport project continued to be an important source of money for corrupt 
politicians. The politics of airport planning became technically oriented. However, the 
relationship between the U.S and the new military government was changing. 
The American military presence in Thailand in the 1960s was so extensive that 
political scientist Benedict Anderson has called the period the ' American Era' of Thai 
history [Fineman, 1997 #26, 1-9]. Thanom was involved with the Americans to a 
greater extent than Sarit, and they came to play a major role in the politics of the region. 
With the refusal by USOM to survey and design the second Bangkok airport and 
a shift in US advisory roles from technical assistance to providing funds, the Thai 
government changed its approach to development assistance. The American actors were 
using a new toot in the name of the World Bank. Eventually the Thai government 
looked for assistance from other countries. 
In March 1968, the Canadian government sent a team of aviat ion experts to 
study the feasibility of the second Bangkok airport3. Their report in June 1968 
recommended that the government proceed with and finish the second Bangkok aiq::.:xt 
by 197 5. In January 1969, the governments of France, Japan, Canada, Italy and Israel 
and some private consortiums from the United States, proposed numerous new 
strategies to develop the new Bangkok airport. Cabinet hO\.vever approved a package 
from Canada, which included a soft loan provision. Cabinet also approved a budget for 
mak ing a master plan. however. it was suspended later 
1 Si:m1 r;11h \\"CC!d~ . \Olumc 25. JI December 198~. pl 8-21 
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In June 1971, Northrop Airport Development Corporation and a Thai joint 
venture, the Italian-Thai Company4, submitted a proposal to develop the new airport 
with a budget of 3,000 million paht. It would invest and provide everything in exchange 
for monopoly control of the airport for 20 years. The Cabinet set up a committee to 
consider this proposal. On 24 August 1971 the committee reported that the government 
should wait for the Canadian master plan and the Northrop proposal was therefore 
suspended. 
In September 1971, the budget for making the master plan for the new Bangko~ 
airport project was cut by the House of Representatives' Committee for Budget 
Provision. No explanation was given for this. On 11 October 1971 the Northrop 
consortium revived its proposal and included 1,000 million baht for the government as 
an extra benefit that would speed up the fina l decision. As a result, renewed interest in 
the proposal was controversial. It was especially controversial when Thanom led a 
successful coup against himself on 17 November 1971 and as a result tore up the ninth 
constitution w hich had been issued only three years previously. On the same day he set 
up a committee to consider the second Northrop proposal In March 1972, the 
committee reported that the proposal was not profitable and obligations could not be 
met and recommended that the government should not accept the proposal. 
Despite strong opposition from some factions, the military government set up a 
new committee o n 10 May 1972 to prepare a draft contract. The first contract was 
signed between the Ministry of Transportation and the Northrop consortium on l 
February 1973. Although the consortium was unable to meet its financial commitments 
providing soft loan sources and fell behind schedule, the government extended the 
contract three times Meanwhile, the democracy movement became stronger and public 
opposition to the project increased. However Thanom appeared not to care. 
Obviously, the extra money offered by the Northrop consortium influenced 
Thanom's policy on the new airport. It was viewed as open corruption with the military 
.: An Italian busincssmm1 and a Thai tycoon. Chaiyudh Kanasutra. founded the Italian-Thai Company. 
Later the Kanasutra family took O\ er and successfully extended it until it has become one of the largest 
co11stmc1ion companies in Tlwiland. Cha1yudh rnct Smit and tried to dc\·elop the ne\\ Bangkok airport but 
Sari t died before a contract 1Y;1s signed. The roles of the It:1lian-Tlwi in the de\·cloprne111 of the ne\\ 
airport arc colllro\ crsial Since the bcgrnning of the project in the 1960s. its name h:1s been mentioned 
e\Cf} time this pro.1cc1 is re\i\Cd. II is \\idely k11oll'11 that the Kanasutra family has a \er:-· close 
relationshi p "llh the militar:-· and is a big poli11cal suppo1 cr of almost CYcr:-· go,cmmcnt It is not clear 
'' hy tl11s family is trying hard 10 take part in this project 
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government making its decision in order to gain the money. After the bloody victory for 
democracy on 14 October 1973, Thanom and two other tyrants were forced into exile5. 
In January 1974, several public debates were held in Bangkok. The new airport 
project was viewed as a corrupt product of the military regime. Papers and documents 
against the project were widely distributed. In response to increasing pressure against 
the project, the Northrop consortium submitted an official letter to the civilian 
government on 15 January 197 4 stating that it wanted to cancel the contract without 
receiving any compensation [Wonghanchao, 1974 #33, 1-338]. 
Obviously, the October 1973 uprising had a strong impact on the SBlA. 
Although there were some technical arguments against the airport project 
[Wonghanchao, 1974 #33, 34-38], the strongest influence against the project came from 
the people who hated Thanom and viewed the project as his money making project. 
From a political point of view, the civilian government was forced to make a decision 
which appealed to the powerful public movement. It decided to suspend the project for 
the time being. 
However, democracy was short lived. On 6 October 1976, further bloodshed and 
a riot in the heart ofBangkok ended all public movements and after a coup on 9 October 
1976, the country was back under mi litary control. As a result, a number of young 
scholars moved into the jungle and waged a liberation struggle in the name of the 
Communist Party of Thailand. Meanwhile, new actors tried to revise the Nong Ngu Hao 
project. A number of provincial businessmen and the local Mafia became members of 
Parliament and a new era of Thai politics began. 
5.1.2 Change and the Balance of Political Power, 1976 to 1988 
This section discusses how new interest groups influenced the development of 
the SBIA from 1976 to 1988. The Vietnam War ended in 1975 and US. commitment to 
Thailand and the region declined. In Kevin Hewison's view, 1977 to 1988 was a time of 
evolution for the constitution and the parliamentary regime under various governments 
led by former military leaders This included an expansion of the role of the parl iament 
and political parties [Hewison, 1997 #109, 14] 
As a result of a political vacuum from October 1973 to October 1976, the 
military played a lesser role and kept only their senate seats in the National Assembly 
' From I~ to 16 October l 9n the uprising against the mi I itary regime in Bangkok stancd a new era or 
modern dcmocr:1cy 111 Thailand. 
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In 197 5, 41 new political parties were registered and 22 parties went into parliament, 
including a number of young candidates representing one of the new interest groups. 
After the coup on 9 October 1976, a puppet government was formed. However it 
was unsuccessful and another coup took place on 20 October 1977. Democracy returned 
with the elections in May 1979. Since then, politicians as entrepreneurs and developers 
have gradually replaced the majority of the Cabinet. Decision-making was now in the 
hands of new interest groups. 
Christensen [ 1993] refers to urban bankers, industrialists, organised business, 
provincial elites and the rural majority as interest groups. Christensen and Ammar 
[ 1993] argue that they are 'single-issue interest groups lobbying for their own particular 
benefit' [Christensen, 1993 #112, 1-19; Hewison, 1997 #109, 7] . The politics of airport 
development continued through a restructuring of political power between 1976 and 
1988. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, research studies and reports relating to the new 
Bangkok airport project were conducted regularly under political pressure and 
uncertainty. Some were revised or rewritten shortly after a new coalition government 
came into power. The old reasons of the limited capacity of Don Muang airport were 
always raised to support the development of the Nong Ngu Hao project. However, the 
longer the Nong Ngu Hao project was postponed, the more money was provided to 
improve Don Muang airport. The lack of progress on the second Bangkok airport 
reflects the political culture of those decades. Certainly, changing administrations meant 
changing policies. In my view, 1976 to 1989 was the most chaotic period for airport 
development in Bangkok. 
In 1976, the military-appointed government revived the new airport project. On 
20 February 1978, TAMS submitted a feasibility study to the new elected government 
of Kriengsak Shamanan [Siamrath Weekly, 11 December 1983, 18-23]. Meanwhile 
Cabinet had approved the improvement of Don Muang airport on 2 May 1978. After a 
reshuffle, the new Cabinet suspended the new airport project study on 20 September 
1979. On the same day, a proposal for U-Tapao airport development was approved as an 
urgent issue. Approval to continue a study of the Nong Ngu Hao airport was given by 
the same Cabinet on 21 December 1979 because of a legal commitment based on the 
Land Acquisition Act issued in 1962 for the new Bangkok airport development. 
This decision caused confusion as to why it had to be reconsidered only three 
months later. Political factions in the Cabinet may be the reason. As a result Kriengsak 
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became the first Thai politician to announce his resignation to the National Assembly 
thus ending his administration on 29 February 1980. However, confusion over the SBIA 
and the state of policy remained. 
On 21 September 1980, under the administration of Prem Tinsulanonda, the 
Cabinet approved a proposal by the Ministry of Transportation to develop the SBIA at 
Nong N gu Hao with an investment of 21,300 million baht. An internal conflict erupted 
over this and Cabinet refused to approve the budget of 60 million baht requested to 
prepare a master plan. After a reshuffle, Chumpol Silpa-archa, a younger brother of 
Banharn Silpa-archa (Prime Minister from 1995-1996), became the Minister of 
Transportation and submitted the proposal again on 19 May 1981. His idea was to 
separate the task of master planning from the construction work. Moreover, he allocated 
another budget of 300 million baht for a detailed design and stated that assistance from 
Japan had been agreed to. Between July and September 1981, more than 20 companies 
from the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Singapore, Australia. the 
Netherlands and Brazil and another three local companies submitted their proposals. 
In February 1982, Prem set up a committee to study whether a detailed plan for 
the airport would be necessary. In September a Thai-Belgian consortium with Arab 
financial support, proposed an investment package of 46,000 million baht as a soft Joan 
without interest for 19 years, but this was not considered. 
In October 1982, the Ministry of Transportation approved the proposal by the 
Netherlands Airport Consultant (NACO) for a master plan and detailed design work at a 
cost of 190 million baht. Despite strong protests from other consortia, the interim 
Cabinet approved the NACO proposal on 12 April 1983, six days before a new election. 
Eventually Chumpol signed the 136 million baht contact with NACO on 20 April 1983. 
The result of the election on 18 April 1983 totally changed the fate of the 
project. Samak Sundaravej became the Minister of Transportation and announced that 
the new airport would not be built at Nong Ngu Hao. In July 1983, Samak stated his 
policy was to improve the Don Muang airport. No matter what the political situation 
was, he continued to argue strongly against the new airport through to the end of his 
term as Minister in 1991. The conflict between Chumpol and Samak seemed to be 
personal and political rather than over technical matters. 
Despite political conflict and the changing situation, NACO completed its 
contract and submitted The SBIA Master Plan, Study, Design and Construction Phasing 
to the government in 1984. Meanwhile, TAMS started another study and submitted The 
156 
Chapter 5 Airport Planning and Development 
Expansion Feasibility Study for the Bangkok International Airport in 1985. Despite 
these reports, Cabinet approved the development of a commercial airport at U-Tapao on 
' 
27 August 1985. Why were three airports proposed at the same time? The chaos created 
by these policies was very controversial in Thailand. 
Even though Prem's administration from March 1980 to September 1988 was 
the longest in this period, political stability did not exist. In fact, Prem' s critical problem 
was the constant power play within the coalition government; moreover, his political 
base was challenged by two coup attempts in 1981 and 1985. The troublesome cabinet 
became the biggest constraint not only for the airport project but also for every other 
development programme. What was Prem thinking about the SBIA development? Did 
he know anything about the corruption associated with this project? 
It should be noted that Prem did not have absolute control through his 
administration. His prime ministership did not follow the democratic path of an election 
process. This is the reason why he withdrew from the position of Prime Minister after 
enormous pressure from various groups and political parties demanding that the leader 
be drawn from the ranks of Members of Parliament. In Kevin Hewison's view, it soon 
became clear that the polity established under Prem was one which appealed to 
conservatives as decision-making and policy were not entrusted to popularly elected 
politicians [Hewison, 1997 # 109, 1, 14]. The chaotic policy on airport development 
during this period reflects this argument. 
The SBIA project did not progress from 1976 to 1989, meanwhile, a lot of 
money was spent on substantially developing Don Muang airport. The runway and 
facilities associated with modem lighting systems and navigation aids were opened in 
1983. Two crash-fire-rescue stations were opened in 1983. The Domestic Terminal was 
opened in 1985. An aircraft parking apron with a hydrant fueling system, service road 
and sewage treatment system was opened in mid-1986. A new overpass crossing 
Vibhavadi-Ransit highway to the Domestic and Cargo Terminal was opened in 1987. 
Parallel taxiway 'C' and a parking apron with 15 bays were opened in 1987. The 
International Terminal with loading bridge gates was opened in I 987. The central block 
office building was opened in 1988 [Berger, 1991 #9, volume 2, 7 .5]. In fact, it was a 
period of major development for Don Muang airport. 
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As a result, the capacity of Don Muang airport increased from 41,247 aircraft 
movements with 2.5 million passengers in 19756 to approximately 80,000 aircraft 
' 
movements with 9.85 million passengers in 1988 [Berger, 1991 #9, volume 2, 7.6]. This 
also explains why the government shelved the Nong Ngu Hao project again. The 
argument on the ultimate capacity of Don Muang airport and the need for the new 
airport was forgotten for a while. 
5.1.3 Boom and Bust, 1989 to 1999 
This section discusses the politics of airport development from 1989 to 1999, a 
period of rapid change in the Thai economy. Thai politics in this period reflects another 
episode in the series of corruption allegations in recent history. 
After Chatichai Choonhavan became Prime Minister in September 1988, trade 
policy towards Indochina became a popular development issue for the government, 
starting the era of the 'bubble economy'. The rapid growth of the Thai economy 
continued in the late 1980s. However, Chatichai' s administration was very 
controversial, as it was perceived to be very corrupt. His scandal-ridden government 
was called the 'Buffet Cabinet' and this was given as a justification for the military 
coup on 23 February 1991. 
Air transportation development was viewed as a gateway to the global market. 
As a result, U-Tapao airport was renamed Rayong U-Tapao International Airport in 
April 1990. Moreover, there was an informal attempt to redevelop Nampong airport, the 
former American airbase designed for B-52 planes, to stimulate the economy in the 
northeast of Thailand. It is clear that the SBIA was not included in the national agenda 
under Chatichai 's administration. 
The main reason for this was that Samak Sundaravej, who had staunch pol icy 
against the new airport project, was Minister of Transportation. An interview in a local 
magazine 7 in February 1991, a few days before the coup, provides important evidence 
of this. He emphasised his policy against the development of the SBIA at Nong Ngu 
Hao. He also pointed out that it was costly to develop a new airport on a swamp. 
However, the government under Anand Panyarachun 's administration approved 
the SBIA on 7 May 1991, 73 days after the coup. I agree with the argument that 
Anand's Cabinet was one of the best Cabinets in recent history. It is worth noting that 
6 Siam Rath weekly, 29 October 1987, p34-35 
; Transport & Communication Magazine. February 199 l, volume 18. 
158 
Chapter 5 Airport Planning and Development 
Anand did not prepare himself to be Prime Minister. Therefore, there needs to be an 
explanation of why his Cabinet approved the project quickly. 
The Director of Urban Development Coordination of the NESDB, Utis 
Kaothien, stated that the new airport project was being reviewed by the NESDB and its 
agenda was being prepared for the Chatichai Cabinet8. But this statement is 
contradictory to the facts, which will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 6. 
It could be interpreted that the project was already on track and only waiting for the 
green light from Cabinet. An interesting question is who was actually driving the 
project: the politicians or the bureaucrats. 
Given Anand's personality, he may have had different reasons for this decision. 
A new company, The New Bangkok International Airport Company (NBIA), was set up 
to take responsibility for the development of the new airport project. In my view, Anand 
wanted an automonous administration to handle the highly competitive global aviation 
market and wanted civil aviation in Thailand to be free from political influence. A move 
away from Don Muang airport seemed to be his desired long-term solution. However, 
implementation of his idea was interrupted after interest groups returned to parliament 
and the project became chaotic again. 
After receiving official approval, the NESDB became responsible for the 
development of the SBIA and it started the project by preparing a master plan. In 
August 1994, a Master Plan and Feasibility Studies for Area around SBIA [Norconsult, 
1994] was submitted to the NESDB. The master plan covered the eastern region of the 
Bangkok Metropolis, Chachoengsao province and the Eastern Seaboard. Many other 
multi-million projects such as a high-speed train, a mass-transit system and a global 
transpark, have since been proposed in the Master Plan area. 
In April 1994. Murphy Jahrn and its partners won a bid with a proposed budget 
of 792 million baht to design terminals and facilities for the SBIA. The contract 
included a commitment to finish detailed plans within 27 months. The Office of the 
Prime Minister issued this procedure as a regulation. The Thai government usually 
selected a designer with the lowest fee for any costly projects. The question is why there 
was no design competition? The consequences of this are critical and will be discussed 
later in Chapter 6, particularly with respect to the design work and increasing 
construction costs. 
8 Utis Kaotian gave an interview at his office in Bangkok on 25 April 1996. 
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In September 1994, contractors were called for the early stage of airport 
construction. It was estimated that roughly 30 million cubic metres of sand would be 
needed for landfill. Political lobhying then began. Some local newspapers reported at 
the time that the price of sand in the open market was 86 baht per cubic metre; and that 
16 baht would go to one person and another 2 baht to the lobbyist. Last! y, the 
contractors would gain only 68 baht per cubic metre. There were many corruption 
allegations over the landfill project. 
The project did not get off to a good start. In early October 1994, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Chalvalit Yongchaiyudh; met the Chairman of the new airport 
development and argued that Nong Ngu Hao was not suitable for airport development 
as it would cause many problems, particularly the risk of flooding on the East of 
Bangkok. He also proposed Kamphaeng Saen as an alternative location but the 
Transportation Committee of the National Assembly opposed this location. 
In addition, the Minister of Transportation, Wanmuhamadnoor Matha, who 
served from 1995-1996, personally expressed the view while he was visiting the 
Australian National University in Canberra on 16 May 1997 that Nong Ngu Hao should 
be used for other functions such as flood protection . Why then did he not oppose this 
project while in his post in the government? Even though he was President of the 
National Assembly at the time, he failed to give any reasons. 
Changes in Thai politics became a turning point again after the general election 
in November 1996. Many contracts were signed and the construction of Nong Ngu Hao 
project began again in 1997 under the administration of new Prime Minister; General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. Surprisingly, Samuk who was Deputy Prime Minister and who 
presented many arguments against the Nong Ngu Hao site in 1983, 1989 and 1991 
remained very quiet on the issue even though it was the hottest issue in the country. 
Despite all this criticism, construction of the most expensive infrastructure in Thai 
history continued. 
On 19 January l 997, Prime Minister Chavalit first raised objections to the new 
airport project during talks with provincial chambers from all over the country in Trang, 
a province in southern Thailand. His interview had an immediate affect on the project. 
Two days later it became the hottest news in local newspapers and continued throughout 
the month. In fact, the real reason behind his interview was related to corruption 
allegations over the landfill contract. The price of sand in the open market jumped from 
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86 baht per cubic metre in September 1994 to near! y 1,000 baht in January 1997. A 
discussion of the politics of the landfill will continue in Chapter 6. 
On 20 January 1997, Prime Minister Chavalit stated that he would relocate the 
SBIA to Bang Pu in Samut Prakan province and turn the Nong Ngu Hao site into a 
reservoir as part of the King's project. On 22 January 1997 the Cabinet decided to 
temporarily suspend the airport project without giving a detailed explanation. On 1 
February 1997, Chavalit was forced9 to continue with the Nong Ngu Hao project. He 
decided to reduce the size of the new airport and simultaneously expand the capacity of 
Don Muang airport with a budget of 970 million baht, to handle 47 million passengers 
annually by 2005. On 30 April 1997 the RTAF started moving out of Don Muang to 
pave the way for its expansion. The AAT then obtained an area of 1,342 metres by 142 
metres. 
On 2 June 1997, the government decided to float the Thai currency, triggering a 
collapse of the Thai economy. Chavalit was forced to resign. In November 1997, Chuan 
Leekpai became Prime Minister. After a long investigation, a charge of corruption over 
the landfill for the new airport was dismissed in April 1999. The SBIA continued 
despite the economic recession. 
It is clear that every political party m the 1990s has been involved with the 
SBIA, led by Chuan Leekpai (elected in September 1992), Banharn Silpa-archa (July 
I 995), Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (November 1996) and Chuan for a second term 
(November I 997). All were associated with a series of corruption allegations. 
Besides the power struggle among factions in the coalition government seeking 
to control the development of new airport, the RT AF expressed its concern on 4 January 
1999 about the appointment of the Managing Director of the NBIA '0 . This would 
suggest that Anand's view on the separation of civil aviation from the military airbase at 
Don Muang may be reasonable. However, the separation of civil aviation from military 
airbase would not guarantee that the project would be free from military interference. 
The RT AF is a major shareholder of the AA T and Thai International Airways. 
In examining the politics of the airport development over the past three decades, 
I agree with Paul Handley that, in seeking and exerting power, the ' new' elite is iittle 
different from the 'old' elite. The new elite has displayed a primary concern for the 
9 Chavalit did not explain clearly why he chose Bang Pu. It became controversial because the Army 
owned a large plot of land in Bang Pu. Meanwhile the factions in the coalition government forced him to 
continued the airport project at Nong Ngu Hao. 
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economic benefits of power and for using these benefits to enhance their power 
[Handley, 1997 #113, 94-114]. Sarit's. regime in the 1960s, Chatichai's administration 
and Chavalit's government in the 1990s are really little different from each other in 
making money from big projects. 
5 .2 Airport Development and Political Changes 
Political space is a site of struggle as well as negotiation and agreement; it is an 
arena of contestation. However, this contestation is not always a challenge to the state, 
especially where an expanded political space is considered a legitimate part of political 
activity [Hewison, 1997 #109, 10]. 
From the period of military regime in the 1960s to the period of political reform 
with the 16th constitution in the 1990s, political changes have influenced airport 
development. The highly authoritarian regime under Sarit's administration seemed to be 
the most favourable period for the SBIA development. 
After new interest groups replaced the military in the 1980s, the project became 
chaotic and did not progress. In Christensen and Ammar' s view, interest groups in 
Thailand are not conducive to the development of good policy, as participatory 
institutions are identified as localised and fragmented [Christensen and Ammar, 1993 
#112, 55; Hewison, 1997 #109, 9]. Some background information on these groups also 
reflects this view. 
A significant phenomenon of Thai politics in the late 1970s was the emergence 
of new political candidates after the military stepped back from politics. A number of 
local developers and businessmen changed their role from supporting the army generals 
to supporting the politicians. The new candidates gradually gained more political 
experience and became the majority in the House of Representatives. 
The first generation of many scandal-prone provincial politicians included 
Banham Silpa-archa and his brother Chumpol from Supanburi, Montri Pongpanich from 
Ayutthaya, Chai Chidchop from Buriram and Sanoh Thienthong from Sa Kaeo who 
started their political careers as Members of Parliament during this period. Even though 
these people have different backgrounds, they all have something in common, that is 
dealing with illegal business [Baker, 1996 #5 , 177]. 
10 hnp://www.nationgroup.com/bkk, local news, 4 January 1999 
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The use of brutal power, along with the patronage system, was used by 'gangster 
MPs '. That is why their careers achieved such a great success in such a brief period, 
during which they also tried to · establish themselves as reputable businessmen and 
developers. They became involved to protect their interests. The bigger their businesses, 
the deeper they got involved. This can be seen by examining the professional 
background of Cabinet Members in selected governments. 
Professional 
Background of 
Cabinet Members 
1. Police and Military 
2. Civil Servant 
3. Businessman 
4. Others 
Total 
Sarit 
Feb 59-
Dec 63 
5 
12 
18 
Than om 
Mar 69-
Nov 71 
12 
14 
2 
28 
Kriengsak 
Nov 77-
May79 
9 
19 
5 
33 
Chatichai 
Aug 87-
Feb 91 
5 
27 
12 
45 
Source: Rangsan Thanapomphan ; Process of Policy Making in Thailand, p 155-171 
Table 5.1 Distribution of professional backgrounds in selected cabinets 
Table 5.1 shows the changes in cabinet representatives that occurred in Thailand 
from 1959 to 1991. First, the leaders of these four governments were army generals. 
Second, the number of Cabinet Members increased sharply from 18 in 1959 to 45 by 
1987. Third, the military and bureaucrats were much less important in the later Cabinet. 
Lastly and most importantly, businessmen became the largest group, totally dominating 
the balance of political power by the late 1980s 11 • 
Changes in the makeup of the various governments also influenced policies. 
This resulted in the problem of uneven development in Thailand which became more 
complicated 12. Public projects were concentrated in the provinces from where Cabinet 
11 In the Sarit government there were no businessmen because all trade was in the hands of the Chinese 
who had a negative image in the eyes o f the dictator. Thanom had better relations with the bankers so that 
he took a high positio n in some commercial banks. After the collapse of the military in 1973, more 
businessmen became politicians and had more opportunities in the Kricngsak government. In the 
Chatichai government they represented over half o f the cabinet and played the major role in the Cabinet. 
12 The best example is Supanburi province, the political fortress of Banharn and his fami ly for life. No 
matter what Banharn's position was in government, a considerable budget had to be pumped into this 
small province so that it became known as 'Banharnburi ' or the city of Banharn. He succeeded in this 
strategy and impressed the local people. Consequently, Banharn and his family have been able to go to 
the House of Representa tives in every ' election festival'. Before start ing political life, going fro m nothing 
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Members were elected. Moreover, the families of Cabinet Members usually owned the 
construction companies which won the bidding for projects. 
' 
In the early 1990s, the Thai economy was booming and the time was right for 
big projects. Meanwhile, a second generation of politicians, directly descended from the 
scandal-prone politicians of 1980s, became young actors in the National Assembly, for 
instance, Kanchana Silpa-archa, Nawin Chidchop and Vithaya Thienthong. Thai politics 
essentially came to another turning point, known as the era of money politics, when 
vote buying, financially supported by the big companies, was everywhere in Thailand. 
It is worth noting that 230 of 393 MPs elected on 17 November 1996 declared 
themselves as professional politicians after having been representatives only once. The 
other 114 MPs, the second largest group, were businessmen 13. Policy-making was 
completely in the hands of big businessmen. During this period, the businessmen in 
government used a tool in the form of studies and reports to make their decision on the 
development of the new airport. 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker viewed these changes as a consequence of 
the new wave of provincial businessmen and a rethinking of Bangkok's business leaders 
who rapidly grew richer and more confident. They were less concerned with the need to 
share their profits with the generals. More seriously, the provincial businessmen had 
very complicated networks and relationships to deal with money made quickly from 
investing in illegal business [Baker and Phongpaichit, 1996 #5 , 167-224]. Despite this 
strong controversy, they have been in the National Assembly for decades without any 
legal challenge. 
The fundamental attitudes of these new interest groups could not easily be 
changed. Most decisions in Cabinet were made on the basis of individual interest which 
reflected their different attitudes and professional backgrounds. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the coalition government paid attention to the central 
budget which was easy to exploit. Later, after better understanding the bureaucratic 
system, a task of the coalition government was to manipulate and rearrange the 
administrative structures and management systems so it could exert general control. The 
top positions in almost every ministry and department were therefore rearranged soon 
to a millionaire in the Cabinet, Banharn had been a local construction contractor for years dealing closely 
with the Department of Public Works. When he became Prime Minister in July 1995, not surprisingly. on 
I August 1995 he immediately approved an additional budget of I l,000 million baht for the construction 
of public works. 
13 Matichon 1996, vol. 848, 19 November 1996, p 57 
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after a new minister took office. This has been a tradition for every new government 
until now As a result, fragmentation occurred everywhere in government offices fror.i 
the small village to the office, of Prime Minister and in the military Organisational 
arrangements and a loss of the balance of power became di lemmas for development. 
Through the period of political transition, more political tactics were developed 
so that some irrational policies became apparently reasonable. Any public comment on 
a project by a minister could immediately raise the land price sharply. In this way 
Chatichai and his Cabinet made a fortune from land speculation besides benefiting from 
the corruption involved with big projects. This easy way of making money 1s 
continuing. The question is what is happening to Thailand's political parties. 
Kramol [ 1982] argues that according to Western definitions of a political party, 
Thailand's parties are ' not real political parties' but ' political cliques' or ' political 
factions ' [Tongdhammachart, l 982 #114, 39]. Kanok [1993] provides the most 
comprehensive checklist based on a review of previous studies and offers the following 
10-point summary of the failings of Thai parties: 
• lack of principles; 
• unclear and similar policies; 
• predominance of personalities; 
• lack of discipline and disunity of party members; 
• lack of stability among parties (partly because of coups); 
• lack of real support from the public; 
• conflict between parties and state officials who look down on parties; 
• too many parties, producing unstable coalitions; 
• need for substantial funding produces over-reliance on, and excessive 
influence of, party financiers; and 
• misunderstanding by politicians and the public concerning the role of party. 
Duncan McCargo examines the conflicts and tensions within three parties, all of 
which have some claim to the elusive status of a ' real' party: the Democrats, the Palang 
Dhamrma and the New Aspiration Parties. In his view, Thai parties are not static 
entities, but fluid organisations in a constant state of transformation. He concludes that 
all three lack some hallmarks of an 'authentic ' party· the Democrats lack any clear 
political direction: Palang Dharma is plagued by factionalism: and New Aspiratior. 1s 
deeply immersed in ' money politics ' [l\-!cCargo, 1997#1l I,l14- 131 ]. 
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All three, as members of the coalition governments from 1992 to 1999, got 
involved with the SBIA project. Apart from allegations of conuption, the conflicts and 
tensions in connection with the airport project were serious among the factions in terms 
of interest distribution. The leader of New Aspiration Party, Chavalit, is the only person 
who opposed the project in 1994 and 1997, however, most factions eventually approved 
and supported the SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao. 
Neher [ 1981] argued that conflict was not a major defining characteristic of 
political activity, which was strongly influenced by passivity, individuality and 
deference [Hewison, 1997 #109, 4]. This explains why factions with strong conflicts in 
the past, can form a coalition government quickly after to meet mutual interests. In 
terms of policy, the issue is not to identify 'good' and 'bad' policy choices, but which 
policy agendas emerge and hold sway under particular political regimes [Hewison, 1997 
#109, 9]. 
Airport development policy during the past three decades concentrated on the 
best choice at the time. However, the government seemed to have only two choices, to 
build or not to build the new Bangkok airport at Nong Ngu Hao at that moment. Delays 
to the SBIA during the 1960s to 1990s in association with the increasing budget are 
consequences of choosing one of the two choices. 
5.3 Airport Reports and Studies, 1991 to 1997 
One of consequences of the second Bangkok airport project has been the 
production of many studies and reports. Reports relating to the project include the 
Eastern Seaboard Development and the Bangkok Plan. A number of articles have also 
been published in local and regional newspapers and academic journals. Almost every 
government has spent time and money producing reports supporting or opposing the 
project. Governments have selectively used and referred to these reports and at times, 
the same reports have been used to argue different cases. Some of these reports have 
had a strong impact on decision-making and development policy that has changed the 
fate of this project. 
This section discusses the situation in the 1990s, which is the transition period of 
Thai politics . Compared with previous periods, the politics of airport development in 
the 1990s and corruption allegations have remained on the agenda although no one has 
been charged. 
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What happened during this period reflects the crucial fact that the project has 
actually started. Many contracts have been signed and a large amount of Japanese loan 
money has been spent. Nobody can stop the SBIA and the project must continue at 
Nong Ngu Hao site. However, the data and information used by the authorities involved 
are controversial and this raises two interesting questions: 
First, is it true that the SBIA is necessary and that Don Muang airport can no 
longer be expanded? Second, what are other alternatives for international airport 
development if the SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao is not necessary? 
Fortunately, research materials are available for studying and answering these 
questions. The focus here is on a review of three reports which provide clear answers to 
the above two questions. The three reports were prepared by the same consult=ng 
company, Louis Berger International, Inc, however the recommendations contained in 
each report were contradictory [Berger, L. (!991a), (199lb), (1991c)]. 
5.3. 1 Airport System JV!aster Plan Study in Thailand (ASlv!P) 
In I 991, Louis Berger International Inc and consortium submitted a final report, 
the Airport System master Plan Study in Thailand (ASNfP) [Berger, L. 1991 a] to the 
AA T. It examined the existing facilities at Don Muang airport and special emphasis was 
given to alternative developments for long-term airport capacity, including a 
comparison of continued expansion at the present site and construction of the new 
airport at the Nong Ngu Hao site 
It is important to review this report for a number of reasons. Firstly, it paved the 
way for Cabinet approval of the SBIA in May 1991 . Secondly, present airport planning 
activities are based on the forecasts in this report. Thirdly, issues related to the potential 
role of a new Bangkok airport were examined and an implementation strategy for the 
airport project was recommended. Lastly and probably most importantly, it was 
undertaken in association with two other studies, the Feasibility Study and lvfaster Plan 
for H..ayong U-Tapao International Airpon and the SBlA: Site Confirmation Study. 
A significant point in the report was that the current ultimate capacity of Don 
:Vluang would be exceeded by 2000 and that air traffic at Bangkok airport was projected 
to be 58 million passengers by 20l0. 
The first controversial issue was the area of study. As mentioned earlier, the 
RTAF and the AAT mutually occupy land at Don Muang airport. Figure 5.2 shows that 
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the AAT only has responsibility for civil and ~ommercial activities within a narrow strip 
west of the runways along the Vibhavadi Rangsit highway. The same layout plan shows 
larger areas including sportclubs, two golf courses and other military compounds 
occupied by the RTAF. 
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Source: Thongchai Roachanakanan. 
Figure 5.2 Layout of Don Muang Airport, 1999 
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The study area was limited within the boundaries authorised by the AA T. Not 
surprisingly, a number of critical problems involved with the expansion of Don Muang 
were also presented. However ,the military and its political power is such a big barrier 
that the civilian government is not willing to deal with these problems. 
The second controversial issue was the forecast of aviation activity at Don 
Muang airport based on 1988 data. The consortium expected that there would be 
20, 176,000 international and 6,467,000 domestic passengers in 1995. The study 
presents forecast numbers of 102,660 international aircraft movements and 49,370 
domestic aircraft movements in 1995. Additionally, 132,200 international and 64,~50 
domestic aircraft movements in 2000 excluding military movements were forecast 
[Berger, 1991a #9, volume 2, 7-44, 7-45]. 
The most interesting issue in this report was the analysis of the ultimate capacity 
of Don Muang airport. The study compared a total terminal development area of about 
130 hectares for Don Muang airport with 300 hectares for Kansai airport in Japan for 
the same functions In conclusion, the ASfv'IP study stressed that the Don Muang airport 
was extremely limited. Is it true that Don rvtuang has reached its ultimate capacity? 
The study referred to a survey in 1990. lt pointed out that although the 
International Terminal Complex, including the Main International Terminal, Central 
Block and North Wing, covered a total area of 224, 115 square metres, only 11,000 
square metres were occupied by the AAT and government offices and 14,000 square 
metres by airline offices. The AAT and airlines used the North Wing, the former 
international terminal with an area of about 50,000 square metres, whi le other portions 
were not in use. The Central Block built in 1988, was also used by the AA T and airlines 
but only 9, 500 square metres out of a total area of 31, 000 square metres were used. 
[Berger, 1991a#9, volume 2, 7-1 4, 7-26]. Obviously, the existing buildings were not 
used effectively. However, these facts were not considered when the government 
approved the development of the second terminal a few years later. 
Tn addition, the ASMP study caused confusion when it considered the feasibility 
of the third runway. On the basis of past studies and recent trends in urban grov,,1h and 
property values in the airport vicinity, it was clear that additional runways at Don 
Muang airport were not economically feasib le. HO\-vever, triple runway operations were 
analysed, as shown in Figure 5.3. The third runway would be located approx imately 
along the present alignment of Paholyothin road if all military fac ilit ies could be 
relocated The report indicated that the operation of three runways would be able to 
169 
Chapter 5 Airport Planning and Development 
facilitate a total capacity of 80 aircraft movements per hour [Berger, 1991 a #9, volume 
2, 7-60, 7-63). 
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Figure 5.3 Study of the third runway at Don Muang Airport 
From a political point of view, the proposed third runway seems to provide some 
opportunities for the future. In addition, the ASwa> study examined other existing 
airport facilities in great detail. cargo terminal, traffic flows, parking space and other 
infrastructure, providing more figures and statistics. The report stressed that there were 
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some options for continuing to expand Don Muang which would require brave 
decisions. 
Probably frustrated by the lack of opportunity for expanding facilities at Don 
Muang airport, the study eventually recommended the implementation of the SBIA at 
Nong Ngu Hao rather than the further development of the existing airport at Don 
Muang. Through the 1990s, the authorities involved always referred to this point to 
progress the SBIA project. However, they did not include or even mention other facts 
such as the third runway and other possibilities for expanding Don Muang airport. 
5.3.2 Rayong U-Tapao International Airport 
In 1922, Prince Arpakorn, or Prince Chumporn Ked-Udomsak, the so-called 
Father of the Royal Thai Navy, surveyed and started to develop a naval base at Sattahip 
in Chonburi province, 175 kilometres southeast of Bangkok. Sattahip and its 
geographical domains were known as the best location for a deep seaport in the upper 
Gulf of Thailand. An area of Sattahip was developed by USOM in the 1960s and 
became U-Tapao airbase. Figure 5.4 shows the location and lay out plan of U-Tapao 
airbase. 
U-Tapao is different from other former American airbases in Thailand. It was 
developed in association with Sattahip Naval Base as a large military complex based on 
a strategy of the integration of land-sea-air transport systems. The giant runway of 60 x 
3,450 metres, aircraft parking of 432,300 square metres, a deep seaport and other 
facilities were particularly designed for B-52 operations during the Vietnam War. This 
airport can handle any type of aircraft. Since the withdrawal of American forces in 
1975, U-Tapao airport and its total area of about 16,700 rai or 2,670 hectares, had been 
under the responsibility of the Royal Thai Navy. 
The significance of U-Tapao airport was later considered and taken into account 
as part of the Eastern Seaboard Development programme in the early 1980s. In August 
1985, Cabinet gave its approval for the Royal Thai Navy to take responsibility for 
development of the commercial airport at U-Tapao. A budget of 165 million baht was 
provided for the improvement of U-Tapao in 1988. Its name was officially changed to 
the Rayong U-Tapao International Airport in April 1990. 
In March 1991, Louis Berger International Inc. and consortium submitted a final 
report, a Feasibility Study and Master plan for Rayong U-Tapao International Airport, 
to the Office of the Eastern Seaboard Development Committee, National Economic and 
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Social Development Board. This study analysed the ultimate potential of U-Tapao 
airport and recommended a number of plans for implementation. This section 
concentrates on review of this report. 
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Figure 5.4 Location and layout of the U-Tapao airbase, 1991. 
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It is crucial to review this report because almost every public debate against the 
Nong Ngu Hao project is related to U-Tapao airport as an effective solution which 
would require less investment. ·Its name is not new; in fact, it has played an import1nt 
role as an alternative airport for Don Muang since the 1970s. This report was completed 
only two months before the approval of the SBIA development in May 1991 The report 
was carried out by the same consortium that prepared the ASMP study previously 
discussed. The detailed study in this report reflects the uncertain policies of airport 
development in the early 1990s. The government 's decisions were supposedly based on 
repons by the same consortium. However, the government's final decisions were made 
without logical explanation. Why was the potential of U-Tapao not considered 
seriously? 
The report stated that the existing single runway of U-Tapao airport could 
facilitate 180,000 to 200,000 aircraft movements annually or over 30 movements '.)er 
hour. Most of the airport infrastructure had already been provided and only some 
additional facilities would be required for commercial uses [Berger, 1991 b #7, l-7]. 
The report forecast that annual passengers at U-Tapao airport could increase to 
1.1 million by 2005 with annual growth rates between 44 and 7.8 per cent. Most 
importantly, it claimed that the opening of the second Bangkok airport at Nong Ngu 
Hao would cause a 25 per cent decrease in U-Tapao traffic (Berger, 1991 b]. In other 
words, this meant that only one of the two projects was feasible for investment 
purposes. If the new development stage of Don ivluang airport were completed, what 
would be the future ofNong Ngu Hao and U-Tapao? 
Some of the figures are frightening. In 1995, there were only 2, 186 airc: aft 
movements with 17,487 arrival passengers and 13,967 departure passengers at U-Tapao. 
Even though it had been upgraded for international aviation in 1990, U-Tapao could not 
achieve its potential. The Director of U-Tapao Airport, Admiral Thaveechai Liangpibul , 
stated that old and complicated regulations, coupled with poor management by the Thai 
Roya l Navy were the biggest constraints [Thansettakij 1996, vol. 1,034, 12]. 
While the development direction of U-Tapao airport was still controversial and 
unclear, two more projects were proposed · the High Speed Train and Global Transpark . 
These attempts were made to increase the importance of U-Tapao and the Eastern 
Seaboard 
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The High Speed Tmin Study'-' was submitted to the NESDB in March 1994. 
Three routes to the Eastern Seaboard were evaluated and the study proposed that the 
most appropriate route was Bangkok-Nang Ngu Hao-Chonburi-Phattaya-Sattahip and 
Rayong with eight stations along 191 kilometres and a travelling time of 104 minutes. 
An investment of approximately 30 billion baht was estimated. It was understood that 
modern technology such as the high-speed rail link would be the most effective solution 
to gaining access to Bangkok. 
In May 1997, the Eastern Seaboard development committee approved an initial 
budget of 600 million baht to fund the first year of construction of the Global Transpark 
at U-Tapao airport. An integrated transport facility would be developed for the air cargo 
airport that could efficiently transfer products to world markets. However, these two 
projects did not attract private sector interest as expected and are likely to remain on the 
waiting list for the next government. Obviously, the case of U-Tapao is following the 
start-and-stop development programme experience which has become a common 
situation in Thailand 
Jn my view, several conclusions in the report are very interesting and reasonable. 
Extensive commercial development could take place at U-Tapao airport without 
significantly restricting the base 's military capacity. A second runway is possible for U-
Tapao airport that would provide enough capacity to serve as a second Bangkok airport 
if the problem of ground access systems could be solved. The most important argument 
of the report was that U-Tapao could be a magnificent alternative to the second 
Bangkok airport at ong Ngu Hao (Berger, 1991 b, l-5] 
The implication is that the SBIA project could be shelved, probably forever, if 
U-Tapao airport could function as the SBlA. Given this recommendation was proposed, 
why did the government continue to develop Nong Ngu Hao0 It seems that Cabinet jjd 
not realise or did not want to consider these facts and figures 
Following the crisis in the Thai economy in 1997, the government was required 
. 
to cut all public expenditure under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund 
1 
j Maurits \ an \Nitsen \\as searching for a basic criterion for !ugh-speed train de\·elopment in Europe. He 
reported lo European \rlinistries of Transport at a Conference in Pans in 199 l that a !ugh-speed train 
should ha\·c a highest speed of 200-:10() kilometres per hour with the a\·eragc tra\·elling speed being 150-
200 kilometres per hour. The number or stops must be limited and a distance bet\\·een each stat ion should 
be O\'Cr 150 kilometres [\Vitsen. 1991 #3-L p n -6 7] In comparison. the proposed high-speed train for the 
Eastern Seaboard 1r1 Th;1 iland seems to be onh· an ordinary c:-;press train. Due to the impacts of the dela~ 
ofNong Ngu Hao airport. this project mis to be reYie\\cd in terms of passenger \·olurne and financial 
returns in April 1997 because it \\ilS original!\· pbnned to scrYc the nc\r airport. Its future remains 
conlrO\ ers1;li . 
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(IMF) In February 1999, the government cancel led the development of the Global 
Transpark at U-Tapao airport. 
5.3.3 SBIA: Site Confirmation Study 
In June 1991, Louis Berger International Inc. and consortium submitted the 
SBIA; Site Confirmation Study to the AAT only one month after the Cabinet approved 
the Nong Ngu Hao project. A basic question is why did this site have to be confirmed? 
The report was probably done in response to political uncertainty. The primary task of 
the study was to determine whether Nong Ngu Hao remained the preferred airport site. 
Details of this study illustrate the unusual process of this project. 
The study approach was simple. Three alternative areas: Nong Ngu Hao, an area 
west of Bangkok and an area east of Bangkok, were considered as potential locations 
for a new airport. The report argued that the areas north of Bangkok were not desirable 
for a second airport because the flight paths would conflict with Don Muang operations. 
Areas to the south on the Gulf of Thailand were also undesirable because of extremely 
high construction costs. Only these three areas were compared and were evaluated using 
six key factors aeronautical factors, construction feasibility, implementation cost, 
ground access, regional compatibility and environmental factors [Berger, 199lc, 2-4]. 
No specific site was evaluated, however, the consortium insisted that its 
approach was reasonable. The study added that previous studies had identified Nong 
Ngu Hao as the best site for the new Bangkok airport [Berger, 1991 c, 8-15]. 
Consequently, the only purpose of the study was to review current information 
including any changed conditions since the 1978 site selection study. 
It is a fact that the urban pa11 of Bangkok metro po Ii s has increased more than 
three-fold since 1974. It has become a metropolitan region with a radius of more than 
I 00 kilometres from the old centre of Bangkok In short, Bangkok in the 1970s and in 
the 1990s are completely different. Nowadays there are primary schools, universit ie!', 
housing complexes, factories, industrial estates and shopping centres surrounding Nong 
Ngu Hao. Despite this, the report concluded that '.'Jong Ngu Hao could offer the lowest 
total cost, the best location and the shortest implementation time The report confirmed 
the suitability of 0iong Ngu Hao. 
The bias of this study is evident The evaluation of the airport location was 
simply made by giving an excellent rating to all the factors relating to l\ong Ngu Hao 
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[Berger, 1991 c, 4]. More importantly, the crucial factor of noise pollution was not 
studied. Why and how the Berger misinterpreted the evaluation of the airport location° 
The study stated that the airport at Nong Ngu Hao would fit in with present and 
projected land use patterns, ground transportation infrastructure and urban growth 
patterns. Its site on the high-growth corridor east of Bangkok could serve future demand 
in the metropol itan region well. The issue of urban primacy seemed to have been 
forgotten. How could a large airport with an expected I 00 million passengers per 
annum, be viewed in isolation from the collective problems of the primate city of 
Bangkok? 
Soft soils and flooding were generally considered as two key factors that could 
greatly increase the construction cost of. the airport. Based on research studies on soil 
characteristics at Nong Ngu Hao and throughout the Bangkok region, it was concluded 
that soft and compressible clay with an average of 15 to 20 metres in thickness was the 
primary factor which would make the construction costly [Berger, 1991 c, 18-22). 
Moreover, the Nong Ngu Hao terrain is located on a floodway. Its ground 
elevations have a range of only 0.50-0.80 metres above mean sea level and its 
continuing land subsidence shows a rate of between 5-10 centimetres per year15 These 
have been openly recognised as serious problems [Camp, 1967 #3 1, 9] The report itself 
stated that the Nong Ngu Hao elevations might be below mean sea level if the 
subsidence continues Even though these facts had been discussed repeatedly, the report 
continued to indicate a number of construction feasibility factors which could solve 
these problems Eventually, the technical solutions of preconsolidation were 
recommended at a cost of approximately 6,800 million baht. The accuracy of this was 
proven some years later. On 30 November 1996, the Italian-Thai Company won the 
bidding for landfill with 30 million cubic metres of sand for the ?'-long Ngu Hao project 
at the cost of 11,650 million baht, excluding the flood protection system. Over the 
period of the project, the original cost ofl\ong Ngu Hao at 68 billion baht had increased 
to over 100 bi llion baht in December 1996. 
The accuracy of the numerical data used in the report is not known. The task of 
the study had been to determine the best site for the new Bangkok airport. However, it 
is not clear why and how these failures happened 
1
; A discussion on l:1nd subsidence is inclndecl 111 Chapter(> A map of l:ind subsidence of Bangkok 1s 
sho\\'11 in Figure ri.4 
176 
Chapter 5 Airport Planning and Development 
It is worth noting that the continuing land subsidence will affect the project. The 
study should have given the utmost importance to airport operations in the long run. A 
good example is Kansai airport in Japan where increased investment has resulted in 
bigger debts. Its ' notoriously high landing fees cannot earn enough profit to cover 
interest payments [Rowe, 1997 #117, 22-24). Certainly, Nong Ngu Hao will follow the 
experience of Kansai under the same conditions. 
The most controversial issue in the report is the brief conclusion. The report 
stated that U-Tapao was not appropriate for the SBIA [Berger, 1991 #8, 32]. This was 
contradictory to the other report made by the same consortium only three months 
previously which clearly stated that U-Tapao could be a significant alternative to the 
SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao [Berger, 1991#7,1-5]. 
It is clear that the real purpose of the confirmation study was to support 
Cabinet's decision and to end public controversy about the project. However, the short 
investigation with a report of only 66 pages was not used or even mentioned by the 
Cabinet. 
Louis Berger International Inc. submitted the three reports to the NESDB and its 
counterpart, the AAT, in 1991. It cannot be denied that both the NESDB and the AA T 
were behind the politics of airport development in the early 1990s in attempting to 
revive the Nong Ngu Hao project. 
A review of three reports in this section explains the role of the NESDB, which 
attends every Cabinet meeting. Although the NESDB may demonstrate technical 
expertise in some areas, its overall role has remained controversial. How much and how 
well does the NESDB understand the meaning of development? Why are some projects 
unable to be integrated? The new airport is one of the projects which clearly shows the 
disconnection and the discontinuity of the transportation network development. 
5.4 Is the SBIA necessary? 
It is worth noting that the government developed and upgraded many new 
airports during the boom in the Thai economy in addition to the SBIA 16. 
As a result of the ASMP report, the head offices of the AA T have moved to new 
multi-million baht compounds built on the other side of Vibhavadi Rangsi t highway 
from the Don Muang airport. The old office headquarters and the first terminal have 
16 S1.:c Appendix 5.2 
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become a ghost compound. A new building for the Second International Terminal anrl 
substantial improvements to the Domestic Terminal were completed in I 995. 
After it was confirmed that the Nong Ngu Hao project could not be finished in 
2003 as planned, the expansion of Don Muang was the only alternative. Private talks 
between the Prime Minister, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and the Air Force 
Commander-in-Chief on 29 January 1997 had the result that the RT AF allowed an 
additional 100 ha at Don Muang to be developed for commercial use. Compensation of 
about 10 billion baht will be provided to relocate some military units to Lopburi, an 
airbase 150 kilometres north of Bangkok. It should be noted that the Prime Minister, 
who has a military background, was involved in every stage of the Don Muang 
development. It would seem that only military persons were able to deal with this 
particular problem. 
On 11 August 1997, Cabinet approved an additional budget of l l ,828 million 
baht to improve Don Muang airport so that it will be able to handle 45 million 
passengers annually by 2007. It is expected that the fifth stage of Don Muang 
development will be completed by the year 2000. The controversial issue of the ultimate 
capacity of Don Muang airport appears to have been forgotten for a while. 
The government's decision on airport development raises two questions. Is it 
true that Don Muang airport cannot be expanded? Is the SBTA necessary? The task in 
this section is to answer these questions 
1v1y investigation starts with the doubtfutly forecast of aviation growth and 
assessment presented in the ASJ\t[p study. Primary data were gathered from the 
.Aeronautical Radio of Thailand, which controls air traffic and all aircraft movements at 
Don Muang airport. 
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Fiscal Year Commercial Military Total 
International Domestic 
1991/1992 98,484 99,769 11,652 209,905 
l 992/1993 102, 140 107,606 14,480 224,226 
1993/ l 994 107,830 104,896 14,903 227,629 
1994/1995 114,252 113,070 12, 726 240,048 
199511996 117, 166 127,698 13,566 258,430 
Notes: l. Source Primary data from Aerothai: Aeronautical Radio of Thailand LTD. 
2 Fiscal year in Thailand is from 1 October to 30 September 
.., 
J. Full statistics found in Appendix 5. 3 
Table 5.2 Aircraft movements at Don Muang airport from 1992 to 1996 
Table 5.2 shows that the current trend of aviation grow1h at Don Muang airport 
is completely different from the forecast in the AS.MP study in 1991. Focusing on the 
period of 1992-1 996, the figures of domestic aircraft movements continued to increase 
sharply and became the greatest in 1996. The table reflects two interesting facts. 
Firstly, the two runways at Don Muang airport can serve more than 250,000 
aircraft movements annually Moreover, there were 15, 119,065 international passengers 
and 5,805,827 domestic passengers in 1995. The rapid growth of domestic aviation may 
reflect a changing lifestyle of travelling in Thai society during the period of the 'bubble ' 
economy. 
Secondly, the statistics clearly show that the main function at Don Muang 
airport is civil and commercial activities, while the military currently accounts for only 
five per cent in terms of aircraft movements. It should be noted that the last squadron of 
jet fighters \Nas withdrawn from Don rvfoang in the 1970s, after the end of the Vietnam 
War. In fact, the primary strategic centre for air defence is Karat and secondary centres 
are at Takhli, Ubon and Suratthani . However, the RTAF usually maintains the 
importance of Don i'v1uang airbase by deploying some aircraft for military 
transportation 
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Thai authorities always argue that Don Muang airport has reached its ultimate 
capacity. The total terminal development area available at Don Muang airport is only 
130 hectares and the total width available for taxi-lanes to Vibhavadi-Rangsit highway 
is less than 400 metres [Berger, 1991 #9, volume 2, 7-119]. In this argument, some old 
facts are repeated again and again to promote the SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao. 
In terms of airport capacity, land is not the only issue that limits airport 
development. Table 5.3 compares the current capacity of a number of large airports 
worldwide, in which the Airports Council International ranks world airports by three 
different indices: aircraft movements, total passengers and total cargo per annum. Land 
requirements for airports vary depending on the aerodrome characteristics and design. 
Airports Land Airport Capacity 
1. London-Heathrow 
2. Frankfurt-Main 
3. Paris-Charles de 
Gaulle 
4. New York-J.F. 
Kennedy 
5. Singapore-Shangi 
6. Tokyo-Haneda 
7.Bangkok-Don 
Muang 
Area 
(ha) Total 
Passengers 
1, 141 56,037 ,789 (5) 
1,700 38,761,174 (8) 
3,104 31,724,035(12) 
2,052 31,155,411(13) 
1,663 24,514,248(28) 
586 46,631,475 (6) 
620 24,992,738(27) 
Notes; I . Statistics collection by Airports Council International 
2. Aircraft movements: landing+take off of an aircraft 
3 . Cargo: loaded+unloaded freight+mail in metric tones 
4. (xx) World Ranking in 1996 
Aircraft 
Movements 
440,340 (20) 
384,971 (27) 
367 ,222 (31) 
355,214 (33) 
179 ,883 (87) 
211,190(76) 
180,594 (85) 
5. Sources: The World's Airports in 1996; http://www.airports.org/ 
Total Cargo 
1, 140,767( 12) 
1,497 ,245 (7) 
979,008 (14) 
1,636,497 ( 4) 
1,211,411 ( 1 I) 
670,689 (22) 
787,539 (18) 
6. In 1996, the AAT currently occupied the land of about 384 ha of 620 ha. Mean while. it is 
believed that the total area of Don Muang airport should be more than 1,280 ha excluding other military 
compounds outside the base. 
Table 5.3 World's airports in comparison 
In Table 5.3, Bangkok International Airport was ranked 851h by aircraft 
movements, 271h by total passengers and 18th by total cargo in 1996. Even though a 
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large area of Don Muang is occupied by the RT AF, as a regional hub for air 
transportation, it is better off than some of the larger airports in the world. This implies 
that land is not the only key element which determines the airport capacity. 
Runways may be considered as another element. There are two runways at Don 
Muang airport, the west runway (03U2 lR) 60 x 3,700 metres and the east runway 
(03R/2 lL) 45 x 3,500 metres [Berger, 1991 #9, volume 2, 7-8]. In June 1999, the 
Director of Don Muang airport, Wing Commander Uthai Thaisanthad, gave an 
interview in a local newspaper17 in which he said that the east runway would be closed 
from November 1999 to February 2000 for foundation maintenance with a budget of 
400 million baht. He insisted that this would not affect aircraft movements and the 
single runway on the west could serve all airlines effectively. 
In the layout of Don Muang airport shown in Figure 5.2, from the review of 
ASMP study, the analysis of land and building uses and the government's decisions in 
1997, it is clear that Don Muang airport can be expanded greatly. If all military facilities 
could be moved out to provide more space, its capacity would be enlarged dramatically. 
Greater efficiency could also be gained if the facilities were used to their full capacity. 
My argument is that the SBIA at Nong Ngu Hao is unnecessary. The above 
reasons are sufficient for the government to stop the project. Moreover, U-Tapao has 
been an international airport for years and should be used as the first alternative for a 
second Bangkok airport. However, the politics of airport development in Thailand are 
complex. Factions in the coalition government seem to enjoy costly development 
projects despite the financial problems. 
Besides the issue of costly investment, the planning politics of the SBIA are 
likely to involve other scandals. My investigation continues to search for a deeper 
connections of exploitation behind this project in terms of property speculation. 
17 Thansetthakij, 6-9 June 1999. http//www. thannews.lh.com 
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This chapter discusses the politics of rational planning for the new airport project by 
reviewing the master plan of the SBIA. The main task here is to understand what was 
involved in making the master plan. The focus is on development concepts, 
methodological study and an analysis of the land use plan. I also discuss whether the 
recommendations are reasonable given the evidence available. 
It is important to review the SBIA master plan because it has influenced many 
related activities, particularly the infrastructure provisions and the preparation of plans 
for Bangkok and nearby urban centres. After the completion of the master plan in 1994, 
a different consultancy firm proposed a better alternative for solving the flood problem, 
but the authorities involved rejected the cheaper option on the grounds that it did not 
follow the master plan. A discussion of this is included in Chapter 7. Hence, it is 
interesting to study what the making of the new airport master plan was all about. 
Cabinet approved the development of the SBIA in May 1991. The Office of the 
Second Bangkok Airport Development Committee (OSBAC) of the NESDB signed a 
contract with a consulting group on 9 June 1993. In August I 994, The Master Plan and 
Feasibility Studies for the Area around the SBIA was submitted to the NESDB 
[Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 1-1] and copies of the final report were distributed 
to many departments for implementation. It had taken took two years to get budget and 
choose a consultant but only one year to make a plan. The making of the master plan is 
another episode in the politics of the SBIA. 
'Planning' is viewed as a rational process of thought and action which ultimately 
aims at promoting human growth. The politics of rational planning is a politics 
of a second order concerned with how ordinary political processes relate to 
planning. Likewise, the rationality involved is a second-order rationality: to plan 
successfully does not necessarily mean to plan in a completely rational way 
[Faludi , 1973 #4] . 
The above statement implies that success of planning practice as part of the 
political process may not be on the basis of rational ways completely. Planners 
sometimes have to be flexible and learn tactics to plan successfull y. 
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My understanding is that planners who are good at planning also seem to require 
skills and experience in dealing with politics. This is understandable. However, the 
situation for planners in Thailand is problematic because of the complex nature of Thai 
politics. There are two reasons for this. 
First, there is a need for a clear meaning of ' rational ' . As discussed previously, 
political factions in Thailand do not care about the process of rational planning. Second, 
what the factions care about most is individual interest. Consequently, the more politics 
are involved, the more irrational planning can become. The making of the master plan 
for the SBIA is a good example. 
I agree with Brian Graham [ 1995] that the geography of arr transport rs 
inseparable from national self-interest and political advantage [Graham, 1995 #116, 46]. 
This idea reflects an overview of the world's airline industry in which airlines have 
become part of the very symbolic iconography of the state's identity [Graham, 1995 
#116, 47]. However, the case of Thailand is different. The government has expressed its 
concern for air transport development as a domain of national self-interest. However in 
Thailand, political advantage is also concerned with individual interests among the 
factions in the coalition government. Thus the development of air transport 
infrastructure has become associated with factional interests. 
As a result of the economic crisis in 1997, the airport project had to be revised 
and scaled down. However some of the work had been completed and this work can be 
evaluated. This work may be enough to enable an evaluation of the master plan to be 
made and an assessment of the likely success of this project, which focuses on the 
politics of landfill. 
6.1 Master Plan as a Prelude for a Mega-Project 
A master plan provides an overview of a large project. A master plan indicates 
all stages of development within a certain period of time in which commitments and 
activities are addressed precisely. It is not clear how and when the use of master plans 
was first introduced in Thailand. In the 1960s and 1970s, American agencies created a 
number of master plans for Thailand under U.S. economic aid programmes. Master 
plans were sometimes prepared in association with a proposal to apply for an overseas 
loan or financial assistance. As a result, almost every Thai government has followed this 
approach by producing master plans for every development programme, including the 
new airport project. 
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In Thailand, the master plan has become a political tool used by the government 
when it wants to start a new proj,ect. The master plan can be used to stimulate public 
interest and highlight the government's concerns. The bigger the project is, the more 
interesting a master plan can be made. As a result, a master plan can highlight positive 
outcomes showing a beautiful perspective of the development. This is to increase the 
popularity. 
The case of the SBIA is no different, although the airport project 1s more 
complicated in terms of its wider consequences. As discussed in Chapter 5, the airport 
project was promoted in association with other projects such as the High-speed Train 
and the Global Transpark. The master plans for these projects were merely viewed as a 
prelude during the boom in the Thai economy, in that ministers enjoyed promoting their 
agendas by talking about the progress of grandiose projects almost every day. 
It should be noted that there was no attempt to make master plans during the 
military regime of Field Marshal Sarit from 1958 to 1963. A Canadian consortium 
prepared the first master plan for the new Bangkok Airport in 1969. The NACO 
completed the second master plan in 1984. Despite different political situations, the 
Ministers of Transportation closely supervised the preparation of the first two master 
plans and arguments about them among politicians were widely publicised. Details 
about the making of the master plans can therefore be studied in local newspapers. In 
contrast, the third master plan was prepared without publicity and very little information 
was revealed to the public. What were the politics behind the making of the third master 
plan from 1991 to 1994? 
Before the coup on 23 February 1991, the Minister of Transportation, Samak 
Sundaravej, staunchly opposed the new airport project at Nong Ngu Hao. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, he had repeated! y argued against the project since 1983. The re vi val of 
Nong Ngu Hao was therefore proposed after Samak had stepped down. 
Respected civilian Anand Panyarachun was installed as Prime Minister by the 
military and Nukun Prachuapmor was made the Minister of Transportation on 6 March 
1991 . Despite the fact that the powerful military was behind the political scene, Anand 
worked freely without any apparent military intervention and his administration was 
transparent and accountable. Cabinet approved further infrastructure developments at 
Don Muang airport on 23 April 1991 and the development of the second Bangkok 
airport on 7 May 1991. Cabinet ordered the authorities concerned to speed up both 
projects. It is important to note that the emphasis in Cabinet records was on design work 
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and the selection of experts while the issue of making a master plan was not mentioned 
It is clear that Anand .had not been well prepared for the position of Prime 
Minister before his appointment2 . The military relied heavily on his diplomatic 
reputation to present an image of good government. The Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Interior were also were controlled by the military. Anand recruited well-
known professionals who had never been involved in scandals for the Cabinet. As an 
interim government, the Cabinet had only one year to carry out its work and its major 
task was to prepare for the coming general election. Meanwhile, the military was 
primarily concerned with purchasing new weapons rather than with development 
projects. The new airport project seemed to be initiated by the authorities concerned, 
that is the NESDB and the AA T, rather than the government. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Utis Kaothien of NESDB argued that the new airport 
project had been considered before there was a coup. This means that the NESDB was 
well aware of the current political situation and was waiting for the right time to 
propose the project. The revival of the new Bangkok airport was therefore promoted by 
the NESDB. When political turmoil occurred, the NESDB was then left to manage the 
project. 
After the election on 22 March 1992, Suchinda Kraprayoon, a General who took 
part in the 1991 coup, took up the position of Prime Minister, a step strongly opposed 
by the whole country. Weeks of political demonstrations with mass killings of 
demonstrators in Bangkok ended when Suchinda resigned in May 1992. Anand and his 
former Cabinet returned to office on 10 June 1992 and stepped down after another 
election or. 13 September 1992. The Cabinet, as an interim government, did not make 
any decisions on big projects and its major concern was to prepare the drafting of the: 
new constitution, which aimed at providing new legal measures to prevent political 
corruption. Consequently, Cabinet let government agencies work on the new airport 
project during this period. The ?\TESDB played the biggest role in managing these mega-
projects during the period of political uncertainty Despite its controversial role and 
1 Siamrath. the local "eekly ne\1 spnper in :Vfay l 99 l. reported n synopsis of the Cabinet meeting about 
the new airpon project. I found nothing about the 111:1ki11g of the master plan. 
; Under the Th;n politic:1l system at the time. 11011-\lPs could be appointed direct to ministeri<ll posts. 
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powerful authority3, the NESDB still played the role of big manager and continued t1 
dominate these projects, however, its attempts to do did not proceed smoothly. 
It is important to note. that all state enterprises4 including the AAT have tc 
submit their financial plans for mega-projects to the NESDB before proceeding tc 
Cabinet. This has enabled the NESDB to manipulate state enterprises. However, th1 
fiscal budget of the state enterprise is Jess controlled compared with the governrni~n 
departments. The state enterprises have higher autonomy in management. The role o 
the government, as the biggest shareholder in the state enterprises, is to provide thi 
main policies and make any important decisions recommended and guided by thi 
NESDB. Corrupt governments have therefore become involved in profitable stat~ 
enterprises. 
Some budget items such as research work do not require Cabinet approval. Thi~ 
explains why many studies and reports could be funded by the AAT, before and after 
the SBIA project were officially approved. 
The NESDB has little authority to control the government departments of the 15 
ministries. As discussed in Chapter 3, most departments have separate legislation, for 
example. the BMA and DTCP. However the implementation of a large project requires 
the integration of many legal measures and investments and this cannot be done without 
cooperation between these departments. 
In the case of the SBIA, the master plan was one of very few instruments the 
NESDB could use to manage the development of the entire project. However, the 
NE SOB 's guidelines were fo llowed selectively by some departments provided their 
mutual interests could be met5. The strongest reaction against the NESDB by any 
government agency came from the BMA As discussed in the review of The Bangkok 
3 As a consequence of the poli tical confiict in 1992. appro,·al of !he budget for the fiscal year l 993 vas 
postponed from September 1992 to 1993 . There was little publicity "·hen the proposed budget of 2:i 
million ba.ht for the study of tJ1e ne\1 Bangkok airport and 25 ntill1on baht for the study of High-Speed 
Train project were submitted by Lile N'ESDB in Febrnary 1993. The Budget ProYision Conunittec of the 
House of Rcprcsentati1 es argued strongly o\·er the ro le of tJ1e NESDB and its proposed budget as it was 
1 ic11ed as interYention by the NESDB in other goYemmcnt agencies· areas of responsibilities [. 1993 
#22 J Despite this. U1e budget was appro,·ed two weeks later. 
~ State enterprise is a form of sem i public-pri1·ate administration in which tJ1e gO\·ernment is the biggest 
shareholder. Most state enterprises arc responsible for dc1'Clopi ng ;rnd pro1·iding pub! ic infrastrncturc and 
utilities. 
'The Department of Higlma~·s. a Department of the Ministry of Trcrnsportation. and the Expressway and 
Rapid Transit Authori ty of Thailand. a state enterprise of the Ministry of Interior. seem to get along \\Cll 
11·ith NESDB because their l11lll ti -m1llion baht projects arc included in the NESDB reports. As a result. the 
Bnngkok-Cho11buri Tolh,ay passing north of the nc11 airport site and the nc\\ stnge ol' the expressway 
passing south of the 11c11 airport site ''ere completed and officially opened in Febmary 1998 without an~· 
obstruction b~ the NESDB. 
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Plan 1995 prepared by the MIT Consultant Team, the BMA did not follow the master 
plan of the SBIA. The master plan did not indicate clearly how to integrate 
infrastructure provisions under a n'umber of different authorities. 
The NESDB had ignored arguments by agencies and hired a group of private 
experts to prepare the master plan. Many government organisations now follow the 
same approach by spending a lot of money to hire private experts. The politics of 
making a master plan therefore reflect the network of consulting businesses and 
relationships between experts and political factions. 
The successful completion of a project depends on many factors, one of which is 
having a good master plan. During rapid changes in Thai politics in the 1990s and the 
overnight collapse of Thai economy in 1997, the early stages of the largest airport 
project in the region became the only lasting memory while politicians searched for 
other means to promote themselves. The master plans of other project proposals were 
forgotten. However, some of the facts behind the airport proposal were gradually 
revealed. These will be discussed in the next section. 
6.2 Review of the SBIA Master Plan 
Besides Norconsultant International A.S. as the leading company, there were 
another six small companies which jointly signed the contract for the master plan for the 
second international airport with the NESDB. It is not clear how these companies were 
selected to prepare the master plan for the new Bangkok airport. The structure of the 
project management was set up to provide separate responsibilities for each company. 
Under this structure, the measures proposed by each working group were not integrated 
and caused confusion. 
The NESDB provided data and information to the hired consortia. Most of this 
had been gathered and analysed in previous reports. It was also second hand and out-of-
date data which had been collected by other agencies. As a result, a number of facts 
were misrepresented6. In fact. much more reliable and more accurate data was available 
and could have been collected directly from the departments and authorities concerned. 
It is not clear why the out-of-date data and information were used. 
6 Two large business zones were proposed to attract commercial investment aro und the airport. however. 
they were not studied in detail. Land use in Bangkok in 1986 and a property marke t survey by some 
private firms were referred to as a data base to indicate the growth of commercial space. 
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The master plan for the new airport repeatedly proposed development guidelines 
which the NESDB had drawn up in other documents. It therefore seems that the experts 
were hired as draftsmen for the NESDB. In addition, its employees played a lesser role 
than the employer did. The NESDB became the main manager in making the master 
plan for the second Bangkok airport. 
It was stated in the introduction of the master plan that the Airport Authority of 
Thailand had been appointed by the Government as the agency responsible for the 
master planning, design and management of the construction of the airport within the 
defined boundary of the airport site. The master plan stated that outside the airport 
boundaries, the NESDB was responsible for the development of a master plan for the 
airport environs and for infrastructure projects. This would be needed to support the 
operation of the airport itself as well as the expected growth of economic activity in the 
area that the airport is expected to generate [Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 1-1]. 
Figure 6. I shows the SBIA layout plan, which presents the full development 
scheme with detailed planning for airport functions. The ultimate capacity of 100 
million passengers per year was stressed and used as a basic criterion for every 
calculation [Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 1-1]. In fact, the planning context 
within the airport boundaries is not complex. It is worth noting that the geographical 
location and landform of Nong Ngu Hao will only allow one scheme for the north-south 
aerodrome, which has technically affected the architectural and engineering layout and 
design. 
The master plan mainly emphasised areas around the new airport. It was 
expected that the new airport would be highly attractive for commercial investmenc. 
Consequently, a detailed land use plan was proposed to identify the necessary 
infrastructure. A number of infrastructure development projects were planned and 
designed to facilitate these new activities. It is interesting to discuss how this idea 
originated, how the planning process occurred and how reasonable the master plan was. 
6.2.1 Master Plan Area and Methodology 
The first controversial issue is the master plan area, an issue which can 
completely distort the context of any planning process. Despite its name, 'the SBIA', 
the new airport is not located in Bangkok, but in Samut Prakan province, some 
hundreds of metres outside the administrative boundaries of the BMA. 
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Three areas were defined: the study area, the master plan area and the land use 
plan area. Some rough boundarie.s were drawn up. However the geography and man-
made benchmarks such as the administrative boundaries, were not taken into 
consideration. The study area that was given the greatest attention was apparently the 
Eastern Seaboard. The master plan area covered the areas within the radius of 30 
kilometres around the airport, including some built-up areas of Bangkok and the lower 
basins of the Chao Phraya River and the Bang Pakong River. The land use plan area 
was the smallest, and included the whole eastern part of the master plan. The reason for 
this was to control development that was expected to extend to the East Coast. 
The planning methodology was apparently simple. A Geographical Information 
System (GIS) and some aerial photograph maps taken in January 1991 were used to 
study existing land use. The environmental, economic, organisational and legal 
implications and impacts were assessed briefly. After reviewing the current situation, 
land use was planned in accordance with population projections and the priority of 
infrastructure projects was formulated within the boundaries of the master plan. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the political geography of local administration m 
Thailand is complex [Winichakul, 1994 #60, 115-127]. The legal system. the 
administrative system and the planning system are all concerned with administrative 
boundaries. This is probably the most important factor that must be considered before 
starting any project. In fact, the politics of boundaries are so sensitive that they 
influence every political issue. 
The boundaries in the second Bangkok airport master plan were defined to cover 
some areas of the BMA, Samut Prakan province and Chachoengsao province. It was 
stated in the master plan that these boundaries were determined in discussions with the 
NESDB. Obviously the NESDB influenced the planning process starting from the early 
stage of defining the boundary. However, it was not explained in the master plan why 
the more influential areas of Bangkok 7 relating to air transportation were not included in 
the master plan, for instance, the city core where most international companies are 
located. Consequently, some of the data and information supplied by the NESDB was 
used selectively and a number of facts were misrepresented in the master plan. 
In practice, boundaries may cause many troublesome problems when dealing 
with legal procedures. It is worth noting that land uses around the new Bangkok airport 
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have been legally controlled by the Samut Prakan Comprehensive Plan since December 
1993, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
The larger areas of the new airport master plan have also been included in two 
other Comprehensive Plans: the Bang Pakong and the Suwinthawong which are in the 
process of being legally issued. Both Comprehensive Plans concentrate on land use 
control around the new airport. 
This implies that the areas around the second airport included in the master plan 
are controlled by four other master plans including the Bangkok Plan 1992. In other 
words, three big authorities at the provincial level have responsibility for controlling 
land development around the new Bangkok airport. The new airport master plan did not 
however explain how to manage the development of the airport under the autonomy and 
different legal powers of these authorities. More details on this are included in the 
discussion on development concepts and land use control. 
6.2.2 Development Concepts 
The theme of the new airport master plan had remarkable similarities to other 
NESDB reports8. The Bangkok Metropolitan Region was expected to be the economic 
hub of Southeast Asia and the development of the SBIA would stimulate the flow of 
economic activities across the region. It was strongly believed that the new airport, as a 
pa11 of Bangkok-Eastern Seaboard development corridor, would attract considerable 
investment [Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 6-1 ]. 
Many development projects that were being implemented by other authorities 
were reviewed briefly by Norconsult International and conso1tium. Policies on high-
tech and export-oriented industrial development and the urban decentralisation proposed 
in the new airport master plan were similar to other reports and studies submitted to 
NESDB . It seems that Norconsult International followed the development concept of 
the 'Multipolis' proposed in the Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study 
(MRSPS). 
7 The most influential areas are the Central Business Distric t areas where most economic activities related 
to overseas trade and the tourism industry are largely concentrated, covering Silom/Sathorn, Surawongse, 
Chula, Lumpini, Ratchada South, Petchaburi and Sukhumvit/Asoke [Ellis, 1995 #421. 
8 Besides the reports that have been reviewed in Chapter 5, the sectoral reports referred to the overview of 
previous studies ; ( 1) Seventh Plan Urban and Regional Transport March 1991, (2) Development of 
Transport Planning Strategy; Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Swdy October 1993 and (3) The 
Eastern Seaboard Corridor March 1994. 
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Figure 6.2 Samut Prakan Comprehensive Plan (1993-1998) 
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In my view, the case of the making of the new airport master plan is no different 
from the case of the making of t~e airport study discussed in Chapter 5. The NESDB 
played a great role in making the master plan. There was excellent cooperation among a 
number of consultants hired by 'the same employer'. Despite the different scale of 
planning, as a result, the development framework and concepts for the SBIA had been 
concluded in complete harmony with the MRSPS. 
After reviewing a number of urban problems and inefficiencies in the primate 
city, the SAMP suggested that areas around the new airport would enable the further 
development of Bangkok [Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 2-9]. However these 
basic assumptions were based on poor analysis. The new airport was not the only key 
factor for success in attracting investment. In fact, many factors and elements must be 
studied carefully and a more comprehensive analysis is needed. Some crucial factors 
seemed to have been ignored. 
The development potential of Bangkok is very diverse and changeable. A large 
number of companies and businesses have been established there for decades. In many 
cases, superstition and religious belief have influenced decisions on the selection of a 
location. A Chinese prophet or a fortune-teller may be the one who makes the final 
decision where the business should go. 
Property markets in Bangkok have also become more competitive due to the 
continuing over supply of property during the past decade. In the early 1990s there was 
a huge surplus of unlet office space in the Central Business District [Ellis, 1995 #42]. 
However, these facts were not mentioned in the new airport master plan. 
From a different perspective, the Vice-President of Land and House Company, 
Viroj Leetrakul, one of the largest property development firms in Thailand, argued that 
the areas around the new airport were not suitable for high investment. His discussion 
focused on several issues such as poor physical geography, the annual flood problems 
and the poor image of Nong Ngu Hao. He eventually recommended low cost housing as 
being more feasible9 . Other people have also expressed similar viewpoints which are 
totally opposite to the development concepts in the new airport master plan. 
The conclusion in the new airport master plan stated that the master plan and the 
land use plan for the area around the new airport should be harmonized with the airport 
master plan to ensure the best possible location and environment for business 
9 Mr. Yiroj gave an interview at his office in Bangkok on 4 June l 996. 
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development. However, the new airport master plan did not elaborate precisely what 
kind of business should be de;eloped. Airlines and private firms related to air 
transportation such as hotels seem to be included and targeted. 
In the view of an airfreight company, it was too early to make decisions on any 
investment because the government's policy on how two international airports would be 
managed was not clear. It is worth noting that every airfreight company has its own 
connections with airlines depending on the quota available and contracts. In addition it 
is already known that costs such as landing fees at the second new airport will be much 
more costly than at Don Muang airport, which will affect their business significantly. 
Apparently, the AAT had no early planning on how to manage and operate two 
international airports and this issue was not addressed in the new airport master plan. 
There has also been a controversy about whether domestic and international flights 
would be separated or merged and which airlines would move to the new airport 10. 
Despite this no arrangements have yet been made by the AA T. 
The expectation of high economic growth may be the primary aim of any master 
plan, however, this possibility needs to be considered carefully and rationally. In the 
case of the master plan for the new Bangkok airport, it is interesting to study how the 
expected high rate of economic growth was assessed. A discussion on this is in the 
review of land use planning below. 
6.2.3 Review of Land Use Plan 
As discussed in Chapter 3, planning in Thailand is legally based on the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1975 in the form of land use planning. This is the only 
available legal instrument which NESDB can use to control development around the 
new airport. The main concern of the master plan of the SBIA was expressed in terms of 
the land use plan, which also provided information for infrastructure planning. 
The making of the SAMP did not follow the legal procedures of the Town and 
Country Planning Act. After the development concepts had been defined, a 1993 map of 
the land use around the new airport (see Figure 6.3) was studied briefly. Because of a 
bias in the definition of the boundary in the new airport master plan, a land use area of 
10 The issue of management of the two Bangkok airports was first discussed in February t 998. seven 
years after approval and four years after the new airport master plan was completed. On 2 1 February 
1998, Chatumonkol Sonakul who heads a go vernment committee studying the investment pattern of the 
new airport project announced that Nong Ngu Hao airport would open in 2003 and would serve 70% o f 
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some 140,000 ha was misrepresented by classifying 90 per cent of the area as 
agricultural use, wasteland or retained natural habitat while only 10 per cent was shown 
as built-up. The 10 per cent had been agglomerated around the site of the new airport. 
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Figure 6.3 Land use around the SBIA site, 1993 
the total passengers and Don Muang would be closed in the following 10-15 years. However, this 
decision will be not finalised easily and the debate continues. 
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The emphasis of the study in the new airport master plan was mainly on the 
areas within the land use plan. Population density, physical conditions, location of main 
industrial estate and existing infrastructure were analysed briefly by the consortium, 
consequently, most of the results of the analysis were optimistic. The positive potentials 
of the areas around the new airport were presented repeatedly, but several facts were 
ignored. During the rainy season, the water level rises one to two metres above mean 
sea level and large areas can be flooded for months. The continuing land subsidence 
shown in Figure 6.4, the inadequacy of the water supply and the number of poor public 
services are all critical problems. 
Despite these already known problems, the areas north, south and west of the 
new airport site have been rapidly urbanised since the 1980s [Sternstein, 1995 #41, 27]. 
In my view, plans to build the new airport did not influence the above changes. 
The new airport master plan seems to focus on the positive elements which have 
influenced development around Nong Ngu Hao. In fact, a similar pattern of 
development has occurred around the outskirts of Bangkok as a result of the cheaper 
land prices, the increasing demand for housing and the lack of land use control. 
The consortium ignored these facts and problems and the bias has continued. 
The projections of population, employment, office space, housing demand and 
infrastructure requirements in the new airport master plan area were presented showing 
great opportunities for the future . Besides a projected ultimate capacity of 100 million 
passengers per annum, the population projections in 2010 indicated that there would be 
1,88 1,000 inhabitants in the new development areas around the new airport and 
5,649,000 inhabitants in the master plan area [Norconsult, 1994 #38, main report, 4-6, 
4-7, 4-8]. These projections were used as primary information for infrastructure 
planning for the SBIA. 
Figure 6.5 shows the 'strategic land use plan 201 O'. It proposed that the area 
inside the five-kilometre zone around the new airport would be developed as a primary 
business zone for commercial and industrial enterprises related to or attracted by the 
airport. Consequently, the east and the west of the new airport, covering about 100 
square kilometres, were defined as a business zone which was the highlight of the land 
use plan. This huge business zone has become controversial. Hence, it is interesting to 
review why and how this huge business zone was defined in the land use plan. 
The approach to land use planning that every planning school has in common is 
to study and to analyse existing land use in association with other basic information. 
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The land uses around Nong Ngu Hao was first surveyed in 1989 by the DTCP for the 
preparation of the Samut Prakan Comprehensive Plan of 1993, the land use control for 
Samut Prakan province from 1993 to 1998. The 1989 land use map in Figure 6.6 shows 
the significance of industrial development in the area. A number of factories were built 
along the both sides of King Kaew Road east of the new airport site. The automobile 
industry and assembly plants with big investments from Japan have already been 
developed along highway no.34 (Bang Na-Trad Road) south of the airport. The 
development of the new housing projects is still limited as this depends on the 
improvement of road networks. The strips of old settlements along the waterways 
already existed. The landscape of Nong Ngu Hao in 1989 was mainly dominated by 
nearly a thousand fishing ponds. 
Figure 6.7 shows the second survey in 1994 in the same area covered by the 
DTCP but it was extended to cover the larger areas east of Bangkok, the coastal areas 
and the Bang Pakong River. The ground survey was undertaken for the preparation of 
the new airport land use control. The 1994 land use map in Figure 6.7 shows some 
significant changes. Most of the old settlements had been replaced by low cost housing 
projects. Many commercial complexes and high-rise office buildings have been built 
along highway no.34. The most controversial of these large developments is the multi-
million Thana City project with a number of housing blocks which were built under the 
flight path of the new airport. 
Compared with the land use plan 2010 in Figure 6.5, the business zone proposed 
in the new airport master plan seems to be contradictory to the current environment. It 
did not explain how existing factories would be replaced by the new commerce and 
business functions. In June 1995, a proposed land sub-division plan for the business 
zone in the new airport master plan was submitted to the NESDB, causing more 
confusion. The term 'light manufacturing industry' was introduced which would require 
an additional 30 to 50 ha per year in the business zone. The consortium recommended 
some special industries which would have great locational advantage in being close to 
an airport. However the consortium did not clarify the definition of special industry. 
Lastly, the consortium concluded that there should be more detailed research and 
(regional) policy clarification. 
Figure 6.8 shows the land sub-division plan for the business zone according to a 
grid system of main access roads and internal main distributor roads on the west of King 
Kaew Road. In June 1995 the consortium introduced an urban structure plan for the 
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zone to include all the necessary development criteria, guidelines, procedures, 
regulations and priorities for the. development of the entire zone. These details were 
prepared for the development implementations. Because of legal procedures, however, 
it may not be easy to convince the Planning Board of the Ministry of Interior to approve 
the proposed zoning patterns. More importantly, the private developers, that is the big 
actors who play the major role in development, have never expressed any interest in this 
business zone. Those speculating in land in that area are investors, not businesses 
seeking to develop there. 
In terms of the obstruction zone indicated in Figure 6.9 and the noise contour 
map shown in Figure 6.10, the land use plan is confused. The new airport master plan 
recommended that special building regulations and safety measures would be necessary 
in the business areas east and west of the new airport. However, the new airport master 
plan did not explain what were the special regulations and how to apply them. 
Most importantly, the environmental impact of the new airport was mentioned 
briefly but no recommendations were made. Apparently, the study avoided identifying 
any initial environment impact statements. In the new airport master plan, the noise 
contour map and safety zones along aircraft flight paths completely cover both proposed 
east and west business zones. In addition , the impact of noise pollution will directly 
affect a number of existing buildings in the urban centre of Lat Krabang in the north and 
the large housing complex in the south. These factors were not included in the new 
airport master plan. 
It is interesting to study why this bias has occurred in the land use plan. As 
mentioned, land uses around the new Bangkok airport have been legally controlled by 
Samut Prakan Comprehensive Plan since 1993. In Figure 6.2, the area east and south of 
the airport site are clearly defined for agricultural use only. The narrow strips along 
King Kaew Road west of the airport are defined for industrial use. Beyond the industrial 
strips, most areas are defined for residential use with medium-density. It is clear that 
land use which is controlled by law is completely different from the land use plan 
proposed in the new airport master plan. Moreover, areas north of the airport which are 
preserved as a floodway are enforced by the Bangkok authorities. The weakness of the 
Samut Prakan Plan, however, is that the validity of its five-year term expired in 
December 1998. 
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Figure 6.4 Land subsidence in Bangkok, 1991. 
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Figure 6.5 Strategic land use plan around the SBIA, 2010 
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Figure 6.8 Land subdivision plan of business zone, 2010 
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Figure 6.10 Noise contour map 
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In addition to the business zone controversy in the new airport master plan, the 
proposed concept for a green belt in the east between the new Bangkok airport and 
Chachoengsao was another controversial issue. The large areas in the east covering the 
districts of Lat Krabang, Bang Bo, Chachoengsao and Bang Pakong that are still 
undeveloped were proposed as a green area. The term 'Lake District', shown in Figure 
6.5, was identified as a green area. The new airport master plan pointed out that the 
primary function of the Lake District was to maintain a water retention capacity east of 
the airport. 
It is worth noting that the strongest impact of restricting land use is usually on 
land prices. As discussed in Chapter 3, this fact is well known among property 
speculators. The new airport master plan promoted by the NESDB has become a 
fundamental mechanism for changing land use control. However, access to information 
on this issue is very difficult because of the political situation. More importantly, an 
investigation of property speculation is also very difficult because most politicians are 
also the landlords who make a fortune from land speculation. The politics of land use 
continues to greatly influence the planning system in Thailand. 
6.2.4 Infrastructure Development Plan 
Infrastructure planning is a part of the process of land use planning. Projections 
of population, employment and other information provide basic data for the provision of 
public services. In the new airport master plan, eight factors affecting infrastructure 
development were separately studied and planned for: (1 ) traffic and transportation 
systems, (2) flood control and drainage, (3) soil and groundwater conditions, ( 4) water 
supply, (5) solid waste, (6) wastewater collection, treatment and disposal system, (7) the 
electrical power system and (8) telecommunications. 
The main task in this section is to review the infrastructure development plan by 
focusing on the rationality of seven of these issues. The more complex issue of flood 
protection will be reviewed in Chapter 7 because it has serious implications for the 
Bangkok Plan 1992 and is the focus of controversy about the new airport project. 
6.2.4.1 Traffic and Transport Systems 
Because of severe traffic congestion in Bangkok for decades, the issue of the 
traffic and transport systems is the most important issue, after land use planning. 
Besides the traditional approach to the problem taken in previous studies, for example, 
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National Urban Development Policy Framework 1990, the consortium identified the 
administrative structure of transEort authorities in the Thai Government as the most 
significant approach to traffic and transportation system planning. More than 20 
authorities under four ministries have responsibility for the development of traffic and 
transportation within the boundaries of the new airport master plan [Norconsult, 1994 
#38, volume I, 1-2 to 1-6]. A number of studies 11 relating to road and public transport 
systems in Bangkok that have been prepared by different authorities have been reviewed 
by the consortium showing a series of opportunities and conflicts. In Helen Ross's view 
[ 1997], this underlines a serious obstacle to development planning which has existed in 
Thailand for decades. This implies that the need to restructure the administration in 
association with the institutional development should be considered [Ross, 1997 #106]. 
In the planning methodology used in the new airport master plan, the main 
emphasis was mainly on road network development. Transport modeling was applied as 
an approach and two steps were adopted. Firstly, trip origin-destination activity 
catalyzed by the new airport was estimated by focusing on the regional patterns of 
transportation. The boundaries were redefined to include the 19 provinces in the Central 
Region and Bangkok. Secondly, a more detailed review of the land use area was 
presented. Airport passengers, employees, business and cargo trips were studied for 
demand projection for the years 2000 and 2010 [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume I, 3-1]. 
A large number of data from a series of 18 superzones with 167 zones were 
studied using transportation planning modeling software. On the basis of the 
information given, a number of maps, tables, charts and diagrams were presented 
showing demand patterns on the road networks. Ultimately, the new airport master plan 
showed a long list of recommendations. 
The report of the new airport master plan accepted that a road-oriented 
infrastructure system has finite capacity limits, either in the form of road space or 
parking space. The study concluded that a key to future mobility for Bangkok is ·urban 
mass transit' [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume I, 4-1]. These facts have been widely 
recognised by outsiders for decades but not in Thailand. Although a mass transit route 
was proposed and shown in the master plan for the new airport, there was no 
11 There are 16 study reports including; ( 1) Metropolitan Bangkok Short Term Urban Transport Review, 
October 1985, (2) The Study on Medium to Long Term Improvement/Management Plan of Road and 
Road Transport in Bangkok, March 1990, (3) Seventh Plan Urban and Regional Transport, March 1991, 
(4) Development of Transport Planning Strategy; Metropolitan Regional Structure Planning Study, 
October 1993 and (5) Bangkok Transit System, December 1993. 
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corresponding proposal in the master plan for a mass transit system t2 . In fact, NESDB 
got approval from Cabinet on 21 July 1992, one year after the approval of the new 
airport project, to modify the w!1ole operation plan for mass transit systems in Bangkok. 
It is not clear why the NESDB did not consider the new airport as a serious concern. As 
discussed, the NESDB has its own approach however this has some limitations. In this 
case, the I\1ESDB cannot go beyond the bureaucratic boundaries which serve the 
political concerns of uncountable interests. 
The planning context for traffic and transport systems was apparently mure 
flexible compared with other issues in the new airport master plan. The many different 
conditions given by key p~rsons involved with the second airport were always 
discussed. Consequently, all the measures and recommendations proposed in the plan 
were carefully based on the assumptions made by those persons For example, 
discussions in January 1994 with senior representatives of Thai International Airways 
confirmed that the new airport and Don Muang airport were expected to evolve as 
independent hubs. As a result, the new airport master plan concluded that there would 
be no need for ground transport services between the two airports However in fact, a 
decision on the operation and management of the two airports has not been finalised 
Several factors were totally ignored and consequently no transport linkage between the 
two airports was proposed in the SAMP. Transit passengers who use the services of 
different airlines seem to have been completely forgotten in the master plan. As a result, 
international passengers may avoid the Bangkok route unless they want a stopover. 
ln my view, the traffic and transport system planning in the SMfP was based on 
a number of uncertainties. My argument is that given the current situation with 
numerous changes in Bangkok's transport infrastructure, the transport plan in the master 
plan is unusable and a major revision is needed. 
6. 2 . ../. 2 Sot! ond Groundwater Conditions 
The issue of soil conditions was the shortest section in the master plan and was 
only discussed briefly on two pages It recommended that 30 metre-long concret~ 
pylons would be required for the construction of new airport areas and the cost would 
be substantial compared \Vith other development costs. This \VOuld cover up one of the 
weakest points in the new airport project 
;: Init ially. there were three mass transit s,·stcms under different authorities· ( l ) Metropolilcln Rapid 
Transit Authorit\ (set up in 19%. the operntion "ill start in 2003). ;1 nc\1 St<lte enterprise under the Office 
or the Pri111e Minister. (2) T;111arnng Electric Train Project under !he Bf\lA and (3) Hopewell Communit~ 
Train Project under the State Rai l11~ys ol Thailand. The Hope" ell Project became bankrupl in 1998. 
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The issue of groundwater conditions and subsidence in the new airport areas was 
discussed, based on some old data from surveys in the early 1980s. The serious problem 
of continuing subsidence of a?out 30 to 100 millimetres per year was described as 
shown in Figure 6.413. Despite these known geographical constraints, the study firmly 
stated that, from a geotechnical point of view, no areas were classified as unsuitable for 
development. A dike and polder system was recommended for flood protection 
[Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume 11, 3-8]. 
In my view, the study of soils and groundwater conditions has covered up the 
most serious problem in the project. It cannot be denied that it will be costly to develop 
the airport project at Nong Ngu Hao. More importantly, it will be even more costly to 
maintain the operation, as is the case with Kansai airport in Japan [Rowe, 1997 # 117, 
22-24]. 
However, the real facts about the soil and underground water have been 
gradually revealed during the construction of the flood protection system. This will be 
discussed in the section on implementation assessment. 
6.2.-1.3 Water Supply 
Water supply development planning is another controversial issue in which a 
number of facts were misrepresented in the new airport master plan. It is worth noting 
that a shortage of water supply in the east of Bangkok has been a critical problem for 
decades and that water supply development is costly. 
In the new airport master plan, the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MW A), 
a state enterprise under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for providing piped 
drinking water to the Bangkok Metropolitan Area and some districts of Samut Prakan 
province. The Provincial Waterworks Authority (PW A), another state enterprise, is 
responsible for water supply provision to other areas in Chachoengsao province. 
Both authorities share the same serious problem of providing water. The most 
seri ous problems that exist in areas around the new airport through to the east coast are 
salinity and the availability of water panicularly during the dry season. The study in the 
new airport master plan stated that the only way to increase the water supply was to 
build dams in the Bang Pakong River to create storage. As a result, a dam I 0 kilometres 
upstream of Chachoengsao City, the Bang Khla \.Vater Treatment Plant, 12 kilometres 
upstream of the dam and other simi lar projects are being developed. However. these 
1
' The figures of land subsidence in Bangkok arc l'roill Norco11sult's report. 
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projects were originally planned to serve industrial demand in Bang Pakong Basin and 
surrounding urban areas, not the new airport project . 
The development of water supplies for areas in and around the new airport is the 
responsibility of the MW A. Based on the assumed consumption of activities proposed 
in the new airport master plan, the forecast of water demand is shown in tables of 
demand figures for 2000 and 20 l 0. It is interesting to discuss how reasonable the 
forecast of water demand is and how development of the proposal is possibie. 
According to the MW A, average water consumption per capita per day in 
Bangkok is currently more than 350 litres. However, the actual consumption is no more 
than 200+ litres per capita per day because the MW A has not succeeded in solving its 
own problem of about 30 per cent leakage in the water supply [MW A, 1991 #43] In the 
new airport master plan, the consumption per capita for MW A in 2000 was set at 25') 
litres per day; however, the leakage problem was not considered. 
The total amount of water demand was calculated very simply. The population 
was multiplied by the consumption per capita. However the most serious controversy is 
that only the populations in Lat Krabang, Bang Phi and Bang Bo were used in 
calculating the figures . In other districts, it was assumed that only I 0 per cent of the 
total population would need a water supply according to the Land Use Plan that 
identified 10 per cent of these areas as residential. For instance, it was projected that 
there would be 533,000 inhabitants in the Pravet district of Bangkok in 2010, but it was 
assumed that only 53,300 people would require a drinking water supply. 
Similar criteria were applied to water demand in the industrial areas. The low 
figure of 8 to 8. 5 cubic metres of water per rai (or 1, 600 square metres) per day was 
used for the calculation compared with the current rate of l 2 cubic metres used by the 
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand. It recommended a separate system for 
supplying low quality water from reservoirs instead of providing only drink ing quality 
water to the industries [Norconsult, 1994 #38. volume Ill, 4-9, 4-1 O] 
The study concluded that an amount of 501,83 7 cubic metres of water supply 
per day would be provided by MWA, of which 27,000 cubic metres per day would be 
needed for the new airport in 2010 (Norconsult 1994 #38, volume III, 4- l 0, appendix 
12] However, the SAMP did not present any calculations relating to the figu re of 100 
million passengers per year Furthermore, it stated that the projections presented should 
be considered as a planning aid, rather than as absolutely correct data. 
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It was proposed that two pumping stations in Lat Krabang and Bang Phli would 
be developed in 1997 and 2000 respectively and that water would be supplied through a 
pipeline direct from Bang Khen Water Plant14. Despite the confusion of these 
projections, it was estimated that a total cost of 14.6 billion baht would be needed for 
the proposed development projects to the year 2010, which was viewed as a profitable 
investment by the entrepreneur [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume III, 4-21]. 
Obviously, the planning context of water supply development is no different 
from other issues in the SAMP. A number of facts were misrepresented and the 
conclusion covered up weak points in the airport project. 
6.2.4.4 Solid Waste 
Solid waste disposal has become a serious problem for every Thai city because 
of increased public awareness about environmental concerns. The biggest problem is 
dumping sites and although proposals have been made for suitable treatment sites, they 
are not welcomed anywhere. Consequently this issue has became a political concern at 
both the local and national levels 15. It is therefore important to review how the issue of 
solid waste was studied and planned in the SAMP. 
Under the Local Administration Act in Thailand, three different types of local 
authorities are responsible for solid waste collection and disposal: the Municipality, the 
Sanitary District and the Local Administration Organisation. Medical and industrial 
inorganic hazardous wastes are mostly collected, burnt or treated by the BMA and the 
Department of Industrial Works of the Ministry of Industry. However in some areas, the 
private sector is hired to transport, collect and dispose of solid waste. 
In terms of boundaries for the SAMP, solid waste collection and disposal is the 
responsibility of all three local authorities. Besides the BMA, the municipality of Samut 
Prakan, the two sanitary districts 16 of Bang Phli, Bang Bo, two authorities in and around 
the new airport and the Provincial Administration of Samut Prakan were all responsible 
for improving their solid waste collection and disposal systems. It is not clear why areas 
of Chachoengsao province, which had been considered in other issues in infrastructure 
14 MW A has three water treatment plants: Bang Khen, Sam Sen and Thonburi. The sources of raw water 
for these plants are in Prathum Thani province, 90 ki lometres upstream of Bangkok. The raw water is 
pumped along an 18-kilometre canal to the Bang Khen Treatment Plant, the largest treatment plant with 
the current capacity of the production of 2 million cubic metres per day. MW A has a plan to increase the 
capacity by pumping the raw water from Meklong River in Kam:hanaburi , 120 kilometres west of 
Bangkok. The project would cost more than 3 billion baht. 
15 One good case is the strong protest against the proposed dumping grounds of the Chiangmai City that 
were moved around for years before being conc luded. 
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development in the master plan, were not included. Some boundaries were overlooked 
in the study and as a result the disposal of solid waste was not fully studied in the 
SAMP. 
Projections for solid waste disposal in and around the new airport were simple. 
Population numbers projected in the master plan were multiplied by the average 
disposal quantity of solid waste per capita. This methodology however was flawed and 
controversial. 
It was simply concluded that a solid waste generation rate of 0.9 kilogramme per 
capita per day and a density of 275 kilogramme per cubic metre could be used for 
calculations. Consequently, the total volume of solid waste generated in areas of the 
new airport Land Use Plan would be 1,620 tons per day or 590,000 tons per year in 
2010. By using a rate of 2 kilogrammes per bed per day, the medical waste in the Land 
Use Plan would be only 4.3 tons per day or 1,570 tons per year in 2010. The industrial 
hazardous waste would be 81,000 tons per year in 2010 [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume 
III, 5-18, 5-19]. 
Some crucial facts were not considered in the second airport study. In April 
1995, the Department of Public Cleansing in the BMA reported that the average solid 
waste generation rate in Bangkok was 1.8 kilogrammes per capita per day and projected 
that there would be about 10,000 tons per day in 2003. It is believed that the current 
amount of solid waste generated in the Bangkok Metropolis is more than 8,000 tons per 
day but the BMA can only collect 6,633 tons per day [(BMA), 1996 #44]. 
However, the focus of the solid waste study was not on the new airport. The 
second airport study briefly concluded that in 2010 there would be 130 tons of solid 
waste daily from the new airport and 125 tons from areas around airport [Norconsult, 
1994 #38, main report, 7-22]. It is not clear why the figure of 100 million passengers 
per year was not mentioned in the calculations. 
The SAMP proposed three possible alternatives for solid waste treatment and 
disposal: (1) sanitary landfill, (2) a composting plant and (3) an incinerator. However, 
no conclusion was made on the most suitable option. The issue became confused when 
the second airport study also recommended that a further study be done on a conceptual 
engineering and financial feasibility. 
16 All sanitary districts in Thailand have been upgraded to municipalities since May 1999. 
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The most serious issue relates to the dumping site. In Figure 6.11, a site in 
Samut Prakan province, close to. the sea was proposed for solid waste treatment and 
disposal. This means that in 2010 an amount of about 1,280 tons of solid waste would 
be dumped and treated every day at the site, just metres from the Gulf of Thailand. The 
Gulf of Thailand was not shown in the original map recommending the dumping site 
(see Figure 6.11). The issues of environmental risks and the serious consequences of the 
proposed site were not studied or even mentioned in the SAMP. 
My argument is that the presentation of the solid waste issue in the SAMP was 
done to cover up more sensitive facts about environmental concerns which could stop 
the development of the new airport project. A review of the following issues reinforces 
this argument. 
6.2.4.5 Wastewater Collection, Treatment and Disposal System 
Water pollution is not a new problem in Thailand. Because of ignorance for 
decades, water pollution has become critical and widespread not only in Bangkok but 
also in every town and city. In Thailand, the management of water pollution in the 
1990s is at an early stage of development. A recent initiative by the BMA in association 
with environmental movements, started the first stage of a wastewater treatment project 
in Bangkok which has stimulated public interest in solving water pollution problems 
properly. The issue of wastewater collection, treatment and disposal was therefore 
addressed in the SAMP as an environmental concern. 
The importance of wastewater management was recognised in the master plan 
but the details were totally misrepresented. The study stated that five industrial estates 
located in the second airport Land Use Plan had their own wastewater collection and 
treatment facilities, therefore wastewater from these industrial estates was not 
considered in the master plan. Worsening water pollution from individual factories in 
Samut Prakan was pointed out briefly and solutions proposed by the Department of 
Public Works were discussed. However it was simply concluded that wastewater from 
the industrial sector was not a primary concern for the master plan [Norconsult, 1994 
#38, volume III]. 
The projections of water supply demand referred to in the section above were 
reviewed in association with former reports prepared by the NESDB. It was assumed 
that about 80 per cent of the water used would be discharged as wastewater. The 
wastewater generated would be 200 litres per capita per day in 2010. This assumption 
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became confused when the consortium reconsidered the land use distribution in the land 
use plan. 
The consortium assumed that there would be 210 persons per ha in the industrial 
areas in 2010. For commercial and institutional land use, an average population of 40 
persons per ha was assumed. An equivalent population of 20 persons per ha was 
assumed for community land use. After identifying the percentage of land use 
distribution, tables showing wastewater projections were presented, however, details 
about the calculations were not included. Based on the number of passengers, the 
wastewater projection for the new airport was about 23,000 cubic metres per day in 
2010. It was concluded that the total flow of wastewater in the master plan would be 
436,819 cubic metres per day in 20 IO based on the assumption of the land use 
distribution [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume III, 6-9, tables 11 and 13]. 
Because of the geographical constraints of the flat terrain, the wastewater 
collection system 17 would require a high investment. Besides costly lifting stations and 
effective pumping stations, a conventional high-rate activated sludge process was 
proposed and a site at Bang Phi was recommended for the location of the treatment 
plant. Because of poor soil conditions and the possibility of ground water 
contamination, the ocean disposal of treated effluent through a short outfall was 
considered to be the most suitable disposal option. 
However a number of facts were misrepresented m the study. The physical 
constraints of elevation of about 0.50 to 0.80 metre above the mean sea level and the 
serious risks of the daily high tide were not examined in the study. The consortium 
assumed that all aspects of the wastewater issue had been studied in the master plan. 
However, the impact of possible failures caused by seasonal floods and flash floods 
were not studied or even mentioned in the SA.NIP. 
If environmental concerns were actually the first priority in decision making, the 
new Bangkok airport at Nong Ngu Hao site would have been cancelled. The same 
approach was also taken with other large controversial projects and a similar approach 
and methodology was used when it came to discussing the sensitive issue of 
environment. Facts are presented in ambiguous way in cases where they may have a 
negative impact on the project. 
17 Without a reasonable s lope, water will not flow away at the required speed. 
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Not surprisingly, the environmental impact assessment of the new Bangkok 
airport became controversial when .the master plan was completed. Unfortunately, the 
assessment became less important after implementation of the project began. Public 
interest moved away from environmental issues to political scandals when the extent of 
corruption involved with the construction of the new Bangkok airport became known. 
This will be discussed in the section on implementation. 
6.2.4.6 Electrical Power System and Telecommunications 
The electrical power system issue was briefly discussed in the SAMP. The 
emphasis was on forecasting electrical power consumption in the new airport and 
developments in the surrounding areas. Based on land use distribution in the master 
plan, the residential, commercial and industrial areas were defined as the three major 
consumers. A simple calculation for the residential area was made based on number of 
dwellings. Another calculation was based on the number of persons in the commercial 
and industrial areas. However, details of the calculations and forecast were not 
presented in the report. 
New electricity terminal stations were proposed and a total investment of 21, 
266 million baht was estimated. The electrical power system is one of the most complex 
issues in planning and requires a large amount of data and reasonable assumptions . 
Because the study was limited to Jess than a year, the electrical power system planning 
for the new airport and the surrounding areas could not be completed. As a result, the 
electrical power system was not reviewed in detail in terms of the planning context. 
Telecommunications developments were also discussed briefly but not studied 
in detail. The Telephone Organisation of Thailand (TOT), a state en terprise, and two 
private companies, Telecom Asia (TA) and Thai Telephone and Telecommunication Pel 
(TT&T), have played a role in the development of telecommunication in areas around 
the new airport. Two million additional lines for the Bangkok Metropolitan Region and 
one million additional lines for the provincial areas were being provided as a part of the 
seventh national plan ( 1992-1997). However, the national plan stated that the new 
airport and its impact on these areas were not included in current development projects. 
Consequently, the additional demand created by the new airport was studied 
only briefly in the second airport study. Three main sources of additional demand for 
services were identified: the airport complex, the additional industrial and commercial 
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development attracted to the area and the residential development around the airport. It 
was assumed that the total additional lines needed in 2010 would be based on the 
density of 30 telephone lines per 100 persons. But the population used for this 
calculation was much less than the projections in the Land Use Plan in the new airport 
master plan. For instance, it was assumed that only 100,000 persons in Lat K.rabang in 
2010, compared with 213 ,000 persons projected in the land use plan, would demand the 
telephone service [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume III, 8-8, 8-9]. This calculation 
confused the resident population with commercial need. 
The study concluded that the total demand generated by the new airport project 
from all sectors would be 235,588 lines in 2010. A total development investment of 
7 ,500 million baht was presented based on the average cost in 1994 of US$1,200 to 
install a line [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume III, 8-11]. 
Hence, it is clear what the making of the new airport master plan was all about. 
In my view, the new airport master plan was made to convince the public that the 
project was ready and would not have negative impact on Bangkok. 
In the overview of the infrastructure development planning contained in the 
SAMP, a large number of facts were misrepresented and numerous negative 
consequences were ignored. Projections of infrastructure demands were low as they 
were based on poor assumptions. Despite these controversies, biased assumptions about 
the prosperity of the new airport project continued and its development potential was 
stressed on many occasions. However, undeniable deficiencies are gradually being 
revealed during implementation of the airport project and these will be discussed in the 
following section. 
6.3 Assessment of Implementation 
In this section, the implementation of the SBIA project will be assessed focusing 
on a number of development projects and the consequences of recommendations 
proposed in the SAMP. This focus will be on the implementation of the airport project 
during the administration of Chavalit Yongchaiyudh from November 1996 to November 
1997. The most interesting case is the landfill project which supports the arguments 
presented in previous sections. It will also illustrate the frustration of the authorities 
concerned when faced with a number of undeniable facts which were covered up in the 
master plan. 
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The issue of management will also be discussed in terms of the management of 
time and resources. It is worth noting that the dramatic changes 18 in Thai politics in 
1996 and 1997 greatly influenced every mega-project in Thailand including the new 
airport project. It is interesting to study how the actors involved played their roles 
defensively and offensively in the development of the new Bangkok airport under 
political pressure and uncertainty. 
Most information used in this section is from contemporary newspapers and 
weekly magazines published m English and Thai. Different viewpoints will be 
discussed in order to point out the complexity of political networks and their 
consequences during this period. 
6.3.J Development Preparation 
After the SAMP was completed in August 1994, there was little progress in the 
development of the new Bangkok airport, which was originally planned to open in 
2000. A new state-owned company named NBIA was established during the second 
administration of Anand Panyarachun 19 to take responsibility for the new airport 
development. The NBIA was designed to be independent from the AA T at Don Muang 
airport, which is controlled by the Thai Air Force. The establishment of the NBIA was 
an attempt to end the military engagement in civilian affairs. 
The NBIA was set up with an initial registered capital of 10 billion baht 
provided by the Finance Ministry with 49 per cent and the AAT with 51 per cent of 
investment and ownership. An investment plan for the new airport development was 
approved in August 1996. In January 1997, the NBIA received a 50 billion baht loan 
from Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF); however , more funds 
were needed. It was expected at that stage that the cost would increased from 97 billion 
baht to over 100 billion baht. The poor and unstable financial conditions in Thailand 
became a critical factor which totally influenced the development direction of the 
airport project later20. 
18 There was a sign of financial problems in early 1997. The government floated the Thai currency in June 
and the Thai financial system collapsed promptly. Chavalit was forced to resign in November 1997. 
19 I 0 June 1992 to 13 September 1992 
1° Consequently, on 13 January 1997, the government had to reconsider the costs and benefits o f the 
proposed new airport. Eventually, on 27 May 1997, Cabinet approved that the new Bangkok airport 
would be scaled down with the total cost of 68.8 bi llion baht. Only one runway will be buil t, which can 
serve about 20 million passengers annually by the year 2003. 
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Financial feasibility is a most important issue that must be seriously and 
carefully considered with every major investment. However, this issue was not studied 
or comprehensively examined in the master plan of the new Bangkok airport. As a 
result of this ignorance, many unexpected critical problems have arisen. The mam 
theme of the SAMP has been completely forgotten. 
In the early stages of development preparation, there was an argument over the 
relocation of villagers out of the construction site. By January 1997, 1,792 families who 
had been paid compensation years previously, had not yet been moved out. The 
argument was that they were compensated at a rate of 4,000-5,000 baht per rai, based on 
1961 calculations, but current land prices had reached 6-7 million baht per rai. After 
each family was given 800,000 baht more in compensation, the last 60 villagers moved 
out in February 1997. A total of 1.4 billion baht was paid by the NBIA in compensation. 
This resulted in a conflict between the NBIA and the AA T because neither of 
them had prepared a budget for relocating the villagers. This matter had never been 
discussed and the SAMP did not consider it as a problem. This has situation has 
influenced many construction projects for which contracts have been signed, 
particularly the landfill project and the dike and polder system. 
Even though the problem of the villagers was over by February 1997, the 
landfill project had not yet started in May 1997 because the contractors had to wait for 
the completion of the northern polder and dike which were due to be finished in 2000. 
The landfill project actually started after a corruption allegation was dismissed in April 
1999 because of poor evidence. 
The delay in the construction of the polder and dike system is another interesting 
issue. The system was designed to dredge existing canals around the airport site. The 
dredged soil and silt was to be used in layers up to 3.50 metres high to build the 
floodwalls. In practice, the floodwalls could not reach the designed level because of the 
poor physical properties of the soil and silt. Obviously, this should have been 
anticipated in the Master Plan. 
On 21 February 1997, the Minister of Transportation, Suwat Liptapallop, seated 
that the new airport project would take more time to complete because of natural 
difficulties. He mentioned that a variety of factors would prolong the construction 
including its geography. Importantly, he stated that one cannot fight against the nature. 
His statement supports my previous arguments that key environmental factors were 
ignored or suppressed in the preparation of the SAMP. 
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There was also little progress in other works unrelated to the site preparation, 
such as the detailed design work which will be discussed in the following section. 
6.3.2 Detailed Design 
In April 1995, a Thai-American consortium, Murphy Jahn-TAMS-Act Group, 
was selected to prepare a detailed design of the new airport under a 792 million baht 
contract. The consortium had 27 months to complete the design work. However, its 
architectural design became controversial because the all-glass passenger terminal did 
not depict Thai identity and did not suit the tropical environment. 
By May 1997 the consortium had worked for over one year but the NBIA had 
not yet approved even a preliminary design for the passenger terminal. A conflict arose 
when the contract was due to expire in the next three months. The consortium needed 
500 days to complete the final design. On 31 July, the NBIA gave the extra time of 550 
days to the consortium. The design work was 10 months behind schedule and the delay 
cost the NBIA 200 million baht in damages. 
There were many controversies during the design work process. Qualifications 
and experience in airport design were not considered as the primary criteria in the 
selection of a designer. Instead the candidate offering the lowest professional fees was 
chosen. Before signing the contract with the MJT A, Airport de Paris, a French 
consortium who was another candidate, complained that the procedure for selecting a 
designer was not transparent. The matter was so serious that there was a protest by the 
French Embassy in Bangkok. 
It is not clear why the design work took so much time, nearly four years. 
Apparently, the cost damages caused by the delay in design work have been greater than 
the lower fee charged by the consortium. Moreover, the delay in design work influenced 
the delays of other projects. 
6.3.3 Politics of Landfill 
Landfill for the new airport project has been a scandal since September 1995. A 
number of local contractors were active in bidding for the landfill project. The price of 
sand quoted in the local market at the time was 86 baht per cubic metre. It was believed 
that 16 baht of every cubic metre of sand would go to the commissioning authorities and 
another one baht would go to each of the two middlemen. The contractor would actually 
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be paid only 68 baht per cubic metre of sand [Matichon, 1995 #45]. Certainly, the 
prospect of making a fortune from millions of cubic metres of sand became attractive to 
certain groups. 
As a result, heavy lobbying by influential politicians over the landfill bid caused 
a delay to the new Bangkok airport project. The Deputy Minister of Transportation, 
Somsak Thepsuthin, changed the specifications for the landfill bid, resulting in a 40 per 
cent rise in the original budget. The changes affected the bidding procedures and as a 
result, very few contractors were qualified to bid. Obviously, this delay was caused by 
political conflict rather than by technical problems. 
On 29 November 1996, the Italian-Thai Development Plc. won the bid to 
reclaim the new airport site at a price of 11,650 million baht for two runways only. This 
became a political scandal because the contract was signed only two days before a new 
government took over the administration21 . Moreover, the price of sand increased 
sharply from less than 100 baht to 900 baht per cubic metre. The NBIA argued that the 
landfill cost was high because the engineering consultant for the airport project required 
good quality sand. Their explanation was controversial and the allegation of attempted 
corruption was submitted to the Counter Corruption Committee by a group of losing 
bidders. 
It was estimated that about 20 million cubic metres of sand would be needed 
which would come from Ayutthaya, Ang Thong and Kanchanaburi, all more than 100 
kilometres from Bangkok. Following the signing of the contract, the landfill work was 
expected to take 1, 100 days or three years. The landfill project became controversial 
and strong reactions came from everywhere. 
In December 1996, the governor of Samut Prakan strongly objected to the new 
airport project. He argued that traffic problems in the affected areas were already 
critical. The large scale landfill with hundreds of truck journeys every day would cause 
more problems and would damage the local economy. This was a reasonable argument. 
An investigation of a corruption allegation was completed and submitted to the 
Prime Minister in September 1997, however this matter was kept quiet for two months. 
The landfill work had already started on I November 1997. A political game began 
when Suwat, as the Minister of Transportation, was to officially open the landfill project 
on 12 November 1997. But on the same day, Pokin Polkun as Acting Prime Minister, 
!t Banharn Silpa-archa took the office of Prime Minister until the last day on 30 November 1996 and 
General Chalvalit Yongchaiyudh replaced him on I December. 
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suspended the landfill contract and recommended the NBIA cancel the contract it had 
signed with the Italian-Thai Development Plc. because of the allegation of corruption. 
This became a time bomb for Chuan Leekpai who became the new Prime Minister a 
few days later. The politics of the landfill work will continue for as long as it is a 
political concern. 
The landfill issue, involving 20 million cubic metres of sand, and the problems 
of sand transportation for three years, were not discussed in the SAMP. The landfill 
project highlights the factors which were neglected in the master plan: the great natural 
constraints of the geography, the poor condition of the built environment and the poor 
management of natural resources. 
The corruption scandals have eclipsed these facts and the question is how 
reasonable and profitable the new Bangkok airport will be. In April 1999, the allegation 
of corruption over landfill was dismissed on the grounds of poor evidence. The landfill 
project is now back on track. 
6.3.4 The Master Plan and Time Management 
The time schedule for implementing the airport project was precisely addressed 
in the master plan, showing a long list of activities and commitments in accordance with 
the responsibilities of the authorities concerned. Certainly, the completion of any mega-
project greatly depends on time management. In the case of the new Bangkok airport 
project, time management was so poor that almost everything was behind schedule 
resulting in a number of problems. 
A fundamental problem of the new Bangkok airport development is the 
administrative structure of the management. Even though the NBIA has been 
established to take responsibility for the project, the coalition government set up a 
committee to manage the development as a whole. The Prime Minister is chairperson of 
the main committee and the Minister and Deputy Minister of Transportation chair other 
sub-committees. 
The administration of Chavalit Yongchaiyudh from November 1996 to 
November 1997 was the airport project's worst period of management. Prime Minister 
Chavalit was from the New Aspiration Party. The Minister of Transportation, Suwat 
Liptapallop, was from the Chat Pattana Party and the Deputy Minister of 
Transportation, Somsak Thepsuthin was from the Social Action Party. These three big 
parties had completely different policies on the airport development. During this period 
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of implementation there were a number of changes to the sub-committees and Cabinet 
made most decisions. 
Consequently, management of the airport project became chaotic and its 
implementation fell behind the schedule in the master plan. The lack of transparency in 
association with political interference was blamed for the project's delay. It is 
interesting to study how and why the delays occurred. 
The first time the AAT officially acknowledged a delay in the new airport 
project was in October 1996. The Authority stated that the major cause of the delay was 
the difficulty in relocating residents from the airport construction site. However, this 
problem was quickly resolved after more compensation was provided. 
Time management became critical when the government was unable to follow 
up anything in the master plan. By January 1997 the government had already signed 16 
contracts with private firms for the new airport project. On 8 January 1997, the Ministry 
of Transportation stated that the NBIA was running out of funds for the project. This 
became very confusing because contracts had been signed without any financial 
planning. As a result, the issue of financial management was discussed urgently as they 
searched for solutions. 
Frustrated by the allegation of corruption with the landfill project, Chavalit 
caused further confusion when he announced on 20 January 1997 that the new Bangkok 
airport would be relocated from Nong Ngu Hao to Bang Pu. A few days later Cabinet 
decided to temporarily suspend the new Bangkok airport project without any detailed 
consideration of the consequences. The controversy of Bang Pu ended after the 
proposed move was disputed. In February 1997 it was proposed to reduce the size of the 
new airport and simultaneously expand the capacity of Don Muang airport. These 
changes in Cabinet's decisions influenced the development of the new Bangkok airport 
and confidence in the management of the project. 
The future of the new Bangkok airport became more uncertain after the 
government devalued the Thai currency on 2 July 1997. Consequently, it was expected 
that the new Bangkok airport project and the expansion of Don Muang airport would 
cost an extra three billion baht each. Pressured by the economic crisis and influenced by 
IMF advice on restructuring the economy, the government was moving towards 
privatisation as a solution. The issue of the management of the two international airports 
was discussed with the possibility of privatisation being extended to other regional 
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airports. However, the process of airport privatisation is complex as it would affect the 
interests of all the authorities involved. 
In October 1996, a sub-committee of the Ministry of Transportation 
recommended that all international flights by Thai Airways International would use the 
new airport, while Don Muang airport would mainly serve domestic routes. The AAT 
opposed this and there was a major change in the committee after the change of 
government in November 1997. 
In February 1998, Thai International Airways denied it was moving its base to 
the new Bangkok airport. It estimated a cost of 20 billion for relocating its headquarters. 
Other airlines immediately reacted strongly. Their argument was reasonable in that 
every airline should be treated equally. 
On the policy of privatisation, the new government has addressed several 
possibilities for private investment. In fact, many overseas companies have been 
interested in privatisation but their main interest has been the international airports at 
Phuket and U-Tapao, not the new Bangkok airport at Nong Ngu Hao. This degree of 
interest by the private investor somewhat contradicts the viewpoints expressed in the 
SAMP. 
The implementation process raises serious questions about the success of the 
new Bangkok airport project and the quality of the master plan. The impact of the new 
Bangkok airport on the issue of flood will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
Part III The Implications of the Politics of Planning 
and Development 
Part I and Part II discussed the historical background of how planning for Bangkok and the 
development of the SBIA became political concerns. This analysis explained why no 
progress was made on these two projects for decades and how the consequences of poor 
administrative, legal and planning systems influenced the development of Bangkok and the 
SBIA. 
As argued in Part II, it is evident that the power struggle among factions in the 
government influenced these two projects. The formal process of rational planning was 
intertered with and the public interest was ignored. Moreover, planning for Bangkok and 
the development of the SBIA did not include the study of urbanisation, which should be a 
concern of planning. 
I agree with David Harvey [ 1989] that the study of urbanisation is not the study of a 
legal, political entity or of a physical artifact. It is concerned with the process of capital 
circulation; the shifting flows of labour power, commodities and capital , the spatial 
organisation of production and the transformation of time-space relations, movements of 
information, geopolitical conflicts between territorially-based class alliances and so on 
[Harvey, 1989 #87, 6-7]. This approach, with all its concerns, is hardly applicable in the 
case of Thailand because of the narrow and limited view taken by the authorities charged 
with the task of planning. Previous discussions on these issues have been limited to a small 
number of scholars with different viewpoints about urban studies in Thailand. However, 
this thesis concentrates on the rather simplistic idea that people can understand the story of 
what is happening to their built environment. 
It is worth noting that Thais do not care much about the implications of complex 
issues involved in planning politics. People seem to think that city planning and the 
development of a new airport are not their concerns. This may explain why very few people 
attended a public hearing about planning in Bangkok in 1997 and 1998. 
In Part III, therefore, I have chosen as a case study a problem which is fundamental 
and very apparent to Thai people through its direct impact on daily life in Bangkok. To 
understand the issues and problems one has to think about the implications of politics for 
the planning and development of Bangkok and the SBIA. People should know how the city 
plan and a big project such as the new airport would affect their living conditions. 
Flooding in Bangkok has been selected for discussion because it is a recurring 
problem and one likely to be exacerbated by the development of the airport. The analysis of 
flood conditions is based on the best available materials that date back to an early study on 
irrigation and drainage system for areas around Bangkok in 1903. 
Chapter 7 discusses the impact of the SBIA on flood protection. An historical 
analysis of the flood phenomenon is made to explain how and why flooding has become a 
chronic problem in Bangkok. Reports and studies on flood protection are reviewed to 
explain why the flood problem remains unresolved. An attempt is made to assess whether 
the study of flooding and protection measures proposed in the SBIA master plan are 
reasonable. The implications of planning politics in terms of flood protection for Bangkok 
are discussed by focusing on the abstract concept of the boundary. 
Chapter 8 is a theory chapter. Discussions in chapter 8 focus on three planning 
domains: city planning, airport planning and environmental planning. The focus is on 
planning theories, theories of urban politics and the environmental concept of integrating 
impact assessments into the planning process. A task in this chapter is to understand the 
impact of politics on planning and development in association with arguments based on 
these theoretical viewpoints. 
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Flood Protection 
Floods are a chronic problem in Bangkok. Besides the daily problem of traffic 
congestion, people are tired of flood problems. During the monsoon season, some areas 
of Bangkok are under water for months. But everyone seems to accept this fact as a part 
of life in Bangkok. Attempts have been made and large amounts of money have been 
spent on controlling and protecting the city from floods for decades. However, the flood 
problem remains critical and causes considerable damage to Bangkok and the Thai 
economy every year. 
This chapter discusses the SBIA in terms of flood protection because the airport 
will block the floodways east of Bangkok. The emphasis is on the impact of the SBIA's 
development on Bangkok's flood protection. The analysis begins with a geographical 
perspective of Bangkok and the lower basin of Chao Phraya River to describe its natural 
setting. As in previous chapters, an historical analysis is made to show how floods have 
become a problem for Bangkok. Key early studies of flood problems in Bangkok are 
reviewed to provide a better understanding and a clearer picture of the development of 
flood protection. Discussions focus on changes in the built environment of Bangkok to 
explain why the flood protection system is not functioning. The SBIA master plan is 
reviewed by focusing on planning solutions. 
As argued in previous chapters, it is not practical to develop a massive project 
such as the new airport on a floodway especially as the project is costly and will change 
the natural pattern of drainage. The landfill project discussed in Chapter 6 is a good 
example. Bangkok's flood problems were not considered in the SBIA master plan and 
no solutions were provided. A key question is what Bangkok will be like after the new 
Bangkok airport is completed. Because of political interests, this controversy has had 
very little influence on the development of the SBIA and the project is continuing. As a 
result, flood control and flood protection in Bangkok will eventually be more costly. 
This chapter compares the different planning philosophies of the Bangkok Plan !992 
and the SBIA master plan, focusing on flood protection planning. 
Chapter 7 The Airport and Flood Protection 
7 .1 Floods and the Physical Environment 
A comprehensive analysis of the causes of flooding and other flood-related 
studies requires a wide-range understanding of geography, topography, geology, 
hydrology, climatology and meteorology. The discussion will be integrated to illustrate 
the development of flood conditions in Bangkok. It is worth noting that current 
understanding of Bangkok's flood problems is extensive and there has been no 
agreement on solutions. Unfortunately, the origins of the flood problem seem to be 
ignored while authorities concentrate on finding solutions to the problem. In this section 
the geography of Bangkok is discussed with an emphasis on the development of the 
built environment, focusing on flood geomorphology and flood protection planning over 
the past century. 
Floods are both physical and socio-economic phenomena which result from a 
number of basic causes. The most frequent causes are climatological and nature [Ward, 
1978 #59, 5-11]. The problems Bangkok faces are largely the result of human activity. 
In fact, the floods were once part of the ecological system that brought fertile sediments 
to the lower plains of Bangkok which were the best areas for rice growing in Thailand. 
During the past few decades, it has become clear that enormous changes in the man-
made environment have become the primary cause of flood problems. 
The human response to the problem of flooding in Bangkok in terms of making 
adjustments has not been rational. Despite the empirical facts, the causes of the flood 
problems have been misrepresented and alternative solutions have been overshadowed 
by economic reasons. In the short term, the benefits of developing the SBIA have been 
presented so as to obscure the damages that floods will undoubtedly have on Bangkok. 
7.1.1 Geography of Bangkok 
It has been known for centuries that Bangkok is on a flood plain 1 which is built 
of sediments carried by the Chao Phraya River. The term 'Sea of Mud' on east Bangkok 
was described when the city was built in 1782 [Sternstein, 1982 #3 , 8]. In other words, 
Thais have always been aware of the geography of Bangkok. Most tools in those days 
were primitive and scientific knowledge was limited, however, the Thais understood 
their environs, which included the frequency of flooding. 
1 William G . Hoyt and W alter B. Langbe in describe the flood plain as the low land that borders a river. 
usually dry but subject to flooding [Hoyt & Langbein, 1955 #57, 12). 
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A better understanding of Bangkok and its surrounding environment in terms of 
an informed approach, gradually developed after Westerners introduced new scientific 
methods. Rainfall statistics in the lower Chao Phraya River were first collected 
systematically by American missionaries in 1845 [Heide, 1903 #28, 150]. 
During the reign of King Mongkut ( 1851-1868), mapping and topographical 
surveys played a much greater role in modernisation projects in Bangkok and certain 
provincial areas2. The growth of urbanism and construction projects fostered the 
development of modem mapping, reshaping knowledge and understanding 
[Winichakul, 1994 #60, 116-117]. Systematic data collection techniques and map 
making greatly influenced numerous studies during the next few decades. 
In addition to the 1894 Directory for Bangkok and Siam by James McCarthy, 
one of the earliest modem studies of the geography of Bangkok was the General Report 
on Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam3 Valley prepared by J. Homan van der 
Heide, an engineer with the Waterstaat of Netherlands India. This report was submitted 
to the Ministry of Agriculture on 24 January 1903. The report was prepared to develop 
an irrigation system which would provide sufficient water to increase rice production 4 
[Heide, 1903 #28, 33]. 
The elevation and topography down-stream of the Chao Phraya River from 
Paknampo5 down to the coast were surveyed for the Bangkok-Chiangmai railway from 
1887 to 1889. The survey concluded that Bangkok and Paknam6 had the sl ightest slope 
of about 1/14,000. The same report presented a table showing the approximate 
elevations of Bangkok at 6 metres and Paknam at 4.5 metres abov.e sea level at the low 
tide as shown in Figure 7.1. It also pointed out that the lowest parts of the river lay at 
nearly the level of the ordinary high tide [Heide, 1903 #28, 4-8]. 
2 Because of political turmoil in the Mekhong region, boundary mapping surveys started in 1884 and as a 
result, the fi rst modern map of Siam, the so-called McCarthy map, was made in l 887. In 1885, the Royal 
Survey Department was established and mapping was no longer regarded as a foreign activity in Siam 
[Winichakul, 1994 #60, 119-129]. 
3 Menam in Thai means 'river' which hereby is the Chao Phraya River. 
4 In 1889, the Siamese Government granted a concession to a private Company, the Siam Canals. Land 
and Irrigation Company, for a period of 25 years to dig canals in the jungles between the great Menam 
and the Nakon Nayok river to the north of the Klang San Sep under the stipulation ' that all the 
uncultivated lands in the region crossed by the canals to be excavated, to a certain distance at both sides 
thereof, should belong to the Company' [Heide, 1903 #28, 26). 
5 It is now Nakhon Sawan City. 
6 It is now Samut Prakan City. 
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Valley 
This is very interesting information . In my view, these figures are reasonable 
because Hiede referred to a modem map of Bangkok that had been made by McCarthy 
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in 1887. If this data is accurate and is compared with Bangkok's current elevation of 
about one metre above mean sea level (MSL), it can be concluded that Bangkok has 
' 
sunk about five metres during the past century. This is why continuing subsidence has 
become a serious problem for Bangkok as we shall see later. 
Heide also described the flooding and the landscape south of Bangkok along the 
coast in 1903. 
The flooding in the lowest tracts of land is not entirely owing to the rivers, but 
partly, especially in the commencement, when the rivers have not yet risen to 
their highest level, to the fact that all the water drained off, in consequence of 
the irregularity of the rainfall, from the higher parts of the whole regions 
between the main rivers, is gathered in these lowest tracts. 
The natural drainage line of these tracts is in a southern direction, about 
parallel to the main direction of the rivers, but drainage in this direction is 
obstructed very much by the embankment of excavated earth along the existing 
klongs (canals) running transverse to this direction [Heide, 1903 #28, 25]. 
Studies of Bangkok's geography were also published in technical monographs 
when Litchfield Whiting Bowne & Associates prepa~ed the first modern city plan for 
Bangkok in 1960. More comprehensive studies were undertaken in the 1960s focusing 
on Bangkok's drainage system problem. 
Figure 7.2 shows the geography of Bangkok in terms of the natural drainage 
area of Chao Phraya River. Camp, Dresser & McKee submitted a report, Sewage, 
Drainage and Flood Protection Systems; Bangkok and Thonburi, to the Bangkok 
Municipality in February 1968. In this report, an area of about 177 ,000 square 
kilometres was identified as the drainage area for Bangkok [Camp, 1968 #61, 31] . This 
explains why a large amount of water is discharged from Bangkok during the monsoon 
season. Geological knowledge was also applied in the study. In 1967, 12 bores sunk to a 
depth of 20 metres indicated that the subsurface conditions of Bangkok were relatively 
uniform. The survey identified a thick layer of very soft clay and silty clay of two to 18 
metres beneath the surf ace. The ground-water level in Bangkok is very close to the 
surface during the wet season. Even during an extremely dry season the ground water is 
rarely more than a metre below the surface [Camp, 1968 #61, 3-5][Camp, 1970 #62, 2-
3]. These geological facts greatly affect the underground construction of drainage 
facilities in Bangkok. 
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Source: Camp, 1968 
Figure 7 .2 The natural drainage area of Chao Phraya River 
These geographical facts have also been discussed in almost every study of 
Bangkok' s flood problems. However another important fact which is rarely mentioned, 
is Bangkok' s geographic location. Bangkok is located in a flood climate region with 
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100 or more thunderstorms per year [Victor & Baker, 1988 #63, 16-23]. This means that 
there is a high risk of floodwater from thunderstorms 7 . 
Because of these natural conditions, the risk of flooding in Bangkok is extreme. 
However, these serious concerns have had little influence on the physical development 
of Bangkok and the city continues to grow. These natural factors combined with the 
expansion of urban areas without any control for decades, has resulted in the constant 
failure of flood protection and flood control. More details on this are discussed below in 
changes in the built environment. 
7.1.2 Changes in the Built-Environment 
In this section, the emphasis is on how changes m the built environment of 
Bangkok have influenced the flood problem. Socio-economic influences on the growth 
of the city are also discussed briefly to give an overview of these changes. 
It is worth noting that a problem with studying changes in the built environment 
of Bangkok is the accuracy of available data8, and the compatibility of data collected by 
different authorities. This problem may be not serious for local authorities but it is very 
important for scholars. For decades, despite numerous studies and reports, little 
comprehensive analysis has been carried out. In addition, some studies are controversial 
and unreasonable in their use of data. Little attention has also been given to the 
consequences of changes in the built environment on the flood problem. 
Despite these problems, however, the best available information and data is used 
in this section to explain the development of built forms in Bangkok. The analysis and 
discussion of patterns of urban change over time will substantially support the argument 
in the next section that uncontrolled changes in the built environment have affected the 
flood geomorphology in Bangkok. 
7 According to annual rainfall s tatistics for Bangkok from 1952 to 1962, the minimum rainfall was 1,275 
mm. in 1959 and the maximum was l,957 mm. in 1957. From 1972 to 1982, the minimum was 1,040. l 
mm. in 1977 and the maximum was 1,829.6 mm. in 1982. Compared with recent statistics, the maximum 
rainfall in 1995 was 1,693.6 nun. with 120-150 days of rain in a year. 
8 In principle, all local authorities are required to collect and classify data as routine work and this data 
usually appears in the BMA annual report. According to my field surveys, data collection is controversial 
because local officials make up data because of corruption. Importantly, there is no feedback process to 
check the reliability of the data. The most scandalous controversy involves data on bui lding permits. In 
reality, a building permit can be issued after a suitable bribe has been offered to the authority concerned, 
consequently, a large number of illegal buildings have been constructed all over Bangkok including 
numerous slums and other illegal settlements. After careful investigation. in my view, the statistical data 
only presents a general view of Bangkok and should not be used for mathematical model study. 
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Floodplains have attracted economic development and settlements in most parts 
of the world (Ward, 1978 #59, 113]. Some floodplains have become permanent 
settlements. People who live clos·e to flooding rivers learn the behaviour of floods by 
observation [Victor R. Baker, 1988 #63, 79]. The experience of Thais is similar. Typical 
Thai houses on bamboo rafts and rows of floating shop-houses along the river in 
Bangkok in the 19th century, reflected the adjustment between man and river. In other 
words, the people of Bangkok in those days understood its geography and knew how to 
live in harmony with nature despite the problems of sanitation during the dry season. 
After the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed with Britain in 1855 
which paved the way for trade with the West, Bangkok underwent a radical change 
'from a floating village to a modern metropolis'. Rice became the most important 
export product for Thailand9 and the irrigation and drainage systems were extensively 
developed to increase rice production. Hence, foreign trade influenced the built 
environment of Bangkok, although the city was still relatively compact and surrounded 
by rice fields in 1925 [London, 1980 #1, 29-30]. When James McCarthy surveyed the 
area in 1888 to make maps, he insisted that there was no settlement in the north or east 
of Bangkok. When he returned in 1895, he found that the land in Rangsit had become 
villages and paddy fields. A town named 'Thanyaburi' 10 was established in Rangsit in 
1902, followed by more settlements [Arsawai, 1987 #21, 89-91). 
Apparently the rice fields on the wet land around Bangkok functioned as 
floodways and the built environment did not cause 'significant' flood problems during 
this period. Other changes in the built environment in terms of waterway development 
during this period will be discussed in detail in the section on flood geomorphology. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Bangkok changed greatly from 1910 to 1975 as 
shown in Figure 2.6 (Sternstein, 1982 #3, 86-91]. Development patterns in the north and 
along the east coast were a result of infrastructure development and industrial 
development during this period. During the 1980s, the mangrove and nipa forests south 
of Bangkok, along the old Sukhumwit Road disappeared completely as the area was 
urbanised. Uncontrolled development during this period had an impact on the drainage 
system of Bangkok. 
Figure 7.3 shows the development of the road system in Bangkok in 1935, 1955 
and 1975 which was studied by Sternstein [Sternstein, 1982 #3, 89). The most serious 
9 The value of exported rice increased from 22.481 million baht in 1900 to 65 .840 million baht in 1911 
[Arsawai , 1987 #21, 129). 
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change was the reduction in the significance of waterways. As a result the natural 
floodways and drainage systems in Bangkok have permanently disappeared. This also 
explains why floods in Bangkok have become a chronic problem since the 1960s. 
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Figure 7.3 Reduction of waterways and development of the road system in 
Bangkok, 1935, 1955 and 1975 
t I 
In addition to aerial photographs, changes in the built-environment of Bangkok 
can be studied by analysing the number of building permits issued for new buildings 
and floor areas by local authorities in Bangkok. However, this approach is limited by 
the data collection system which just started two decades ago. 
10 The meaning of Thanyaburi is the town of rice, which may reflect land development in this period . 
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Statistics of development trends Bangkok in the 1980s and 1990s provide the 
best available data11 . In 1984, there were 33,678 new buildings with a total floor area of 
7. l 08 million square metres. During the period of economic boom and property 
speculation in Bangkok from 1990 to 1994, the total area of new buildings higher than 
four storeys was 75.139 million square metres. High-rise buildings became possible 
because of technological advances in construction methods and began to reshape the 
landscape of Bangkok along with increasing land prices. Statistics 12 in this period show 
that property development in the Khlong Toei district near the port was the highest with 
11.09 million square metres. Meanwhile, similar statistics from peripheral districts such 
as Lat Krabang, north of the new Bangkok airport, where almost 80 per cent of the area 
is identified as a flood way by planning law, also show significant changes in the same 
period. Importantly, the total floor area of new buildings approved in Lat Krabang 
increased sharply from 17 ,732 square metres in 1990 to 296,344 square metres in 1994 
[BMA, 1995 #65, 8]. As a result, these new built forms are on the floodways and 
influence not only the existing drainage system but also the pattern of flood protection. 
The built environment of Bangkok in the 1990s has changed greatly. The city is 
more dispersed and urban areas are spread in every direction and cross the boundaries of 
Bangkok to nearby provinces. Rice fields and the beautiful landscape on the 
floodplains, including in the supposedly preserved green belts, have been replaced by 
housing projects. These changes do not reflect the mechanism of supply and demand in 
the housing markets but property speculation in the early 1990s. As a result of the 
collapse of the Thai economy in 1997, many of these projects have become bankrupt, 
including the new town of Muang Thong Thani on Changwattana Road, one of the 
mega private projects that has become the most expensive ghost town in Thailand. 
Besides shortcomings in these projects which have caused considerable damage 
to the national economy, these empty built forms which were developed as a result of 
loopholes, now permanently block floodways. In Bangkok as a whole, there is only one 
open area in east Bangkok which still acts as a natural floodway with about four 
kilometres of floodpath. This tloodway, which was included in the Bangkok Plan 1992. 
has been preserved and runs more than ten kilometres towards to the sea. The SBIA is 
located near the end of this floodway. 
11 The first annual report and s tatistics for Bangkok were produced in 1980. Unfortunately, data sets for 
198 l and 1982 were lost because of flood problems. In addition the BMA only had four persons working 
on the statistical data collection. As a result. the second annual report was produced in 1984 but did not 
include statistics for building permits [BMA, 1984 #66, I] . 
12 More details are shown in Appendix 7.1. 
236 
Chapter 7 The Airport and Flood Protection 
The increasing number of built forms has influenced not only flood protection 
patterns but also the increased demand for water supplies in Bangkok. Because of the 
inadequate distribution of water supplies, these new developments have increased the 
use of underground water, which has caused serious subsidence problem in many areas 
of Bangkok. This explains why drainage systems are not working and why drainage 
networks in these areas have to be revised often. The increased demand for water 
supplies has also affected flood problems in terms of the increased amount of 
wastewater flowing into waterways, which will be discussed in the following section. 
7.1.3 Contemporary Flood Geomorphology 
Paradoxically, there is little scientific interest in flood geomorphic research 
because of the lack of data and information. A complete study of the flood phenomena 
in Bangkok has never been made and modern attempted studies of the flood problem 
have been unable to proceed. However, the geomorphic flood experience during the past 
few decades has provided another perspective on floods in terms of the mutually 
interactive systems between man and nature. The historical background to flood control 
will be discussed briefly to explain the development of the present situation and to give 
an overview of changing policies on water management. The discussion in this section 
focuses on the role of floods in shaping the landscape of Bangkok and how changes in 
the built environment have affected flood processes. The emphasis here is on the 
floodway east of Bangkok where the SBIA is being developed. 
It is worth noting that since the first settlement, man has interrupted the balance 
of the water cycle on the floodplains of the Chao Phraya. During Bangkok's early days, 
most canals and waterways were developed to facilitate military movements; for 
instance, in 1737 Klong San Saep connected two rivers, the Chao Phraya and the Bang 
Pakong. An initiative to control water as part of the southern central plain conservation 
scheme started at the end of 1902. Many rivers, canals and waterways around Bangkok 
were redredged and completed in 1912. They were all were connected and controlled by 
locks and regulators at both ends of the canals to conserve water for navigation and 
irrigation. The main canals on the west bank of the Chao Phraya River were redredged 
in 1939 and all were dredged in 1957. However, the water in these canals and 
waterways was still far from sufficient to feed the agricultural areas. It was concluded 
that the scheme could not be regarded as completed until a major dam, the Chao Phraya 
Dam on the Chao Phraya River, was built and the water was regulated by passing 
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through these canals to these areas. Eventually, a water distribution system of 246 
canals about 2,200 kilometres13 in total length, were developed [(UN), 1959 #64, 107-
111]. Great attempts were mqde during the first half of the century to reshape the 
landscape to conserve water rather than to protect the land from floods. 
Since the Chao Phraya Dam in Chainat was completed in February 1957, the 
drainage basins of the lower floodplains have changed. More significant impacts on the 
geomorphic aspects of flooding began after the Bhumiphol Dam, the first hydroelectric 
power project which was located some hundreds of kilometres upstream of Bangkok, 
was completed in 1964. Since then, it became national policy to develop dams upstream 
of every river in Thailand. In accordance with consequences of upstream deforestation, 
these dams have had a number of impacts on the floodplains downstream such as 
erosion, transportation of sediments which affect drainage patterns, and seawater 
intrusion. It is taken for granted that upstream dams are important and can protect 
settlements downstream, including Bangkok, from flood hazards. However, arguments 
about the advantages of these dams have become controversial since Bangkok's floods 
have become a chronic problem. 
In contrast to the enormous upstream development of bigger dams in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the need for improvements to canals on the floodplains around Bangkok has 
been ignored. Public policy on water control has also changed. Rice is no longer the 
country's primary export and has been replaced by modern industrial products. Canals 
in and around Bangkok have become drainage systems for new urban areas and 
numerous factories . As a result, these canals are heavily polluted and their old functions 
of transportation and irrigation system have been forgotten . 
In February 1968, Camp, Dresser & McKee proposed a flood protection plan for 
Bangkok. Figure 7.4 shows the various components of the proposed drainage system 
with approximately 300 kilometres of flood barriers or embankments to keep the Chao 
Phraya River floodwaters out of protected areas which are concentrated in a core area of 
150 square kilometres [Camp et al, 1968 #6 l, 98-100]. However, the recommendations 
for the historical quarters of Bangkok were implemented and the city has continued to 
grow and flood protected areas have been extended accordingly. 
13 This total length docs 1101 include the Ir\C main canals. 
238 
Chapter 7 The Airport and Flood Protection 
~ o I I 
~I 
1>--
,,, -
I~ .. 
Source: Camp, 1968. 
Figure 7.4 Flood protection systems 
The policy in 1980s was to protect and control floods in the city core of 
Bangkok. Consequently, more pumping stations were built in association with the 
development of polders and embankments. During this period, many reports and 
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studies14 on Bangkok's flood problems were produced and many alternatives were 
proposed. However, these expert studies and proposals have been ignored and the 
solutions became political concerns that will be discussed later. 
In the 1985 master plan for flood protection 15 as shown m Figure 7 .5, the 
Prakhanong polder was determined as the second and outer barrier for flood protection 
east of Bangkok. The larger areas beyond the Prak.hanong polder, from .Klong Nong 
Bon to Lat Krabang, the location of the SBIA, were defined as flood retarding areas 
[Samaharn, 1987 #67, c5.8]. Although an area of 501 square kilometres was to be 
included in the study in 1985, the study only covered an area of about 260 square 
kilometres because of financial problems [Zotti, 1987 #36, D2.3]. Consequently most 
areas in east Bangkok were totally submerged for three months in 1985. The floods 
were among the worst experienced by people who lived outside the barriers. 
It is clear that flood problems in the 1990s have been caused by more complex 
factors than geomorphic factors because of changes in the built environment. In 1995, 
flash floods resulted from seasonal rains in Bang Bua Thong, a district of Nonthaburi 
some kilometres north of Bangkok and some newly built housing projects were nearly 
three metres under water within a few hours. These floods created a controversy as there 
had never been flash floods like this before. How could they happen in areas such as 
this? The local authority prepared a report on flood damage however no further 
investigations were undertaken. It is time that flood geomorphology in Bangkok is 
seriously studied. 
Basically, flood flow depends on the physical characteristics of drainage basins 
and stream channels [Victor & Baker, 1988 #63, 1 O]. The flood phenomena in the 1990s 
reflect this. There is now serious concern that the problem of flash floods, similar to the 
case of Bang Bua Thong, has spread throughout Bangkok. Even though a 
comprehensive analysis cannot be made here, it is quite clear that these unusual floods 
are consequences of changes in drainage networks and the interactive system between 
the built environment and flood geomorphology. Most importantly, this interaction has 
caused failures in flood protection and control in Bangkok, resulting in flood problems 
becoming more complicated. 
i.i Sec Appendix 7.2 
15 In 1985 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) submitted ·The Master plan for Eastern 
Suburban Bangkok' that proposed floodplain management and structural measures for an area of 50 l 
square kilometres. 
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Figure 7.5 Master plan for flood protection for Bangkok, 1987 
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It is clear that the SBIA will greatly affect the drainage basins and the flood 
geomorphology in east Bangkok. Despite the empirical fact that many areas around 
Bangkok are facing flood problems, there has been no action from the authorities 
involved or even from the public. A curious question is what people in Bangkok are 
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thinking about in terms of the flood problem. If floods are considered to be a chronic 
problem in Bangkok, why are pe.ople so uninterested in the problem? A more serious 
question is how planners and decision-makers understand the flood problems of 
Bangkok? These interesting points will be discussed in the following section. 
7 .2 Reconsidering Bangkok's Flood Problems 
There are good reasons to reconsider Bangkok's flood problem. Firstly, it is 
important to study the basis of the flood problem by presenting different perspectives on 
the understanding of the flood phenomena. Secondly, it is interesting to find out 
whether floods should be considered as a problem. If the floods should not be 
considered as a problem, what is the real problem? Most importantly, it is misleading to 
treat Bangkok's flood problems in isolation from the politics of development control 
and flood management. This includes the case of the SBIA. 
The analysis in this section focuses on the historical facts, some of which are 
reviewed to explain how Bangkok's floods have become a chronic problem. The 
discussion focuses on why all previous solutions have failed to solve the flood problem. 
Using the best available information, this section focuses on events before and after 
1952. 
Before any large dams were built on the Chao Phraya River in 1952, the Royal 
Irrigation Department concluded that large floods would only occur on the central plain 
when typhoon rains followed one another in close succession in the Mae Ping River and 
the Nan River watersheds in northern Thailand during August and September each year. 
A distinction between flood and drought was made by analysing the discharge of the 
Chao Phraya River at the end of the rainy season, which can vary from 2,500 to 6,500 
cubic metres per second (c.m.s). If the supply was between 3,500 to 4 ,200 c.m.s. , the 
flood would have positive results. If the supply failed to reach 3,500 c.m.s. it resulted in 
a drought situation. If there was too much water, the crops would be damaged if the 
discharge rose above 4,200 c.m.s. [Kambhu, 1952 #68, 242-243]. 
After the big dams were developed upstream during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
ecology and the hydrogeography of the rivers were affected. In 1987 it was reported that 
the discharge of the Chao Phraya River at Bangkok was 1,500-1,600 c.m.s. compared 
with the upstream discharge of 3,500 c.m.s. It was believed the upstream dams were 
likely to protect Bangkok from floods. 
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Other interesting data given in the same report was measurements of the water 
level at Ayuthya which had been recorded for the previous 118 years or since 1834. 
During this period there were only four high floods , damaging between 21-31 per cent 
of the crop. During the same period there were 53 years with good normal water and 61 
drought years, the worst of which damaged 43.04 per cent of the crop. The study 
concluded that floods on the central plain were not as serious as droughts, and that was 
why irrigation was more urgently needed than flood control [Kambhu, 1952 #68, 243]. 
It also pointed out that the high risk flood areas were to east Bangkok where 
flood discharges from the Nakhon Nayok River, some kilometres northeast of Bangkok, 
were usually strong and damaging [Kambhu, 1952 #68, 243). As a result the Chiengrak-
Klong Dan project shown in Figure 7.6, a large irrigation system which is now the site 
of the SBIA, was developed and completed in 1953 as the main channel running south 
to carry surplus water into the sea [UN, 1959 #64, 109]. East Bangkok was originally 
set aside for floodways in the 1950s. A serious question is why these facts were not 
considered when the site for the SBIA was selected in the 1960s. 
Despite new data and new technologies, any understanding about flooding in 
Bangkok in the 1980s seems to be limited to old perspectives. In June 1987, Bangkok's 
flood problems were discussed at an 'International Workshop on Urban Flood 
Protection and Drainage in East and Southeast Asia' held in Bangkok. A lot of 
engineering data and figures were presented. Hermann Zotti, an Austrian engineer, 
concluded that flooding in Bangkok was a result of three events: flood discharge from 
the Chao Phraya, high tides and heavy rainfalls in the city [Zotti, 1987 #36, 2.1 ]. The 
study only focused on natural phenomena, and overlooked the impact of changes in the 
man-made environment on flooding. 
My argument is that floods were not a critical problem in Bangkok before 1952, 
however since 1952 floods have been a problem as a result of man-made actions. One 
question is what the floods before 1952 were all about? Hence, it is interesting to study 
how the floods became a chronic problem. This is discussed in relation to earlier 
solutions. 
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F igure 7.6 Chiengrak-Khlong Dam project 
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7.2. l Floods Before 1952 as a Natural Phenomenon16 
There are reasons for choosing 1952 as a crucial date in considering Bangkok's 
flood problem. Firstly and most importantly, the report prepared by the Royal Irrigation 
Department in 1952 was the last official document that clearly described the flood in 
Bangkok as a natural phenomenon. Secondly, it was the time before most of the dams 
were built upstream and before the dams changed the natural conditions. Lastly, it was 
the time that new roads replaced the waterways in Bangkok which changed the natural 
drainage system as shown in Figure 7.3. 
Floods can occur in almost all seasons but they are more apt to take place in 
some seasons than in others [Hoyt & Langbein, 1955 #57, 50]. Floods only become a 
hazard when they impinge unfavourably upon human activity [Ward, 1978 #59, 114]. 
These statements provide a general understanding about floods and apply to the case of 
Bangkok before 1952. Documents by some Westerners are also pertinent. 
J . Homan van der Heide [Heide, 1903 #28, 26) concluded in his report, General 
Report on Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam Valley, in June 1903 that: 
Near the coast, as well as in the inland regions, the water has elevated the soil 
by depositing silt to its ordinary high tide level and so in these regions flooding 
only occurs rarely, at the extraordinary high tides. 
In general, however, in consequence of the rapid rising of the banks, in times 
of ordinary high flood, [and still less in times of scanty rainfall when supply is 
most required] the level of the rivers does not rise above the banks for any 
considerable time and to any considerable height and therefore overflow of 
natural watercourses in Lower Siam is also of little or no avail to fill up the 
deficiency of the rainfall in respect to water supply for paddy cultivation. 
The above conclusion is rather contradictory to a traditional opinion in respect 
to the flooding of the fields by the rivers, but nevertheless is as exact as it is 
natural [Heide, 1903 #28, 23]. 
In Heide's view, floods in those days were not a problem but a natural 
phenomenon. James McCarthy who spent 12 years collecting material for the 
compilation of a map of Siam from 1881 to 1893, had the same view of the flood 
phenomenon as Heide [McCarthy, 1994 #71, 21]. Moreover, Heide [Heide, 1903 #28, 
16 According to Thai chronicles, many great floods, which have been regarded as natural phenome na. 
have occurred in Bangkok: December 1785; 28 October 18 19; 4 November !931; 25 November 1859; 17 
November 1879; JO October 1917 and September 1942 [Prainoi, 1992 #70, 470-477) . 
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31-33] concluded that flooding contributed to soil fertility as a considerable quantity of 
silt was carried to the fields . Consequently he stressed the advantages of adequate 
irrigation and also proposed the development of a large drainage system which would 
be the most effective way of providing water for rice cultivation. He also concluded that 
overflows from river banks occurred very rarely from natural causes. When it occurred, 
nearly all the silt carried by the overflowing water was filtered out and retained by the 
vegetation, for example grass or paddy or some other kind of plant. 
The development of canals and irrigation systems started in Rangsit district in 
1888, 40 kilometres north of Bangkok. However, the canals were unable to supply 
water because they were not properly developed 17 [Arsawai, 1987 #21, 149]. The failure 
of the irrigation development was controversial and an investigation was made. In his 
report to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1915, Ward [Ward, 1915 #56, 2] stated that the 
1913 rice harvest was very bad because of irrigation problems. In contradiction with 
Heide' s proposal, Ward proposed five smaller irrigation projects. 
As the primary source of income for the country, rice production in the irrigation 
areas became so important that speculation in paddy fields was a 'serious business' in 
the 1900s [Arsawai, 1987 #21, 49-51]. As a result, the natural phenomena of drought 
and flood in this period became a serious issue in the politics of water management. 
One of the five proposed projects, Pasak South Canal in the Rangsit Area, was first 
developed in 1915 18. Despite the very high investment, the decision on Pasak was 
controversial and is probably the first example of the politics of land and water 
management in Thailand. Some years later, C.D. Gee, an irrigation engineer who served 
as a civil servant during the reigns of King Rama 6 and King Rama 7, argued that the 
Subharn Canal project would be a more profitable development. However the 
government decided to develop Rangsit first because it did not want to interfere with 
landownership in another district [Arsawai, 1987 #21, 162]. That is why there is a 
concentration of irrigation networks in the Rangsit area. 
The greatest flood in this period occurred in 1942, m which 6,500 c.m.s was 
recorded in a catastrophic flood (Camp, 1967 #31, 13 ]. It is worth noting that the Chao 
Phraya Dam had not yet been built and natural resources were still prosperous in the 
1940s. The great Bangkok flood of 1942 may therefore be viewed as the last natural 
17 The most controversial issue was corruption. Consequently, the government had to revise the contract 
many times [Arsawai. 1987 #21 , 18-61). 
18 The investment proposed for Pasak South Canal was 11.5 million baht compared with 7 .5 million baht 
for Subharn Canal, which was a larger project. The others were about 1-1.5 million baht. 
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flood Since then, as discussed in previous chapters, Bangkok's environment has 
deteriorated because of human constructions However, floods during this period were 
still limited to the central area 9f Bangkok. The flood hazard was first considered as an 
issue in the Litchfield report in 1960 and was seriously discussed in 196219 and 196420. 
The impact of man on flood problems since the 1960s will be discussed in the following 
section. 
Our understanding of floods as a natural phenomenon in the 1990s is much more 
developed. Hence, it is relevant to discuss some fascinating new issues about floods and 
climate change Thai scholars are now focusing on global changes such as the El Nino 
phenomenon. However, the flood problems in urban areas have still not attracted their 
interest. There is no doubt that the El Nino phenomenon has become another factor 
causing floods, and will increase the complexity of flood study. 
7.2.2 iv/an-made problems since 1952 
The di scussion in this section will focus on man-made causes of flood problems. 
Besides deforestation and uncontrolled changes in the man-made environment as 
discussed in Chapter 2, poor human responses to the flood hazard in terms of 
adjustments and protection have also had an impact on Bangkok's flood problems 
Flood problems between 1952 and 1998 have become more complicated as a result of 
urban sprawl and poor infrastructure provision. Attempts have been made to solve the 
flood problem by increasing the discharge capacity of pumping stations. However few 
attempts have been made to reduce flood damage by controlling the development of 
Bangkok. Although a lot of money has been spent on improving flood protection 
systems, the flood problem remains and has become more critical in some areas. 
The politics of flood control management is, in my view, the most serious factor 
which has caused the failure of flood protection. In fact, there have been many 
opportunities to solve flood problems decades ago but nothing has been done. A brief 
discussion of hist0rical facts will be made to explain how pol itics has become involved 
with flood problems in Bangkok The emphasis in this section is on the development of 
the drainage system in Bangkok 
1
' 'Report Oil SC\\eragc and Se\\age Disposal for tile Central Arca or Bangkok: dmed September 2505 
B E ( 1962 A. D )' and ·Drainage alld SC\\ erage for Bangkok Mu111cip;1lit~. di1tcd October 12. 2505 B.E 
(1962 A.D) 
:o Bangkok Sc,,·erage. Drainage and Flood Control: diilcd Fcbru:1ry 17. 2509 B.E. ( l %~ A D) by the 
World Bank. 
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Bangkok has a combined sewage and stormwater21 system, which increases 
flood problems during the rainy ~eason. It has been argued for decades that Bangkok 
needs to have a separate sanitary sewer system [Camp, 1967 #31, 2]. This argument 
may explain the situation since 1952. In fact, the need for separate sewage and 
storm water systems has been recommended since 1910 when sanitation became a public 
concern. Edwin Ault [Ault, 1910 #58, 6-7] mentioned in his report22 that sewerage and 
rainwater in a combined system would have serious results for the river. It is not clear 
when the drainage system for Bangkok became a combined system. 
The combined system was not considered as a problem for flooding during the 
first half of this century. The reason Bangkok did not have a flood problem during this 
period was that a number of existing canals provided an excellent storm drainage 
system. 
The importance of the existing drainage network was recognised in many studies 
during the 1960s. The improvement of these canals was recommended in the Litchfield 
Plan in 1960, in the Husband Report23 in 1962, in the Tholin Report24 in 1962 and in a 
World Bank Report25 in 1964. 
In my view, the best study during this period was the study, Sewerage, Drainage 
and Flood Protection Systems; Bangkok and Thonburi prepared by Camp, Dresser & 
McKee in 1968. The study covered an area of 370 square kilometres and included the 
wastewater sewerage system, the flood protection system, the storm-water drainage 
system, the priority of systems, construction cost estimations and operations that had 
been planned for a population of 5 .4 million in 1999. 
It is worth noting that these studies strongly recommended a separate sanitary 
sewer system and a separate wastewater treatment system for Bangkok. These systems 
are essential for any city. However, a separate sanitary sewer system has not yet been 
developed and the first wastewater treatment plants were only built in the 1990s. 
Surcharges for wastewater treatment will be imposed and enforced by law in 17 districts 
of Bangkok in 2001. 
21 Excreta disposal is generally by septic tank. All o ther wastewaters are usually discharged into the 
nearest ditch or canal or into the storm water drainage system. Overflows from septic tanks usually find 
their way into the drainage system which turn the canals into septic reservoirs [Camp, 1968 #61, l ). 
22 Edwin Ault, an English engineer, submitted a Project for the Sewerage of the City of Bangkok, in the 
Kingdom of Siam to the Minister for Local Government on 11 January 1910. 
"
3 Report on Sewerage and Sewage Disposal for the Central Area of Bangkok, submitted in September 
1962 
2~ Drainage and Sewerage fo r Bangkok Municipality, submitted on l 2 October 1962 
25 Bangkok Sewerage, Drainage and Flood Control. submitted on 17 February 1964 
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The most controversial flood protection programme in the 1980s was a proposal 
for a diversion channel 220 metre~ wide and 40 kilometres long, known as Chao Phraya 
2. It was to begin in the north of Bangkok at the meander in the river near Pak.kret and 
run west of the outer ring road to the end near the mouth of the Chao Phraya. It was 
calculated that a discharge of about 1,700 c.m.s could be diverted to the channel which 
would protect 1,400 square kilometres of Bangkok. The proposal was impressive from 
an engineering point of view. The Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) proposed 
another flood routing alternative in 1985 to east Bangkok. However, these proposals 
were not practicable from the government's point of view. There was a problem with 
land acquisition for the construction of the bypass and this quickly ended the proposal. 
This proposal was not new as two diversion channels on the east and west of Bangkok 
had been proposed in the 1960 Litchfield Plan as part of land use control on the 
floodplains of the Chao Phraya. However that proposal was never implemented. 
A failure to implement these recommendations was due to political concerns. 
The military government under dictatorship regimes in the 1950s and the 1960s, was 
not interested in Bangkok's problems and failed to implement any of the 
recommendations of these studies. The 1970s and 1980s was the most dramatic period 
in Thai politics and as a result, fragmentation among factions in the government caused 
the delay of many development projects. This included the flood protection programme 
for Bangkok and the SBIA project. 
The discussion of flood problems in this section is extensive in terms of the 
politics of development management in Bangkok. No matter how many studies are 
made, these will mean nothing for as long as the government still treats political interest 
as the first priority. Besides the studies being a waste of time and money, floods in 
Bangkok have become a chronic problem. 
7.2.3 Flooding as a Chronic Problem 
As discussed in previous sections, Bangkok's flood problems cannot be solved 
quickly. In addition, budget cuts as a result of the economic recession in Thailand have 
become another constraint. Budget restrictions will have a major impact on large 
development programmes such as the flood protection system. The resolution of 
Bangkok's flood problems is a long way away and as a result flooding in Bangkok will 
remain a chronic problem for years. 
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The authorities seem to have overlooked the possibility of permanently 
eliminating chronic flooding problem and no one appears to have given it much 
thought. There are also a number of more critical constraints which could result in 
flooding remaining a chronic problem forever. The discussion in this section focuses on 
two constraints: the physical urban structure of Bangkok and increasing demands on the 
water supply in Bangkok. 
The fact that Bangkok was not planned is crucial. No space has been provided 
for new public services. As a result almost every infrastructure development project 
faces similar system and network problems. Roads and narrow lanes are the only places 
where power lines, telephone lines, water pipes and storm water drains needed for mega 
projects such an expressway and mass transit system can be laid together. The existing 
road network is the only network available for infrastructure systems. 
As the city continues to grow, roads and lanes are unable to be expanded to 
provide more space for infrastructure improvement. Modern technology has been 
applied where possible to increase the capacity of some systems, for instance, the 
telephone network and optical fibre networks. However, the biggest concern is that the 
existing drainage system with old concrete pipe drains cannot be improved by new 
technology. In addition to 1,049 canals with a total length of 1,890 kilometres. the BMA 
is responsible for the concrete boxes and pipe drains along 1,497 roads with a total 
length of 1,082. 736 kilometres and a total road area of 18, 178,941.85 square metres 
[BMA, 1996 #44, 75]. These systems have not changed for years despite the rapid 
growth of Bangkok during the economic boom of the 1990s. 
It is impossible to try and redevelop and rearrange the narrow streets and lanes 
in the high density areas of Bangkok. The city's poor physical urban structure in terms 
of road networks is the main reason why the drainage systems cannot be improved 
properly. It is also clear that a totally new separate sewage system for the whole city of 
Bangkok cannot be developed in the near future. A 'Study on Common Utility Duct 
System' submitted to BMA in January 1995, also did not clearly recommend a separate 
sewerage system [Epsilon, 1995 #72, 2.5-2.6]. In addition to the large investment that 
would be required during the economic recession, the issue of land acquisition for these 
systems is a political concern and this may be the biggest problem for the government. 
Also increasing demands on the water supply will make the flood problem more 
serious in Bangkok. Despite improvements to the service, the MWA can only serve 
piped water within an area of 710 square kilometres. From 1982 to 199 1, demands on 
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the water supply in Bangkok and some areas in Nonthaburi and Samut Prakan increased 
by an average of 5.7 per cent annually. Total water production has increased from 630.3 
million cubic metres in 1982 to 1,109.2 million cubic metres in 1991 or more than 3 
million cubic metres per day [MW A, 1991 #43, 56]. This does not include the large 
amount of underground water26 that is pumped to use in factories and other areas ·of 
Bangkok the MW A cannot serve. It is an important fact that about 80 per cent of the 
water used in Bangkok is considered as wastewater, which flows into the drainage 
system27 . This increasing wastewater will also affect the efficiency of drainage systems. 
The Department of Mineral Resources expressed its concern in the local 
newspaper on 27 May 1999. Its survey shows that an amount of more than 3 million 
cubic metres of groundwater per day was being pumped in Bangkok. In fact, the law 
only allows 1.5 million cubic metres of groundwater to be pumped per day. The most 
serious consequence of this is rapid subsidence in some areas of Bangkok which have 
sunk more than 0.50 metres since 1983. This has also affected drainage networks and is 
causing the failure of flood protection measures. 
Because of Bangkok's poor physical urban structure, most attempts during the 
past decades have focused on improving the capacity of the pumping system by 
installing a number of bigger pumps throughout the city. These pumps carry water from 
gutters and concrete blocks into nearby canals and from the canals into the river. 
Although the pumping system network is being improved, flood control which 
depends on the pumping system network alone cannot protect the thousands of square 
kilometres of Bangkok and nearby areas. As has already been shown, flash floods 
caused by a tropical storm coming from the Gulf of Thailand can severely damage 
Bangkok. Even with a small storm, upstream dams cannot help. It is not practicable, nor 
possible, to carry millions of cubic metres of surplus water into the sea more than 30 
kilometres away in a short time [Roachanakanan, 1997 #55 , 68]. These constraints were 
not considered in the master plan of the SBIA. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Governor of the BMA, Bhichit Rattakul, has 
concentrated on environmental issues, which he promised during the election campaign 
26 In 1995 it was recorded that 307,739 cubic metres of underground water was pumped daily in Bangkok 
compared with 244,063 cubic metres per day in 1993 [BMA. 1996 #44, 9]. However, the use of 
underground water in Samut Prakan is much higher than in Bangkok, which was 470,4 l l cubic metres 
per day in 1993. [BMA, 1994 #74, I OJ. As a result, the use of underground water over many decades has 
caused the serious problem of land subsidence [Norconsult, 1994 #38, 4-2]. 
27 The assumption of 80 per cent is usually applied for basic calculation and the same criterion is also 
used in the Master Pla n of the new Bangkok airport [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume III/6-17]. 
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m 1996. Although he may succeed in making Bangkok cleaner, he failed to solve 
Bangkok's flood problems in 199,7, 1998 and 1999 because of a poor understanding of 
flood protection and ignorance about the need for early preparation. The question 
therefore is how well Bhichit understands Bangkok's flood problems. 
The BMA, under the administration of Bhichit Rattakul, has introduced a new 
policy for controlling the excavation of main roads by naming some roads in Bangkok 
as construction-free sites. This is an attempt to solve the old problem of traffic 
disruptions caused by public authorities. It means that no public utility construction 
projects can be carried out on these roads for 10 years28 This includes the development 
of sewerage systems along the main roads. 
Given that floods have become a chronic problem for Bangkok, an important 
question is what should be done. Is it reasonable to propose another mega project such 
as second international airport which is being built on a fioodway? The Airports 
Authority and the NESDB use the SBIA master plan to argue that the new airport 
project will not have any negative impact on flooding in Bangkok. They argue instead 
that the new airport project will assist with flood protection in east Bangkok. Their 
arguments will be discussed in the following section. 
7 .3 Review of Flood Protection for the SBIA 
As discussed in Chapter 6, a number of facts in the SBIA master plan have been 
misrepresented29 and most of the proposed projects are unrealistic. In this section I 
study what the SBIA master plan has proposed for flood control and drainage and how 
reasonable the recommendations are. The impact of the new Bangkok airport on 
Bangkok' s flood problems will be evaluated by analysing the master plan. An attempt is 
made to assess whether the study of flood protection and the proposed measures are 
reasonable. 
28 On 28 January 1998, BMA announced that 45 roads in Bangkok would be free from any public utility 
road excavation for I 0 years however this was overruled by other agenc ies. On 17 Ju ly 1998, a ban on 30 
roads was e nforced by a new regulation signed by the Governor of the BMA. 
29 This is supported by a local news report on 27 May 1998. It was reported that the King was worried 
about flood protection around the new airport and east Bangkok. The most serious concern was that 
calculations made by the Airports Authority consultants were not accurate and misrepresented rainfall 
statistics and the amount of floodwater expected in the area. On 26 May 1998, the local news reported 
that the King's representative had visited the new Bangkok airport project site. The Airport Authority's 
consultant made the assumption that the water level in this area would rise only four centimetres in a year. 
In reality. the fl ood water level rises by more than one metre. 
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7.3.1 Flood Control and Drainage 
The SBIA master plan qmtains a brief study of flood control and drainage 
covering only 18 pages. It clearly states that the new Bangkok airport will have some 
impact on flooding in terms of a reduction of natural flood storage and drainage water 
pumped from the airport and it would raise water levels in canals around the airport 
[Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume II/2.3-2.6]. What does this conclusion mean? 
The master plan briefly examines old information and facts on Bangkok's 
problems prepared by agencies during the 1980s. Most importantly, Figure 7.6 shows a 
map30 with a flood pattern and the existing drainage system for the master plan area. 
This map clearly shows the new airport will block existing floodways. It also indicates 
that three main canals, the Nong Prue, Nong Kha and Nong Traka which pass through 
the airport site, will permanently disappear. It also includes a proposal for a new canal 
running parallel to the dike to change the waterway. It is doubtful whether the planners 
were aware of the need to make to make better provisions for flood hazards. However, 
the more controversial point is their poor calculations and their assumptions about flood 
protection. 
The master plan concludes that the main causes of flooding in the study area are 
direct rainfall , the limited drainage capacity of the canals and the limited ability to drain 
the floodwater to the sea during the high tide season. The amount of floodwater was 
calculated using a 150-year flood with an annual rainfall of 2,200 millimetres. Without 
using a map, an rectangular shaped area of 750 square kilometres was simply defined as 
the flood condition study area using the boundaries of the King's dike to the west, 
Minburi to Chachoengsao road to the north, Bang Pakong River to the east and gulf 
shoreline to the south. 
The formulae31 were presented but no calculation details were provided. By 
using the highest record of one-day rainfall of about 200 millimetres32, the total volume 
of rainfall over the study area would be 150 million cubic metres. It was estimated that 
3° Figure 2 in Sectorial Report. volume II. 2. Flood Control and Drainage, in 'Master Plan and Feasibility 
Studies for Area around Second Bangkok International Airport' 
31 Let Xp be the computed theoretical value of annual precipitation, maximum annual water level or 
discharge, where the subscript p is the probability level obtained from plotting position rule as: 
p = (i -a) l(N + I - 2a) 
Where i is the rank in ascending order of magnitude; N is sample size; and a is a parameter depending 
on the distribution function assumed. In this case the value of a is 0.40 for all distributions (Cunnane 
formula), except fo r Gumbel distribution where a equal to 0.44 (Gringonen formu la) [Norconsult, l 994 
#38, Part B, sectoral report, volume II]. 
32 The average rainfall in Bangkok is about 90-120 mil limetres per day. 
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there would be flood runoff of 60 million cubic metres, based on a runoff coefficient of 
0.40 for a mixed built-up and rur~l area. The existing canals with a total length of 150 
kilometres were considered as providing a natural storage capacity of about 14 million 
cubic metres. The existing discharge capacity of all main canals was presented. 
According to the final calculation, an amount of 53 million cubic metres of floodwater 
must be removed within one day, however this would require a combined discharge of 
613 cubic metres per second continuously. The natural drainage capacities with 
pumping can carry only 158 cubic metres per second of the surplus water into the sea 
and yet, the significance of high tides was not included in this assumption [Norconsult, 
1994 #38, volume II/2.3-2.15]. 
Despite these serious issues, it was simply confirmed that the SBIA would have 
very little impact on the regional drainage system with a maximum rise of about five 
centimetres in water level [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume II/2.3]. The consultant 
appears not to have considered flood routing, but has used elementary mass balance for 
these calculations. Time factors are, however, critical and should have been considered 
using a three-dimensional model. 
Despite this, the Norconsult consortium proposed some flood protection 
facilities in the Second Airport master plan. The Norconsult report [Norconsult, 1994 
#38, volume II/2.15] proposed that all main north-south canals which drain surplus 
water into the sea would be improved. A new additional canal connecting two canals, 
Bang Pia and Samrong, would also be developed. More new pumps would be installed 
at the main canals, Bang Krabue, Charoen Rat, Sao Thong and Klong Dan. A pumping 
system with higher discharge capacity was considered as the most effective solution. 
Figure 7.7 shows the proposed upgrading of existing drainage canals that would cost 
3,015 million baht. Pumps and associated facilities would cost 2,062 million baht 
[Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume II/2.18]. It seems convincing that these measures can 
solve the flood problem. 
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Figure 7.7 Existing drainage, canals and pumps around the SBIA 
The Norconsult report focused on an area of 24 square kilometres to the east of 
the new airport which had been proposed in the land use plan of the SBIA master plan 
for commercial development. Flood protection for this area was briefly discussed, see 
Figure 7.8. A polder system was proposed, however, it recommended that agreements 
must be reached with the landowners at an early stage because the land was privately 
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owned. The polder system was to cost 4,000 million baht excluding 3,000 million baht 
for the development of a storm-water drainage system [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume 
II/2.18]. Apparently the commercial area east of the new Bangkok airport was a more 
important factor in the study. However it ignored the impact of more construction and 
change in the land surface which would affect runoff in years to come. 
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My first argument 1s that the study area of 750 square kilometres was 
unreasonable. It is too simple to define a flood study area by merely selecting a 
rectangular area around the new airport when the drainage system in the wider region is 
very complex. As discussed in the previous section, the development of canal networks 
in east Bangkok were originally designed to carry flood discharges from Rangsit basi11 
and Nakhon Nayok River into the sea. In other words, thousands of square kilometres of 
the Nakhon Nayok watershed should have been used as the study area. As a result, all 
the assumptions based on the area of 750 square kilometres are unreasonable and the 
calculations of floodwaters have been greatly underestimated. 
Second, it is optimistic to assume that the existing canals can retain an additional 
14 million cubic metres of water. Importantly, these canals are lined and therefore cut 
off from groundwater, and can only function as natural storage areas in May during the 
early part of monsoon season when the water level is still low. In reality, they cannot 
retain large amounts of surplus water when thunderstorms hit Bangkok almost every 
day from July to November. 
Third, it is impossible to conclude that the SBIA would have very little influence 
on the existing drainage system causing only about five centimetres maximum rise in 
\Vater level. The floodwater level in this area is already higher than one metre during the 
monsoon season without the new Bangkok airport . In fact, records of flood damage 
caused by flash floods from 1970 to 1983 are evidence of the rise in water levels in east 
Bangkok: 1 80-2. 15 metres in \tlinburi and 1.20-1.45 in Lat Krabang. These figures are 
also shown in a table in the study [Norconsult, 1994 #38, volume II/2. 7). Hence, the 
study seems to contain contradictions. 
The study only focused on flood protection for the new Bangkok airport and ~he 
new commercial areas. Larger areas in east Bangkok which would be affected if the 
floodway is blocked by the new Bangkok airport, 'Were not considered in the master 
plan 
fn brief, the study of flood control and drainage in the SBlA master plan reflects 
a poor understanding of flood conditions [t is not surprising that King Bhumiphol has 
expressed his concern about the project many times Despite this the development of the 
new· Bangkok airport is continuing. 
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7.3.2 Response to Flooding: Choice of Adjustment? 
It is interesting to study how reasonable the flood control and protection plans 
recommended in the SBIA master plan are, for instance, in protecting the airport site 
from floods. Besides costly landfill for the site, a polder system around the site of the 
new Bangkok airport was proposed as the best choice for flood protection of the large 
32 square kilometres floodplain, regardless of how the airport siting affected the rest of 
the city. The discussion in this section, therefore, is on the rationale of the development 
of the polder system around the new Bangkok airport. Is this the best choice? 
After completing the embankment on the north side, the NBIA signed a 458.686 
million baht contract on 30 June 1998 to build an earth embankment on the other three 
sides, east, west and south of the new Bangkok airport site, which is scheduled to be 
completed within two years. A substantial pumping system is also being installed. It is 
expected that the 3.5 metres high embankment will prevent floods by carrying water 
from the airport into the nearby canals. However, the NBIA has not mentioned anything 
about flood protection for areas outside the embankment. 
In fact, there was an attempt to propose another alternative after the SBIA 
master plan was completed in August 1994. The AA T opened a bid to select a private 
firm to design and provide technical details for the construction of the new airport. 
Using the north-south direction of the runway, a consulting company33 (as a competing 
candidate) rejected the costly polder system and proposed another cheaper choice for 
flood protection that could save a lot of money. Its two options are interesting. Firstly it 
proposed developing one or two new large canals parallel with the runways. Secondly, 
there would be no need for enormous landfill if the runways were elevated and sat on 
concrete piles, leaving space in the form of large utility ducts beneath the runways 
which could function as the main drainage system. However these alternatives were not 
considered and the AAT simply argued that the company had not followed its master 
plan. 
It should be noted that all cheaper alternatives were rejected by the AA T. 
Besides the costly polder system, controversies have occurred everywhere, from the 
architectural design with the clear glass roof for the passenger terminal which is 
unsuitable for Thailand 's tropical climate, through the use of expensive materials that 
must be imported from other countries. Despite strong arguments from the Association 
of Siamese Architects, however, the AAT does not care and the use of the costly 
33 A senior engineer of th is company gave an interview at his house in Bangkok on 12 May 1996. 
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alternative is continuing. Consequently, the cost of the new Bangkok airport has 
increased from 68,000 million baht to over 100,000 million baht in December 1996. As 
argued in Chapter 6, bidding for reclamation for the runways on 30 November 1996, at 
a cost of 11,650 million baht, is a good example. Why were cheaper solutions not 
considered? What were the reasons behind the decisions on costly alternatives? 
Despite these controversies, the AA T and the NESDB seem to have ignored the 
basic human response to the flood hazard. In the view of Roy Ward, man's response to 
flood hazards involves a choice between adjustment, abatement or protection. Through 
the work of Gilbert F. White, however, the 'adjustment' choice has become a more 
widely canvassed and a more imaginative alternative to the engineering approach 
[Ward, 1978 #59, 116]. In other words, the adjustment choice should be considered as 
first priority as it is more appropriate in terms of socio-economic benefit and 
environmental conservation. 
In the SBIA master plan, the adjustment choice was never considered or even 
mentioned. It is very clear that maximum use of the entire 32 square kilometres for 
airport development was the preferred policy. Polders and dikes were proposed for 
flood protection around the airport site. Recommendations for blocking three existing 
canals and proposals for an embankment around the airport site reflect a poor 
understanding of flood control management. The impact of blocking three canals was 
not studied carefully especially as this will result in changing flooding patterns and the 
regional drainage systems. 
More importantly, achieving flood protection by pumping water from the airport 
into nearby canals and nearby urban areas is viewed as a selfish solution . Even though 
the BMA and Department of Royal Irrigation (DRI), who are responsible for flood 
protection in the Bangkok Metropolis have expressed their serious concerns about the 
new Bangkok airport's flood protection system, development of the polder system 
continues. 
7.3.3 Ignorance of the Flood Hazard and the Economic Response 
Why the government continues to ignore the flood hazard in east Bangkok is a 
serious question. A simple answer is that the government has given importance to the 
new Bangkok airport as a regional aviation hub to stimulate the Thai economy. The 
economic imperative has always been stated leaving aside the shortcomings of the new 
Bangkok airport project. The economic aspects of the flood problem, however, are 
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complex requmng detailed and comprehensive analysis. This section, therefore, 
discusses the balance between public interest and the socio-economic damage caused by 
flooding and the economic benefits to be gained from the SBIA. 
The balance of public interest is a broad term that has been used by all political 
factions in Thailand. Its meaning is controversial within the factions and outcomes have 
depended on who has been able to convince the largest number of people. In other 
words, the definition of public interest has become a political issue which has been 
raised in every debate including the debate on the new Bangkok airport project. 
The first public interest debate on the project took place in December 1973 after 
the collapse of the military dictatorship regime. The second debate took place in July 
1983. During these periods, most arguments focused on the corruption scandal however 
the complicated issue of increased damage from flooding which would be caused by the 
new Bangkok airport, has not been settled. There are a number of reasons why no 
comprehensive study has been carried out on this serious issue. 
Firstly, a better data collection system for flood damage has yet to be developed 
and a more comprehensive approach to calculating flood damages has not been 
possible. Damage reports are not usually made by local authorities until after the flood 
season. The assessment of flood damages are simply made by summing up flood 
protection expenditures made by public agencies during that fiscal year. There is also 
conclusive evidence that budget provisions for flood protection are increasing every 
year34. 
Secondly, government departments are responsible for collecting the data. As 
discussed in previous sections, there are two basic problems in using this data, that is 
their availability and accuracy. In addition, as a result of corruption, some data and 
information is made up. As a result most research reports and studies which include data 
prepared by the government departments misrepresent the data and the results of these 
studies are not reliable. This includes the case of the SBIA master plan. 
Most importantly, the results of this study are concerned with the current 
political environment. Almost every government during the past few decades has gained 
political support from big projects. The publication of any negative results from a study 
which may influence the reputation and credit of the government is therefore forbidden. 
34 For ins tance. the budget for Department of Drainage and Sewerage of BMA has increased sharply from 
940 million baht in 1992 to 2,875 million baht in 1996 [BMA, 1996 #44, 155]. 
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This may explain why the government has never mentioned any of the shortcomings of 
the new Bangkok airport project. . 
Admittedly the consequences of the development of the SBIA are both positive 
and negative. The economic benefits of the new Bangkok airport include an increase in 
passengers and airfreight which will stimulate the growth of tourism, industry and 
overseas trade. The damages caused by flooding should be evaluated in terms of 
physical damage through casualties such as death, injury and sickness. Besides flood 
damage, there will also be a number of unseen and long-term impacts. These 
consequences should be considered as a part of the decision-making framework. This 
simple approach seems to have been ignored. 
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique for evaluating and comparing the benefits 
and costs of a scheme, which is appropriate in considering the economic aspects of a 
response to the flood hazard. Despite some difficulties in comparing the benefits and 
costs of a scheme, the application of this technique is generally used to determine which 
particular response to a flood hazard should be adopted [Ward, 1978 #59, 180-181]. 
This technique has become a basic principle which has been in relation to every public 
investment including the mass-transit system in Bangkok and the high-speed train 
project. However, no cost-benefit analysis has been made of flood damages resulting 
from the new Bangkok airport. 
The issue of cost-benefit analysis seems to be not important. The authorities 
involved concentrated on infrastructure development in and around the new airport. 
An overview of investments and funding requirements proposed in the SBIA 
master plan included a long list of infrastructure development proposals with a total 
investment of 158,390 million baht, excluding the construction cost of the new airport. 
However, the study did not compare this with the amount of revenue which would be 
gained from the airport project. As discussed in Chapter 5, there has been no clear 
policy on how Don Muang airport and the new Bangkok airport would operate and be 
managed and which airlines will use the new airport. In other words, there has been no 
cost-benefit analysis of the new Bangkok airport project in terms of investment. The 
question is how a decision was made on this project without early financial planning. 
Another serious question is how a big Japanese financial firm such the OECF has 
approved a loan of 75 billion baht to develop the new Bangkok airport. 
In the view of the Thai government, flood damage in east Bangkok may be o f 
little significance compared with the enormous investment involved in the SBIA. This 
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may explain why the flood hazard in east Bangkok is ignored and the impact of noise 
pollution has not been considered, seriously. In fact, the new Bangkok airport will have 
a significant influence on Bangkok's flood protection system, which will be discussed 
in the following section. 
7. 4 Impact of the SBIA on Flood Protection 
On 4 May 1998, the local news reported that two districts in east Bangkok, Lat 
Krabang and Nong Chok, had been listed as a flash-flood sensitive zone since the dry 
season in 1997 because of the construction of the new Bangkok airport, in which the 
marshland and three canals were being filled. The Director of the Department of 
Drainage and Sewerage of the BMA, Nikhom Prajnakorn, also stated that two 
development projects north and south of the new Bangkok airport, the Bangkok-Chon 
Buri expressway and the Bang Na-Trat highway, had blocked major flood drainage 
systems which would result in serious inundation in east Bangkok. These events give a 
picture of how chaotic the situation in Bangkok is as a result of the new Bangkok 
airport. 
The major controversy, which is a critical issue in this section, is the flood 
protection management, which reflects the unstable politics of administration and 
authority in the Thai government. 
7.4.1 Changing Patterns of Flooding 
As discussed earlier, the flood flow depends on the physical characteristics of 
drainage basins and stream channels [Victor R. Baker, 1988 #63, 1 OJ. It is very clear 
that the SBIA will change the existing flood patterns in east Bangkok. This means the 
old flood protection plans will need major revision. The DRI and the BMA are working 
hard to cope with the altered hydrological system and likely patterns of flooding. 
Neither of them is following the SBIA master plan. New alternatives have been 
proposed based on different assumptions. 
As discussed, all north-south canals carry surplus water directly into the sea and 
function in association with the east-west canals as a system. The blockage of three 
north-south canals will influence the pattern of drainage systems and also change 
flooding patterns. Discharges from the north and the north-east flowing into east 
Bangkok already cause flash floods every monsoon season. The flood protection plan 
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therefore needs to cover the large area of about 3,000 square kilometres from Rangsit 
plain down to the Gulf of Thailan~. 
Two east-west direction canals, Phra Khanong and Saen Saep, pass through the 
centre of Bangkok. They act as the primary drainage system for the most important 
districts of Bangkok, Bang Kapi, Phra Khanong, Dusit, Pathum Wan, Phaya Thai, Huai 
Khwang, where a number of economic activities are located. These areas are considered 
as the heart of Thai economy. They have the potential to move the flood waters into the 
centre of Bangkok. This is why a large pumping station with the biggest discharge 
capacity is located at the mouth of the Phra Khanong canal. 
A serious concern is that these two canals cannot carry more surplus water from 
east Bangkok. If the floodwater flowing into these two canals from east Bangkok is 
more than the discharge capacity of the pumping stations, then flood problems in the 
city core become critical. In short, flooding will have an impact not only on the suburbs 
east of Bangkok but also on the central business district of Bangkok. 
As a result, the DRI is revising its flood protection plan to drain more surplus 
water from Rangsit plain into Rangsit canal, another east-west direction canal some 
kilometres north of Bangkok. Other main canals such as Bang Sue and Bang Khen in 
the north are also expected to carry more surplus water from the northeast areas of 
Bangkok. However, these east-west canals have to drain water into the Chao Phraya 
River and this may cause floods on the both banks of the river for about 30 kilometres 
down to the mouth. The DRI concentrates on the other north-south direction canals in 
east Bangkok, which are being dredged to increase the discharge capacity. 
The Director of DRI has concluded that the fate of Bangkok depends on the 
tropical storms in August and September35, in other words, a number of tropical storms 
would be a disaster. His argument is reasonable. Some days after he gave this statement, 
the first heavy rain in Bangkok36 occurred on 1 August 1998, starting the monsoon 
season. A rainfall of 155 millimetres within two hours caused flash floods in 15 districts 
of the inner and outer areas of Bangkok. The central business districts of Bang Rak, 
Phaya Thai and Ratchathewi were 40 centimetres under water which caused traffic 
congestion on the day. It took two days to drain the water out of the city core. 
35 Local newspapers reported his statement on 22 July l 998. 
36 Within the 24 hour-period from l.OOpm on 31 July lo l.OOpm on 1 August !988, the rainfall by dis trict 
was recorded as follows : 286 mm in Taling Chan; 2!5.4 mm in Dusit: 200.8 mm in Dindang; 183 mm in 
Porn Pap; and l 76 mm in Pathum Wan. 
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Obviously, flooding patterns in Bangkok have changed and the flood protection systems 
and networks are not working. 
Despite these problems, the AA T and the NBIA have remained silent while the 
people of Bangkok have blamed the Governor of BMA, Bhichit Rattakul. The popular 
term 'public interest' seems to have been forgotten for the time being. A question is 
whether the flood damages on I August I 998 are related to the new Bangkok airport? 
This question needs to be answered by the relevant authorities. 
7.4.2 Floods as a Planning Issue 
Land use regulation is necessary to obtain the best use out of floodplains with a 
minimum of flood damage and a minimum expenditure on flood protection [Ward, 1978 
#59, 122]. In the case of flood protection for Bangkok, it seems that the method of land 
use regulation applied in the Bangkok Plan 1992 has not been successful. In this 
section, the concept of land use zoning will be discussed, focusing on the context of 
planning and flood problems. 
Since the first modem plan for Bangkok, the Litchfield Plan, was introduced in 
1960, flooding has become a planning concern for Bangkok. The Litchfield Plan clearly 
considered the flood prone areas in east Bangkok as floodways and this fact has long 
been accepted since the 1900s. Unfortunately, the use of laws to enforce preventive 
measures in terms of land use control only began in 1992. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, cheaper land prices on the floodplains east of 
Bangkok were attractive to speculators during the boom in Thai economy in the early 
1990s. As a result, private investors developed a number of housing projects on 
floodways in Min Buri and Lat Krabang because of loopholes in the planning law. 
However, legal loopholes were not necessary when the government decided to develop 
the new Bangkok airport on the floodways. This controversy reflects an unpleasant 
aspect of Thai politics . 
In Roy Ward's view, most action on floodplain regulation is taken within the 
context of the Town and Country Planning Act. Land use regulation is one of the main 
ways of managing the flood hazard and its potential role as the most important 
adjustment mechanism is only just being realised. In a democratic society, land use 
regulation is inextricably linked with the politically biased process of planning. By 
definition, it means that regulations which impose restrictions on choice must be seen to 
be fair and soundly based if they are to stand up in court [Ward, 1978 #59, 126- 128]. 
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This basic principle has been applied in Bangkok but some important things are 
missing. 
Firstly, as argued in Chapter 3, the role of land use regulation is not clear and its 
application remains relatively ineffective. Because of a poor history of planning 
development, the planning system in Thailand does not work well and the concept of 
land use zoning by dividing the city into different functions is not applicable. The 
advantages of land use control have not been recognised. As a result, the green belts and 
the floodpaths have not been successful. 
Secondly, land use control is concerned with the politics of speculation. The 
speculators, who view floodplain regulation as a disaster for their business, do not 
consider that there needs to be a balance between land use and flood risk. This is more 
controversial when the speculators become politicians who can issue floodplain 
regulations. Political bias becomes evident in these cases. 
Thirdly, no compensation has been provided when the government has refused 
permission to develop land on floodpaths. Limited finances are often cited as a reason 
for not offering compensation. In addition no improvements have been made to 
floodplain regulations to enable them to be better implemented. Despite the yearl y 
experience of flood hazards, these concerns have never been addressed in the 
government's agenda. 
Hence the case of the SBIA provides a good example of how these things have 
been overlooked. It may also explain why areas on the west and east of the airport have 
been proposed for commercial development. What can be done under these 
circumstances may be argued extensively. However, a key solution to these problems 
may be found somewhere and this will be discussed in the following section. 
7.4.3 Beyond the Boundary of Administration and Responsibility 
The impact of the SBIA on changes in flooding patterns and flood protection 
planning reflect several failures in the legal, planning and administrative systems in 
Thailand. As argued in Chapter 3, the new Bangkok airport project is one of many 
problem cases which have resulted from the disintegration of the legal system, planning 
and administrative systems. These complicated systems have become chaotic when 
dealing with any problem which crosses the boundary of administration and legal 
concerns. The discussion in this section focuses on the issue of boundary in terms of the 
administrative system. 
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Despite early warnings about a serious flood hazard because of the construction 
of the new Bangkok airport, the, AAT and the NBIA did not express much concern 
about flood protection for Bangkok. The economic crisis in 1997 had a strong impact on 
the project. Despite this the development of a polder system around the airport began on 
schedule, starting with the blockage of three canals on the north side. 
Meanwhile, the BMA and the DRI also expressed serious concerns and more 
flood protection facilities were prepared. The Deputy of BMA, Somchai 
Nilsidthanukoh, stated that there would be no flooding if the rainfall was less than 60 
millimetres. If rainfall was more than 60 millimetres but less than 100 millimetres, 
BMA could drain the water out within two hours37. However, this capacity was very 
low given the floods on l August 1998 when the rainfall was over 200 millimetres. 
In August 1997, the Governor of BMA, Bhichit Rattakul, visited the site of the 
SBIA project and called for urgent action by the AAT, the NBIA and the Ministry of 
Transportation to solve the drainage problem caused by the airport project. He visited 
the site again and again to follow progress on this. In March 1998, Bhichit Rattakul 
returned to the site of the SBIA and expressed his strong concern about the completion 
of the earth embankment on the north side, which has blocked three canals passing 
through the airport site. However, the Airports Authority and the NBIA did nothing 
during the past year and flood protection became a political issue. 
In June 1998, after more political pressure to work on flood protection, the 
NBIA started to dredge two nearby canals around the site of the new Bangkok airport. 
Nong Ngu Hao on the east and Lat Krabang on the west would be 2.50 metres deeper 
through the length of 12 kilometres. Why was there no cooperation among government 
agencies on flood protection? There are a number of reasons why the AAT and the 
NBIA did not care about flood protection and why the BMA failed to cope with the 
flood problem. 
Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 4, the SBIA is located some hundreds of metres 
outside the administrative boundary of the BMA. That means that the Governor of 
BMA has no legal authority to do anything outside his territory. 
Secondly, in terms of the balance of power, the administration of the BMA is a 
special form of local government in which the administrative structure is considered to 
be a political ministry. Despite being given autonomy, every bureaucratic action has to 
37 The statement was reported on the local newspaper on 13 July I 998. 
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pass through the Minister of Interior and the Cabinet. In contrast, the administration of 
the AAT is in the form of a state: enterprise and the NBIA is a new private company. 
Consequently, these different administrative systems, as a result of a different political 
status, has caused a number of difficulties in achieving cooperation. The structure of 
government and the structure of authorities in association with flood protection in 
Bangkok are shown in Appendix 7.3. 
Thirdly, the boundary of administration and responsibility is so complicated that 
flood control and management has become chaotic under a number of authorities. The 
DRI, under the administration of the Ministry of Agriculture, is responsible for the 
rivers and canals as the primary drainage system. The Department of Highways, under 
the Ministry of Transportation, is responsible for ditches and gutters along the 
highways, roads and expressways. The RTAT, which is another state enterprise under 
the Ministry of Interior, is responsible drainage systems in some areas. Each is 
responsible to a different minister and therefore coordination is lacking. The poor 
physical structure and the urban complexity of Bangkok, in particular the drainage 
systems, make for even less effective planning and management under these authorities. 
Most importantly, there is no unity among these authorities because they are 
under the administration of numerous factions in the coalition government. As 
discussed, a significant feature of Thai politics is the lack of stability and the existence 
of a coalition government that depends on sharing interests. In the view of political 
factions, Bangkok's flood problems are not profitable; moreover they are sensitive 
issues which may have a negative influence on their reputations. Therefore the approach 
has been to simply stress that Bangkok's flood problems are a local government 
concern. 
Consequently, most people think that only the BMA is concerned with flood 
problems. This may explain why people blame the BMA and why the ministers 
involved never have any serious discussions about Bangkok's flood protection. As 
argued in Chapter 4, Bangkok's problems are complex and should be considered at the 
national level. In fact , Bangkok's flood control problems could be solved quickly if the 
Prime Minister as the head of government did something. It cannot be denied that every 
problem in the country should be a concern of the Prime Minister. The question is why 
the head of government, during the past few decades, has never played a vital role in 
solving Bangkok's flood problems. 
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Despite the powers written in the constitution, the Prime Minister cannot do 
everything. All Prime Ministers , have been concerned with and preoccupied by the 
power struggles in the coalition government. The politics of planning and development 
management has become a game of making a fortune, which is reflected in the big 
development projects. Under these circumstances, and given the economic crisis, a 
campaign calling for 'a good governance' seems to be the last hope for Thai society. 
Beyond the boundary of administration and responsibility, arguments on the 
politics of Bangkok's flood problems and the SBIA are extensive and have been 
difficult to resolve. However, theoretical arguments can be concluded within the 
narrower context of politics of planning and development, which will be discussed in 
the last chapter. 
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City planning has been regarded as an important development tool in Thailand since the 
first Town and Country Planning Act was implemented in 1952. Its importance was 
stressed in a letter from the Bangkok Municipality to the Mol asking for American 
technical experts to help with city planning in 1955. The government also expressed its 
concern in a statement by the Minister of Interior in 1959: 
We cannot let Bangkok grow up the way it has grown. Proper city planning is 
essential and should have been made a long time ago. We are pleased to learn 
that the present government has realized the importance of city planning and 
has started to work on it [Pore, 1959 #83, 2). 
Coupled with this, the government adopted a national policy to maintain 
Bangkok airport as the aviation hub of the region [Consultants, 1959 #15, 97; Pore, 
1959 #83, 2). Similar statements were repeated over and over through the next few 
decades. However, politics has influenced city planning and airport planning and there 
has been little progress with the two projects. Environmental issues have also become 
involved in planning after the Promotion and Conservation of Environment Act was 
adopted in 1975. Environmental planning has become a political tool which factions 
have used to intervene in project planning. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, master 
plans have been developed to meet the mutual interests of different factions and impact 
assessments have been conducted to cover up the consequences. Planning has been 
subject to political pressure. 
The government's decisions on planning for Bangkok and the SBIA ought to be 
transparent, reasonable and understandable. On many occasions, however, the 
government has not given any clear explanation of why policies have changed so 
frequently, creating chaos between the two projects. In my view development projects 
in Thailand have never been free from political interference. The bigger the project, the 
more political interference is evident. Bangkok is the biggest city in Thailand and the 
new airport is the most expensive infrastructure to be developed, so the planning and 
development management of the projects has become the subject of a series of conflicts 
among factions. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, it is clear that political factions have served 
their individual needs instead of public interest needs and the factions do not care about 
the consequences of policy changes. The individual interests at stake are so huge that 
environmental aspects and the negative impact of the new airport have been ignored. 
The consequences of political interference are therefore extensive and complex. 
The fonnal, technical process of development planning known as 'rational planning' 
does not accurately portray how development decisions are made in Thailand. Reliance 
on this process alone is far from effective in this turbulent decision-making context. The 
task in this chapter is to consider the role of political considerations in planning and 
development and to discuss this in theoretical terms. 
The style of politics in Thailand can be defined as 'pluralist' because of the 
large number of parties and factions. The struggle for power and money, using 
any means, is the primary concern of these factions. In some cases, factions 
may make an agreement or establish temporary relationships, connections and 
networks after negotiating how their mutual interests can be met. Historically, 
the factions have never been truly united and a high degree of fragmentation 
has become a unique feature of Thai politics. 
The planning history discussed in Part I points out that the political refonns of 
1932 dispersed the single power elite of the absolute monarchy into a pluralist political 
power elite. Despite many radical changes, with bloody violence in 1973, 1976 and 
1992, the struggle for power among various factions remains and has become a 
fundamental aspect of Thai politics. 
Under the pluralist bureaucratic structure in Thailand discussed in Part II, the 
administrative, legal and planning systems are manipulated by political factions to 
extend their roles in the planning and development of multi-million baht projects. The 
development of these factions, with their similar ways of thinking and decision-making, 
can be understood in terms of the 'political paradigm' [Sinsawasdi, 1996 #103, 293-
344] which reflects on changes in development policy and planning. 
The growth and decline of factions is beyond the concern of this thesis. 
However, what has really happened in the planni ng of Bangkok and the SBIA project 
reflects the evolution of political manipulation in planning from 1959 to 1999. These 
t\VO projects provide good cases for learning from the planning and environmental 
assessment failures caused by political interference. 
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This chapter discusses why technical knowledge and skills in planning were not 
effective in dealing with local .and national interest-based politics. The task is to 
understand the interaction of interests in three planning domains: city planning, airport 
planning and environmental planning. Bangkok city planning is viewed by the national 
government as a matter of local politics (the BMA) while airport planning is viewed by 
the national government as a concern of national politics. Environmental planning 
should focus on a rational assessment which is supposed to determine which proposed 
policies and actions are reasonable. Since there has been no attempt to integrate or even 
improve the coordination of these three planning domains, the first question is how the 
government deals with conflicts over these different planning domains. The discussion 
here is on how politics has influenced planning. This is based on assessing the impact of 
the SBIA on flood protection as discussed in Chapter 7. 
The focus is on key influences and relationships among the three planning 
domains to understand how political interests during the past few decades have operated 
to produce a series of conflicts. Based on an assumption that 'political power' is the 
domain of politicians and 'rationality' is a requirement for planners, these conflicts will 
continue for a long time because Thai politicians have a different understanding of 
rationality and planners do not have sufficient political power. Attempts are made to 
point out that political influences on the three planning domains are related to power 
arrangements between factions in the coalition government. 
Theory provides a basis for the evaluation and assessment of what has happened; 
linking all contexts and arguments in the previous chapters together. The discussion 
focuses on planning theory, urban politics theory and the concept of integrating 
environmental impact assessment and planning. There is a need for an understanding of 
these theories in order to comprehend complex cases such as Bangkok city planning and 
the development of the new airport. It is clear that Thai authorities have not considered 
these theories, and practices founded on them, as guides. This chapter concentrates on 
theoretical arguments to explain the ongoing failures of planning practice in Thailand. 
8.1 The Political Paradigm of Planning in Operation 
Narong Sinsawasdi studies Thai politics in terms of psychology. He tries to 
answer why there are so many factions, constitutions and violent conflicts in Thailand. 
He points out three co-factors: political behaviour, national characteristics and social 
characteristics [Sinsawasdi, 1996 #103, 1-72] . These three factors are unique and create 
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a relationship between leaders and followers. Political leadership relies on beliefs, 
values and personalities [Sinsawasdi, 1996 #103, 15-19], which differ from place to 
place in Thai society. Each politician has his own style of personality depending upon 
his social background. However, all politicians have the same interest in increasing their 
power. 
It is believed that a political party is created as a base for a power elite 
[Sinsawasdi, 1996 #103, 336]. As a politician increases his power, he establishes his 
own party, even if it is a small one with only one member. This explains why there are 
many political parties in Thailand. With different political bases and backgrounds, each 
political party has many factions which can be distinguished in terms of locality1, 
religion and personal connection. In reality, these independent factions have more 
bargaining power and are able to challenge political affairs within and between parties. 
One shortcoming is that the political factions have been able to influence the Thai 
bureaucratic system with their different ways of thinking. 
Besides the problems of the administrative, legal and planning systems 
discussed in Part II; there are also a number of key influences which act as driving 
forces on the political factions. In some cases these influences are subject to the use of 
power of one person as we shall see later. This discussion focuses on how these 
influences relate to Bangkok city planning and the SBIA project. 
The relationship between city planning and airport planning can be distinguished 
in terms of local and national politics. Based on the analysis of the Bangkok Plan 1992 
discussed in Chapter 4 , and a review of the SBIA master plan discussed in Chapter 6, 
the two planning domains reflect a lack of coordination. This discussion focuses on the 
interaction between the two planning domains and the consequences of different 
planning philosophies on the areas around the new Bangkok airport. 
8.1.1 Key Influences on Political Dynamics in Planning 
Many factors influence the political dynamics underlying planning in Thailand. 
This includes the conflict between factions through changes in the political economy at 
the regional and local level. According to the discussion in Part II, there are three key 
factors which factions consider as serious concerns which may change, postpone or 
1 The New Aspiration Party (NAP), for example, proclaims itself as the political party for the northeast 
people. However, some members of the NAP in the south who are Muslims have proclaimed themsel ves 
as another faction in the NAP, namely the 'Wada' group. 
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cancel a project. This section discusses how these factors influence planning and 
development management. 
The arrangement and distribution of power in the coalition government is the 
first factor that influences planning. This occurs soon after a coalition government is 
formed. In Thailand about I 0 political parties are represented in the national parliament 
after an election with four or five of those parties forming a coalition government. 
Naturally, the factions in each party forming a government have to accommodate their 
mutual interests so that political power can be distributed satisfactorily. The factions in 
each party aim to acquire control over departments and authorities to enable them to 
promote their own interests. The political manipulation of planning starts here. 
Having gained a portfolio, a Minister uses his authority to recruit his most 
trusted men as the heads of departments responsible for major projects. The connection 
between politician and bureaucrat develops immediately: this extends to the entire Thai 
bureaucratic system. This explains why each reshuffle of a coalition government is 
followed promptly by the appointment of a new head of department. Consequently, 
plans, reports and budgets which have already been prepared may be changed to fu lfil 
each new Minister's policy. This is a main reason why the Managing Director of the 
NBIA is dismissed and another appointed in association with each change of 
government. 
Absolute command and control within a certain timeframe is the second factor 
required by factions, because political interference is most effective when they gain 
absolute command and control. The longer the factions hold power the more money 
they can make. This key factor was evident during the dictatorship regime of Sarit in the 
early 1960s. However, the current political situation does not allow any faction to have 
absolute command and control. 
Political circumstances changed after the collapse of the military government in 
1973 to be replaced by a plurality of new factions who no longer rely on the military. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the struggle for absolute command and control has become a 
serious problem in coalition governments because of parties being composed of a 
number of factions from different backgrounds with complex connections. It is also 
easy for any party to de-stabilise a coalition. That is a reason why no government has 
been able to complete a four-year term since 1973. It is interesting to study how the 
government can work under these circumstances. 
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It has become established practice for the Prime Minister, as the head of the 
coalition government, to appoint ~he best men from his party to chair the Ministries of 
the Interior and Finance2 so that he can control their budget allocations. This is 
understandable, as the Prime Minister needs to control the budget. 
This phenomenon reflects David Harvey's idea [Harvey, 1989 #87, 165] about 
the forces that influence the urban process and the urban experience under capitalism. 
Harvey turned to Marxist meta-theory and considered how urbanisation is framed by the 
intersecting abstractions of money, space and time, shaped directly by the circulation of 
capital in time and space. Hence, command over money, command over space and 
command over time form independent but interlocking sources of power. He referred to 
Marx's statement that 'The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power' 
which generally explains the politics of class struggle in the city. That is his reason why 
confusion, conflict, and struggle are a normal condition [Harvey, 1989 #87, 165-199]. 
In the case of Thailand under the capitalist system, in my view, these sources of 
power are concentrated in the group of political factions that struggle to gain control 
over money (budget allocation), space (department and ministry) and time (period of 
administration). This is concerned with individual interests. I agree with Harvey that 
Bangkok is following this same urban experience in the shaping of the city. However, 
command and the use of power that is shaping Bangkok is dispersed in the hands of 
political factions rather than in the hands of the public through the democratic control 
delegated to the bureaucracy. 
Hence, the term 'command' becomes a theoretically specific element. Despite 
many clear descriptions and interpretations by law, it is clear that the Prime Minister 
does not have absolute command and control in dealing with the factions. In practice, 
the factions have so much bargaining power that the Prime Minister has to concentrate 
on the most important issues3. This explains why the Prime Minister does not pay 
attention to city planning or the SBIA project. 
The third and most powerful influence is King Bhumibol Adulyadej. 
2 The Ministry of Interior is the most powerful ministry with plenty of legal power. The Ministry of 
Finance controls the public budget. When the Prime Minister has more bargaining power, the Ministry of 
Transportation, the M inistry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry are second priorities. The 
distribution of power in the coalition government depends on the proportion of a faction's seats in the 
parliament. This current pattern of arrangement is totally d ifferent from the period of military government 
in the 1960s. when the Ministry of Defence was the most important. The dictator considered the Ministry 
o f Defence as his political base against coup attempts. 
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Despite many political changes over the past decades, King Bhurnibol is a 
remarkable and stable political i<?on in Thailand who has been on the political stage 
since his coronation in 1946. In theory, the King is the 'personification of the Thai 
nationhood' [Baker, 1996 #5, 198]. It is very important to note that any criticism of the 
King and the royal family is illegal in Thailand under Article 8 of the constitution4 . 
This thesis limits itself to his moderating influence over the politics of planning and 
development management. While the King, as constitutional monarch, is aloof from day 
to day politics and must appear impartisan, he is the one person with power and respect 
who can solve a crisis. 
The political relationship between King Bhurnibol and Field Marshal Sarit 
during the military regime in the 1960s was not clear. The King's role became 
significant in ending political conflicts in 1973, 1976 and 1992 with a personal use of 
power, which is not written in the constitution. 
King Bhumibol is interested in agricultural development and enjoys spending 
time in rural areas. He is also concerned about critical problems in Thailand and offers 
model technical solutions through the 'King's projects'. One of these projects is the 
flood protection project in east Bangkok. 
Every faction has responded to his initiatives immediately without question. 
Compared with other projects, the King's projects never have any problems with the 
administrative, legal and planning systems. 
It is clear that King Bhumibol has absolute command and control in his position 
as constitutional monarch. However, His Majesty selectively uses this power to solve 
critical problems and to end political conflict among factions when necessary. 
Furthermore, factions try to avoid attracting his attention as it can affect their individual 
interests. 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker have studied the evolution of political 
pluralism in Thailand discussing how factions with provincial business interests rushed 
to the political theatre in the late 1980s. Their study pointed out that these factions 
quickly spent money made from investing in illegal business with large profit margins, 
thus paving the way to the parliament [Baker and Phongpaichit, 1996 #5, 176-177]. 
3 A good example is a local election for Municipality of Samut Prakan in 1999. It is known openly that 
this is a dirty election. A faction in the coalition government is behind this dirty election, however. the 
Prime Minis ter seems to see nothing and know nothing. 
~Article 8 of the 16th constitution: The King is the country's reserved institution. Nobody can sue, accuse 
or show contempt for the King. 
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Hence, 'money politics' began with vote buying in Thailand. Their study extends an 
understanding of how and whx these factions exploited individual interests and 
struggled against each other in making money. Beyond these facts, the next task of this 
section is to understand how the factions have used their different approaches to 
planning under the constraints of the key influences discussed above. 
Every political faction has connections with bankers, developers and the landed 
elite who support them during each election campaign. The shortcomings of ' money 
politics' are evident when these politicians form a coalition government. Some of their 
supporters, in the name of 'experts', become advisors to ministers and some are 
appointed to chair the executive boards of state enterprises so they can direct them to 
their own advantage5. Hence, some government officials are forced to follow a new 
faction's policy otherwise they may be transferred to non-effective positions. 
Another shortcoming is that plans and budgets that have already been prepared 
are revised to meet the individual interests of factions. Ignorance of the Bangkok City 
Plan 1995 prepared by the MIT team discussed in Chapter 4, the politics of landfill for 
the SBIA discussed in Chapter 6 and the flood protection assessment study discussed in 
Chapter 7 are examples of planning politics. This explains why technical knowledge in 
planning has not been applied effectively and how chaotic the development of multi-
million baht projects in Thailand has been. 
Naturally, factions may express their interests openly while a coalition is being 
formed. For example, the Social Action Party (SAP) expressed an interest in taking 
responsibility for the development of the SBIA in 1996 and I 997. Control over the 
Ministry of Transportation was also important to the SAP. However, the distribution of 
power in the coalition government did not give the SAP absolute power over the 
Ministry of Transportation. Hence, a strategy of delay was applied. Many committees 
were set up by the Prime Minister to evaluate the progress of the new Bangkok airpo11 
project. As happened with another project, environmental issues also became a political 
concern because the Ministry of Science and Technology, which was under the control 
of another faction, conducted an environmental impact assessment. So far as I can find 
5 The government appointed Nukul Prachuapmor, the former Governor of the Bank of Thailand (BOT). to 
investigate what caused the failure of the BOT following the currency crisis in June 1997. Nukul 's report 
identified the failure of the BOT as a result of the most serious case of intervention in the (BOT), which 
had previously been free from political interference for decades. The interference occurred when fact ions 
within the coalition government re-organised the administration of the BOT and appl ied pressure so that 
financial policy and plans were only profitable for their supporters. This political interference caused an 
economic disas ter when the decision to devalue the Thai currency failed in July 1997, ending the 
economic boom. 
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out, this EIA has never been publicly released. This type of political situation also 
occurred with the BMA in 1998 when the Ministry of Science and Technology opposed 
a proposal for a tram project because of an unclear environmental impact study. In the 
broad context of environmental issues, it may take months or years to satisfy the 
Ministry of Science and Technology before getting final approval. Environmental 
impact studies are a government concern and are not applied to the King' s projects. The 
governments never view the King's projects negatively. 
As the democratically elected government in Thailand comprises multi-faction 
parties which aim to satisfy their individual interests, conflicts between factions and 
political interference in project planning are hardly avoidable. Despite professional 
planners having the skills and experience, planning practice in Thailand is not 
functional. The domains of city planning, airport planning and environmental planning 
are easily used as political tools in the hands of factions. 
This pattern of political interference has occurred in almost every government 
agency during the few past decades. Many such cases have resulted in corruption 
allegations. However the corrupt politicians have not been charged because of loopholes 
in the legal system. People are tired of the corruption problem. Coupled with the 
collapse of the Thai economy in 1997, it has become one of the most powerful driving 
forces behind the adoption of the 16th constitution which includes many articles6 to 
create measures to terminate political interference. However, it may be too soon to 
expect an optimistic outcome following this political reform. 
In my view, these measures have had little impact on the key influences 
mentioned above. They can only slow down the process of political interference as 
factions will not give up and will look for other ways to intervene in multi-million baht 
projects. 
8.1.2 Lack of Connection between City and Airport Planning 
An airport is an urban element however few cities can have an airport. The 
bigger the airport the more important the role and functions the city can play. In 
6 Article 79: The state must promote and accept public participation in planning and implementing 
environmental and natural resource conservation and management, as well as controlling and eradicating 
pollution that threatens people's lives, welfare and quality of life. Article 11 l: Members of Parliament 
shall not use their status or position as a House Representative to interfere or intervene in an appointment. 
transfer, reshuffle or promotion, in an increase of salary for government officials. employees o f 
government agencies, state enterprises or local administrations, and Members of Parliament may not 
dismiss the offic ials mentio ned above. 
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developed countries, a busy airport located close to the city is unwelcome because of 
the noise pollution problem. City .planning and airport planning are hardly integrated in 
Thailand. However, the new Bangkok airport may be different in relation to the noise 
pollution problem. As far as I am aware, the Thai people never have taken action 
against the airport project and do not complain about aircraft noise. 
I agree with Richard De Neufville that there is no uni versa! methodology for 
ensuring that airport planning is appropriate to all needs. Countries have distinct 
philosophical orientations, traditions of government and education heritages. These lead 
them to differ in their interpretation of facts, the formulation of problems and processes 
of decision-making in all-important aspects of planning [Neufville, 1976 #91, 35]. The 
case of Bangkok airport reflects this statement well. 
The government regards the international airport as the gateway to the world 
which will contribute to rapid economic development in the country. This may explain 
why there are many international airports in Thailand7. Besides the basic functions of 
air transportation, the international airport has become a symbol of sovereignty and 
prestige for many countries including Thailand. This is the main reason why the 
terminals and facilities at Don Muang airport and the SBIA are designed for luxury and 
spaciousness. Hence, the concern for economical development is ignored. 
Airport planning in Thailand is part of national planning practice. The 
government draws up policies and develops airports through the central planning 
agencies. The planning process is authoritarian with no public participation. Local 
communities are informed after decisions have been made. These activities are 
completely different from the process of city planning. 
Bangkok city planning became a truly local practice after the first legal plan 
prepared by DTCP was implemented in 1992. The BMA is responsible for the 
preparation of new plans and their implementation and enforcement by law. The DTCP 
plays the role of a technical advisor as the secretary of the Board of City Planning. In 
principle, people can participate in city planning because a 'public hearing' is a 
compulsory procedure as a crucial part of the planning process. However, there are 
some practical problems, which I will discuss later. 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, political factions with their own individual 
interests have intervened in airport planning and city planning in both national and local 
7 These international airports are in Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Khonkaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Ubon 
Ratchathani. Phuket, Haadyai, U-Tapao, and Phitsanulok has just been proposed in l 998. 
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politics. Consequently, the two planning domains are distinguished in terms of actors, 
institutions, administrations and P?licies through budget allocations and legal controls. 
This explains why the Bangkok Plan 1992 and the new city plan prepared in 
1998 did not consider the new Bangkok airport. The SBIA, with a capacity of 100 
million passengers per year, was not examined and its impact was not studied. 
Meanwhile, the SBIA master plan does not relate to the Bangkok area despite the fact 
that the new airport is only some hundreds of metres outside the administrative 
boundary of the BMA. This is also a reason why the the new Bangkok airport master 
plan fabricated the environmental assessment studies and covered up its negative impact 
on Bangkok, particularly noise pollution and flood protection. It is clear that authorities 
involved try to avoid any conflict between local and national politics regarding the 
making of the two plans. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the new Bangkok airport master plan recommended 
that a rubbish-dump site be developed on the coast even though the largest waste 
disposal plant run by the BMA is located only a few kilometres from the new Bangkok 
airport. This reflects the lack of coordination between city planning and airport 
planning. 
It is worth noting that consecutive Thai governments have been nervous about 
the new Bangkok airport development since the 1970s. The government regards 
Singapore as its biggest competitor in the region. When Changi airport in Singapore was 
opened in 1981, its impact on Bangkok became a nightmare for the Thai government. 
While the Thai government was arguing and revising its policy on the development of 
the SBIA project, the second terminal of Changi airport was opened in 1990 and its 
third terminal will be opened early in the 21st century. These circumstances forced the 
Thai cabinet to approve the development of the SBIA project in May 199 1. Hence, it is 
clear that Changi was a key factor influencing the Thai government. 
During the past few decades the government has used this point to revise the 
master plan and speed up the implementation of the SBIA project. The new airport 
project became a focal point in the arrangement and distribution of power in the 
coalition government as factions struggled to have absolute command and control over 
the project. In contrast, the government overlooked the importance of city planning for 
Bangkok. In fact, city planning and airport planning should not be considered in 
isolation because millions of airport passengers have to stay and use facilities in the 
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city. This crucial factor is not included in the Bangkok Plan 1992 and the new plan of 
1998. 
Aviation authorities in Thailand seem to believe that a well planned airport with 
the longest runways, luxury terminals and the best airport facilities are the most 
important factors that can make the SBIA the aviation hub of the region. In fact, 
aviation agreements between countries, the global airline networks and the economic 
linkages between regions through the urban infrastructure and the transportation 
network between the airport and the city are co-factors which determine whether it can 
be the regional aviation hub. Through the massive investment in airport infrastructure, 
the NESDB expects that Bangkok will be a pivotal member of the Asia Pacific's 'string 
of world cities' [Leman, 1995 #10, 42]. 
However John Friedmann insists that 'development planning is not just a matter 
of economics and that economic infrastructure, building the world' s biggest 24 hour 
airport, tallest office tower or what ever, is by no means all that is needed, or even 
always the most important thing, to succeed in the process of world city formation' 
[Friedmann, 1998 #92, 38]. The development policies proposed by the NESDB for 
Bangkok and the new airport discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, reflect how little the 
national planning authority understands about the planning philosophy of aviation, 
urban and regional development. The Governor of Bangkok also seems to ignore these 
policies and concentrates on other projects he has promised during the election 
campaign. 
It is not clear whether the government considers the separation of city and 
airport planning as a problem however the need for better coordination between 
authorities is always being discussed. But as far as I am concerned, there has been no 
attempt to integrate or even talk about the two planning domains as a single concern. It 
is difficult to know when the problem of the lack of coordination between city planning 
and airport planning will be resolved. 
As Bangkok remains a primate city with a number of chronic problems, 
Bangkok is what Friedmann calls 'a city whose unchallenged range of control is the 
entire national territory' [Friedmann, 1998 #92, 3 l ]. In my view, the best-planned 
airport might well be located in the worst planned city, that is in Bangkok. The task of 
this section is to understand the ongoing failures of planning practice as the result of the 
lack of coordination between city and airport planning. 
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8.2 Planning under Political Pressure 
Planning theory and practice as Peter Hall describes in his article 'The City of 
Theory ' , is the key focus of the discussion in this chapter. I agree with Hall that there is 
a need for an improved, reciprocal relationship between the two: theory that is formed 
by and relevant to actual planning practice and planning practice informed and 
improved by theory [Hall, 1996 #86, 383]. This idea is reasonable and should be 
responded to broadly. The planning experience in Thailand discussed in the previous 
chapters reflects the fact that this improvement would require a number of radical 
changes to overcome a number of constraints. This section attempts to identify these 
constraints to this improvement in the case of Bangkok. 
The section discusses some contemporary ideas, concepts and theories in three 
planning domains (city planning, airport planning and environmental planning) in 
relation to the ongoing failure of planning practice in Thailand. It focuses on planning 
theories, the concept of integrating environmental impact assessment with planning, and 
theories of urban politics. Based on the hypothesis that planning practice is under 
political pressure, the task is to theoretically synchronise the rationale of the three 
planning domains using the case of Bangkok and the SBIA project. 
8.2.1 Reconsideration of the Definition of Planning 
Planning is a broad term which has been discussed and defined in association 
with many fields. I agree with Yehezkel Dror (1973] in his article, 'The Planning 
Process: A Facet Design', published in a classical book A Reader in Planning Theory 
edited by Andreas Faludi. Dror gave a definition of planning in the 1970s that 'planning 
is the process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the future, directed at 
achieving goals by preferable means'. This definition includes seven different elements 
which introduce some of the concepts which make up planning [Dror, 1973 #128, 330-
332). 
Patsy Healey made a contribution to theoretical debates on planning in the 1980s 
by identifying planning as a concrete activity undertaken by identifiable actors and 
institutions leading to outcomes which can be evaluated against objective criteria 
[Healey, 1982 #90, 19]. Hence, actors and institutions are concerned with politics and 
evaluation has become a key word in the field of environmental planning. 
Healey [ 1995) concentrated on the relationship between planning and politics in 
the 1990s in relation to the British planning experience. In Healey's view, a plan is a 
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store of policy principles and criteria, goals and objectives. It is intended to guide but 
not determine regulatory decisio11s. The objective is to provide sufficient flexibility to 
allow a 'reasonable' balance of individual and collective interests in specific decisions. 
These traditional models assume a unitary 'public interest'. Plan-making could proceed 
dominated by experts and officials, realising political goals, which are assumed to be 
widely understood and shared [Healey, 1995 #88, 253]. 
This section discusses the failures of planning practice in Thailand based on 
these two definitions of planning and the relationship between planning and politics. A 
starting question is 'what are implications of the seven different elements in Dror's 
view'. 
1. Planning is a process which must be distinguished from a 'plan'. A plan can 
be defined as 'a set of decisions for action in the future' and can be arrived at either 
through planning or through some other rational or irrational, method of decision-
making [Dror, 1973 #128, 330]. As a Thai planner, I have a somewhat different view of 
this element. 
Planning in Thailand is essentially a political process which may or may be not 
distinguished from a plan. Politicians are decision-makers who are not interested in how 
a plan is made or what plan looks like. Planners are forced to follow decisions which 
have already been made. For planners, any question about rational and irrational 
decision-making is forbidden. 
2. Of preparing. Planning is essentially a process of preparing a set of decisions 
to be approved and executed by some other organs formally and legally [Dror, 1973 
#128, 330]. This element reflects a political tradition in Thailand. Selected advisors in 
the name of 'experts' prepare recommendations and sometimes decisions for the 
Minister. This is not a 'rational ' process of preparing a set of decisions. In some cases it 
does not require any investigation process because of lobbying among factions. As a 
result the decis ion is made informally to meet the mutual interests of factions. Any 
'preparing' for decisions is only done to ensure that lobbying by factions is successful 
and there will not be any problems with the formal and legal approval. 
3. A set. A set of decisions is a matrix of interdependent and sequential series of 
systematically related decisions [Dror, 1973 #128, 331 ]. This element may frustrate the 
Thai planner because related decisions are not arranged systematically. A set of 
decisions cannot be made in the Thai system because the pluralist structure of the 
administration is under the control of factions . 
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4. Of decisions for action. Planning is primarily directed at action and not other 
objectives [Dror, 1973 #128, 331]. The meaning of this element is completely different 
in the Thai context. In practice, political factions identify their objectives and express 
their individual interests before the planning begins. 
5. In the future. Planning is directed toward the future. This is the most 
important characteristic of planning as it introduces the elements of prediction and 
uncertainty and conditioning to all aspects, problems, and features of planning [Dror, 
1973 #128, 331]. Time, in association with the other key element space, is an abstract 
element, the importance of which has been stressed in every planning school as a basic 
principle of planning philosophy. 
Basically, Thai planners apply the five-year term as the time frame for planning 
however, the term in the future may cover a much longer period of probably 10 years or 
20 years to cover complex issues such as population projections and environmental 
impacts. The meaning of this element is totally different in the view of political factions 
in Thailand. In their view, the meaning of the term 'in the future' depends on how long 
they can have power to control the project. It could be weeks or months but seldom 
more. This explains why political factions cut short the planning time frame and rush 
into implementing a project without completing an investigation. 
6. Directed at achieving goals. The planning process cannot operate unless it has 
more or less defined goals to the achievement of which its recommendations for action 
in the future are directed [Dror, 1973 #128, 331]. This element is likely to be out of the 
control of the Thai planners. In practice, political factions define their goals, sometimes 
as part of a policy package, and planners only get orders to make or reshape a plan to 
fulfil the politician's individual interest. 
7. By preferable means. The very nature of planning, as a process for the rational 
shaping of the future according to our desires, depends on the means-ends relationship 
which is basic to the planning process. The planning process is directed at suggesting 
the preferable means for achieving our goals [Dror, 1973 #128, 332]. The last element is 
directly concerned with politics and clearly reflects the political culture in Thailand. 
Planners may propose rational alternatives to the government, but none are usually 
selected. In some cases, political factions express their own preferences which they have 
had in mind before joining the coalition government. More importantly, their prefen-ed 
means may never be set out in a planning document. The politics of landfill discussed in 
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Chapter 6 is a good example of this. City planning, airport planning and environmental 
planning are particularly subject to political pressure. 
' 
In terms of the planning definition given by Healey, the identifiable actors and 
institutions in the planning process in Thailand are the political factions and the 
coalition government and not the well-trained planners and planning authorities. A Plan 
has become 'a store of political objectives' aiming at 'individual interests'. An 
evaluation against objective criteria is ignored and attempts are made by the government 
to cover up the consequences in cases where negative impacts are foreseen. It is clear 
that the political factions dominate the planning process in Thailand and that 
professional planners are unable to use their knowledge and play an active role in 
rational planning. As planners do not have sufficient political power and political 
factions do not have rationality, the failure of planning practices in Thailand remains 
unsolved. 
The definitions of planning given by Dror and Healey combine to provide a 
theoretical understanding about what a good planning process should be. These 
definitions seem to be ideal for Thai planners because the experience of planning 
practice in Thailand has shown that good planning processes cannot be applied because 
of strong, open and unavoidable and political influences. Planners in Thailand are 
unable to make rational plans with clear objectives based on public interest. In my view, 
what Thai society requires most may not be a better planning process but a less self-
serving political system. 
8.2.2 Reflections of John Friedmann's Ideas and Theories on 
Planning 
Theories and concepts in the past few decades have changed vastly and have 
extended from the traditional doctrines to a number of new fields of study. Many new 
technical terms and new subjects have been created as a consequence of the evolution of 
these theories and concepts. Arguments on these theories and concepts are extensive. 
This includes 'planning theory' , however, a theoretical delimitation of planning can be 
made. 
This thesis considers John Friedmann's theories and ideas for discussion because 
he has made one of the largest contributions to the fields of regional planning, 
economics, geography, and development s tudies since the 1950s. His theories and ideas 
on development refl ect the changing perspective of planning in the 20th century . The 
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discussion focuses on his recent planning ideas and concepts which have become more 
involved with the political arena and social learning [Friedmann, 1998 #89, 1-2, 9-10]. 
Importantly, he is the first scholar who has argued that the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1975 is unsuitable for Thai conditions. His recommendations reflect the problems of 
planning practice in Thailand in 1975. An interesting discussion is possible on the 
theoretical contradiction of planning practice in Thailand from his perspective. 
John Friedmann visited Thailand during 17-28 March 1975 and submitted a 
report to the NESDB on 3 April 1975 with a number of specific recommendations 
within the rural-urban context. His ideas moved beyond 'perspective planning8' to the 
meaningful implementation of rural-urban development programmes. His focus was on 
new institutional arrangements, for example, the creation of regional development banks 
and a set of viable 'planning regions'. He introduced the concept of an urban pre-
investment study. The application of 'growth centre' theory was discussed in 
association with his core/periphery model. However, he found that there were a number 
of serious difficulties in the case of Thailand. 
The theoretical and ideological difficulties were discussed by Friedman in his 
report. For example, the theory of 'optimum city size' was discredited by him and the 
development of urbanisation in Thailand was 'extremely slow' under conditions of 
rapid population growth overall which did not suit these theoretical approaches. He 
regarded political pressures as practical difficulties. In Friedmann's view what needed 
to be done was to reorient developmental thinking and to shift the pattern of investment 
allocation from urban to rural areas [Friedmann, 1975 #39, 3-4]. 
Friedmann' s recommendations to Thailand in 1975 were useful to people who 
were involved in spatial planning. These recommendations reflected his theories and 
ideas in the 1970s. He regarded Thailand as an agrarian society and the core-periphery 
distinction and agropolitan approach were introduced to the Thai government. He 
viewed development as 'self-reliance' which was not merely economic expansion but 
provided employment opportunities and equity. Unfortunately, his recommendations 
were largely ignored and development decentralisation progressed only slowly in 
subsequent decades. However, the same recommendations of 'self-reliance' and rural 
development were reintroduced in December 1997 through the King's projects9 and the 
government responded to these recommendations immediately. 
s Friedmann used this term to express his concentration on implementation rather than planning acivity. 
9 See Appendix 8.1 
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Compared with his longer experience in South America, in my view, the 
experience in Thailand did not i~fluence Friedmann's ideas on regional development 
planning theory. However, his concept of 'bottom-up approach' showed his political 
focus for the next decade. His book, Planning in the Public Domain published in 1987, 
discusses planning problems in which he tries to escape from the three common routes 
of high technology, deregulation and propaganda and repression to a fourth route which 
aimed to ' re-centre political power in civil society' [Friedmann, 1987 #93, 13]. The 
term civil society is stressed in his book Cities for Citizens published in 1998, in which 
Friedmann uses the concept of civil society to discuss the changing doctrine of planning 
towards the new political economy of planning. In his view, 'civil society is ultimately 
for itself' [Friedmann, 1998 #89, 28]. 
Friedmann explains that civil society was used in its modem sense by Hegel in 
his Philosophy of Rights in 1821. Despite decades of debates the core meaning of civil 
society has remained constant. Civil society designates those social organisations, 
associations and institutions that exist beyond the sphere of direct supervision and 
control by the state [Friedmann, 1998 #89, 21]. 'Citizen rights' has becomes a key word 
in this concept. 
As a holistic approach to citizenship, which is the right to have rights, it stresses 
active participation in a political economy that is just and mutually supportive and 
embraces all sorts of rights and responsibilities, including cultural and environmental 
[Friedmann, 1998 #89, 26-27]. Planning in a transactive style, is discussed and 
Friedmann' s views that planners working for and with ci vi! society must be 
'organically' connected [Friedmann, 1998 #89,31]. In other words, planners should 
adapt themselves in harmony with the working environment by learning how the local 
people live and what they think about their environment. 
In terms of transactive planning, Friedmann states that local autonomy is 
important and must first of all be strong at the local level. This would require a more 
perfect form of democracy. It also involves creating opportunities for self-development 
that aims at the removal of artificial obstacles that limit each person's chances to 
develop her or his innate abilities to the fullest possible extent. His discussion on 'social 
justice' as a part of planning is based on the work of Iris Marion Young. This powerful 
argument is that different groups have different needs, that universal remedies have 
unequal results and that the politics of justice must create a heterogeneous public 'where 
participants discuss together the issues before them and come to a decision according to 
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principles of justice [Friedmann, 1998 #89, 33-34]. Social justice is another key word 
in the planning process with a positive meaning. 
In David Harvey's view, however, the concept of social justice is not an all-
inclusive one which encapsulates our vision of the good society. It is rather more 
limited. Justice is essentially thought of as a principle (or set of principles) for resolving 
conflicting claims. These conflicts may arise in many ways. 'Social justice is a 
particular application of just principles to conflicts, which arise out of the necessity for 
social cooperation in seeking individual advancement' [Harvey, 1973 #94, 97]. The aim 
of social justice is to provide reasonable and rational resolutions as a means of avoiding 
social conflicts in the planning process. However, the term social justice is seldom 
mentioned and seems to be less important in the formal planning process in Thailand. 
It is important to note that the 'bottom-up' approach to planning based on 
public-participation, has been addressed in the Town and Country Planning Act 1975 in 
Articles 33, 34 and 35. In fact, the Act is considered to be the most flexible and 
democratic civil law in that in principle the local people can participate in the planning 
process and determine the direction of development in their communities 
[Roachanakanan, 1990 #20, 79). In principle, planning law provides opportunities for 
self-development and social justice to the local people. However in practice, 
Friedmann's concept of transactive planning is rarely applied in Thailand because of 
numerous problems and difficulties. 
First, as discussed in Chapter 4, very few local people participate in the planning 
process even though the schedules of proceedings are announced via public media such 
as local newspapers, radio and television for weeks beforehand. Moreover, most 
participants are actually local politicians and community leaders who participate in the 
public debates on planning but do not truly seek benefits for their communities. In some 
cases, the community leaders are speculators who are only interested in making money, 
and as a result their planning objectives are misleading and do not focus on public 
interests. 
Second, most local people have poor reading skills and cannot understand two-
dimensional maps or plans. This therefore becomes an obstacle which limits their 
understanding about their built environment. 
Third, in my view, Thai society cannot yet be regarded as a 'civil society' 
because only a very small number of groups, associations and institutions exist to 
represent the public interest against state control. Some of these include non-
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government organisations (NGOs). Moreover, it is too soon to conclude whether 
democracy in Thailand has improved following the adoption of the new Constitution in 
1997. My argument is that a perfect democracy itself does not create a good plan, but 
the people who understand democracy can make a good plan based on the public 
interest. Despite many political changes, nobody knows how much Thai people 
understand about the true meaning of democracy as 'money politics' through vote 
buying still exists. 
Last and most importantly, as discussed earlier, development projects m 
Thailand have never been free from political interference because political factions are 
always intervening in the planning process using any means. As a result the local people 
feel powerless. Under these circumstances, 'social justice' seems to be a theoretical 
term which is rarely found in Thai society. 
These problems and difficulties are evident in the case of Bangkok. If ' planning' 
in Friedmann' s view is a part of social learning, the task of planning in Thailand is to 
understand the complexity of its political culture and traditions - from the national 
legislative chamber to the meeting room of the small community. Another task is to 
improve the participation process in order to achieve a genuine and comprehensive 
expression of public interest and to permit greater public influence over planning 
decisions. 
8.2.3 Environmental Impact Assessment 
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a process of identifying and 
evaluating the possible effects of proposed activities so that serious environmental 
damage can be avoided or minimized. The effectiveness of an environmental impact 
assessment, as a strategy for environmental protection, ultimately depends on its point 
of intersection with the planning and decision-making process. The timing of an 
environmental impact assessment determines its purpose, scope and outcome [Armour, 
1990 #95, 5]. 
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the impact assessment studies for the SBIA 
were deficient as some data was made up. This section discusses the practice of 
environmental impact assessments in Thailand in the light of selected EIA literature and 
the need for a more effective integration of impact assessments into the planning 
process. 
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Thailand first imported the idea of EIA in 1975 by incorporating it in the 1975 
Promotion and Conservation Act. But it was systematically and legally 
enforced in 1991. By now, the term is a familiar part of any large-scale 
development project. While some people have hoped that it would play an 
important role in protecting Thailand's environment, other critics see it as 'a 
rubber stamp' (Thai Development Newsletter No. 25, 1994, 25). 
This statement reflects the slow development of environmental impact 
assessments in Thailand. Environmental planning has followed the same experience of 
city planning and airport planning. The question is how the environmental impact 
assessment procedures operates in Thailand and how this diverges from accepted 
international practice. 
In an interview with a local English-language newspaper, The Nation, on 5 
August 1994, a senior environmental expert at the Office of Environmental Policy and 
Planning (OEPP), Suphawit Piamphongsarn, explained that EIA was introduced as part 
of the planning process in order to reduce the environmental impact of development as 
much as possible. The objective of an EIA is not to stop or disagree with a project. It is 
supposed to provide a plan which will cause the least environmental impact. If any 
negative impact is to occur, the EIA should state how this would be managed (Thai 
Development Newsletter No. 25, 1994, 25) 10. However this has become a problem for 
planning practice in Thailand because few environmental impact studies are carried out 
before a project is approved. In most cases, the monitoring process is only undertaken 
after a project has been implemented; perhaps years later. Some projects have a critical 
impact on the environment and the situation becomes so complex that the government 
runs out of ideas on how to deal with the never-ending consequences 11 . The EIA studies 
on hydroelectric projects in the north and the northeast are good examples. 
In my view, the EIA has become a political issue and as a result, few EIA 
studies of government projects are conducted properly. The systematic bias of an 
environmental impact assessment starts immediately after factions gains power as part 
of a coalition government and aim to ensure that their mutual interests can be met. This 
systematic bias has also extended to private projects. In an interview with The Nation 
on 5 August 1994, Suphawit Piamphongsarn of OEPP admitted that: 
10 International practice generally encourages proof of the need for the project with an examination of 
alternatives and a real possibility that a project may be stopped if negative impacts are unacceptable. 
10 Bangkok Post on I 0 May 1992. 
11 Bangkok Posr on I 0 May 1992. 
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The EIA studies of big development projects are usually distorted by some of 
the consultant companie~ who carry them out. They try to over-estimate the 
project's benefits, but usually under-estimate the project's costs especially its 
environmental costs 12. 
In the case of government projects, political factions play a role in selecting a 
consultant company, which is supposed to be a third party, to carry out the EIA study. 
Government officials are then forced to write the Terms of Reference in a way which 
will facilitate bidding by a company preferred by the political faction. Political factions 
can thus control an EIA study. In addition, data and information in the EIA is 
sometimes fabricated and the results of the EIA study are presented to cover up any 
negative environmental impacts. This is the reason why some critics see the EIA in 
Thailand as a mere rubber stamp. 
The politics of EIA in Thailand are complex. The task of carrying out an EIA is 
limited to a small group of experts who have a licence from the OEPP. Social impact 
assessments (SIA) which allow people to know in advance the consequences for the 
human population and the community of a proposed action or policy change [Burdge, 
1988 #97, 15] are not carried out in Thailand. In reality, government decisions on 
projects are not based on either EIA or SIA studies but on agreements between factions 
within the coalition government. In some cases, the government may postpone but not 
cancel a project, if a local community with strong 'leadership' demonstrates against the 
project. In terms of my concern, however, there is yet to be public information or debate 
on the EIA conducted on the SBIA. 
8.2.4 Integrating Impact Assessments into the Planning Process 
Audrey Armour views ' planning' as a problem-solving process with several 
discernible stages in which parts or all of the planning process may be repeated until an 
appropriate solution is found. It is generally acknowledged that if built into the early 
phases of planning processes, the impact assessment offers considerable potential for 
ensuring that resource management and land use decisions are environmentally sound. It 
is standard practice internationally for impact assessments to be conducted as a separate 
process and apart from the planning process as a means of justifying planning decisions 
rather than contributing in any meaningful way to them [Armour, 1990 #95, 5]. Hence, 
1 ~ Thai Development Newsletter, No.25, 1994, p25 
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it is important to study this concept of environmental impact assessment in theoretical 
terms. 
In Armour's view, ' integrating EIA into planning' means reformulating the 
planning process so that environmental impact considerations are integral to it from the 
start to the finish. The process of EIA merges with the process of planning and they 
become one [Armour, 1990 #95, 5-7]. However, Armour highlights a number of barriers 
to a more effective integration of EIA and planning in that the economy, the 
environment and social equity become problematic. The need for technical or 
disciplinary integration, the need for consultative integration and the need for 
organisational integration are discussed by Armour. There is a recognition that 
integration does not come easily in a world characterized more by competition than 
cooperation, where mastery of means has not been coupled with clear ends and where a 
shared environmental ethic or consensus on principles of 'social justice' are still 
woefully lacking [Armour, 1990 #95, 7-11]. These factors seem to exist m every 
society. 
In my view, ' integrating impact assessments into the planning process' is an 
approach based on optimistic assumptions which requires a high degree of discipline in 
a society and social justice principles. My argument is that integrating impact 
assessment into planning is an ideal approach but a long way from being applied in 
Thailand. 
The biggest barrier is the pluralist structure of the administrative, legal and 
planning systems in association with the political style of pluralism in Thailand. The 
term ' to integrate' in the context of planning and decision-making has never existed in 
the mind of any Thai politician because of individual interests. The major problem with 
this approach in Thailand is that it is time consuming as it means that all or part of the 
planning process may need to be repeated until an appropriate solution is found. As 
discussed earlier, political factions in Thailand try to cut the planning process short and 
rush to the implementation process. The 'integrated' approach is a waste of time in the 
view of political factions because a more effective integration of the EIA and planning 
may have a negative influence on their individual interests. This is the reason why 
environmental impact assessments in some areas of Thailand are poorly conducted and 
biased, including the case of the SBIA 13. 
13 Based on the observation of my fieldwork, the people who live around the new airport site know very 
little about the impact of the airport development. They have probably never experienced noisy aircraft 
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Roy E. Rickson, Rabel J. Burdge and Audrey Armour state that the 'impact 
assessment is most successful w~en fully integrated with planning at the appropriate 
jurisdiction level where project development occurs'. When this integration is 
accomplished, environmental and socio-economic factors become central to planning 
decisions rather than being treated as 'external' or peripheral to the planning process 
[Roy E. Rickson et al, 1989 #99, 347]. 
I agree with this statement. However, more and more development projects in 
Bangkok continue to develop along the lines of the SBIA. Hence, the question is what 
should be done under these circumstances given that the current style of city planning is 
not effective and EIA is poorly conducted. Despite the number of barriers and 
constraints, the need for a more effective way of integrating EIA into the planning 
process should be regarded as a considerable challenge for planning practice. This 
approach challenges the professional planners and the environmental activists in 
Thailand and their first task is 'to overcome the political barriers'. 
8.3 Pluralism, Regime and Leadership 
The analysis and discussions in previous chapters lead to the conclusion that 
Bangkok city planning and the development of the SBIA are all about politics. A 
delimitation of the theoretical field is difficult in this section because there are a number 
of political theories. Despite some similar elements and situations, the Thai experience 
is difficult to compare with western cases. However , my empirical study has observed 
that what really happened to the Bangkok Plan 1992 and the new Bangkok Airport 
project between 1959 and 1999 involved three significant political elements, pluralism, 
regime and leadership. This section discusses pluralism theory, regime theory and the 
concept of leadership. 
Pluralism has been remarkably influential in the study of urban politics [Judge, 
1995 #98, 13]. In 1961 , R.A. Dahl used the term 'pluralism' throughout his work to 
theorize the concept of 'polyarchy' 14, as a normative benchmark, as an idealized 
institutional arrangement against which the actual performance of existing political 
systems could be assessed. Dahl argued that the existence of a significant number of 
landing and taking off over their roofs around the clock. It is clear that the government has not provided 
sufficient information about the consequences of the new Bangkok airport development to the local 
people. Hence, the basic principle of the social impact assessment has been ignored and the systematically 
biased environmental impact assessment continues under political influences. 
14 The existence of a significant number of relatively autonomous social groups and organisations. 
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relatively autonomous social groups and organisations 'is what has come to be called 
pluralism' [Judge, 1995 #98, 16]. 
G. Jordan identifies the main characteristics of a general pluralist model. First, 
power is seen to be fragmented and decentralised. Second, there are dispersed 
inequalities in so far as all groups have some resources to articulate their case, even if 
their demands are not necessarily or successfully acted upon. Third, this dispersion of 
power is a 'desirable feature in any system approaching the status of democracy '. 
Fourth, political outcomes in different policy sectors will reflect different distributions 
of power within those sectors. Fifth, the exercise of political sector extends beyond the 
formal institutional structure of elections and representative institutions in liberal 
democracy. Sixth, the interaction of interests would supply a practical alternative to the 
'general will' as the source of legitimate authority. Finally, the disaggregated nature of 
decision-making, and the very uncertainty of outcomes of the bargaining process, helps 
bind participants to the process itself [Judge, 1995 #98, 14]. 
This conceptual framework provides a general understanding of pluralist 
theories. In the views of David Judge, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman, there is no 
single, homogenous theory of 'pluralism' or 'elites' or 'regimes' or for that matter, 
'Marxism' or ' feminism': they are only theories. However, pluralism rapidly fragments 
into a series of models or types of theory, where different 'pluralisms' are apparent in 
different cities at different times [David Judge, 1995 #100, 4-5]. Urban politics in 
Thailand reflects a similar model of pluralism. 
In fact , 'pluralism' has existed as a significant feature of Thai politics since it 
became an independent state in 1247. Pluralism is evident in terms of the struggle for 
power between a number of factions in association with strong conflicts such as 
assassinations, coups and the termination of whole dynasties, which have been recorded 
in Thai history through the past centuries. Pluralism has changed from a few groups in 
the royal fami ly to the military fac tions after the political reform in 1932 and to new 
factions with different backgrounds after the collapse of the military regime in 1973. 
The political system remains pluralist. 
Pluralism theory provides a 'realistic evaluation of the actual disposal of 
resources of actors', focusing on the 'process of bargaining, negotiation, salesmanship 
and brokerage and on leadership in mobilizing' those resources [David Judge, 1995 
# 100, 20). In this approach, planning for Bangkok and the development planning of the 
SB IA are regarded as the resources of political interests and factions are regarded as 
293 
Chapter 8 The Politics of Planning and Development 
actors. This implies that delays in the two projects during the past few decades was a 
result of political factions failing to arrange and complete the process of bargaining and 
negotiation. 
In my view, the successful process of bargaining and negotiation relies greatly 
on 'regime' and 'leadership'. The best example of this is the development of the SBIA 
under the dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit from 1960 to 1965. 
A regime can be defined as 'an informal yet relatively stable group with access 
to institutional resources that enables it to have a sustained role in making governing 
decisions'. Participants are likely to have an institution base, that is they are likely to 
have a domain of power. The regime, however, is formed as an informal basis for 
coordination and without an all-encompassing structure of command [Stoker, 1996 #96, 
272]. In Thailand, this definition may extend to the military, the coalition government, 
the city council, the local Mafia and small villages. The conceptual perspectives are the 
same. 
Complexity is central to the regime perspective. Institutions and actors are 
involved in an extremely complex web of relationships. Diverse and extensive 
patterns of interdependence characterize the modem urban system. Lines of 
causation cannot be easily traced and the policy world is full of unpredicted 
spillover effects and unintended consequences. Fragmentation and lack of 
consensus also characterize the system [Stoker, 1996 #96, 272]. 
Regime theory is concerned more with the process of government-interest group 
mediation than with the wider relationship between government and its citizens. Regime 
theory views power as structured to gain certain kinds of outcomes within particular 
fields of governmental endeavour. The key driving force is 'the internal politics of 
coalition building'. If a capacity to govern is achieved, if things get done then power has 
been successfully exercised and to a degree, it is irrelevant whether the mass of the 
public agreed with, or even knew about, the policy initiative [Stoker, 1996 #96, 273). 
In my view, the application of regime theory in the case of Thailand requires a 
deeper and wider understanding of the political system because most factions have 
complex webs and connections. Their structure and connections are involved with 
illegal business, preventing a comprehensive analysis and investigation. Since city 
planning is the domain of local politics and airport planning is the domain of national 
politics, the overlapping regimes of local and national politics become problematic for 
studying the meaning of regime theory in Thailand. 
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Besides the military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, it is difficult to distinguish 
the periods of political regimes in Thailand because of the number of political changes. 
After the collapse of the military regime in 1973, no government has been able to 
complete a four-year term of administration. Some governments have lasted less than a 
month15• These short-lived governments are not regarded as regimes. 
Despite these constraints, the purpose of regime analysis is to understand the 
conditions under which such effective long-term coalitions emerge in order to 
accomplish public purposes [Stoker, 1995 # 101, 55]. This explains why all coalition 
governments in Thailand have been willing to compromise and rearrange power among 
the factions in order to achieve the longest possible term of administration. However, an 
effective long-term coalition requires political leadership which is the most important 
element in my view. 
Clarence N. Stone believes that governmental authority at the local level can 
command only modest resources. Energetic governance requires more than office-
holding alone can provide. The weakness of formal authority gives added importance to 
the 'personal leadership' of the prominent urban actor [Stone, 1995 #102, 96]. This 
viewpoint is interesting in studying urban politics. However, most recent studies on the 
leadership concept are comparative and their discussions concentrate on the American 
and British experience which cannot be compared with the Thai experience because of 
their different political systems. 
I agree with James MacGregor Burns who sees leadership as a form of power 
[Stone, 1995 #102, 97]. In my view, political leadership in the Thai context is unique. In 
Thai society, this form of power is unique. The person who becomes leader has to make 
ongoing contributions in terms of money, resources and manpower. As a result it may 
take years or decades before Thai society accepts him or her as a true leader. 
In Stone's view, it is acknowledged that ' leaders are constrained by social, 
political, and economic structures in which they and their followers are embedded'. The 
personality is both a strength and a weakness [Stone, 1995 #102, 109). This explains 
why Thai leaders have to adapt themselves to the mainstream of the locality 
[Sinsawasdi, 1996 # 103, 67] and why they try to cover up any weaknesses such as a 
poor educational background. At the same time, they learn how to use their power to 
manipulate the society. 
15 The 35th government from 15 February 1975 to 14 March 1975 and the 38th government from 25 
September l 976 to 6 October 1976 are examples. 
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I agree with Stone that leadership differs from individual to individual and that 
the personal factor is important,[ Stone, 1995 # 102, 105]. In the Thai context, the 
military leader, the bureaucratic leader, the religious leader, the community leader, the 
Mafia leader and the political leader all have different types of interactions with their 
followers, however, they also have something in common. Leaders and followers are 
tied up with the 'patronage system' which is regarded as the key element of leadership 
in Thailand [Sinsawasdi, 1996 #103, 53-55]. The consequences of this have been 
discussed in other literature [Baker, 1996 #5, 1-264]. In my view, any further study of 
leadership in Thailand should focus on the complexity of political webs among leaders. 
Regime theory and the concept of leadership indicate that 'the end of leadership 
means the end of regime'. This is the crucial reason why factions do everything they can 
to destroy the leadership of their political enemy. Conspiracies have been widely used to 
get rid of every leader in the Thai political theatre, with the exception of King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej whose leadership is the most powerful and stable in Thailand. King 
Bhumibol has become a political icon with the highest respect in Thai society. 
In urban politics, pluralism, regime and leadership remain key political 
elements. This thesis has explained how they have influenced every development 
project in Thailand. The longer a regime and leadership lasts, the more stable a project 
is. What happened to Bangkok city planning and the development of the SBIA between 
1959 to 1999 are therefore good cases for studying the politics of different regimes and 
leadership. 
8.4 Future Prospects for Planning Practice under Political 
Direction 
The discussions in previous chapters lead to many remarkable conclusions. The 
development of poor planning practice in Thailand is strongly related to political 
interference. The administrative, legal and planning systems are not effective m 
enabling rational plan-making to take place and moreover, the systems are open to 
political intervention. City planning, airport planning and environmental planning have 
become political tools used by factions for individual interests. The formal planning 
process which should be based on public interests is under political pressure. There are 
loopholes everywhere. Technical knowledge in planning and the appl ication of good 
theories and concepts are ignored by the factions. Politicians do not have rationality and 
planners do not have sufficient power. Politicians are decision-makers and become 
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stakeholders in multi-million baht projects. Plans and budgets which have been prepared 
are rearranged shortly after each new government is formed. Political factions do not 
care about the consequences of changing policies or plans. 
Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to apply planning theories, 
the concept of social justice and the concept of integrating environmental impact 
assessment into the planning process because of the number of constraints and barriers. 
Future prospects for coordinating planning practice with political direction will require 
radical changes both in Thai society and in the approach to planning and politics. 
People expect that the 16th constitution adopted in 1997 will bring positive 
changes to Thai society. In my view, the new constitution does not guarantee anything. 
As the style of politics in Thailand remains pluralist in association with the patronage 
system, it may be too soon and too optimistic to expect major improvements in planning 
practice. Some people believe the leadership of King Bhumibol will be able to solve 
every crisis. However, he cannot intervene in every instance, especially in long-term 
endeavours such as city planning. 
Fundamentally, what the cases of Bangkok city planning and the SBIA project 
show is that development projects in Thailand occur under a system of strong and open 
political interference, which is understandable but unpredictable. 
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This evidence presented shows how much politics influenced Bangkok city 
planning and the development of the SBIA through the past four decades. Power struggles 
among the political factions in association with corruption have become a common 
phenomenon of Thai politics. Policy and development decisions are made in a framework 
of financial and political constraints and opportunities. Both Bangkok city planning and the 
SBIA Project progressed very slowly because of frequent changes of government and 
ministers. The factions used all means possible to make money from the two activities. That 
includes many attempts to cover up important facts about the new airport project. 
After studying all the available evidence carefully, this thesis concludes that the 
SBIA is not necessary. The existing airport could be expanded greatly if the government 
could move the headquarters of the Air Force out of Don Muang to nearby airbases. Studies 
on two other existing airports, U-Tapao and Kamphaeng Saen, have been conducted as 
alternatives for the SBIA. However, the government has consistently ignored this option 
despite the fact that it is costly to develop a new airport on swamp at the Nong Ngu Hao 
site and that the new airport is blocking the natural floodways and will affect flood 
protection on the east Bangkok. The reasons why the government decided to develop the 
new airport at Nong Ngu Hao are concerned with complex politics which date back to 
1960. 
Through the past four decades the governments and other authorities involved have 
repeated statements of the need for the new Bangkok airport, and argued that the Litchfield 
Plan recommended the separation of civil and commercial aviation out of Don Muang 
airport. After checking carefully, I found that the main report of the Litchfield Plan did not 
say anything about the separation of civil and commercial aviation out of Don Muang 
airport. Despite the most important section that recommended development of a deep 
seaport at Sriracha which has become Laem Chabang project in the 1980s, no mention of 
the new Bangkok airport was found. It might be written somewhere in a letter or might 
have been discussed among some of the people involved but it is not part of the official 
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record. If it were, this idea could qot have been studied carefully because the consultants 
did not have time to work on this subject. 
In the same period, on the contrary, Transport Consultants, Inc. (1959), another 
American consultant company made a thorough study of the whole transport system in 
Thailand. The consortium's report A Comprehensive Evaluation of Thailand's Transport 
System Requirements to Ministry of Communication [June 1959) recommended an 
integrated military and civil air transport system. The consortium argued that Thailand was 
not ready at that time to engage on her own in the very costly, highly competitive field of 
international air transport. However, the Thai governments over the past four decades have 
never mentioned this recommendation. 
The main reason why the airport initiative was welcome immediately was the 
politics of Field Marshal Sarit, the dictator from 1958 to 1963. Nong Ngu Hao was selected 
for the SBIA because of Sarit's needs and individual interests. 
The new airport project has been a opportunity for money making since 1962. In the 
1950s and 1960s the United States Operations Mission to Thailand (USOM) intervened in 
the process of granting contracts for large construction projects in order to prevent Thai 
extracting bribes and rents. The best way for technocrats to insulate a project from corrupt 
practices was to engage USOM in every step of the process from the feasibility studies to 
finished product. The main reason why Sarit wanted the new airport was to make money in 
his own way so that the American government could not interfere. The Land Acquisition 
Act was issued in 1962 to make this possible. Any attempt to amend this Act requires a 
majority of the National Assembly. Every faction understands this troublesome procedure 
well. This is one reason explains why the airport project at Nong Ngu Hao has survived for 
three decades. Meanwhile, the Litchfield Plan was ignored and there was very little 
implementation. 
The Litchfield Plan in 1960 considered urban primacy as a basic problem of 
Bangkok, and recommended population control and development decentralisation to other 
cities as early measures for solving urban problems. These recommendations were repeated 
again in 1963 [Nims, 1963 #122], however, the government ignored this advice. 
Bangkok city planning and the SBIA Project again did not progress in the 1970s 
and 1980s because of power struggles among the political factions. Despite the adoption of 
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a new planning law, the Town and Country Planning Act 1975, and a new form of local 
government, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) s ince 1975, Bangkok city 
planning was not implemented legally until 1992. The delay of city planning caused a 
number of urban problems due to the lack of development control for decades. However, 
the Bangkok General Plan 1992 did not solve the problems of Bangkok because it relied on 
the old style of planning practice focusing on land use control only. The plan attempted to 
preserve the large area on the east of Bangkok as natural floodways. Large developments in 
this area were forbidden. However, the plan had no effect over the area where the new 
airport site, four kilometres wide and eight kilometres long, was blocking the floodways. 
Bangkok city planning and the new airport project remained interrelated in the 
1990s. Cabinet approved the development of the SBIA at Nong N gu Hao in May 1991. A 
master plan of the new airport was completed in 1994. It is clear that the master plan of the 
new airport was deficient, covered up a number of key facts, and some important issues of 
environmental imapcts were not included. The impacts of the aircraft noise and the 
permanent disappearance of the three main existing canals on the nearby communities were 
not considered. The master plan recommended large-scale commercial and property 
development around the airport where the city plan did not allow such developments. 
Density control in terms of floor area ratio was introduced in The Bangkok Plan 
1995 prepared by a MIT planning team. However, this plan was ignored due to political 
change in 1996. Bangkok city planning in the 1990s has become a matter local practice 
following the delegation of this responsibilty, while the airport planning remains a national 
practice. The progress of each reflects local and national politics respectively and the 
separation of responsibilities exacerbates the risk of inconsistences. 
A pattern of separate development in accordance with political influence does not 
only happen to the Bangkok city planning and the new airport project, but also other 
projects in Thailand. That includes a small irrigation project in a small village through a 
large industrial development programme in the south of Thailand. In some provinces where 
the local Mafia are powerful such as Chon Buri and Samut Prakan, political influences are 
evident and the national government seldom keeps an eye on them because the local Mafia 
run factions in the coalition government. 
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This thesis argues that the ~hole system of governance is a radical problem. The 
poor system is open to money politics in association with the patronage system in Thailand. 
As this radical problem remains, professional planning is ineffective. The implication of 
this for planning theory is that there is no point in relying on rational approaches to 
planning in such politically changed contents. We need theoretical perspectives which 
recognise and describe complex possibilities for interaction between politics and planning. 
The need for transparency and accountability has been discussed as crucial measure 
to wipe corruption out of the governance system in Thailand. Despite the Consitution of 
1997 with a number of more powerful measures, the factions continue to influence both 
local and national politics. Three dirty elections within six months in 1999 in Samut Prakan 
province, and a number of corruption allegations over development projects in Bangkok 
and in other municipalities throughout the country between 1998 and 1999 show that the 
old style of Thai politics remains unsolved and the political interferences continue. 
Hence I believe that the problems of planning practice can be solved if the 
authorities involved have open minds and a clear understanding what city planning is all 
about and what it can achieve. However the first and greatest task is to reduce the influence 
of personal interest in the governance system. The public and press have important roles 
here in demanding accountability for major development decisions and planning steps 
thorough EIA of plans and project proposals would assist to this accountability. 
City planning is a tiny part of the whole system of governance. The Thai 
government expresses very little concern about its importance and ignores its problems. 
This thesis does not expect any big change in the near future. Any attempt to improve the 
whole system of governance in Thailand takes time, and requires wisdom and a strong 
unity of good people who really understand which development directions the country 
should take, how fast it should be, and what Thai society should gain from it. 
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Appendix I Litchfield's problems: 1957 to 1960 
Litchfield, Whiting Bowne & Associate [ 1960] stated in their main report submitted 
to the Ministry of Interior in March 1960 that: 
Maps and aerial photography are one of the basic tools in the development of any 
planning programme. Planning maps must provide sufficient accuracy to plot 
engineering, social and economic data so that proposals and plans may be drafted for 
the future development of an area ... 
Based on the inventory of existing map materials, the 1: 10,000, 1957 map prepared 
by the Department of Metropolitan Police, Ministry of Interior, was selected as the 
most accurate and the best available. This map also met the requirement of covering 
all existing urbanised areas in the Bangkok-Thonburi Metropolitan Area. At the same 
time this map was adopted, an order was placed with the Royal Thai Survey 
Department, Ministry of Defence, for 1: 10,000 aerial coverage to check the accuracy 
of the map's details . When the aerial coverage and field inspection was carried out in 
connection with the Land Use Study, it was discovered that the map was 'faulty' ;rnd 
in several areas including the Metropolitan Area, was unable to be used for planning 
purposes. 
The review of existing aerial coverage had fortunately revealed that a controlled 
photo-mosaic had been prepared by the 291h U.S. Army Engineer Battalion, stationed 
in Tokyo, Japan from U.S. Navy aerial coverage taken in 1957. Utilizing the control 
in the photo-mosaic, the 1: I 0,000 aerial coverage mentioned above and field checks, 
a base map at 1: 10,000 covering the Metropolitan Area was prepared. This map has 
been used as the base map in plotting all engineering, social and economic data 
gathered by the project. 
The map was prepared in December 1958, however it does not have the accuracy 
required for a base map for the Bangkok-Thonburi Metropolitan Area. The map met 
certain requirements of the planning project but did not provide the topographic 
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information necessary to prepare storm drainage and sanitary sewer plans [Litchfield, 
1959 #81, 1-2]. 
Appendix 2.1 Reports and master plans prepared in the 1960s and 1970s 
During the 1960s and 1970s, many reports and master plans were prepared to try 
and solve Bangkok's problems. American consultants prepared the first master plan for the 
city in 1960, known as the Litchfield Plan. This pioneering effort was unofficially 
refashioned in 1969, unofficially transformed in 1970 and officially revised in 1971 
[Sternstein, 1982 #3, 117]. A study, Sewage, Drainage and Flood Protection System for 
Bangkok and Thon Buri, was submitted to the Bangkok Municipality by other American 
consultants in July 1967. In February 1970, Camp, Dresser & McKee submitt~d a master 
plan, Water Supply and Distribution in Bangkok to the Metropolitan Water Works 
Authority. In December 1971, another report, Bangkok Transportation Study, was prepared 
by a German consultant company and submitted to the Office of Metropolitan Traffic 
Planning. 
Appendix 2.2 Planning conflict 
The issue of administration is a good example and was pointed out by Sternstein in 
his research work, Planning the Developing Primate City, Bangkok 2000. The DTCP was 
established in 1961 following recommendations by American consultants in response to the 
number of uncoordinated and separate developments in the metropolitan area by a host of 
agencies with equal and frequently overlapping and conflicting mandates. 
The city planning sections in the Bangkok and Thon Buri municipalities were 
established in 1956. The Town and Country Planning Division in the Department of Public 
Works was established in 1953 and became the DTCP in 1961. The DTCP assumed 
responsibility for overall planning in the metropolitan area and in up-country centres as 
well. There was intense conflict between the DTCP and the city planning section of the 
Bangkok municipality when the Litchfield Plan was revised by the City Planning Division 
of the Bangkok Municipality in 1969 and by the DTCP in 197 1. The advisors who 
proposed the creation of the DTCP argued that 'There cannot be two offices promoting two 
separate plans for the same city [Sternstein, 1971 #18, 1-2]. The conflict remained for years 
but improved when the new Bangkok city plan was prepared in 1997. 
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Appendix 2.3 Mass transit dev~lopment in Bangkok 
From 1990 to 1992 two mass transit projects were developed in Bangkok by the 
BMA and the SRT. 
On 21 July 1992, Cabinet gave approval to the NESDB to hire Dr Tony M. Ridley 
as a consultant. His task was to modify the operational plans for the different mass transit 
projects in Bangkok. 
On 28 July 1992, Cabinet approved the establishment of the MRT A, a new state 
enterprise under the Office of Prime Minister. 
In 1993 the government approved a mass transit master plan which coordinated the 
three different mass transit systems in Bangkok. The BMA 'Sky Train Project' is shown as 
the green route and the MRTA Project is shown as the blue route. The third system is 
shown as the red route and was developed by the SRT but the developer became bankrupt 
in 1997 before the project could begin. A new attempt has been made to revise the SRT 
route by a German company which has expressed an interest and will submit a proposal to 
SRT by the end of 1999. 
Appendix 3 .1 Local revenue and tax collection in communities around 
Bangkok 
The Department of Local Administration (DOLA) reported that in 1997, nine of the 
10 top-ranking Tambon Administrations (the administration of local community) with the 
highest revenues in Thailand under provincial administrations, were in the nearby provinces 
of Bangkok. Their net revenues, excluding government subsidies in 1997, were 169 .17 
million baht for Bang Phi Yai in Samut Prakan, 125.58 million baht for Bang Kaeo in 
Samut Prakan, 113.80 million baht for Bang Chalong in Samut Prakan, 105.62 million baht 
for Kukot in Pathum Thani, 91.84 million baht for Bang Saothong in Samut Prakan, 71.30 
million baht for Bang Pia in Samut Prakan, 70.88 million baht for Racha Thewa in Samut 
Prakan, 54.82 million baht for Bang Muang in Samut Prakan and 52.31 million baht for Sai 
Ma in Nonthaburi. (Matichon Weekly, vol. 891 , 16 September 1997, p32). Additionally, 
DOLA has divided 6,397 Tambon Administrations in Thailand into five categories based 
on their annual revenues. There are 78 communities in the first category with revenues of 
20 million baht, 65 communities in the second category with revenues of 12-20 million 
baht, 168 communities in the third category with revenues of 6-12 million baht, 298 
communities in the fourth category with revenues of 3-6 million baht and 5,788 
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communities in the last category with revenues less than 3 million baht (Matichon Weekly, 
vol. 944, 22 September 1998). 
Appendix 3 .2 Income distribution survey of the richest and poorest provinces 
in 1991 and 1993 in Thailand 
Income Distribution per capita in the 10 poorest provinces 
1991 1993 Percentage 
Provinces Income per Capita Provinces Income per Capita of Change 
Si Sa Ket 11,574 Si Sa Ket 12,969 4.8 
2 Surin 12,155 Surin 14,051 7.8 
3 Yasothon 12,608 Buriram 14,343 6.9 
4 Roi Et 12,763 Nakhon Phanom 14,706 7.6 
5 Buriram 12,926 Sakon Nakhon 14,826 7.3 
6 Kalasin 13,040 Yasothon 14,921 7.2 
7 Ubon Ratchathani 13,22 l Mukdaharn 15,033 6.8 
8 Sakon Nakhon 13,254 Roi Et 15,150 6.7 
9 Mukdaharn 13,746 Kalas in 15,326 5.7 
IO Nakhon Phanom 13,822 Ubon Ratchathani 15,480 5.7 
Income Distribution per capita in the 10 richest provinces 
1991 1993 Percentage 
Provinces Income per Capita Province Income per Capita of Change 
Samut Prakan 169,431 Bangkok 218,622 14.5 
2 Bangkok 168,238 Samut Prakan 218,424 14.9 
3 Chonburi 136,971 Chonburi 155,961 6.9 
4 Pathum Thani 113,526 Pathum Thani 135,362 9.6 
5 Samut Sakhon 93,239 Samut Sakhon 121,758 15.3 
6 Phuket 92,562 Rayong 103,033 5.6 
7 Rayong 84,379 Phuket 92,975 5. 1 
8 Saraburi 71,355 Saraburi 77,366 4.2 
9 Ranong 65,381 Ranong 67,731 1.4 
10 Nonthaburi 44,057 Nonthaburi 56,584 14.2 
Notes: 1. Source: Matichon Weekly Magazine, vol. 862, 25 February I 997 
2 . Income per Capita per year in Thai currency, baht 
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Appendix 4.1 The Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
The definition of the 'Bangkok Metropolitan Region' (BMR) differs between scholars and 
authorities. In this chapter, it is more functional to use the definition of the BMR given by 
Sternstein gives in his last research work in 1995, Bangkok Metropolitan Region: Population 
Projection for Small Areas; Evidence of Population Change from the Censuses of 1960, 1970, 1980 
and 1990. It is generally accepted that his study on the population of Bangkok is the finest in terms 
of data collection and comprehensive analysis. 
Appendix 4.2 Urban population change, BMR 
Stemstein was asked to prepare data from the 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses in order 
to discover population trends in each of the six provinces comprising the Bangkok Merropolitan 
Region - the provinces of Krung Thep Maha Nakhon, Samut Prakan, Nonthaburi, Parhum Thani, 
Nakhon Fathom, Samut Sakhon- and for each of the districts making up the core metropol itan 
province. The fieldwork was carried out in late 1994 and the final report was completed in 1995. 
The following tables show some details of this study. 
PA THUM THAN! 
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I 
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NONG CHOK [ 
) 
NONTHABURI ·z 
:--... 
0... 
-~ 
I TALING 
\ ,---
'"----~\ !' 
\--\ r -
NONG KHA EM 
G0L" OF THAll.J\ND 
LAT KRA8ANG 'y' 
';~~~~'"CENGSAC 
1 PHRA NAKHON 
2 SAl,lPHANTHAWONG 
3 PQt,I PRAP SATIRU PHAI 
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District PoEulation in thousands 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
l Phra Nakhon 135.4 120.0 112.2 103.8 
2 Samphanthawong 84.4 67.3 70.2 39.8 
3 Porn Prab Sattru Phai 130.6 105.4 172.0 82.4 
4 Bang Rak 102.8 91.8 117.8 79.6 
5 Pathum Wan 159.7 133.4 208.6 150.2 
6 Klong San 96.8 126.7 129.4 124.5 
7 Thon Buri 13 l.2 200.6 240.6 272.3 
8 Bangkok Yai 40.5 74.5 93.0 96.2 
9 Bangkok Noi 105.7 187.2 343.0 328.9 
10 Dus it 384.0 619.3 1083.9 1149.7 
11 Yan Nawa 168.0 256.9 350.7 362.8 
12 Phra Khanong 170.8 382.5 482.3 701.9 
13 Bang Kapi 61.2 87.9 236.1 599.3 
14 Bang Khen 94.6 186.4 355.6 607.9 
15 Min Buri 29.5 36.7 51.4 103.4 
16 Lat Krabang 23.6 29.4 39.5 77.4 
17 Nong Chok 32.4 40.4 46.6 56.5 
18 Rat Burana 26.0 61.3 105.4 183.1 
19 Bang Khun Thian-Muang Samul Sakhon 94.6 186.4 355.6 607.9 
20 Phasi Charoen 58.7 110.4 171.0 256.4 
21 Nong Khaem 11.4 22.9 39.2 84.4 
22 Taling Chan 36.5 42.7 62.0 110.0 
23 Phra Pradaeng 48.8 87.2 143.2 18 l.6 
24 Muang Samut Prakan 84.9 137.1 227.6 376.4 
25 Bang Phli 53.0 57 .1 69.3 132.3 
26 Bang Bo 48.0 47.9 44.7 79.6 
27 Bang Kruai 31.6 39.l 43.3 66.2 
28 Bang Yai 24.2 26. l 27.8 35.0 
29 Sai Noi 20.0 23.4 24.7 29.4 
30 Bang Bua Thong 24.9 30.6 34.5 54. l 
31 Muang Nonthaburi 58.7 99.4 164.0 256.6 
32 Pak Kret 36.8 50.6 75.3 133.5 
33 Lat Lum Kaeo 20.4 23.5 27 .7 30. 1 
34 Muang Pathum Thani 38.4 46.1 59.2 80.0 
35 Sam Khok 25 .8 26.2 28.9 30.8 
36 Khlong Luang 26.6 37.3 66.8 86.4 
37 Nong Sua 20.4 25.3 31.0 33.4 
38 Thanyaburi 26.5 38.4 57.7 76.2 
39 Lam Luk Ka 3 l.7 37.l 48.4 75.6 
40 Bang Len-Karnphaeng Saen 139.4 152.7 179.4 214.7 
41 Muang Nakhon Pathom 116.7 :37.9 185.6 216.9 
42 Nakhon Chaisi 60.9 67 .3 79.9 94.6 
43 Sam Phran 53.4 61.4 81 . I 103.3 
44 Ban Phaeo 51.2 60.9 69.0 67.0 
45 Krathum Baen 32.7 40.9 56.9 98 .9 
46 Bang Pakong 49.2 50.7 56.9 70.0 
47 Ban Pho 35.2 34.7 44.8 43.2 
48 Muang Chachoengsao 80.8 89.6 106.5 125.7 
49 Bang Nam Prieo 48.0 53.3 58.4 68.7 
50 Bang Khla 56.5 60.3 73.4 88.5 
51 Phanom Sarakam 53.0 66.0 105 4 156. l 
Total 3576. 1 4848.2 7136.5 9283.2 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region: Population numbers by standard constituent districts 1960, 
1970, 1980, 1990 
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District Percentage 12012ulation ~owth 
1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 
1 Phra Nakhon -1 I .4 -7.3 -6.6 
2 Samphanthawong -20.3 4.3 -43.3 
3 Porn Prab Sattru Phai -19.3 63.2 -52.1 
4 Bang Rak -107 28.3 -32.4 
5 Pathum Wan -16.5 56.4 -28.0 
6 Klong San 30.9 2.1 -3.8 
7 Thon Buri 52.9 19.9 13.2 
8 Bangkok Yai 84.0 24.8 3.4 
9 Bangkok Noi 77.l 83.2 -4. I 
10 Dusit 61.3 75 .0 6.1 
11 Yan Nawa 52.9 36.5 3.4 
12 Phra Khanong 123.9 26.1 45 .5 
13 Bang Kapi 43.6 168.6 153.8 
14 Bang Khen 97.0 90.8 71.0 
15 Min Buri 24.4 40.0 101.2 
16 Lat Krabang 24.6 34.4 95 .9 
17 Nang Chok 24.7 15.3 21.2 
18 Rat Burana 135.8 71.9 73.7 
19 Bang Khun Thian-Muang Samut Sakhon 97.0 90.8 71.0 
20 Phasi Charoen 88. l 54.9 49.9 
21 Nong Khaem 100.9 72.5 115.3 
22 Taling Chan 17.0 45.2 77.4 
23 Phra Pradaeng 78.7 64.2 26.8 
24 Muang Samul Prakan 6 1.5 66.0 65.4 
25 Bang Phli 7.7 21.3 90.9 
26 Bang Bo -0.2 -6.7 78 .1 
27 Bang Kruai 23.7 10.7 52.9 
28 Bang Yai 7.8 6.5 25.9 
29 Sai Noi 17.0 5.6 19.0 
30 Bang Bua Thong 22.9 12.7 56.8 
J 1 Muang Nonthaburi 69.3 65.0 56.5 
32 Pak Kret 37.5 48.8 77.3 
33 Lat Lum Kaeo 15.2 17.9 8.7 
34 Muang Pathum Thani 20.0 28.4 35.J 
35 Sam Khok 1.6 10.3 6.6 
36 Khlong Luang 40.2 79.1 29.3 
37 Nong Sua 24.0 22.5 7.7 
38 Thanyaburi 44.9 50.3 32. l 
39 Lam Luk Ka 17.0 30.2 56.2 
40 Bang Len-Kamphaeng Saen 9.5 17.5 19.7 
41 Muang Nakhon Pathom 18.2 34.6 16.9 
42 Nakhon Chaisi 10.5 18.7 18.4 
43 Sam Phran 15.0 32. l 27.4 
44 Ban Phaeo 18.9 13.3 -2.9 
45 Krathum Baen 25. I 39.1 73.8 
46 Bang Pakong 3.0 12.2 23.0 
47 Ban Pho -1.4 29. 1 -3.6 
48 Muang Chachoengsao 10.9 18.9 18.0 
49 Bang Nam Prieo 11.0 9.6 17 6 
50 Bang Khla 6.7 21.7 20.6 
51 Phanom Sarakam 24.5 59.7 48.1 
Total 35.5 47.2 30. 1 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region: population growth by standard constituent districts l 960-
1970, 1970-1980, 1980-1990 
Note: !. Source: Larry Stcrnstein [Sternstein. 1995 #41, 25-27] 
2. Based on data from the censuses of 1960. 1970. 1980 and 1990 
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Appendix 5. I U .S economic ai_d to Thailand 
United States' economic aid to Thailand started after an agreement was signed between the 
Thai government and the US government in September 1950. In the early years, it mostly 
concentrated on small-scale projects in agriculture, health, education and communication 
developments. In 1954 the US assistance programme jumped nearly sixfold to US$ 46.1 million 
compared with an average level in the first four fiscal years of aid from 1951-1954. Transportation 
quickly became the largest sector of the programme, receiving nearly half of the funds between 
1954-1960. 
Appendix 5.2 Classification of airports in Thailand (1995) 
With paved runways over 3,047 metres 
With paved runways over 2,438 to 3,047 metres 
With paved runways over 1,524 to 2,437 metres 
With paved runways 914 to 1,523 metres 
With paved runways under 914 metres 
With unpaved runways 1,524 to 2,438 metres 
With unpaved runways 914 to 1,523 metres 
Sources; http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/Lh.hLml 
Total 
6 
9 
10 
23 
42 
14 
105 
Note: This does not include the upgrading of Pitsanuloke airport with a paved runway of 3,000 
metres and three new airports with paved runways of 2,400 metres, Roi Et, Burirum and Chumpom 
which will be completed by 2000. 
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Appendix 5 .3 Aircraft movem~nts at Bangkok International Airport [Don 
Muang] 
The following tables show aircraft movements at Don Muang airport, based o n primary 
data from the Aerothai; Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. 
199111992 Commercial 
International 
October 7,850 
November 8,038 
December 8,358 
January 8,354 
February 7,938 
March 8,408 
April 8,090 
May 8,206 
June 8, 112 
July 8,682 
August 8,350 
September 8,098 
Total 98,484 
Total all movements 
Table 1 Aircraft Movements in Fiscal year 1992 
199211993 Commercial 
International 
October 8,628 
November 8,368 
December 8,704 
January 8,708 
February 7,682 
March 8,536 
April 8,406 
May 8,562 
June 8,306 
July 8,774 
August 8,902 
September 8,564 
Total 102,140 
Domestic 
7,700 
7,906 
8,406 
8,848 
8,248 
8,580 
8.594 
8,496 
7,7 12 
8,808 
8,646 
7,852 
99,796 
209,905 
Domestic 
8,766 
8,780 
9,526 
10,132 
8,470 
9,490 
9,206 
8,744 
8,176 
8,61 4 
9,324 
8,378 
107,606 
Total a ll move ments 224.226 
Table 2 Aircraft Movement in Fiscal Year 1993 
Military 
730 
883 
871 
1,105 
1,037 
l, 198 
979 
1,009 
1,014 
957 
918 
951 
11 ,652 
Military 
837 
1,102 
1,098 
l ,209 
l, 171 
1,312 
1, 122 
1,666 
1,342 
1,21 l 
1, 181 
1.229 
14.480 
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1992/1993 Commercial Military 
International Domestic 
October 8,990 8,938 1,335 
November 8,704 8,592 1,264 
December 9,080 8,980 1,242 
January 9,072 9 ,320 1,482 
February 8,464 8,444 1,344 
March 9,184 9,166 1,240 
April 9,262 9,046 1,108 
May 9,140 8,460 1,486 
June 8,704 8,248 1, 183 
July 9,074 8,658 1321, 
August 9,196 9,012 1,075 
September 8,960 8,032 1,012 
Total 107,830 104,896 14.903 
Total all movements 227,629 
Table 3 Aircraft Movements in Fiscal Year 1994 
199411995 Commercial Military 
International Domestic 
October 9,422 8,692 936 
November 9,348 9,244 1,206 
December 9,662 10, 166 l, 150 
January 9,696 10,234 1,199 
February 8,832 9,230 1,000 
March 9,836 9,972 1,080 
April 9,730 I0, 120 1,056 
May 9,810 9 ,398 1,228 
June 9,244 8,524 1,066 
July 9,640 9,006 858 
August 9,706 9,756 986 
September 9 ,326 8,728 96l 
Total 114,252 113,070 12,726 
Total all movements 240,048 
Table 4 Aircraft Movements in Fiscal Year 1995 
3 I l 
199511996 Commercial 
International 
October 9,804 
November 9,442 
December 10,028 
January 9,894 
February 9,660 
March 10,024 
April 9,760 
May 9,990 
June 9,388 
July 9,748 
August 9,892 
September 9,536 
Total 117,166 
Total all movements 
Table 5 Aircraft Movements in Fiscal Year 1996 
Domestic 
10,188 
10,568 
11 ,338 
11,310 
10,694 
11, 118 
I l, 122 
10,570 
9,654 
10,210 
10,890 
10,036 
127,698 
258,430 
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Military 
925 
1,063 
l ,192 
1.229 
l, 123 
l, 154 
1,236 
1,444 
922 
1,107 
1,109 
1,062 
13.566 
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Appendix 7 .1 Area of new buiidings authorised in Bangkok by district from 
1990 to 1994 
Figures in thousand square metres 
District 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total 
I. Phra Nakhon 26.30 44.52 28.23 19.71 1 I .43 130.21 
2. Porn Prab 1.78 69.47 115.93 4.28 12.25 203.72 
3. Samphanthawong 98.56 17.64 1.19 6.02 16.05 139.47 
4. Pathum Wan 214.05 919.19 273.02 864.64 l ,210.21 3,481.13 
5. Bang Rak 646.89 680.65 789.02 328.86 216.82 2,662.26 
6. YanNawa 291.93 365.36 1,138.73 794.63 686.83 3,277.51 
7. Sathon 829.34 221.26 317.39 242.39 30.59 1,640.99 
8.Bang Kho Laem 56.90 316.89 275 .85 132.20 347.00 1,128.86 
9. Dusit 14.02 18.08 6.79 9.03 24.82 72.76 
10. Bang Sue 26.58 139.89 180.02 196.72 109.63 652.86 
11. Phaya Thai 251.04 380.48 313.08 248.62 273.41 1,466.64 
12.Ratchathewi 508.77 633.65 229.16 394.87 531.47 2,297.95 
13.Huai Khwang 1,381.82 1,291.66 1,343.11 1,262.28 419.45 5,698.34 
14. Din Daeng 89.43 126.12 117.39 105.34 106.47 544.76 
15. Phra Khanong 701.l l 1,151.1 l 540.24 846.25 503. 15 3,741.88 
16. Klong Toei 2,037.34 3,372.39 2,547.57 1,976.70 1,157.31 11,091.34 
17. Prawet 163.19 938.47 384.73 656.90 393.52 2,536.82 
18. Suan Luang 513.46 650.70 367.13 682.69 313.38 2,527.38 
19. Bang Khen 96.19 141.79 216.08 306.89 501.35 1,262.30 
20. Don Muang 292.42 257.47 211.52 1.903.49 2,021.28 4,686.19 
21. Chatuchak 338.73 1,325.94 1,656.90 1,700.33 487.50 5,509.42 
22. Bang Kapi 733.48 788.90 897.70 1,669.14 953.08 5,042.32 
23. Lat Phrao 48.47 186.90 168.44 435.25 225.59 1,064.67 
24. Bung Kum 182.31 217.28 250.13 487.60 452.13 1,589.46 
25. Nong Chok 26.30 3.97 392.32 12.40 58.46 493.46 
26. Min Buri 20.78 28.38 97.04 119.84 163.46 429.52 
27. Lat Krabang 17.73 58.90 51.74 51.79 296.34 476.18 
28. Thon Buri 106.45 116.64 43.86 72.24 65.52 404.73 
29. Klong San 215.89 226.70 356.15 218.72 187.45 1,204.93 
30. Bangkok Noi 32.49 1.62 267 .93 54.35 273.28 629.69 
31. Bang Phlat 131.48 459.67 737.87 206.24 625.30 2,160.58 
32. Bangkok Yai 23.98 69.48 10.37 46.88 47.19 197.92 
33. Phasi Charoen 13.47 210.57 378.55 414.69 666.12 1,683.43 
34. Bang Khun Thian 77 .88 186.3 1 178.75 307.58 175.21 925.75 
35. Chom Thong 87.82 35.22 108.20 92.95 192.23 516.44 
36. Taling Chan 44.50 80.77 58.69 60.27 174.20 418.46 
37. Rat Burana 146.95 223.60 1,202.46 416.98 513.43 2,503.44 
38. Nong Khaem 119.00 40.82 220.21 130.14 134.91 645.10 
Total 10,609.01 15,998.63 16.473.39 17,480.00 14,578 .01 75, 139.06 
Note: Source: Report on building permission in Bangkok 1994, City Planning Dept., BMA 
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Appendix 7 .2 Studies of flood protection for Bangkok 
Flood protection studies are as follows: 
(l) Bangkok Flood Control and Drainage Project (City Core) in 1984; 
(2) Master Plan for Flood protection and Drainage in Eastern Suburban Area Bangkok in 
1985; 
(3) Master Plan for Flood Protection and Drainage of Thonburi and Samut Prakan West in 
1986; 
(4) Flood Routing and Control Alternatives of Chao Phraya River of Bangkok in 1986; 
(5) Improvement of Canals Connecting Klong Ta wee Wattana and Klong Khun Ratpinidjai 
to Alleviate Flood Damage (West Bank of the Chao Phraya River) in 1985; 
(6) Integrated Flood Relief Plan of the West Bank or 'Chao Phraya 2 Project' in 1984; 
(7) Bangkok Flood Alleviation Study of Model Feasibility in 1985; 
(8) Bangkok Flood Control Management Project in 1985; and 
(9) Management Consulting Services for Flood Control of Bangkok and Vicinity in 1986. 
Appendix 7 .3 Bangkok flood protection and administrative duplication 
Cabinet established the National Committee on Flood protection for Bangkok and its 
vicinity on l 0 October 1983. The responsibilities of government departments and public agencies 
for flood protection in Bangkok are based on geography and administrative boundaries and cover 
three separate physical areas: (1) the Chao Phraya river, (2) the agricultural areas outside Bangkok 
and (3) urbannised areas in Bangkok and vicinity [Sodsathit, 1987 # 126, B 1.12]. 
The Royal Irrigation Department (RID) within the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, a state enterprise within the Office of the Prime 
Minister, are responsible for controlling water in the Chao Phraya river which includes the upstream 
dams. 
The RID is also responsible for the Chao Phraya river, the agricultural areas outside 
Bangkok and the vicinity of Bangkok. The Flood Relief Centre of the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration (BMA) is responsible for the vicinity of Bangkok. 
All District Offices, the Department of Drainage and Sewerage, the Department of Public 
Cleansing of the BMA are responsible for BMA urbanised areas. However, other BMA departments 
also have responsibility for flood protection, for example, the Department of Public Works and the 
Department of Traffic and Transportation. 
In practice, other departments and public agencies are responsible for their drainage 
systems and networks , for example, the Department of Highways within the Ministry of 
Transportation and the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand, a state enterprise 
within Ministry of Interior. 
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The National Committee on Flood Protection includes three sub-committees: the Sub-
Committee on Project Designation, the Sub-Committee on Supervisions and the Sub-Committee on 
Supporting Activities. The members of these sub committees are from the Bureau of Budget, the 
National Economic and Social Development Board, the Department of Technical and Economic 
Cooperation, the State Railway of Thailand, the Department of Highways, the Department of Public 
Works of the Ministry of Interior and the BMA [Sodsathit, 1987 #126, B 1.20]. 
Appendix 8.1 H.M. King Bhumipol Adulyadet's speech on 4 December 1997 
"Being a tiger is not important. What is important is to have enough to eat and to live; and 
to have an economy which provides enough to eat and live. Having enough to eat and to live means 
supporting oneself to have enough for oneself. 
I used to say that this efficiency does not mean that each household has to produce its own 
food, weave its own cloth. That is too much. But within a village or district, there must be a certain 
amount of self-sufficiency. Anything, which can be produced beyond local need can be sold. but 
maybe not sold too far away, to minimise transport costs. 
If we can change back to a self-sufficient economy, not completely, even not much as half, 
perhaps just a quarter, we can survive. 
But people who like the modem economy may not agree. It is like walking backwards into 
a klong. We have to live carefully and we have to go back to do things which are not complicated 
and which do not use e laborate, expensive equipment. We need to move backwards in order to 
move forwards. If we do not do like this. the solution to this crisis will be difficult. 
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Chronology of Bangkok Airport Development, 1911 to 1991 
1911 
1914 
1920 
1928 
1937 
1948-
1952 
1954 
1959 
1960 
1962 
1962 
1963-
1968 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970-
1973 
197 1 
January 
March 
23 June 
8 November 
9 April 
June 
August 
September 
January 
January 
June 
Thai aviation begins with first landing on the field of Sra Prathum, the 
first airfield in Bangkok now the Royal Bangkok Sports Club at 
Prathumwan. 
New airport built at Don Muang, 29 kilometres north of the Royal 
Palace. 
First commercial flight serves the route Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima. 
The Royal Dutch Airline,KLM is thefirst international carrier to land 
at Don Muang airport. 
The Royal Thai Air Force established and located at Don Muang 
airport. 
Improvement of Don Muang airport undertaken by the Air Force. 
Beginning of the United States' construction programme after the 
French collapse at Dien Bien Phu; seven airbases upgraded and 
constructed including Don Muang airport. 
A report titled 'A Comprehensive Evaluation of Thailand's 
Transportation System Requirements' recommends an integrated 
military and civilian air transport system. 
Litchfield Whitning Bowne & Associates provides first modern urban 
plan for Bangkok. Recommends the separation of civil and 
commercial aviation away fromDon Muang. A site 17 kilometres ease 
of Bangkok is proposed for a new airport. 
A committee is set up to progress the development of the new airport. 
The US Federal Aviation Administration proposes a site 
approximately 25 kilometres east of Bangkok named 'Nong Ngu 
Hao'. Thai government proclaims intention to purchase 19,000 rai 
(30.4 square kilometres) at Nong Ngu Hao for a new international 
airport. 
Land Acquisition Act for airport development at Nong Ngu Hao is 
approved. 
Nong Ngu Hao land acquisition with a budget of 129 million baht for 
an area of 19,241 rai . 
The US Federal Aviation Administration reconfirms the best site is 
Nong Ngu Hao. 
U-Tapao airbase finished at a cost of US$ 105.9 million and becomes 
base for B-52 for military operations in Indochina. Infrastructure and 
services developed to accommodate all types of aircraft. 
USOM refuses the Thai government proposal to survey and design the 
Second Bangkok International Airport at Nong Ngu Hao. 
The governments of France, Japan. Canada, Italy and Israel submit 
their proposals to design and develop the Second Bangkok 
International Airport. Cabinet approves the Canadian proposal. 
Development and extension of Don Muang airport for the first 
generation of wide-body aircraft 
The Thai aviation committee refuses the first proposal of Northrop 
Airport Development Corporation to develop the Second Bangkok 
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1971 September 
1971 11 October 
1971 17 November 
1972 March 
1972 10 May 
1973 1 February 
1973 14 October 
1974 15 January 
1976 6 October 
1978 20 February 
1978 2May 
1979 20 September 
1979 21 December 
1980-
1989 
1981 3 February 
1981 19 May 
1982 October 
1983 18 April 
1983 22 November 
1984 
1985 
1985 27 August 
1991 23 April 
1991 7 May 
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International Airport at Nong Ngu Hao. 
The budget for the Canadian proposal is cut and the government does 
not explain why. 
Northrop Airport Development Corporation proposes the development 
of Second Bangkok International Airport again but public opposes it. 
Thanom's coup early morning. The military government sets up a 
committee to study the Northrop's proposal. 
The committee refuses the Northrop's proposal. 
The military government approves the Northrop's proposal. 
The military government signs a contract with the Northrop. 
Collapse of military regime. 
Northrop Airport Development Corporation cancels the signed 
contract without any compensation. 
Return of military regime. 
Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS) submits a proposal to 
develop the Second Bangkok International Airport. 
Cabinet approves the 10-year development programme for Don 
Muang airport. 
Cabinet approves the improvement of U-Tapao airport, 175 km. 
Southeast of Bangkok for commercial and suspends the TAMS's 
proposal. 
Cabinet revises its approval and continues the study of the Second 
Bangkok International Airport. 
Development of Don Muang airport to accommodate 16 million 
passengers per annum. 
Cabinet approves a budget of 50 million baht to purchase anoth 51 rai 
at Nong Ngu Hao. 
Cabinet approves a budget of 60 million to prepare a master plan for 
the Second Bangkok International Airport. 
Netherlands Airport Consultants (NACO) wins bidding to prepare the 
master plan for the new Bangkok airport. 
Mr. Samak Sundraravej, Minister of Transportation, refuses to 
develop the new airport at Nong Ngu Hao and proposes a new site at 
Sai Noi in Nontaburi province for the Second Bangkok International 
Airport. 
Samak submits a proposal to expand Don Muang airport within the 
budget of 80-90 million baht. 
NACO submits 'The Second Bangkok 1ntemational Master Plan·. 
TAMS submits 'The Expansion Feasibility Study for the Bangkok 
International Airport'. 
Cabinet approves the development of a commercial airport at U-
Tapao. 
Cabinet approves the development of Don Muang airport increasing 
the capacity to 25 million passengers per annum. 
Cabinet approves the development of the Second Bangkok 
International Airport at Nong Ngu Hao. 
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